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As we pointed out last week, the alliance of political evangelical conservatives is beginning to fray. The current Republican field offers no obvious choice for evangelicals, and the strains within the movement are beginning to pull it in different directions. For evangelicals this means that unless they find a way to unite around a candidate in 2008, the evangelical movement will fade as a political force. Form the standpoint of the Republican Party, this situation raises separate but equally difficult questions. As the evangelicals battle amongst themselves over the movement’s relationship with the Republican Party and wrangle over climate change, Guantanimo detainees, the relative importance of poverty, and other issues on the periphery of the movement, Republicans are beginning to debate what type of relationship they wants to have with evangelicals generally and with the various evangelical factions specifically. Given the strategic impasse the party and evangelicals have reached, we think the GOP will conclude that its best interest is served by parting ways with the evangelicals. Whether this is the wisest long term decision is yet another story. Background on the Republicans and Evangelicals The Republican Party is currently a coalition comprised of voters with three primary interests: national security, conservative social values and small government. There is significant overlap between these: most social conservatives are hawkish on defense issues and support limited government. This overlap is what binds the party. The overlap, like the evangelicals, however, is beginning to fray, and unlike the broad evangelical Christian movement, nothing inherently binds the three core Republican camps together, which is to say, there is no reason that economic libertarians must be in the same political party as social conservatives. Evangelicals became strongly tied to the Republican Party in the 1980s, spurred primarily by a shared interest in limiting the power and influence of the federal government in the wake of the 1960s and the Warren Supreme Court. The Cold War added another level of ties, as Christian Conservatives acutely saw the threat to religion in the avowed atheism of the Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology. Of these two, the alliance between libertarians and evangelicals was the more strategically important: while the Democratic Party had a number of staunch anti-Communist hawks, it counted few small government libertarians among its ranks. Common cause between social conservatives and libertarians joined to the hawkish Republican Party (stronger on national defense issues than Democrats since Nixon’s presidency) formed the foundation of the Republican Party for more than two decades. Evangelicals emerged as an influential block in national Republican politics in the late 1980s. One key to their power has been their famous ability to get out the vote in elections, but their power is equally the result of their work behind the scenes as party volunteers and fund raisers. Perhaps most important is the strength of evangelicals in the primary season. Motivated by highly charged emotional issues, particularly abortion, evangelicals are more likely to vote in primaries and are far more likely to take part in caucuses. Evangelicals are also disproportionately represented among the party’s volunteers, positions that provide familiarity with the levers of power and with the individuals who make decisions within the party at the local, state and national level. In truth, if evangelicals were taken away form the Republican Party, the impact would be felt most strongly not in the direct number of votes lost but in the disorder that will come in the wake of their leaving. Disappointment with Success Having been a crucial ingredient of the Republican Party’s emergence as a majority party, evangelicals are frustrated by what they see as the lack of progress that Republicans have made toward evangelicals’ goals in the past six years. From the evangelical perspective, little has changed: Roe still stands, recognition of gay marriage is far closer to fruition now than six years ago, popular media is no less supportive of unChristian lifestyles and models than in 2000. Even the larger evangelical victories are partial victories: the ban on partial birth abortion is facing challenges and a Supreme Court decision, and the ban on the use of federal funds for stem cell research does not ban stem cell research at all, only the use of federal money. Frustration over a general lack oif progress is at the root of the evangelical splintering. As evangelicals fracture, the view of the rest of the Republican Party and its leadership is equally complicated. The party’s ties to evangelicals are coming to be seen by many in the party as a severe handicap in the battle to win support among moderate voters. In areas where liberal social values have taken root, the role of the “religious right” in the Republican Party is a severe liability. Mainstream voters in New England and the West Coast view evangelicals as intolerant and intrusive in private affairs, and this perception has been firmly transferred to the Republican Party in many places. The result has been a political nightmare for the GOP: for the first time in the modern political era, there are no Republican Senators from New England or the West Coast, where liberal social values predominate. This is where the fissures in the party become so volatile. While idealists within the evangelical movement simply shrug off criticism that they are killing the party, both realist and liberal evangelicals are trying to deal with this characterization: pragmatists by trying to reach a compromise within the Republican Party, liberals by fighting the stereotypes of evangelicals as intolerant and intrusive. Complicating matters for the Republican Party id the observation that Democrats are beginning to win back the support of the so-called Reagan Democrats – middle class whites who tended before 1980 to vote with labor candidates, but who were attracted to Reagan (and the Republican Party afterward) based on national defense issues. With the conduct of the war in Iraq contested, and with neither social conservatism nor economic libertarianism appealing to them, Reagan Democrats are returning to the Democratic Party. To survive as a powerful political party, the GOP must win the support of foreign policy hawks. The Democrats, in stunningly characteristic form, appear to be obliging by turning the war in Iraq into a litmus test for its presidential hopefuls. Even the most clearly pro-War Democratic candidate, Sen. Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.), has been forced by political winds to call for a mandatory pull-out date for soldiers from Iraq. As the antiwar faction of the party continues to increase its power, Democrats may be giving the GOP precisely what it needs to toe the line on the defection of the hawks. As the hawks come back to the nest, however, the small-government libertarian wing of the party has less reason to stay. Democrats are doing a good job of talking about responsible fiscal policy, and the Republican Party has convinced a large swath of fiscal conservatives that it cannot be trusted with power. Deficits began to soar once President Clinton left power, and though Bush’s taking the reigns coincided with a recession followed by a war, for fiscal conservatives, there is little holding them in the Republican Party, and the continued presence of the evangelicals – again, perceived by many of intrusive and anti-libertine -- provides more impetus to move. Unlike with the hawks, the Democratic Party has not yet offered fiscal conservatives a compelling reason to stay in the Republican ranks. As evangelicals have seen their power in the party recede and particularly as they foresee their power potentially disappearing with their inability to agree on a candidate for 2008, evangelicals have tried to strengthen the ties between themselves and the hawks. The strategy appears to be an attempt to salvage at least two-thirds of the old Republican coalition while also focusing the party’s attention on foreign affairs. Security and conservative social values are still attractive to many Reagan Democrats, despite the conduct of the war and fears of the intrusive designs of the evangelicals. The effort to pull together evangelicals and hawks seems unlikely to succeed, however, as the nomination of either of the strongest foreign policy candidates – Sen. John McCain (Ariz.) and Rudolf Giuliani -- would only exacerbate the fractures in the evangelical movement. Divorce The safest course of action for the Republican Party is a public, but not messy, divorce. If evangelicals brought only their positive attributes -- motivation and organization -- to the party, there would be no doubt as to the Republican Party’s long term direction. The catch, of course, is that the evangelical approach to politics is, well, evangelical. From the GOP’s perspective, too many have come to see evangelicals as an intrusive group, desirous of using government to actively change how people live. Through their opposition to abortion, they are seen by many, particularly liberal women, as opponents of equality. Through their opposition to gay marriage, they are seen by many as anti-gay. People fear evangelicals not because they oppose various actions and behaviors but because they are seen desirous of using the force of law to change people’s behavior. This conflict has moved to the center of the once strong libertarian-social conservative alliance in the Republican Party. Those who adhere to the position that government should leave people alone – both in the personal lives and their business dealings – see evangelicals as intrusive and inherently in opposition to libertarianism. The libertarians’ successes, seen in the general support for fiscal discipline, low taxes and light business regulation, are most obvious in the degree to which both parties generally adhere to their approach. Since Bill Clinton’s re-election in 1996, the Democratic Party has shifted to one that is socially liberal but that is also fiscally conservative and, compared to 1992, far less enamored with government’s regulatory powers. While Democrats have not yet shrugged off the tax-and-spend label, they are showing that it does not apply as it once did. The only major regulatory advances offered in the 109th Congress so far relate to climate change, and the most visible climate change bills have Republican co-sponsors. None of the major Democratic Presidential hopefuls is running on an anti-business platform, and almost all tout their pro-business credentials. This is not to say that Democrats are the more business friendly party, but the experience of the 2001 to 2007 has shown that Democrats versus Republicans presents a cross rough for libertarians facing a choice between fiscal responsibility and increased regulation. As long as the Democrats control the impulse to regulate business, libertarians are again in play in the political debate. That Democrats and Republicans differ only on the degree to which they support libertarian governing means that this traditional Republican constituency is likely to lose the most members to the Democrats. The vast majority of evangelicals, on the other hand, are not really in play for the Democrats yet. As a result, at least for the time being, the Republicans are likely to see surest bet is to firm up its libertarian flank both by appealing to these voters directly, but also by publicly breaking with evangelicals, the group that libertarians distrust and that alienate moderates in key constituencies. The bet that Republicans would be making is that while they may lose the infrastructure support, get-out-the-vote efforts and volunteer labor, the evangelicals at the end of the day will not vote for any of the current Democrats. The biggest fear – a third party – would seem remote, as evangelicals are too well led to embark on a Ralph Naderesque campaign that would only have the effect of election the less palatable major party candidate. If the break were public and clear, Republican candidates on the West Coast and Northeast would have a chance of electoral success.