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Rutgers Model Congress Committee: Historical Presidential Cabinet of 1859. Topic: Bleeding Kansas Position: President James Buchanan Delegate: Rohini Bhaumik East Brunswick High School The American civil war is often acknowledged to be one of the most interesting events in the nations’ history. Some historians find that the civil war occurred because of states rights, others find that it occurred because of slavery, all agree that the strife in Kansas was a huge aggravating factor to the furnace of the pre-civil war America. In a brief summary, the strife in the area was caused because of abolitionist and pro-slavery forces exploding into violence, inciting more mass debate on the issue of slavery during the 1850’s. President James Buchanan was sworn in just as the Kansas conflict became politically intensified. His oath into the oval office was one of gravity, a responsibility to preserve the Union. He was obliged to resolve a conflict that he did not make in order to keep the states united under the Constitution. By observing the history and political arena of the Kansas conflict, those in the future gain a deeper understanding of the strife that occurred there. In 1803, President Thomas Jefferson acquired the Louisiana Territory from the French, with hopes to expand democracy into the western frontier (Louisiana Purchase Treaty 1). No one was anticipating that eventually this expansion would incite debate that threatened to tear the Union apart. In 1820, the territories Maine and Missouri applied for statehood; Congress was faced with a huge power struggle. Senator Henry Clay helped form the Compromise of 1820, quelling the debate, for a period of time (Missouri Compromise 1). The Compromise established that, “the parallel of latitude of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes,” would create a boundary line, dividing free states to the north, and slave territory in the south (Joint Committee of… 1). For a long time, Congress was more than satisfied, and the nation maintained unity. However, heated questions are never quelled by compromises. In 1850, the United States had just acquired massive territories from its war with Mexico (Compromise of 1850 1). California was attempting to enter as a free state, destroying the delicate balance formed in the Compromise of 1820 (Compromise of 1850 1). On January 29, 1850, the “Great Compromiser” Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, Senator from Massachusetts, and John C. Calhoun, senator from South Carolina, debated the compromise. With the help of Stephen Douglas, a Democrat from Illinois, the group formed a series of bills that would make up the compromise that was pushed through Congress (Compromise of 1850 1). The territories of New Mexico, Nevada, Arizona, and Utah would be organized, and slavery would be addressed at a later time (Compromise of 1850 1). Washington D.C. would eliminate the slave trade, but maintain the institution itself (Compromise of 1850 1). Finally, California would be admitted as a free state. Slave-state politicians were pacified with the Fugitive Slave Act, the most controversial of these bills (Compromise of 1850 1). The Compromise again maintained unity, but the solution was temporary. With the introduction of the Kansas Nebraska Act, Congress faced a huge problem. Now the furnace of the pre-civil-war-congress burned with an intensity that had not yet been matched. The Union was uncomfortable, but stable after the Compromise of 1850. Congress did not expect that this was the peace before the storm. The storm was the Kansas-Nebraska Act. The land west of Missouri was now ripe for statehood (Kansas-Nebraska Act 1). But just as it always had, slavery became the landmark issue. How would Congress maintain the balance of slave and free states in the Senate? Would there be a balance between the two? Stephen A. Douglas emerged with the answer, in the form of an extremely controversial piece of legislation (Smock 181). The introduction of the Kansas-Nebraska Act was not problematic until Douglas proposed its main point, and how to deal with the slavery question (Kansas-Nebraska Act 1). First of all, the Nebraska Territory was to be divided into two states, Nebraska and Kansas (An Act to Organize the Territories of Nebraska and Kansas 1). The Act declared that the citizens of the new territories of Kansas and Nebraska were to decide the status of slavery, despite being over the 36 30’ line (Smock 181). Dubbed “popular sovereignty,” this was far from a new idea. It became the rallying cry of those wishing to extend slavery north of the latitude already established (Smock 181). The Act provided that “every free white male inhabitant above the age of twenty-one years who shall be an actual resident of said Territory, and shall possess the qualifications hereinafter prescribed, shall be entitled to vote, “ on whether or not their territory would be slave or free (An Act to Organize the Territories of Nebraska and Kansas 1). It essentially repealed the Compromise of 1820, and the delicate balance between abolitionist and pro-slavery politicians. Douglas did not anticipate that popular sovereignty would be dangerous enough to do more than disturb Congress, let alone bring forth a low-intensity civil war. Nebraska, to the surprise of no one, quickly decided it was a free state, as it was the state farther north. Kansas, on the other hand, became the stage for “a territorial war between free-soil and proslavery elements,” (The Civil Rights Movement 82). When Americans remember “Bleeding Kansas” few know the details of the issue itself. In fact, until 1856, actual bloodshed remained at a minimum (The Civil Rights Movement 82). On May 30, 1854, President Pierce signed the Kansas-Nebraska Act into law (Smock 181), hoping that a railroad from Chicago to California through Nebraska would be created. No one anticipated violence, only profit for the railroad industry. Under the New England Society charter, the first settlers arrived on July 28th, 1854 (Bleeding Kansas 1). Other groups were interested in using popular sovereignty to their advantage by establishing Kansas as a free or slave territory, known as Border Ruffians (Robinson 133). Border Ruffians crossed into Kansas and affected the outcomes of several of these key elections by claiming to be settlers and intimidating valid voters. On November 21st, 1854, the Wakarusa War is fought between proslavery and abolitionist forces, mostly Border Ruffians (Bleeding Kansas 1). A force of approximately 1,500 proslavery men, mostly from Missouri, besieged roughly 500 defenders of the free-staters (McCool 1). There were no pitched battles, no organized raids or offensive military maneuvers, and only a single recorded death by hostile means. The Wakarusa War was more of a weeklong standoff. Calling it a “war,” was mostly propaganda of the media to dramatize the urgency of the Kansas conflict (McCool 1). In March of 1855, Kansas elected its first territorial legislature. Pro-slavery forces controlled the legislature, causing Free-staters to form and ratify their own constitution, the Topeka Constitution (Robinson 154). Pierce rejected the Topeka Constitution, saying that it did not constitute…“the body politic” (Kansas Becomes a State 1). Then, in May of 1856, the year of Buchanan’s election, Samuel Jones leads a band of border ruffians on a raid against Lawrence, Kansas (Bleeding Kansas 1). Three days later, John Brown and abolitionists retaliate in the form of the Pottawatomie Massacre, killing five proslavers along the Kansas Creek (Bleeding Kansas 1). In early July, President Pierce orders Edwin Vose Sumner to lead 200 infantrymen into Topeka Kansas to intimidate free staters into not holding a convention (Bleeding Kansas 1). Again more violence explodes as the Battle at Osawatomie commences; 12 free-staters under John Brown are attacked by 250 pro-slavery-ites (Bleeding Kansas 1). President Pierce leaves the mess into the hands of the president-elect, James Buchanan. Despite Pierce’s strongest efforts, anti-slavery-ites take control of the Kansas legislature in October of 1857. The Lecompton Constitution, a slavery faction constitution, is easily ratified, with many voters boycotting rather than choosing between two constitutions with slavery (Kansas becomes a State 1). A Free-stater convention in Leavenworth is adopted, but Buchanan does not support it, as is des not represent the people of the state (Nevins 151). The Lecompton Constitution is supported, but the House of Representatives drafts a version of it, with a few modifications, called The English Bill (Nevins 152). It is overwhelmingly defeated in Congress, despite that James Buchanan had signed it with approval. The 4th Constitutional Convention is eventually held in Wyandotte, Kansas. Here, the Wyandotte Constitution is drafted, and eventually ratified by the state, abolishing slavery. Kansas is finally admitted to the union, mainly due to the reduced number of Southern senators in Congress. The Kansas-Nebraska Act not only signaled huge change in Kansas, but it also meant the death of the Whig party. Now, there were two major parties, the Democrats, and the emerging Republican Party. The Democrats were the faction that was interested in maintaining the “peculiar institution” of slavery. Most Democrats strongly held the proslavery belief that the Constitution protected the institution. Obviously, most of them advocated the pro-slavery Lecompton Constitution and Governor Walker, the pro-slavery Pierce-appointed Governor of Kansas (Nevins 154). The biggest player in the Kansas conflict of the Democrats was Stephen Arnold Douglas. A Democrat senator elected from Illinois. Douglas introduced the controversial “Kansas-Nebraska Act.” His interests lay in the proposed railroad running through Chicago all the way to California (Smock 181). For evident reasons, Illinois would gain massively from the Act, and Douglas continued his stance for popular sovereignty. He, like most calm-minded politicians, did not believe Kansas would be a slave state, as its’ geography did not support cotton. Douglas and most democrats considered slavery in an extremely economic manner. He did not anticipate that the Democrats would flare into a power-struggle, desperate to control another state (Biography 1). The Democrats were vehement in their struggle in Kansas. It was imperative to maintain a Democrat majority in the area. Since Nebraska was obviously was free, it was vital to make Kansas a Democrat area in order for the senate to maintain its equality. Most defined the Democrats with pro-slavery, and thus a big part of the strife was because of slavery. It is evident through their actions that the Democrats could not sacrifice Kansas. War Democrats began to rise, as more and more democrats seemed to find war as the only answer to the slavery question (Smith 99). In the election of 1856, the Democrats were unwilling to nominate Pierce again, as his administration was highly unpopular. Pierce was too closely recognized with “Bleeding Kansas”(Smith 86). Stephen Douglas, too, could not be nominated, as he was associated with the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which caused a great rift between Democrats (Smock 182). They agreed on James Buchanan instead, more because of his anonymity than anything else (Nevis 4). The Democrats won the election, but were not nearly as strong in the Congress. Although the Democrats won this very difficult election, they became identified as an extremely Southern party. With each passing election, sectionalism grew in strength, and the Union seemed in dire peril. In most current and historical American elections, the race is usually against two contending parties. The election of 1856, however, is the only election where a third party holds an acknowledgeable number of electorate votes. The Know-Nothing Party gained great prominence. Millard Fillmore was the Know Nothing nominee. The Know-Nothings were a nativißst American political faction. It gained sentiment because of the anger towards the growing Irish Catholic society in the United States. The movement attracted former Whigs, prohibitionists and many disillusioned Democrats. It is one of the only third parties that have been very successful in American history In addition to the Know-Nothing party, another major change occurred in party politics during this election. The Whig party was now defunct. Torn apart by the slavery question, the Whigs were completely eliminated in this election. The downfall of the Whig party began when the Compromise of 1850 was proposed. The Whigs could not agree on whether or not the party would be an abolitionist entity. The Kansas-Nebraska Act was the first recorded vote where Southern Whigs voted with their Southern Democrats, as did their northern counterparts (The Civil Rights Movement 82). The death of the Whig part is a major player in this election, as many Whigs became Democrats. The Republicans were the other major dominating party in the Bleeding Kansas conflict. The abolitionist movement wasn’t strongly identified with any party the way that the Democrats had with pro-slavery-ites. The Whigs were not completely abolitionist, and eventually dissolved because of that reason. The Republicans were those who represented abolitionist constituents now (Nevins 182). The Republican party did not play as big a role in the Bleeding Kansas issue, mainly due to the fact that they simply were not as popular as the Democrats or the Whigs once were (Robinson 87). The party was against making Kansas a slave state because it was an abolitionist party in general. However, more than promoting abolition, the Republican Party was interested in capitalizing on the blunders of the Democrat party, because the Republicans were not quite as popular as it other contending parties normally have been (Robinson 88). The media was a tool for the Republicans, who were willing to make the mistakes of the democrats echo in the pages of their news portals (Robinson 87). Because of the violence during Pierce’s administration, the Republicans had a highly successful election. They nominated John Fremont for president, and even after the unsuccessful presidential run, the party won a majority in the Congress of 1856 (Nevins 155). They would not make James Buchanan’s presidency an easy one. Many of these Republicans were also highly sympathetic to John Brown and his militant followers (Robinson 88). The media in the north portrayed the group very sympathetically. This, however, was not an accurate portrayal of the group. John Brown and his followers were much more like terrorist and thugs (Bleeding Kansas 1). Many accounts in 2008 even contest his sanity. However, the news sources in the North were extremely biased toward the abolitionist cause, which Brown and his followers were faithful to. Thus, many believed that Brown was a hero (McCool1). Southern news sources were slightly more accurate in depicting Brown, but they were extremely biased as well. It also did not bode well for the pro-slavery cause that a force of 200 retaliated upon a group of 12 Brown-ites (Bleeding Kansas 1). With the media circulating pro-abolitionist propaganda, and Democrats blundering through the strife in Kansas, the Republicans grew exponentially in a very short amount of time. President James Buchanan is considered to be a forgotten president. Many blamed him, saying, “Buchanan might have prevented the key event that triggered the Southern secession,” (Smith X). But the circumstances under which he was elected were highly tense. Buchanan was the president of an “America that elected him in November 1856 was already painfully divided,” (Smith 1). Historians have called him weak and indecisive, when in fact he is not (Smith 11). Buchanan’s aim was to maintain his parties’ policies, and to maintain the nation’s unity. This required calm-headed-ness, and diplomatic skills, which too often remain forgotten and unacknowledged. Buchanan often felt that the North was at fault of the Kansas conflict. Senator Alexander Stephens of Georgia spoke with great confidence that, “ My word for it you need have no apprehensions for the Wilmot Proviso hereafter if Buchanan be elected…I do verily believe if in the approaching contest we shall succeed, there will never be another sectional or slavery struggle in the United States, at least in our day,” (Smith 17). Indeed, Stephens spoke these words correctly, because Buchanan managed to keep the furnace that was Congress before the Civil War. He did not, however, live without his blunders. To begin with, instead of avoiding the heated decision of Dred Scott v. Sanford like a better politician would have, Buchanan asserted that the slavery issue should have been set out to the courts, that it was a judicial issue (Nevins 59). He said that “<it> is happily a matter of but little practical importance, and besides it is a judicial question, which legitimately belongs to the Supreme Court of the U.S. before whom it is now pending, and will, it is understood” (Nevins 59). Buchanan’s biggest mistake, though, was making Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois his enemy (Smith 19). Douglas was extremely influential and vital to the Democrats. He was more successful than Buchanan in many ways. On a personal level, Buchanan had been unsuccessful in getting the approval of a young woman who soon wedded Douglas. On a professional level, Douglas attained positions in Congress at a very young age that Buchanan was never able to attain. Douglas was also Buchanan’s only opposition in the presidential race. Buchanan held Douglas responsible for reopening the issue of slavery with the Kansas-Nebraska Act. By the time he became president, Douglas was not popular with the administration. On top of all of this, Buchanan chooses to favor Jesse Bright, a big enemy of Douglas. Bright was highly influential on Buchanan’s policy, and was responsible of constantly ruining Douglas’s image in the eyes of Buchanan (Smith 20). Now that the slavery question was on the table because of Douglas’s selfish interests, Buchanan felt the same way as the senator from Illinois did. Buchanan believed that Kansas would be a free state. However, as a Democrat president, it was essential that Buchanan’s Southern friends felt as though they had been fairly treated (Smith 33). He wanted a Democratic majority in Kansas even if there was no hope of a slave state. To achieve the aforementioned goals he wanted, Buchanan appointed Robert J. Walker as acting governor of Kansas (Smith 33). Walkers’ plan was in conjunction with Buchanan’s; a free Kansas with a Democratic state (Smith 153). However, by the time Buchanan was inaugurated, much of the violence in the Kansas conflict had already occurred, many of the Border Ruffians had been established, and most knew what sides of the conflict they were on. So when Walker arrived to Kansas to encourage the scheduled referendum, individuals already knew how they were going to vote. Fredrick P. Stanton, the acting governor of the Topeka government that was not federally recognized, encouraged free-staters to vote in the June election. Free-staters refused to do so unless the certain conditions were followed (Nevins 149). In each township or district two people, one from the abolitionists and one from the slavery party should act together in correcting the Kansas registry, as many who did not really live there were voting. Also, in each precinct, four election judges should act; two from the abolitionist cause two from the slavery cause, and at least three must sign the election certificate of every delegate to the convention (Nevins 149). Stanton said he had no authority to do so, and so the abolitionists boycotted the referendum (Nevins 150). Because the free-staters boycotted the election, the Lecompton Constitution was technically in effect. Buchanan decided to support it since the people elected the Constitution (Nevins 152).. Eventually, he was forced to concede to the English Bill (Bleeding Kansas 1), but not even that was enough. Kansas eventually did become a Democratic free state. Historians now do not agree on new approaches to the conflict, as Buchanan’s presidential powers were much more limited. While many may not have acknowledged his success, Buchanan was able to achieve his goals in Kansas, maintain national unity, and avoid war. Buchanan may be remembered best in the pages of history, but he a master at avoiding war. He managed to salvage a success in the Kansas conflict, with only 55 dead, and all of his goals having been attained. He considered his inaugural oath the most solemn promise he had ever made. His dedication to his country is reflected in his words, “disunion is a word which ought not to be breathed amongst us even in a whisper. Our Children ought to be taught that it is a sacrilege to pronounce it…there is nothing stable but Heaven and the Constitution.” (Smith 17). Works Consulted “An Act to Organize the Territories of Nebraska and Kansas.” 1854. Records of the United States Government; National Archives. 1854. <http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=28&page=transcript> 22 March 2008. “Biography,” Harper’s Weekly. 2005. Online. Internet.<http://elections.harpweek.com/1860/bio1860-Full.asp?UniqueID=6&Year=1860> 22 March 2008. “Biography of Franklin Pierce.” The White House. September 2001. 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