Download POWER, MORALITY AND THE SOCIAL LEARNING PROCESSES

Author: Anttonen, Saila Maarit
Title: Socio-historical learning after Auschwitz?
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is the argumentation about socio-historical learning, power and
morality. The philosophical part of the research is an argumentation between critical theory,
Habermas’ communicative theory and the Foucauldian power discourse. The historical researches
were done by studying the re-education project of the Germans in the archives of the Frankfurt
School. The main problems of this paper are: 1) On what basis can modernisation be
conceptualised as socio-historical learning, democratisation and equalisation? 2) How have sociohistorical learning, democratisation and equalisation materialised in the light of the National
Socialist politics of truth and the subsequent re-education programmes aiming at democratisation?
3) What was learnt in Auschwitz and from Auschwitz?
The National Socialism and its barbarous incarnation, Auschwitz, taught, or it should have taught,
that this kind of exercising power was morally condemnable. In addition to manipulation, there was
also activity that can be more justifiably referred to as education on the basis of the fact that it
fostered human growth and “die Bildung” (the formation of culture and civilisation according to the
human rights) unlike the National Socialist propaganda and manipulation did. An effort was made
to root out the social and historical learning processes conforming to the National Socialist ideology
as carefully as possible after the collapse of the National Socialist system – this effort was the reeducation of the Germans, which was carried out by the Allied, the Jewish organisations and the
critical intellectuals of the Frankfurt School.
Document type and origin: Conference paper will be presented in EERA-conference.
Network 13: Philosophy of Education. Hamburg 18th September 2003.
Suggested key terms: socio-historical learning, power, morality, Auschwitz, democratisation,
educational and social philosophy, re-education of Germans
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Socio-historical learning after Auschwitz?
Ph.D., docent, lecturer Saila Anttonen
University of Lapland
Finland
1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to construct a multidimensional discussion about socio-historical
learning, in which power and morality are seen as two basic dimensions. The German critical theory
and French post modern philosophy provided the main social philosophical traditions for my study.
I will further construct a theory of learning which is fixed both historically and socially. The
examination is targeted at modernisation as socio-historical learning. The philosophical
argumentation and the elaboration of the dialectical cultural theory is carried out in the concepts of
critical theory that come mostly from the social philosophies of Theodor W. Adorno, Max
Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse. The theory of socio-historical learning is based on the philosophy
of Jürgen Habermas, Klaus Eder and Axel Honneth.
The dialectics of power and morality provided main tension of my research (see also Anttonen
1998). The philosophical part of the study was carried out as an argumentation between the critical
theory, the Habermasian theory of communicative action and the Foucauldian power discourse
(Anttonen 1998, 21-196). The historical studies were mainly carried out by studying the archives of
the Frankfurt School (Anttonen 1998, 232-292). The historical materials of the archives of Theodor
W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse are significant in the cultural-historical sense
from the viewpoint of researching the National Socialist and the post-war era (1930-1960).
The main problems of this paper are: 1) On what basis can modernisation be conceptualised as
socio-historical learning, democratisation and equalisation? 2) How have socio-historical learning,
democratisation and equalisation materialised in the light of the National Socialist politics of truth
and the subsequent re-education programmes aiming at democratisation? 3) What was learnt in
Auschwitz and from Auschwitz?
2. Socio-historical learning
I will first clarify the concept of the socio-historical processes of learning developed by
Jürgen Habermas (1981a, 1981b, 1995) and Klaus Eder (1991). The development of modern
societies has been examined as socio-historical and collective learning processes from this
perspective. The criteria for learning processes which are worth pursuing include equal forms
of communication and argumentative moral judgements. These factors also function as the
indicators of whether the practices and decision-making of communities are democratic or
not. (see also Anttonen 1997, 62-65).
Eder (1991, 9-13) argues that the process of the egalitarian-discursive formation of the
communities by the autonomous subjects with a post-conventional view of the world is the
first precondition for normative processes of learning in the political system. The autonomous
subject with a post-conventional view of the world means that the human being experiences
herself/himself as a thinking and responsible being in the sense that she/he takes
responsibility for the organisation of the world which is not any longer given, objective and
supernaturally justified. Also, political participation and the formation of communities
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suppose the formation of associations in which subjects like these can act on the basis of
egalitarian and discursive principles without any kind of domination or oppression. The most
important preconditions of the collective processes of learning are the collective effects of
individual acts which are based on intersubjective experiences. These principles of
egalitarian-discursive decision-making (die Willensbildung) also function as the
preconditions of moral learning which contributes to the equality of different groups and
cultures. The processes of moral learning are connected with the postulate of democratisation
in politics, education and working life. This postulate means that everyone should participate
equally in decision-making concerning one's own field of action.
In addition to the learning processes like these at the micro level, it is also important to
examine the learning processes of the systems at the macro level. The socio-historical
processes of learning are mostly constructed on the perspective of the capacity of systems to
adapt themselves to the changing conditions and environments. According to these
examinations, the most important aspirations for learning have come from the efforts of the
systems to survive. According to Eder (1991, 21-24, 494), socio-cultural evolution is,
however, a process of learning which is much more than just blind variation, or changes in
the structures of the systems which have been caused by the new conditions. The central
problems of socio-historical learning are more complicated: On the one hand, what are really
the problems that force a system to adaptation? On the other hand, what are the conditions
which force the continuously changing and complicating surroundings to gradual adaptation?
The systems, such as the economic system, the political system or the educational system, are
also not only reacting to the imperatives that are coming from the outside. Their own criteria
of relevance and the collective learning processes at the intersubjective level with the post
conventional view of the world and the democratic-egalitarian decision-making (die
Willensbildung) also have an influence on the learning processes of the systems.
The conception of the socio-historical processes of learning is problematic in spite of the fact
that it is better justified than the conception of history as progress, or the abandonment of the
optimistic and utopian conceptions of history such as these, once and for all. The biggest
problem is, however, how these processes of learning can be carried out and have been
carried out. Furthermore, the historical experiences of the real-discursive processes of
learning indicate that this development will not necessarily lead to good life for people. It also
is problematic whether there is historical evidence, which makes this conception plausible.
What kind of learning processes can actually be pointed out in the history of Western
societies-in the processes of modernisation?
3. Power
One of the goals of the research was to examine the dialectics of power and morality in sociohistorical learning processes. These learning processes were moved and they were directed by
the power system of society. The results of the learning processes were, however, generated
by the dialectics of power and counter power in both cases - in the case of the National
Socialist politics of truth and in the case of the democratising re-education. The possibilities
for counter power to emerge, in particular, explains to what extent the intended and
unintended results arose. The National Socialist politics of truth and the pedagogical ideology
which was to convey it produced the intended results – the manipulation of the National
Socialist subjects in quite the optimum way. But, for instance, the protests by students in the
academic world of the 1960s evidence, however, that the re-education in accordance with the
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democratic-emancipatory politics of truth succeeded in producing the intended results by
educating critical subjects, too.
The effects of this politics of truth were not, however, as total by nature as those of the
National Socialist politics of truth, as it gave possibilities for many different and pluralistic
kinds of subjects to develop under a democratic ideology. The most significant difference in
the formation of the subjects who grew in the sphere of these politics of truth was in the
amount of power that people had to themselves. The degree of autonomy among the subjects
or "the social maturity" varied in the sphere of influence of these two politics of truth in such
a way that the democratising politics of truth allowed greater autonomy than the National
Socialist politics of truth that was strongly based also on the personal submission to the
discipline. The degree of autonomy also varied depending on the positions. The positions of
people changed essentially as the politics of truth changed. Autonomy increased in the case of
some people, and decreased in the case of the others, especially the former National
Socialists. (Anttonen 1998, 335-359; Adorno 1996; Max Horkheimer -Archive V 16.173-184;
Max Horkheimer -Archive IX 248.2, 13-15, 17-18, 28-29, 31; Hitler 1941b, 52; Lingelbach
1970, 52-96.)
Both politics of truth were thoroughly permeated by power. Meanwhile, there were
significant differences in the degree of suppression and the negative effects of power. The
most important difference was in the possibilities of thinking and acting freely. The
differences could be noticed in the possibilities to express criticism and in the emergence of
communication. The basic nature of the National Socialist politics of truth was suppressive,
and it repressed dissident opinion and action. It was not admissible to criticise the system.
There were no possibilities for free critical communication. Meanwhile, the democratising
politics of truth opened up these possibilities, on the basis of which its power influences can
be defined as emancipatory and productive. Thereby, the way in which power and power
relations were structured also changed from the authoritarian and hierarchical relations of
authority to a networked power system in which the emergence of international
communication relations had an important role. (Anttonen 1998, 208, 262-263, 290-291;
Bungenstab 1970, 145-162; Hitler 1941b, 49, 53-54; Honneth 1985; Max Horkheimer Archive IX 172.27, 2-3.)
The power analysis that was carried out made visible not only these power influences on the
general social level but also the micro mechanisms of power – the local technologies, the
techniques and the tactics of power introduced by Michel Foucault (1976; 1977; 1980). These
disciplinarian microforms of power were seen especially clearly in the analysis of the
practices in Auschwitz, and also in the examination of manipulation given by the National
Socialist youth organisations. The Auschwitz analysis proved that the power influences of the
National Socialist system were most questionable from the moral point of view. It is true that
the restricted communicative rationality could actually be discerned even in the descriptions
concerning the concentration camps, but it still had no chance to direct socio-historical
learning processes under this power system. It is grounded to maintain contrafactually that
Auschwitz would not have been possible if social power had emerged as communicative
power, as it would have required the acknowledgement of the human worth of the Jews and
the other persecuted groups. (Anttonen 1998, 218-225, 295-309; Levi 1987; Habermas 1990.)
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4. Morality and the re-education of the German people
Although the socio-historical learning processes advancing from the National Socialist
politics of truth to the democratising re-education programmes were indisputably
democratising and egalitarian, the realisation of moral learning processes, in particular, left a
lot to be desired, as post-conventional morality was not achieved on any large scale and the
nature of the learning processes was not determined according to the principles of discourse
ethics. It is true, however, that it proceeded in that direction at least officially. Moral learning
remained, however, for the most part an unrealised learning potential, as both of the politics
of truth were based on egoistic interests according to which they realised the conventional
moral principles. Democratic re-education politics declared an emphasis on the universal
human rights. The goals of this politics and the education that was planned for its direction
contained the idea of collective learning and communicative rationality, but they could not
realise such learning processes in practice. The problem was above all the moral learning
processes, although some progress was indeed made in the realisation of democratic learning
processes. (Habermas 1990; Anttonen 1998, 307-309, 353-359; Anttonen 2002.)
The pedagogical practices of the democratising re-education programmes aimed at learning
processes that could realise the communicative rationality, as the goal was also to influence
the dissolution of the positions of dominance in the German society. The basic conflict
between pedagogy and social learning was seen in these attempts as well. Even though it
would have been possible for rational communication to exist in pedagogical interaction, it
was not necessarily possible for it to exist as political communication in these extremely
conflicting circumstances. And the realisation of rational political communication is the
prerequisite for the social learning processes to evolve in the direction of the communicative
rationality. (Habermas 1979; Habermas 1981a; Habermas 1981b; Habermas 1995;
Bungenstab 1970; Kellermann 1981; Lange-Quassowski 1981.)
In my researches, the most important problem was the question of what kind of social
learning processes emerged as the dominant ones from among the ambivalent tendencies and
potentialities in the German society in the researched era, ranging from the 1930's to the
1960's. A second problem was how the relations between pedagogy and social learning
processes were constructed. The relation between the pedagogical and socio-political became
dialectical in such a way that an aspect of domination manifested itself even in the democratic
re-education programmes, assuming a conflicting relation to the communicative rationality
that pedagogical activity strived for. This conflict had an influence on the main direction of
socio-historical learning. The situation was defined in this age of social transformation as a
field of counter forces. On the basis of the historical analysis, it is necessary to observe that
the effects of the manifestations (including education) of the communicative rationality were
smaller than those of general politics, the practices of which were still strongly characterised
by the instrumental rationality. (Anttonen 1998; Anttonen 2002; Max Horkheimer -Archive
IX 248.1-4.)
No unambiguous answer can be given to the question what the influence of pedagogy and
education was on the realisation of these democratic social learning processes, as it is not
possible on the basis of the analysis to distinguish the effects of pedagogy and education from
the effects of the other cultural processes. It can be said, however, that the influences of the
re-education programmes and of the humanitarian democratic mentality that emerged in the
sphere of their influence have not been minor in the German society.(Max Horkheimer -
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Archive. V 13.49; Max Horkheimer -Archive. V 13.50-52, 32-39.) The communicative
rationality did not, however, assume a central role even in these processes, although the moral
issues did receive more emphasis in public discussions. Power was still based strongly on the
positions of domination and the power struggles. The politics of the re-education programmes
was also characterised by the manipulative aspect that is typical of communication directed
by the strategic-instrumental rationality. The educational and pedagogical activities and the
scientific discourse on which these activities were based were, however, paving the way for
the learning processes into the direction of the communicative rationality. The mainstream of
social learning processes proceeded, however, above all in the economic and technological
learning processes just like it had been before. Serious attention was given, however, to the
importance of political and moral learning processes in this critical situation, which also
raised these processes to a position in which they could direct the socio-historical
development. (Anttonen 1998, 353-359; Max Horkheimer-Archive V 13.40 (40-41, 45-47),
1-5.)
The theory of the communicative action introduced by Jürgen Habermas (1981a; 1981b) was
supported by the historical analysis of my researches. The discourse without domination
remained, however, a utopia. Its realisation is not realistic or not necessarily even reasonable
to wait, because it would be likely to mean the end of communication (Habermas 1995, 152153). So, on what basis is it grounded to maintain that the communicative rationality is
reasonable, if its ideal form, the ideal speech situation, is not?
5. The dialectics of power and morality
I will examine what kind of learning potentialities these two politics of truth, the National
Socialist and the democratising re-education, opened up, and in what form the learning
processes which were developed in their sphere manifested themselves (and in what form
they did not). The re-education of the German people and the democratising politics of truth
opened up more learning potentialities than the National Socialist politics of truth did, with
the latter being based on an ideology that was defined as the only right one. The learning
processes complying with the National Socialist politics of truth were oriented, above all,
militaristically and nationalistically, although they also promoted the economic processes and
the employment. These politics of truth did not allow intellectual learning processes. The
moral learning processes were determined according to the nationalistic moral code, which
was a code that allowed "immorality" from the viewpoint of the universal human rights. It
was a standstill of moral learning processes and a barbarous regression in the light of the
Habermasian theory of discourse ethics and the discourse of morality in the critical theory.
The National Socialist politics of truth were lacking any democratic practices. The democratic
learning processes were restricted to the conservative view on the equality of opportunities.
An inconsistent idea of equality prevailed in the National Socialism. The conservative
educational equality was emphasised, among other things, although the system finally became
elitist. This fact results in the conclusion that the democratic political practises and the
egalitarian learning processes can proceed at a different pace.
Only little communicative rationality was to be found in these processes. The processes in its
direction did materialise in interaction between people just like previously in the sociocultural evolution. The National Socialist politics of truth shut up the learning processes in
the iron cage of the instrumental rationality. The power system produced, above all, morally
condemnable and condemned consequences – Auschwitz. The politics of truth and the
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National Socialist pedagogical ideology as its part were helping towards it. Power was,
however, partly productive even in this system, but above all it was heavily destructive.
Meanwhile, the power which materialised in the democratising politics of truth was, above
all, productive by nature. The democratising politics of truth made it possible for the learning
processes to be multilinear. The learning processes adhering to it were directed towards the
democratisation, but there would have been room for improvement in the terms of the
equality. The concept of educational equality acquired a more radical meaning, but its
emphasis on the equality of opportunities remained without aiming at levelling down the
initial differences. The issue of equality between sexes, for instance, was not mentioned at all
in the materials concerning the democratising re-education programmes. In the sphere of this
politics of truth there were, however, intellectual learning processes that made criticism
possible, and they are a prerequisite for the democratic social practices.
In addition to learning processes which aimed at the democratisation, an important role, in
this period of transition in the society and world politics, had, however, the economic
processes whose promotion was associated with the general human interests, the world peace
and the human rights. The moral learning processes were directed to the post-conventional
goals which were not, however, fully realised even in this socio-historical situation. The
practices of the new politics of truth also turned out to be manipulative and the aspect of
power emerged as a struggle for supremacy. It is true, however, that the goals targeted at the
communicative rationality were set officially as the aim of this politics of truth unlike in the
National Socialist politics of truth. The possibilities for them to come true were watered down
in practice by the struggles for supremacy and by the manipulation even in this politics of
truth. However, the prerequisites for the public discourses and the argumentation improved. It
is grounded to argue that the movement and the direction were towards the communicative
rationality. The re-education of the German people helped to promote it. (Horkheimer &
Adorno 1944; Habermas 1982; Habermas 1993; Max Horkheimer -Archive 248.2,1-42.)
The National Socialism taught or it should have taught something about the responsibility, the
morality and the problems of ethical education. The construction of a totalitarian power
system raises the moral question of who will assume the responsibility for the consequences
of the system which are, after all, realised in and through people's action. Is the moral
responsibility the problem of the leaders of each power system or the citizens, or both for
their own part? It is also necessary to consider what the possibilities are and within which
limits for an individual citizen to exert influence, as well as what the possibilities and the
limits of collective influence are. When we try to explain the influence of the National
Socialist ideology on the social learning processes, we are trying to find answers to the
questions how the construction of such a mentality was possible as a collective
consciousness, and how the politics of truth and the pedagogical ideology account for the
emergence of the National Socialism. The brutal use of a pedagogical ideology in the service
of the interests of power politics shows why ethical and moral education is necessary. The
analysis also makes it possible to suggest certain criteria for the content of ethical education.
Taking a stand on moral issues is, however, always somewhat daring, especially if the
normative attitudes turn into the expressions of opinion in the issues of guilt. This has,
however, been the case in the studies of the National Socialism, which is partly due to the fact
that the German society after the Second World War was built in this way on account of the
war crimes trials. The Germans were identified with the National Socialists without enough
justification, giving them a morally condemning definition, while the Jews have been defined
hereby as morally acceptable, but still as people who belong to a different caste, which has
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served to reproduce the old antithesis. In the formation of the moral views must, however,
take into account the losses that the German people suffered, as well as, the fact that not all
Germans were National Socialists. (Habermas 1993; Anttonen 1998.)
6. The dialectics of education and socio-historical learning
The relation between education and learning, especially socio-historical learning is, however,
always problematic. Pedagogy does not merely produce the intended learning results but it
also produces the unintended "by-products". The National Socialist education did not produce
the desired results in all respects but also produced some other results – and I willingly add:
fortunately. It was not successful in manipulating all German people into the supporters and
the implementers of an ideology that was functional for the totalitarian system. In addition to
manipulation, there was also activity that can be more justifiably defined as education on the
basis of the fact that it promoted the human growth unlike the National Socialist propaganda
and manipulation did. The manipulation pursuant to the totalitarian ideology did, however,
function efficiently as a rule. This kind of education tinged with manipulation also had its
own risks which was seen in the post-war situation as it became apparent that the National
Socialist ideology and manipulation had not resulted in very permanent learning results in the
minds of people. The social learning processes conforming to the National Socialist ideology
were tried to abolish as carefully as possible after the collapse of the National Socialist
system. (Max Horkheimer -Archive IX 178.)
There is a good reason to ask on which conditions the National Socialist pedagogical ideology
would not have had even the influences that it did have. First of all, this would have required
an opposition and the resistance against the system among the professional and the other
educators, which was suppressed quite successfully on a large scale in the National Socialist
system (Max Horkheimer -Archive II 2 326-329). There was no rebellion among the
recipients at the large scale, as it was suppressed in this violent system. Secondly, it would
have required that people did not identify themselves with the ideology in question and
especially with its incarnations, the "Führers". One of the most important factors threatening
successful education is that the one being educated does not identify herself/himself with the
educator (a person or a pedagogical idea). Both the educators and the educatees mostly
identified themselves with the "Führers" in the National Socialist system. It was characterised
by a leader cult and the worship of the highest Führer. The learning processes in the
totalitarian systems are also conflicting by nature, not totally parallel, although the ruling
powers in such societies have the goal of paralleling their direction. The micro processes in
the society also included processes which were against the prevailing system and ideology.
(Adorno & al. 1950; Aurin 1983; Tennorth 1985; Max Horkheimer -Archive IX 178.)
The pedagogical and educational system functioned as important mechanism to promote
learning at the individual and social level (Max Horkheimer-Archive V 16.191-248; Max
Horkheimer-Archive V 16.173-175). The goals were reached quite successfully, as education
was built in a totalitarian fashion and the ideology conveyed by it was also totalitarian by
nature, whereby the ideology had quite a total hold of the children's and adolescents' thinking
and life-world. In a system and in an ideology like this the human growth could not, however,
be realised if the criterion for the human growth is the orientation toward the universal
morality and the learning of democratic ways to exercise power and of the competencies
needed in these processes.
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Pedagogy and education are used to solve the conflicts in the learning processes that are
present in each society. The dialectical and critical concept of education can be defined as
follows. Pedagogy (and education as one of its implementers) is an attempt to solve the
unresolved conflicts in conflicting learning processes. Its success means the human growth
and the realisation of learning processes which are intended. The aspiration for and the
realisation of the human growth is the most important criterion which distinguishes the
concepts of education and manipulation. Pedagogy and education should thus be in the
service of the human growth, not of the exercise of power aiming at supremacy. The problem,
however, still is that education is always to a certain degree in the service of social power
irrespective of the form of the society. (Anttonen 1998, 355.)
Education has usually been formed according to the main stream of the prevailing sociohistorical learning processes, and simultaneously education forms the tendencies of the sociohistorical processes of learning with the other social fields of action.
7. Auschwitz as a spot of socio-historical learning processes
Several critical social philosophers, for example Horkheimer & Adorno (1944) and Lyotard (1985)
have suspected whether it is possible to speak about the Enlightenment and the progress after
Auschwitz. The aim of my article is to ask whether it is grounded to speak about the socio-historical
learning after Auschwitz and to answer: yes, it is grounded.
A young chemist from Turin, who experienced Auschwitz and survived in Auschwitz, Primo
Levi describes his experiences in his book If this is a man which was originally published in
1947. I use this work in my reconstruction of the view about it what was learnt in the every
day life practises in the concentration camp of Auschwitz, or which were the factors which
centrally defined the life world of the concentration camp. Levi (1987, 28) describes the first
learning experience in Auschwitz as following:
"Then the lorry stopped, and we saw the large door, and above it the sign, brightly
illuminated (its memory stills strikes me in my dreams): Arbeit macht frei, work gives
freedom.”
"A dozen SS men stood around, legs akimbo, with an indifferent air. At a certain
moment they moved among us, and in a subdued tone of voice, with faces of stone,
began to interrogate us rapidly, one by one, ... ... Someone dared to ask for his luggage:
they replied, ‘luggage afterwards’. Someone else did not want to leave his wife: they
said, ‘together again afterwards’. Many mothers did not want to be separated from their
children: they said ‘good, good, stay with child’. They behaved with the calm assurance
of people doing their normal duty of every day. But Renzo stayed an instant too long to
say good-bye to Francesca, his fiancée, and with a single blow they knocked him to the
ground. It was their everyday duty.” (Levi 1987, 25.)
There was learnt to give the orders and to obey in Auschwitz. There was learnt violence. Was
learnt the coldness, the inhumanity and the brutality.
"We also know that not even this tenuous principle of discrimination between fit and
unfit was always followed, and that later the simpler method was often adopted of
merely opening both the doors of the wagon without warning or instructions to the new
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arrivals. Those who by chance climbed down on one side of the convey entered the
camp; the others went to the gas chamber. This is the reason why three-year-old Emilia
died: the historical necessity of killing the children of Jews was self-demonstrative to
the Germans. ... was a curious, ambitious, cheerful, intelligent child; her parents had
succeeded in washing her during the journey in the packed car in a tub with tepid water
which the degenerate German engineer had allowed them to draw from the engine that
was dragging us all to death." (Levi 1987, 26.)
There was learnt to kill in Auschwitz. There was learnt to kill men, women and children in
Auschwitz. There was learnt to kill children in Auschwitz. There was learnt the horror, to fear
and to blunt the killing the closest people.
”... That precisely because the Lager was a great machine to reduce us to beasts, we
must not become beasts; that even in this place one can survive, to tell the story, to bear
witness; and that to survive we must force ourselves to save at least the skeleton, the
scaffolding, the form of civilization.” (Levi 1987, 47.)
"* This word ‘Muselmann’, I do not know why, was used by the old ones of the camp
to describe the weak, the inept, those doomed to selection. ... ... Even less worthwhile is
it to make friends with them, because they have no distinguished acquaintances in
camp, they do not gain any extra rations, they do not work in profitable Kommandos
and they know no secret method of organizing.” (Levi 1987, 95.)
”Their life is short, but their number is endless; they, the Muselmänner, the drowned,
from the backbone of the camp, an anonymous mass, continually renewed and always
identical, of non-men who march and labour in silence, the divine spark dead with
them, already too empty to really suffer. One hesitates to call them living: one hesitates
to call their death, in the face of which they have no fear, as they are too tired to
understand.” (Levi 1987, 96.)
"The personages in these pages are not men. Their humanity is buried, or they
themselves have buried it, under an offence received or inflicted on someone else. The
evil and insane SS men, the Kapos, the politicals, the criminals, the prominents, great
and small, down to the indifferent slave Häftlinge, all the grades of the mad hierarchy
created by the Germans paradoxically fraternized in a uniform internal desolation.”
(Levi 1987, 128).
”The Germans have succeeded in this. They are ten thousand and they are a single grey
machine; they are exactly determined; they do not think and they do not desire, they
walk.” (Levi 1987, 57.)
There was learnt to destroy the identity of human being in Auschwitz. Simultaneously, there
was learnt the ultimate means to save the identity and the subjectivity. Was learnt the ultimate
means to save the human dignity. Those who learnt this, could survive. Simultaneously, when
was learnt what is the worth of human being was learnt that the human being had no worth.
Was learnt what is the subjugation and the total exploitation of human dignity. Was learnt to
insult the human rights. Was learnt a crime against the humanity and the humanness.
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”Alberto is my best friend. He is only twenty-two, two years younger than me, but none
of us Italians have shown an equal capacity for adaptation. Alberto entered the Lager
with his head high, and lives in here unscathed and uncorrupted. He understood before
any of us that this life is war; he permitted himself no indulgences, he lost no time
complaining and commiserating with himself and with others, but entered the battle
from the beginning. He has the advantage of intelligence and intuition: he reasons
correctly, often he does not even reason but is equally right. ... He fights for his life but
still remains everybody’s friend. He ‘knows’ whom to corrupt, whom to avoid, whose
compassion to arouse, whom to resist.” (Levi 1987, 63.)
”But Lorenzo, was a man; his humanity was pure and uncontaminated, he was outside
this world of negation. Thanks to Lorenzo, I managed not to forget that I myself was a
man.” (Levi 1987, 128.)
There were learnt the laws of nature in Auschwitz. The most important was the fight for
surviving and the learning of the means to realise this aim. But, there were, also, learnt
solidarity and love in Auschwitz. There were learnt sociality and communality. There was
learnt to create so warm and strong relationships to the other people that they only are
possible in such inhuman conditions. Those who learnt this they could survive. There were
learnt very many things in Auschwitz, but the most important point is that some people learnt
this and the others that. What was learnt depended on it what kind of position each person
had in this brutal field of subjugation.
The learning processes of Auschwitz are connected with the processes of modern society and
science, in general. The learning processes of Auschwitz reflect such learning processes of
the modern, Western societies which have been put in the service of the instrumental
rationality. (see also Anttonen 1998, 218-225.)
8. What was learnt from Auschwitz: the lessons of the National Socialism
What was learnt in Auschwitz and from Auschwitz? The National Socialism also taught a
totalitarian method to exercise power that was based on subordinative and suppressing
supremacy, fraud, propaganda and manipulation as well as violence, killing and death. It was
part of the learning process to learn to keep silent about the insults that were inflicted. It was
learned, above all, what it means to be persecuted. A lesson of the National Socialism to the
posterity concerning power and morality is the fact that a democratic society, pluralism,
multiculturality and the increased appreciation between cultures emerge as the important
goals. The construction of social power presupposes the existence of an opposition, whereby
power is determined both as the power of the ruling power elite and as a counterpower and
whereby it is not the autocracy by the nature. The morality determining the National Socialist
ideology also makes it known to the future generations that a morality that is restricted to
inside of one group and treads down the other groups' rights cannot claim the position of
universal morality, which is why the construction of a morality that is directed to the
universal rights emerges as the central goal, focusing on cultural pluralism, intercultural
tolerance and respect for the other cultures. A pluralistic idea of pedagogy and the guarantees
for democracy in the educational system and in the society are also worth pursuing. The
realisation of democracy requires learning to be critical, as a capacity of critique functions as
a precondition for ”an only right ideology” not to be justified. Learning to exercise power
11
democratically, also, requires the participation in the discussion about common affairs and
learning to participate.
The prevailing moral code of the National Socialist politics of truth was, however, the code of
the "traditionalist" morality determined by the National Socialist supremacy that was
characterised by the mysticism. It was the internal moral code of the community of National
Socialists that did not meet the criteria of the "universal", post-conventional morality. Power
was also used through the moral code of democratising politics of truth. Power was used
especially clearly through the pedagogy, as even the new politics of truth was conveyed
essentially through education. The function of pedagogy was to secure the main ideological
influences even in this case. The adoption of a set of values that enabled democracy took
place at least partly, which was also the purpose. In addition to the moral code of the Allied
and those who were involved in the emancipatory and democratic discourse, there still was
the conservative (National Socialist) moral code that shaped for its own part the contents of
the emancipatory and democratic discourse and the politics of truth. The principles of
discourse ethics materialised in the contents and in the goals of emancipatory pedagogy. It is
true that the processes and the realisation of argumentation still left room for the
improvement, as the manipulative nature of the politics of truth remained. For this reason,
even this discourse can be defined as the politics of truth. The moral code of the
democratising politics of truth was characterised by a universal orientation. It is not grounded,
however, to maintain unambiguously that this moral code developed the post-conventional
subjectivity and sociality, but it is possible to maintain that it at least made possible the
development of such a subjective and collective identity unlike the National Socialist moral
code did. (Max Horkheimer -Archive IX 172 1-32.)
The progress of learning processes in the direction of the communicative rationality leaves,
however, a lot to be desired. But, if the new politics of truth are compared to the earlier
totalitarian politics of truth and its moral code, it can be argued that it was a great advance
into this direction. The pedagogical processes also had an influence on the progress of social
learning processes into this direction, as it is especially the pedagogical processes between the
subjects that provide the situations in which new kind of moral consciousness emerges. The
post-conventional "moral code" based on the universal human dignity became the officially
accepted moral code in this social and international situation. Beneath the surface the
conservative-nationalistic moral code also survived, which has manifested itself culturally
and also in the scientific discourses of the racism, the neoconservative groupings, and the
revisionist approaches. The ethics of science and the moral issues were in a highly precarious
state even in the new situation, which is proved, for instance, by the struggles in the
connection of the dismissals of the university and the teaching staff. (Max Horkheimer Archive II 8 28-32; Max Horkheimer-Archive V 13 (23-58), 40; Max Horkheimer -Archive V
13 (42-43).) The most important thing was, however, that moral questions were given
attention in the discourses of the critical theory. Yet, it is necessary to ask the rhetorical
question if the fact that a discourse emphasises democracy secures to it the cognitively
privileged position that makes it possible to maintain that the discourse is more truthful than
another one. It is, at least, grounded to argue that it is morally more justifiable.
Both types of rationality, the communicative one and the instrumental-strategic one, the
former of which materialised in the discursive morality and the latter as dominating power,
moved the historical learning processes but produced different results. The most important
problem is what kind of rationality starts to direct the mainstream of history and what can be
12
learned from the pathologies of historical learning processes (cf. Eder 1991). It can be
maintained that the traces of a different rationality, the communicative one, can even be found
in the historical pathologies such as Auschwitz. The zones of communicative rationality did
not, however, have a chance to direct history under a totalitarian power regime, because it
would have required that these people who created such a marginal phenomenon should have
had the power to direct the course of history. This requirement is contrafactual in relation to
communicatively formed morality and the principles of discourse ethics. As a critical
comment a further question must be asked: to what extent is it realistic to assume that the
disputable requirements for validity are acknowledged or that the communication takes place
in a symmetric way?
It is justifiable to criticise Jürgen Habermas' (1981a, 369-460) idea of the ideal speech
situation for the fact that it presupposes omniscience or someone knowing the final truth, as
truthfulness can ultimately only be evaluated if it is known. This possibility is questioned and
proved not to be a plausible ideal on the basis of the historical analysis of the National
Socialist politics of truth. The National Socialist politics of truth broke consciously the
requirements for the validity of truth, justice and honesty through its manipulative politics of
truth, as its goal was to construct a great "collective lie". Meanwhile, the declarations of
democratising discourses attempted to realise these requirements for validity, even though the
manipulative aspect was still realised in the practices of the politics of truth. Both of the
politics of truth were full of power and domination relations in which the conditions of
symmetrical communication were not materialised, although they had been expressed as goals
for the discourse aiming at democratisation. Although it is not grounded to maintain in
conclusion that learning processes directed by the instrumental rationality were replaced by
ones directed by communicative rationality, it is justified to argue on the basis of the
historical evidence that the learning processes directed by the communicative rationality
became worthy of pursuit in the discourses of the re-education politics after the Second
World War.
What was learned from Auschwitz, and what was not learned? On the superficial level of the
official politics, more democratic and morally justifiable social practices were learned, which
has not, however, been able to make sure that the pathologies of the historical processes that
led to Auschwitz do not still live on the deep level of the humanity that can be excavated
from the depths of history – at both the individual, collective and social levels.
9. Conclusion: Power, morality and socio-historical learning
Modernisation is grounded to conceptualise as socio-historical learning on the basis of a learning
theory that also includes the learning of social pathologies. Modernisation cannot, however, be
determined unambiguously in terms of democratisation and egalitarianism. Pedagogy and education
emerge as the important promoters of social learning, and the guarantors of democracy and equality
in the discourses of the critical theory. Meanwhile, my historical researches provide evidence
against the hypothesis of the egalitarian influence of pedagogy and education. The National
Socialist ideology emphasised the conservative educational equality, although the system was elitist.
The equality of opportunities between the strata of society was set as the goal for the democratising
re-education programmes which were realised by the Allied, the critical intellectuals and the Jewish
organisations through the divided Germany after the World War II. To the equality between the
sexes was not given any attention. It is indisputable that the re-training and the formal programmes
of re-education had a democratising effect (Max Horkheimer-Archive V 16.191-248; Max
13
Horkheimer-Archive V 16.173-175). The political and moral learning processes were set as the
important goals in the international educational policy after the Second World War. Pedagogy and
education were used to exert an influence on them. A prerequisite was to unlearn the National
Socialist pedagogical ideology which was military, violent and disciplinary. The official policy
swearing by the human dignity has not been successful in eradicating the pathologies of the
historical processes that led to Auschwitz from the deep historical level. The learning processes of
the post-conventional morality which were based on the humanity and the discourses between the
human beings have not materialised, although the conflict between the generations in the 1960s
produced the significant changes of values. (Max Horkheimer -Archive. IX 235.) The economic and
technological learning processes, however, are still in a dominating position.
The self-understanding of modern science has been based on the instrumental and calculating
rationality. The moral issues have been neglected. The combination of knowledge and power has
been able to promote democratisation and equality only to a limited extent. Discourses based on
critical interests have, however, been demanding the democracy and the emancipatory education.
Scientific knowledge and the power of experts have had a great effect on socio-historical learning.
Correspondingly, social power has had a significant influence on the scientific discourses. The
transition from the National Socialist politics of truth to the democratising politics of truth did not
materialise through the scientific discursive resistance, as it was realised through a military victory
of a power regime that was external to the scientific community. This made possible critical
argumentation and discursive power struggles typical of the democratic institution of science.
The research results do not justify the argument that learning processes directed by the instrumental
rationality were replaced by ones directed by the communicative rationality. But, there is a good
reason to argue that learning processes that were in line with the communicative rationality became
worthy of pursuit in the international politics after the Second World War when the emphasis was
put on the significance of pedagogy and education (Max Horkheimer -Archive IX 248.1-4).
Historical evidence speaks in favour of the plausibility of the Habermasian communicative
discourse. The Foucauldian discourse of power became a target of sharper criticism, although
historical evidence was to be found to support it as well. Unlike the Habermasian discourse, it could
not, however, open up morally lasting perspectives of action. These discourses function, however,
very well to complement each other critically.
The research results can be utilised in the educational and political discussion about the democracy
and the equality, and in the methodology and the formation of the social and educational theory as
the familiarity with the European philosophy, the history of modern society and pedagogy and the
comparative research. The frame of reference of the socio-historical learning, the formation of
culture and the methodology of a dialectical theory and the historical research on society and
education (die Bildung) are a new combination in the Finnish, in the German, and even in the
international research. The National Socialist pedagogical ideology is a nearly unexplored and the
democratising re-education a fully unexplored area in the Finnish social and educational sciences.
14
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18
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19
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20