Download Summary of Lessons as derived from AIRPOWER in

Summary of Lessons as derived from AIRPOWER in SMALL WARS by Corum and Johnson. Pages
423-439.
“The experience of airpower in small wars outlined in this book provides some useful lessons to guide the
employment of airpower against insurgents and terrorists in the future.” (Corum/Johnson, 425)
Lessons
1) A comprehensive strategy is essential.
a) National strategy must win over the people
b) Not just a military op, must not ignore political and economic dimensions
c) EBO with links to national strategic objectives (ELDORADO CANYON, DOOLITTLE RAID,
lack of Phase III termination, Phase IV+ strategy in OIF)
2) The support role of airpower
a) Recon, transport, aeromedical evac so on…
b) …proves most important contribution
c) Air mobility of police, army
d) BERLIN AIRLIFT, PROVIDE PROMISE, COLD WAR ISR, GWOT ISR
e) Colin Gray’s concept of range and reach
3) The ground attack role of airpower becomes more important when the war becomes conventional.
a) Airpower gains the advantage when insurgents attempt positional warfare
b) Conventional ops requires logistics, lines of communication, headquarters and heavy weapons
which all make excellent targets for airpower
c) ANACONDA (OEF), OP BAGRATION, OIF, Khe Sahn, Khafji
4) Bombing civilians is ineffective and counterproductive
a) Punishment of civilians often makes them more hostile
b) Or targeting insurgents or terrorist in urban areas with resulting civilian casualties generally works
as a propaganda advantage of the rebels.
c) No such thing as 100% “surgical strike”
d) Airpower may provoke outcry
e) Indirect approaches may also fail – deforestation is an example
f) COERCION Theory, ALLIED FORCE, WWII, LINEBACKER and FLAMING DART
g) Douhet advocated targeting populations; Pape discounted these Punishment type coercion
strategies; in Lebanon 2006, we see non-Arab Lebanese supporting Hezbollah due to Israeli
bombing of infrastructure
5) There is an important role for the high-tech aspect of airpower in small wars.
a) Remotely piloted vehicles – observation/prep of battlespace without expense
b) Space-based recon and GPS
c) SOF with high tech toys to call in strikes (OEF, Israel)
d) High tech is a force multiplier, not the answer
e) DESERT STORM, OIF, OEF
f) GPS bombs and Synthetic Aperture Radar overcomes WX (Gray)
g) Altitude of Global Hawk
h) Loiter time of Predator/GH
6) There is an important role for the low-tech aspect of airpower in small wars.
a) Use of light propeller planes for observation and strike roles…
b) …slow speeds and long loiter time
c) Use of older transport planes like DC-3/47 as an example
d) Air force reserve in Guatemala (private pilots with Cessna 172s, etc) to patrol roads and rural
areas and supplies to remote areas
e) OIF, Guatemala, El Salvador
7) Effective joint operations are essential for the effective use of airpower.
a) Airpower carefully coordinated with ground forces
b) All coordination with police forces, intelligence agencies, and military and civilian civic action
c) URGENT FURY (C2 issues), OIF, OEF, BAGRATION, OVERLORD,
d) Colin Gray – unity
e) Douhet – Air Superiority, independent AF
8) Small wars are intelligence intensive.
a) More difficult to locate and target insurgents
b) HUMINT critical
c) Overcoming lack of intelligence sharing
d) Lack of interagency support in OIF, SOF intel, CIA HUMINT
9) Airpower provides the flexibility and initiative that is normally the advantage of the guerilla.
a) Airpower makes ground forces more effective (force multiplier)
b) Recon easier from the air
c) Easier to take the offensive to the enemy (expeditionary warfare)
d) LEBANON, TAIWAN, OEF, OIF, Gray (flexibility), Guatemala, El Salvador
e) Colin Gray’s speed, flexibility in concentration, range and reach, geographically unbounded
10) Small wars are long wars
a) “The search for the quick, decisive victory is an integral part of the Western military culture”
b) Time is required to adapt training, equipment, and doctrine to effectively fight small wars
c) Small strikes, heliborne commando raids, close air support missions, and troop transport
d) Plan for long term strategy accordingly
e) Don’t lend themselves to final or conclusive victory
11) The US and its allies must put more effort into small wars training.
a) Popular support is the center of gravity
b) Legitimacy of the government is the most important factor in the eyes of the people
c) Stand up AF squadrons to train other countries air forces (FID)
d) Little doctrine exist for USAF training others AFs
e) ACSC should spend time addressing small wars…6 page closed book test to follow.
f) Colin Gray’s expense limitation
Paper Outline
Strategic Impact of Airpower on COIN
1) A comprehensive strategy is essential.
a) National strategy must win over the people
b) Not just a military op, must not ignore political and economic dimensions
c) EBO with links to national strategic objectives (ELDORADO CANYON, DOOLITTLE RAID,
lack of Phase III termination, Phase IV+ strategy in OIF)
2) Small wars are long wars
a) “The search for the quick, decisive victory is an integral part of the Western military culture”
b) Time is required to adapt training, equipment, and doctrine to effectively fight small wars
c) Small strikes, heliborne commando raids, close air support missions, and troop transport
d) Plan for long term strategy accordingly
e) Don’t lend themselves to final or conclusive victory
3) Effective joint operations are essential for the effective use of airpower.
a) Airpower carefully coordinate with ground forces
b) All coordination with police forces, intelligence agencies, and military and civilian civic action
c) URGENT FURY (C2 issues), OIF, OEF, BAGRATION, OVERLORD,
d) Colin Gray – unity
e) Douhet – Air Superiority, independent AF
Non-Kinetic Operations are vital to Airpower’s Contribution to Future Small Wars
1) Small wars are intelligence intensive.
a) More difficult to locate and target insurgents
b) HUMINT critical
c) Overcoming lack of intelligence sharing
d) Lack of interagency support in OIF, SOF intel, CIA HUMINT
2) There is an important role for the high-tech aspect of airpower in small wars.
a) Remotely piloted vehicles – observation/prep of battlespace without expense
b) Space-based recon and GPS
c) SOF with high tech toys to call in strikes (OEF, Israel)
d) High tech is a force multiplier, not the answer
e) DESERT STORM, OIF, OEF
f) GPS bombs and Synthetic Aperture Radar overcomes WX (Gray)
g) Altitude of Global Hawk
h) Loiter time of Predator/GH
3) The support role of airpower
a) Recon, transport, aeromedical evac so on…
b) …proves most important contribution
c) Air mobility of police, army
d) BERLIN AIRLIFT, PROVIDE PROMISE, COLD WAR ISR, GWOT ISR
e) Colin Gray’s concept of range and reach
Airpower’s Contribution to Small Wars
1) Bombing civilians is ineffective and counterproductive
a) Punishment of civilians often makes them more hostile
b) Or targeting insurgents or terrorist in urban areas with resulting civilian casualties generally works
as a propaganda advantage of the rebels.
c) No such thing as 100% “surgical strike”
d) Airpower may provoke outcry
e) Indirect approaches may also fail – deforestation is an example
f) COERCION Theory, ALLIED FORCE, WWII, LINEBACKER and FLAMING DART
g) Douhet advocated targeting populations; Pape discounted these Punishment type coercion
strategies; in Lebanon 2006, we see non-Arab Lebanese supporting Hezbollah due to Israeli
bombing of infrastructure
2) There is an important role for the low-tech aspect of airpower in small wars.
a) Use of light propeller planes for observation and strike roles…
b) …slow speeds and long loiter time
c) Use of older transport planes like DC-3/47 as an example
d) Air force reserve in Guatemala (private pilots with Cessna 172s, etc) to patrol roads and rural
areas and supplies to remote areas
e) OIF, Guatemala, El Salvador
3) Airpower provides the flexibility and initiative that is normally the advantage of the guerilla.
a) Airpower makes ground forces more effective (force multiplier)
b) Recon easier from the air
c) Easier to take the offensive to the enemy (expeditionary warfare)
d) LEBANON, TAIWAN, OEF, OIF, Gray (flexibility), Guatemala, El Salvador
e) Colin Gray’s speed, flexibility in concentration, range and reach, geographically unbounded