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Golden Desert 2010
Hegemony Disad
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Hegemony Disad - Index
1NC................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 2
***Uniqueness*** ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 4
Uniqueness – General ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 5
Uniqueness – Resiliency .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 6
Uniqueness – Asia ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 7
***Links*** ................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 8
Links –Military Presence ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 9
Internal Link—Readiness ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 10
***Impacts*** ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 11
Impacts - General ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 12
Hegemony solves War ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 13
Hegemony solves the Economy .............................................................................................................................................................................. 14
Hegemony solves Terrorism .................................................................................................................................................................................... 15
Hegemony solves Middle Eastern Conflicts ......................................................................................................................................................... 16
***Aff Responses*** ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 17
Hegemony Declining – Economic Overstretch ................................................................................................................................................... 18
Hegemony Declining – Middle East ....................................................................................................................................................................... 19
Hegemony Declining – Multipolarity Now ........................................................................................................................................................... 20
Link Turns ................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 21
Impact Turns............................................................................................................................................................................................................... 23
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A. Uniqueness—US Hegemony is strong in all areas
Layne, 6 (Christopher, Research Fellow - Center on Peace and Liberty - Independent Institute, National Interest, Fall)
By all accepted measures the United States is an extraordinarily powerful global actor. The United States dominates the
global economy with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of about $11 trillion. China, usually cited as America's most likely
future great power rival, has a GDP of approximately $1.4 trillion. Not only is the U.S. economy big, it is also at the forefront
technologically. The dollar remains the primary reserve currency for the international economic system--a huge advantage for
the United States, since other nations keep propping up the dollar for fear that a major drop in its value would negatively affect
their own investment portfolios. U.S. economic power is also reflected in Washington's dominance of key international economic
institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Economic strength and technological prowess go a long
way toward explaining America's military dominance. The sheer magnitude of the U.S. economy means that Washington is
easily able to spend over $500 billion annually on defense. This is more than the rest of the world combined spends on
defense, but only about 4 percent of the U.S. GDP, which means that even at this enormous absolute level of expenditure, defense
spending is far less of a burden on the American economy than was the case during the Cold War. The United States, indeed,
is a global hegemon and has formidable tools at its disposal, and it can wield its power effectively to attain important policy
objectives. For example, the sheer magnitude of America's lead in military power over its closest would-be rivals has a potent
effect in dissuading them from trying to emerge as great powers and to challenge the United States's dominant role in a
unipolar world. Events since 9/11 have illuminated other ways in which the United States has been able to utilize its hegemonic
power. Thus, American military prowess was showcased by the quick collapse of the Taliban and Saddam's Iraq. Moreover,
the economic incentives the United States could proffer were vitally important in persuading a reluctant Pakistan to allow itself to
ally with the United States in the battle against Al-Qaeda. Central Asian states offered the United States the opportunity to establish
military bases--and Putin's Russia acquiesced to this. And the very fact that the United States could defy the United Nations
(and major powers such as France, Germany, Russia and China) and carry out the invasion of Iraq (essentially) unilaterally proved-if proof is needed--that the rest of the world could not do much to constrain the United States.
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B. Link and Impact—US military presence in foreign regions prevents decrease in hegemony, stability, and
peace.
Kagan, 7 (Robert, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “End of Dreams, Return of
History”, 7/19)
Conflicts are more likely to erupt if the United States withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. In Europe,
too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be
destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its
periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the
possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe,
history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States
withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the
likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under
unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle
East and the assumption of a more passive, “offshore” role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest
the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia
make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the
region battle it out. Nor would a more “even-handed” policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking
peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel ’s aid if its security became threatened. That
commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world,
practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground. The
subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In
the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least
two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn ’t change this. It only adds a new and more threatening
dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an
immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region
is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A
diminution of American influence would not be
followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if
only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand
and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance
of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn ’t changed that much. An American
withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to “normal” or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new
instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American regional predominance in the
Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to
be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend
American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction
of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.
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***Uniqueness***
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Uniqueness – General
US will dominate the international order for at least 50 more years
Kori Schake, (Research Fellow, Hoover Institution), MANAGING AMERICAN HEGEMONY, 2009, 3.
American success is, not surprisingly, resented by states and societies that have not found ways to preserve what they value.
Societies with "better" but less popular attributes feel affronted that the accessibility of American society and culture has such
broad appeal. The equation that makes the United States so successful is not difficult to discern, but difficult to put
into practice, especially if societies clamor for the economic enrichment, innovation, and durable social peace of
American society without wanting to endure its fractiousness, economic insecurity, and permeability. For these
reasons, despite the near-term shortcomings, American power is likely to dominate the international order for at
least another half century.
US the global economical, military, political, and ideological power now
Giacomo Chiozza, (Prof., Political Science, Vanderbilt U.), ANTI-AMERICANISM AND THE AMERICAN
WORLD ORDER, 2009, 32.
Few commentators, if any, dispute the primacy of the United States in all the dimensions that define the power
status of a country: military, economic, political, and ideological. Even the doomsayers predicting a rapid collapse of
America's dominant position in the international state system concur that the United States towers over the world
with its military might, its economic wealth, its political influence, and its ideological appeal.
Scholars constantly predict decline and they turn out to be wrong
Josef Joffe, (Fellow in International Relations, Hoover Institution, Stanford U.), FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sep/Oct 2009,
21-35.
Every ten years, it is decline time in the United States. In the late 1950s, it was the Sputnik shock, followed by the "missile gap"
trumpeted by John F. Kennedy in the 1960 presidential campaign. A decade later, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger sounded
the dirge over bipolarity, predicting a world of five, rather than two, global powers. At the end of the 1970s, Jimmy Carter's
"malaise" speech invoked "a crisis of confidence" that struck "at the very heart and soul and spirit of our national will." A
decade later, academics such as the Yale historian Paul Kennedy predicted the ruin of the United States, driven by overextension
abroad and profligacy at home. The United States was at risk of "imperial overstretch," Kennedy wrote in 1987, arguing that
"the sum total of the United States' global interests and obligations is nowadays far larger than the country's power to defend
them all simultaneously." But three years later, Washington dispatched 600,000 soldiers to fight the first Iraq war--without
reinstating the draft or raising taxes. The only price of "overstretch" turned out to be the mild recession of 1991.
US massively outspends other countries on military power
Josef Joffe, (Fellow in International Relations, Hoover Institution, Stanford U.), FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sep/Oct 2009,
21-35.
The gaps become exorbitant in the realm of military power, where the United States plays in a league of its own. In 2008, it
spent $607 billion on its military, representing almost half of the world's total military spending. The next nine states spent a
total of $476 billion, and the presumptive challengers to U.S. military supremacy--China, India, Japan, and Russia--together
devoted only $219 billion to their militaries. The military budget of China, the country most often touted as the world's next
superpower, is less than one-seventh of the U.S. defense budget. Even if one includes among potential U.S. adversaries the 27
states of the EU, which together spend $288 billion on defense, the United States still outweighs them all--$607 billion
compared to $507 billion.
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Uniqueness – Resiliency
US will be the hegemon for the next 40-50 years
Kori Schake, (Research Fellow, Hoover Institution), MANAGING AMERICAN HEGEMONY, 2009, 135.
If American advantages remain durable as globalization advances, we and the rest of the world will be stuck with America as
hegemon for another forty or fifty years. It may not be what many states and societies want, but absent a catastrophic
discontinuity, the vectors of power will continue to deliver it. In fact, rather than becoming more like other states as we struggle
to overcome our internal problems and other challengers rise, it may well be that America becomes more successful than, and
more different from, other states. The slope of the lines representing our power and that of other states may diverge further
than at present, increasing our power relative to others.
American political culture and US economic strength make hegemony resilent
Kori Schake, (Research Fellow, Hoover Institution), MANAGING AMERICAN HEGEMONY, 2009, 135-136.
Pessimistic analyses place too much weight on the present setbacks in Iraq and difficulties of the current administration. The
fundamental strengths of American political culture and the American economy give us much greater resiliency than they credit.
Other states and societies would have to be more resilient, faster adapting, more magnetic, more capable along a wide range of
political, cultural, economic, and social factors than we are for the United States to decline. It merits repeating that the United
States came to dominate the international order as globalization advanced because the very things that make one successful
domestically in America are the things that make one successful in the political, economic, and cultural milieu of a globalizing
economy. Our power is so enormous because we dominate through attraction and innovation, and the elements of our power
reinforce each other. The time and transition costs are substantial for other states and societies to catch up, and their succeeding
would require America's failing to adapt during prolonged competition, which is unlikely.
US will remain the largest single aggregation of power
Richard Haas, (President, Council on Foreign Relations), TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS IN AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY, 2010, 27.
In this world, the United States is and will long remain the largest single aggregation of power. It spends more than $500 billion
annually on its military -- and more than $700 billion if the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are included -- and boasts land,
air, and naval forces that are the world's most capable. Its economy, with a GDP of some $14 trillion, is the world's largest. The
United States is also a major source of culture (through films and television), information, and innovation.
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Uniqueness – Asia
US power and influence have not declined in Asia
Robert Sutter, (Prof., Asian Studies, Georgetown U.), THE UNITED STATES IN ASIA, 2009, 282.
The U.S. image in the Asia-Pacific has declined in recent years, and U.S. foreign policy continues to be widely criticized.
Nevertheless, U.S. ability and willingness to serve as the Asia-Pacific's security guarantor and its vital economic partner remain
strong and provide a solid foundation for continued U.S. leadership in the region. According to Asia-Pacific officials
interviewed in 2004-2007, overall American power and influence in the region have not declined.
US will lead in Asia for years
Robert Sutter, (Prof., Asian Studies, Georgetown U.), THE UNITED STATES IN ASIA, 2009, 282.
It appears that whatever new order is emerging in the Asia-Pacific region will have the United States as its leading power for
many years to come. This forecast rules out some of the possible outcomes for the Asian regional order noted in the first
paragraph of this chapter. Thus, China's dominance is precluded. Moreover, the U.S. role in any condominium, competition, or
collective concert of powers in the Asia-Pacific would be that of its leading power.
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***Links***
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Links –Military Presence
US foreign military presence critical to US economic security and leadership
Michael Mandlebaum, (Prof., International Relations, Johns Hopkins U.), TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS IN
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 2010, 6-7.
America's services to the world also extend to economic matters and international trade. In the international economy, much of
the confidence needed to proceed with transactions, and the protection that engenders this confidence, comes from the policies
of the United States. For example, the U.S. Navy patrols shipping lanes in both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, assuring the safe
passage of commerce along the world's great trade routes. The United States also supplies the world's most frequently used
currency, the U.S. dollar. Though the euro might one day supplant the dollar as the world's most popular reserve currency, that
day, if it ever comes, lies far in the future.
US security commitments and willingness to enforce international rules bolsters its hegemony
Kori Schake, (Research Fellow, Hoover Institution), MANAGING AMERICAN HEGEMONY, 2009, 86.
Most states want a very high degree of reliability that the enforcer of rules in the international order is actually willing to enforce
the rules, which at the end of the day means imposing its will by force. As unpopular as the United States often is for its choices
about using force, its willingness to be the guarantor of security formally for twenty-five NATO allies, South Korea, Japan,
Australia, and New Zealand, with more conditional offers to scores of other states, is an enormous contribution to its power in
the international order.
Pulling US troops out of foreign areas would instability, making any attempt to restore hegemony impossible
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy in 03 [Schlesinger Working Group Report, Spring 2003; Prepared by Paul G.
Frost; “Unintended Consequences of an Expanded Military Presence in the Muslim World”;
http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/isd/military.pdf]
A number of “bad” options are still possible: attacks on U.S. or coalition troops stationed in the Middle East
escalate, which evoke the tragedies of Lebanon; Kurds fight Turks, Shiites massacre Sunnis and intra-Shiite faction fighting
increases; Afghanistan continues to be ungovernable, while al Qaeda regroups to orchestrate further attacks on
coalition troops in that nation; Iran successfully blames the U.S. for internal governance failures and turns popular
sentiment against us, which leads to additional American deaths in Iraq. Elsewhere, the Palestinian political transition
collapses amidst a new bout of suicide terror, which causes the nascent Israeli-Palestinian peace process to collapse. Rulers of
one or more regional regimes friendly to the U.S. may be deposed, and domestic politics of G.C.C. countries look headed
toward heightened instability while the tensions build between India and Pakistan. North Korea continues to test and
provoke the U.S. while Washington attempts to identify a means of containing/deterring a de facto nuclear rogue
and avoids the words “regime change”. Implicit in all of these worrying scenarios is the possibility that events will
interact and connect to create more surprises. For example, a terrorist attack in any Gulf nation could make an
economy slump that would drag down the entire region into instability.
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Internal Link—Readiness
Readiness is key to hegemony
Donnelly, 3---Resident Scholar at AEI (Thomas, Resident Scholar at AEI, 2/1.
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.15845/pub_detail.asp)
The preservation of today's Pax Americana rests upon both actual military strength and the perception of strength. The variety
of victories scored by U.S. forces since the end of the cold war is testament to both the futility of directly challenging the United
States and the desire of its enemies to keep poking and prodding to find a weakness in the American global order. Convincing
would-be great powers, rogue states, and terrorists to accept the liberal democratic order--and the challenge to autocratic forms of
rule that come with it--requires not only an overwhelming response when the peace is broken, but a willingness to step in when
the danger is imminent. The message of the Bush Doctrine--"Don't even think about it!"--rests in part on a logic of preemption that
underlies the logic of primacy.
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***Impacts***
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Impacts - General
Asian, European and Middle Eastern stability all depend on US Hegemony
Schmitt, 6– Resident scholar and director of the Program on Advanced Strategic Studies at the American Enterprise
Institute (Gary, “Is there any alternative to U.S. primacy?” The Weekly Standard, Books & Arts, Vol. 11 No. 22,
February, Lexis)
In the case of Europe, after examining both the sources of tension and cooperation in current transatlantic relations, Lieber argues
that Europe has no choice but to depend on American leadership and power. Europe's lack of unanimity over foreign policies, and
its own lack of hard power, leave it with little choice but to rely on the United States when it comes to maintaining the world's
security blanket. As for the Middle East, after making the case for going to war with Saddam's Iraq--a case that ultimately hinges on
the risks of not acting--Lieber notes that it still remains the case that "only the U.S." can deter regional thugs, contain weapons
proliferation to any degree, keep the Arab-Israeli peace process afloat, and keep the oil supplies flowing to us and our allies. And in
Asia, it is the United States that "plays a unique stabilizing role . . . that no other country or organization can play." Absent
America's presence, the region's key actors would face a dramatically different set of security concerns, in which more overt, "great
power" competition would likely become the norm.
US Hegemony’s key to solve stability, foreign aggression, proliferation, nuclear terrorism and nuclear war
Dole, 95 (Robert, Senator from Kansas, Foreign Policy, No. 98., Spring, 1995, JSTOR)
The world of 1995 and beyond is still a dangerous place. There are many new and emerging threats as we approach the millennium.
A resurgent Russia filling a vacuum in Central Europe or looking for a foreign diversion from internal secessionist struggles; a
revitalized Iraq threatening the oil fields of Saudi Arabia; a fundamentalist Iran seeking to dominate the Persian Gulf; a nucleararmed North Korea threatening South Korea and Japan with ballistic missiles-all are scenarios that the United States could face in
the near and medium terms. Islamic fundamentalism sweeping across North Africa could overwhelm the successes to date in
achieving peace in the Middle East. A fourth conflict between India and Pakistan could escalate into the world's first nuclear war.
Nuclear-armed terrorist states like Libya or Iran, emboldened by the North Korean example and armed with missiles from
Pyongyang, could threaten allies in the Middle East or Europe. Economic competition between Japan and China could take a
military turn. Radical "ethno-nationalists," religious militants, terrorists, narcotics traffickers, and international organized crime
networks all pose threats to states in regions of the world where America has core interests. While the collapse of Somalia or
Rwanda may not affect those interests, the disintegration of states like Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, or Pakistan would. American
leadership, however, can overcome the challenges of building a just and durable peace after the Cold War. The words of President
Dwight Eisenhower's first inaugural address are as true today as they were in 1953:
To meet the challenge of our time, destiny has laid upon our country the responsibility of the free world 's leadership. So it is
proper that we assure our friends once again that, in the discharge of this responsibility, we Americans know and we observe the
difference between world leadership and imperialism; between firmness and truculence; between a thoughtfully calculated goal and
spasmodic reaction to the stimulus of emergencies.
As the United States approaches the next century, two principles should remain constant: protecting American interests and
providing American leadership. The end of the Cold War has provided us with a historic opportunity. Such an opportunity should
not be forfeited in favor of the pursuit of utopian multilateralism or abandoned through intentional isolationism. We have seen the
danger to America's interests, prestige, and influence posed by both of these approaches. Instead, we must look to the lessons of
the Cold War to guide our future foreign policy: Put American interests first and lead the way. The future will not wait for America,
but it can be shaped by an America second to none.
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Hegemony solves War
U.S. leadership deters conflict and solves all their impacts—collapse results in cascading great power wars
Thayer 2006 [Bradley A., Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, Duluth, The National Interest,
November -December, “In Defense of Primacy”, lexis]
countries want to align themselves with the United States
A remarkable fact about international politics today--in a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that
. Of course,
this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes--their own protection, or to gain greater influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America--their security is
tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements--and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to
U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given
us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is
America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the
one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies.
United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to
You can
count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with
realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation.
all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these
Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power.
states because it is a rising great power. But even
China proclaims that it will, if
necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work,
and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates.
The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran
or Havana could very well reorient relations. THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic
Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust
monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to
think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when
international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles.
Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've
effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics.
got (until you lose it)."
Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has
U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany.
American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia
and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's
likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread
democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the
Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed
democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are
been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War,
Today,
more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the
Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and,
one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted.
Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be
better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in
January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may
not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in
With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal
worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems
from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The
the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy.
United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size
of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess.
Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India.
Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American
the United States, in seeking primacy, has
been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive
externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War--and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911
force"--it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need.
primacy.4 As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides. Fourth and finally,
On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid and
deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as
forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort. No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping
American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than
almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll,
operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces.
Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters
fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a
lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or
Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive
impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg. THERE IS no other state, group of states or international
organization that can provide these global benefits. None even comes close. The United Nations cannot because it is riven with conflicts and major cleavages that divide the international body time and again on matters great and trivial. Thus it lacks the ability to
speak with one voice on salient issues and to act as a unified force once a decision is reached. The EU has similar problems. Does anyone expect Russia or China to take up these responsibilities? They may have the desire, but they do not have the capabilities.
Let's face it: for the time being, American primacy remains humanity's only practical hope of solving the world's ills.
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14
Hegemony solves the Economy
Hegemony solves for our economic interests
Khalilzad 1995 – RAND, Ambassador to Afghanistan (Washington Quarterly, Spring)
Moreover, a global leadership role serves the economic interests of the United States. For example, it can facilitate U.S. exports, as
recently seen in U.S. contracts with Saudi Arabia for the sale of aircraft and the modernization of Saudi telecommunication systems.
As discussed earlier, the costs of alternative approaches to U.S. global leadership can ultimately be higher. Rather than undermining
domestic prosperity, such a role can in fact facilitate it. The economic benefits of U.S. leadership have not been focused on either
analytically or in the statements made to the public.
Hegemony is key to the global economy
Walt, 2 (Stephen, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, “American Primacy:
Its Prospects and Pitfalls” Naval War College Review, Spring)
By facilitating the development of a more open and liberal world economy, American primacy also fosters global prosperity.
Economic interdependence is often said to be a cause of world peace, but it is more accurate to say that peace encourages
interdependence-by making it easier for states to accept the potential vulnerabilities of extensive international intercourse.10
Investors are more willing to send money abroad when the danger of war is remote, and states worry less about being dependent on
others when they are not concerned that these connections might be severed. When states are relatively secure, they will also be less
fixated on how the gains from cooperation are distributed. In particular, they are less likely to worry that extensive cooperation will
benefit others more and thereby place them at a relative disadvantage over time.11 By providing a tranquil international
environment, in short, U.S. primacy has created political conditions that are conducive to expanding global trade and investment.
Indeed, American primacy was a prerequisite for the creation and gradual expansion of the European Union, which is often touted
as a triumph of economic self-interest over historical rivalries. Because the United States was there to protect the Europeans from
the Soviet Union and from each other, they could safely ignore the balance of power within Western Europe and concentrate on
expanding their overall level of economic integration. The expansion of world trade has been a major source of increased global
prosperity, and U.S. primacy is one of the central pillars upon which that system rests.12 The United States also played a leading
role in establishing the various institutions that regulate and manage the world economy. As a number of commentators have noted,
the current era of "globalization" is itself partly an artifact of American power. As Thomas Friedman puts it, "Without America on
duty, there will be no America Online."13
Global Nuclear War
Walter Russell Mead, Senior Fellow in American Foreign policy @ the Council on Foreign Relations, World Policy
Institute, 1992
What if the global economy stagnates – or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new period of international
conflict: North against South, rich against poor. Russia, China, India – these countries with their billions of people and
their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to the world than Germany and Japan did in the ‘30s.
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15
Hegemony solves Terrorism
Hegemony is critical to solve for terrorism—it would have solved 9/11
Boot, 1 (Max, Senior Fellow for National Security Studies, “The Case for American Empire” 10/15/2001
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer_preview.asp?idArticle=318&R=76C47AD0)
MANY HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE September 11 attack on America was payback for U.S. imperialism. If only
we had not gone around sticking our noses where they did not belong, perhaps we would not now be contemplating a crater in
lower Manhattan. The solution is obvious: The United States must become a kinder, gentler nation, must eschew quixotic
missions abroad, must become, in Pat Buchanan's phrase, "a republic, not an empire." In fact this analysis is exactly
backward: The September 11 attack was a result of insufficient American involvement and ambition; the solution is to
be more expansive in our goals and more assertive in their implementation. It has been said, with the benefit of faulty
hindsight, that America erred in providing the mujahedeen with weapons and training that some of them now turn against us.
But this was amply justified by the exigencies of the Cold War. The real problem is that we pulled out of
Afghanistan after 1989. In so doing, the George H.W. Bush administration was following a classic realpolitik policy. We
had gotten involved in this distant nation to wage a proxy war against the Soviet Union. Once that larger war was over, we
could safely pull out and let the Afghans resolve their own affairs. And if the consequence was the rise of the Taliban-homicidal mullahs driven by a hatred of modernity itself--so what? Who cares who rules this flyspeck in Central Asia? So said
the wise elder statesmen. The "so what" question has now been answered definitively; the answer lies in the rubble of the World
Trade Center and Pentagon.
Terrorists have the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons – An attack would escalate into full-scale nuclear war
Patrick F. Speice Jr., 2006 [Patrick F. Speice, Jr. is an associate in Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher's Washington, D.C. office. Mr.
Speice currently practices in the firm’s International Trade Regulation and Compliance Department, focusing on export controls
and economic sanctions compliance, and in the firm's Litigation Department. He earned his J.D. in 2006 from the Marshall-Wythe
School of Law at the College of William & Mary, where he served as an Articles Editor for the William and Mary Law Review and
as a Graduate Research Fellow. Mr. Speice earned a B.A. in political science cum laude in 2003 from Wake Forest University
“Negligence and Nuclear Nonproliferation,” William & Mary Law Review, 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427, February]
Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or fissile material
from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era nuclear
security measures. Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including “steal[ing] one
intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or …[being] sold or given one by such a country, or
[buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways.” Equally threatening,
however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own.
Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. Although nuclear devices are
extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant. Moreover, the
sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the United States makes it incredibly likely
that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built. Accordingly, supply-side controls that are
aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most effective means of
countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaing a
large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. This resulted in at least 35,000 former
scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, raising the chilling prospect that these
scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist
organization with nuclear ambitions. The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and
material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist
attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of human and economic losses. Moreover, there would be
immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons,
massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict.
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Hegemony solves Middle Eastern Conflicts
American Leadership is key to preventing future conflict in the Middle East
Christopher, 4 (December 30, Warren, New York Times staff writer,
http://select.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=FB0B14F93C5D0C738FDDAB0994DC404482, Michigan
owes me four dollars – you’ll see why)
America has always been the indispensable party for progress in the Middle East. The brilliant efforts of Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger in 1974 and 1975 brought about Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai and the peninsula's return to Egypt. President Jimmy
Carter's legendary endeavors at Camp David in 1978 produced the Israel-Egypt peace treaty, which was supported by American
financial assistance to both countries. That aid continues to yield returns today. And when Israel and Jordan negotiated a peace
accord in July 1994, King Hussein, the present King's father, told me that the negotiations could not have succeeded without
tangible support from the United States, which was forthcoming in the form of debt forgiveness and military equipment. But
meaningful American involvement at this critical time will require more than words and dollars -- it must take the form of action. It
will not be enough for President Bush to make broad policy statements, however eloquent. It will also require something beyond
telephone diplomacy by Secretary of State-designate Condoleezza Rice. Reliance on these hands-off methods promises a
continuation of the past four years' failures.
The impact is nuclear war
Steinbach, 2 (John, Center for Research on Globalization, March 3,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html)
The Israeli nuclear arsenal has profound implications for the future of peace in the Middle East, and indeed, for the entire planet. It is clear from
Israel Shahak that Israel has no interest in peace except that which is dictated on its own terms, and has absolutely no intention of negotiating in good faith to
curtail its nuclear program or discuss seriously a nuclear-free Middle East, "Israel's insistence on the independent use of its nuclear weapons can be seen as the
foundation on which Israeli grand strategy rests."(34) According to Seymour Hersh, "the size and sophistication of Israel's nuclear arsenal allows men such as Ariel
Sharon to dream of redrawing the map of the Middle East aided by the implicit threat of nuclear force."(35) General Amnon Shahak-Lipkin, former Israeli Chief of Staff
is quoted "It is never possible to talk to Iraq about no matter what; It is never possible to talk to Iran about no matter what. Certainly about nuclearization. With
Syria we cannot really talk either."(3 6) Ze'ev Shiff, an Israeli military expert writing in Haaretz said, "Whoever believes that Israel will ever sign the UN Convention
prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons... is day dreaming,"(37) and Munya Mardoch, Director of the Israeli Institute for the Development of Weaponry,
said in 1994, "The moral and political meaning of nuclear weapons is that states which renounce their use are acquiescing to the status of Vassal states. All those
states which feel satisfied with possessing conventional weapons alone are fated to become vassal states."(38) As Israeli society becomes more and more polarized,
the influence of the radical right becomes stronger. According to Shahak, "The prospect of Gush Emunim, or some secular right-wing Israeli fanatics, or some some of
the delerious Israeli Army generals, seizing control of Israeli nuclear weapons...cannot be precluded. ...while israeli jewish society undergoes a steady polarization,
the Israeli security system increasingly relies on the recruitment of cohorts from the ranks of the extreme right."(39) The Arab states, long aware of Israel's nuclear
program, bitterly resent its coercive intent, and perceive its existence as the paramount threat to peace in the region, requiring their own weapons of mass
destruction. During a future Middle Eastern war (a distinct possibility given the ascension of Ariel Sharon, an unindicted war criminal with a bloody record
stretching from the massacre of Palestinian civilians at Quibya in 1953, to the massacre of Palestinian civilians at Sabra and Shatila in 1982 and beyond) the possible
Israeli use of nuclear weapons should not be discounted. According to Shahak, "In Israeli terminology, the launching of missiles on to Israeli territory is regarded as
'nonconventional' regardless of whether they are equipped with explosives or poison gas."(40) (Which requires a "nonconventional" response, a perhaps unique
exception being the Iraqi SCUD attacks during the Gulf War.) Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has
serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in
the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a
last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and
the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely
reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to
U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland
seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously
destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel
refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a
world conflagration." (44)
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***Aff Responses***
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18
Hegemony Declining – Economic Overstretch
US Hegemony on the decline – increasing deficits and unstable debts prove
Dustin Ensinger, contributing journalist for the EconomyInCrisis.org, 2010 [February 2, 2010, “Huge Deficits
Altering US Hegemony, http://www.economyincrisis.org/content/huge-deficits-altering-us-hegemony)
The sun may finally be setting on the American Century, according to The New York Times, which claims that America‘s
massive and unsustainable debt will be the cause of waning influence around the world in the near future.
Not only is the deficit out-of-control - expected to be 1.3 trillion in the 2011 fiscal year - but the nation’s projected long-term
debt is even more unsustainable. By the end of the decade, deficits are projected to rise to over five percent of gross domestic
product. “[Obama’s] budget draws a picture of a nation that like many American homeowners simply cannot get above water,”
The Times writes. Even worse, much of that debt is borrowed from foreign central banks, especially Asian powers Japan and
China. As of September 2009, China held $790 billion of U.S. debt while Japan held roughly $752 billion.
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19
Hegemony Declining – Middle East
US Hegemony is declining – the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have exposed US weaknesses and the
economic crisis continues to worsen
The Guardian 2010 [May 31, 2010, Chris Phillips, staff writer on Middle Eastern affairs, “US Hegemony in Middle
East is Ending, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/31/us-hegemony-middle-east-ending)
Yet even though the return to cold war bi-polar blocs in the Middle East is unlikely, the region's international relations are
changing. US power is waning. Though Washington remains the world's only superpower, the quagmires of Iraq and
Afghanistan have exposed the limits of US ambitions, while the economic crisis has forced the Obama administration to focus
energy elsewhere.While the Bush era saw the US hegemonic in the region, squeezing the defiant few like Syria and Saddam
Hussein's Iraq, today's Middle East sees a power vacuum led by partial US retreat being filled by assertive regional and middle
powers. Turkey and Brazil's recent nuclear deal with Iran typify this emerging new climate. Stephen Walt has highlighted that
this shift in power is global, with Asia's share of GDP already outstripping that of the US or Europe. As ever, it seems the
Middle East could prove a microcosm of these international changes. If the age of American uni-polarity is coming to an end,
perhaps hastened by unnecessary wars and economic shortsightedness, it is much more likely that international relations in the
Middle East will come to reflect the multi-polar world that will follow rather than revert to a bi-polar cold war.
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20
Hegemony Declining – Multipolarity Now
US hegemony declining – a shift to a multipolar world is immediate – US economy and unnecessary
wars ensure Asia’s dominance
The Guardian 2010 [May 31, 2010, Chris Phillips, staff writer on Middle Eastern affairs, “US Hegemony in Middle
East is Ending, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/31/us-hegemony-middle-east-ending)
Stephen Walt has highlighted that this shift in power is global, with Asia's share of GDP already outstripping that of the US or
Europe. As ever, it seems the Middle East could prove a microcosm of these international changes. If the age of American unipolarity is coming to an end, perhaps hastened by unnecessary wars and economic shortsightedness, it is much more likely that
international relations in the Middle East will come to reflect the multi-polar world that will follow rather than revert to a bipolar cold war. In such circumstances, it won't just be Russia and Turkey expanding their reach in the region, but China, India
and Brazil will all bid for a role, too – presumably having fewer demands than Washington about their clients pursuing
democratic reforms and peace with Israel. Saudi Arabia's growing relationship with China might signify the shape of things to
come.
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Link Turns
The us military is destabilizing the Middle East—removing troops ensures regional security without antiAmerican backlash, solves their offense
Preble, 3 (Chrsitopher Preble, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at CATO and Former U.S. Navy Officer, CATO
Policy Analysis, “After Victory: Toward a New Military Posture in the Persian Gulf”, p. Online:
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa477.pdf)
On a broader level, the Middle East need not be stabilized by an overwhelming American military presence. U.S. troops provide a
greater level of security than what regional actors might choose to provide. To the extent that American troops have become a
lightning rod for anti-American extremists, however, U.S. troops have been a notably destabilizing influence. In short, there is a
middle ground between U.S. hegemony and total chaos wherein stability can exist without the presence of thousands of American
troops and without generating an anti- American, anti-democratic backlash.
Withdrawing troops helps Hegemony – it curbs backlash.
The New York Times in 06 [Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press and Benjamin Valentino; December 12, 2006; “Time to
Offshore Our Troops”; Lexis]
THE Iraq Study Group's recommendation that the United States withdraw its combat forces from Iraq reflects a growing
national consensus that our military cannot quell the violence there and may even be making matters worse. Although many are
hailing this recommendation as a bold new course, it is not bold enough. America will best serve its interests in the Persian
Gulf by withdrawing its ground-based military forces not only from Iraq, but from the entire region. Critics of the
report continue to debate the wisdom and details of a drawdown in Iraq, but there has been no debate about America's broader
strategy in the gulf. Policymakers and analysts from across the political spectrum assume that the United States must
maintain a robust military presence there. The bipartisan authors of the report, for example, advocate maintaining ''a
considerable military presence in the region'' including ''powerful air, ground and naval deployments in Kuwait, Bahrain and
Qatar'' even after the last American combat troops leave Iraq. Others -- including Donald Rumsfeld and Hillary Clinton -- go
further and consider strengthening our forces around the gulf by shifting some troops from Iraq to neighboring countries.
Maintaining a large military presence in the region has been the cornerstone of American policy since the 1991 Persian Gulf
war, and remains so today. With the Iraq war, we now have tens of thousands of troops elsewhere in the
neighborhood. But this strategy is flawed. In fact, many of the same considerations that led the Iraq Study Group to
call for withdrawal of combat forces from Iraq suggest that the United States should withdraw its troops from
neighboring states as well -- leaving only naval forces offshore in international waters. As in Iraq, a large United
States military footprint on the ground undermines American interests more than it protects them. Just as our
troops on Iraqi streets have provided a rallying point for the insurgency, the United States military presence
throughout the region has been a key element in Al Qaeda's recruitment campaign and propaganda. If America
withdrew from Iraq but left behind substantial forces in neighboring states, Al Qaeda would refocus its attacks on
American troops in those countries -- remember the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia? Worse,
the continued presence of our military personnel across the region will continue to incite extremists to attack
American cities. Osama bin Ladin repeatedly stated that the presence of American forces on the holy ground of the
Arabian Peninsula was a primary reason for 9/11. Our presence also destabilizes our important regional allies. Not
only do American bases make these countries a target for terrorists, but many of their citizens bristle at the sight of
United States bases on their soil. Indeed, the most serious near-term threat to our energy interests is the overthrow
of friendly governments by domestic Islamic extremists, a danger that is increased by the presence of our troops.
The good news is that the United States does not need to station military forces on the ground in Persian Gulf countries to
protect its allies or to secure its vital oil interests. For nearly 30 years, Pentagon planners have focused on two principal threats
in the gulf: the conquest of major oil reserves (by the Soviet Union or a regional power like Iraq or Iran) and interference with
shipping through Persian Gulf waters, particularly through the Strait of Hormuz. Forces stationed ''over the horizon'' -- afloat in
the Indian Ocean and at bases outside the Middle East -- can address both threats. By maintaining a strong naval presence
in the Indian Ocean, along with some naval forces in the international waters of the Persian Gulf itself, the United
States would be able to thwart an invasion of any gulf oil producer. Long-range American aircraft stationed at Diego
Garcia, an island in the Indian Ocean, could contribute as well. Should more substantial threats arise, those air and
naval forces would buy time for ground forces and land-based aircraft to return to bases in the region. This is the
same strategy that the United States used to defend the Persian Gulf during the later years of the cold war. It would
be even more effective now. Today's adversaries have considerably less offensive military power than 15 years ago:
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22
Link Turns
Foreign military presence will collapse the US empire
Catherine Lutz, (Prof., International Studies, Brown U.), THE BASES OF EMPIRE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE
AGAINST U.S. MILITARY POSTS, 2009, 9-10.
States that invest their people's wealth in overseas bases have paid direct as well as opportunity costs, the consequences of
which in the long run have usually been collapse of the empire. In The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, Kennedy notes that
previous empires which established and tenaciously held onto overseas bases inevitably saw their wealth and power decay and
that history demonstrates that military "security" alone is never enough. It may, over the shorter term, deter or defeat rival states
... [b]ut if, by such victories, the nation over-extends itself geographically and strategically; if, even at a less imperial level, it
chooses to devote a large proportion of its total income to "protection," leaving less for "productive investment," it is likely to
find its economic output slowing down, with dire implications for its long-term capacity to maintain both its citizens'
consumption demands and its international position.
US militarism results in overstretch and US decline
Chalmers Johnson, (President, Japan Research Institute), ASIA TIMES, Aug. 4, 2009. Retrieved Jan. 22, 2010 from
www.atimes.com.
However ambitious United States President Barack Obama's domestic plans, one unacknowledged issue has the potential to
destroy any reform efforts he might launch. Think of it as the 800-pound gorilla in the American living room: our longstanding
reliance on imperialism and militarism in our relations with other countries and the vast, potentially ruinous global empire of
bases that goes with it. The failure to begin to deal with our bloated military establishment and the profligate use of it in
missions for which it is hopelessly inappropriate will, sooner rather than later, condemn the United States to a devastating trio
of consequences: imperial overstretch, perpetual war and insolvency, leading to a likely collapse similar to that of the former
Soviet Union.
Massive local foreign opposition to US bases
Catherine Lutz, (Prof., International Studies, Brown U.), THE BASES OF EMPIRE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE
AGAINST U.S. MILITARY POSTS, 2009, 14.
Between 1947 and 1990, the United States was asked to leave France, Yugoslavia, Iran, Ethiopia, Libya, Sudan, Saudi Arabia,
Tunisia, Algeria, Vietnam, Indonesia, Peru, Mexico, and Venezuela. Popular and political objection to the bases in Spain, the
Philippines, Greece, and Turkey in the 1980s meant that those governments were able to negotiate significantly more
compensation from the United States. Portugal threatened to evict the United States from important bases in the Azores unless
it ceased its support for independence for its African colonies, a demand with which the United States complied. In the 1990s
and later, the United States was sent packing, most significantly, from the Philippines, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Vieques, and
Uzbekistan.
US bases just make the populace targets for foreign attack
Catherine Lutz, (Prof., International Studies, Brown U.), THE BASES OF EMPIRE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE
AGAINST U.S. MILITARY POSTS, 2009, 26-27.
Critical observers of U.S. foreign policy, Chalmers Johnson foremost among them, have thoroughly dissected and dismantled
several of the arguments that have been made for maintaining a global military basing system. They have shown that the system
has often failed in its own terms, that is, has not provided more safety for the United States or its allies, and U.S. apologists fail
to characterize what the bases actually do: while said to provide defense and security, the U.S. presence has often created more
attacks rather than fewer, as in Saudi Arabia or in Iraq. They have made the communities around the base a key target of Soviet
or other nations' missiles, and local people recognize this. So on the island of Belau in the Pacific, site of sharp resistance to U.S.
attempts to install a submarine base and jungle training center, people describe their experience of military basing in World War
II: "When soldiers come, war comes." Likewise, on Guam, a common joke has it that few people but nuclear targeters in the
Kremlin knew where their island is. Finally, U.S. military actions have often produced violence in the form of blowback rather
than squelched it, undermining their own stated realist objectives.
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23
Impact Turns
US hegemony is ill defined – it will continue to expand dangerously and entangle the US in foreign conflicts
Conry, 97 (Barbara, Foreign Policy Analyst at Cato Institute. http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-267es.html)
"Global leadership" has gained increasing prominence as a guiding principle for American foreign policy. Yet the concept itself
remains largely unexamined. Although "leadership" sounds benign, today's proponents of global leadership envision a role for the
United States that resembles that of a global hegemon--with the risks and costs hegemony entails. Global political and military
leadership is inadequate, even dangerous, as a basis for policy. The vagueness of "leadership" allows policymakers to
rationalize dramatically different initiatives and makes defining policy difficult. Taken to an extreme, global leadership implies U.S.
interest in and responsibility for virtually anything, anywhere. Global leadership also entails immense costs and risks. Much of
the $265 billion defense budget is spent to support U.S. aspirations to lead the world, not to defend the United States. There are
also human costs. Moreover, it is an extremely risky policy that forces U.S. involvement in numerous situations unrelated to
American national security.
These entanglement wars risk nuclear conflict
Layne, 97 (Christopher, Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, “From Preponderance to
Offshore Balancing” International Security, Summer)
The insurance argument advanced by the strategy of preponderance’s advocates is also problematic. Great power war is
rare because it is always an uncertain undertaking: war is to some extent its own deterrent. It is, however, an imperfect
deterrent: great power wars do happen, and they will happen in the future. In a world where nuclear weapons exist the
consequences of U.S. involvement could be enormous. The strategy of preponderance purports to insure the
United States against the risk of war. If extended deterrence fails, however, the strategy actually ensures that America
will be involved in war at its onset. As Californians know, there are some risks (earthquakes, for example) for which
insurance is either prohibitively expensive or not available at any price because, although the probability of the event
may be small, if it occurred the cost to the insurer would be catastrophic. Offshore balancing has the considerable
advantage of giving the United States a high degree of strategic choice and, unlike the strategy of preponderance, a
substantial measure of control over its fate.
Interventions on behalf of the liberal order perpetuate endless war
Layne, 98 (Christopher, Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, World Policy Journal,
“Rethinking American grand strategy: Hegemony or balance of power in the twenty-first century?” Volume 15, Issue 2,
Summer, Proquest)
Indochina and Bosnia demonstrate how the strategy of preponderance expands America's frontiers of insecurity. The
posited connection between security and economic interdependence requires the United States to impose order on, and
control over, the international system. To do so, it must continually enlarge the geographic scope of its strategic
responsibilities to maintain the security of its already established interests. As the political scientist Robert H. Johnson
observes, this process becomes self-sustaining because each time the United States pushes its security interests outward,
threats to the new security frontier will be apprehended: "Uncertainty leads to self-extension, which leads in turn to new
uncertainty and further self-extension." 16 Core and periphery are interdependent strategically; however, while the core
remains constant, the turbulent frontier in the periphery is constantly expanding. One does not overstate in arguing that
this expansion is potentially limitless. Former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski recently has suggested, for
example, that NATO expansion is just the first step toward creating an American-dominated "Trans Eurasian Security
System" [TESS], that ultimately will embrace Russia, China, Japan, India, and other countries--a security structure "that
would span the entire [Eurasian] continent." 17 There is a suggestive parallel between late Victorian Britain and the
United States today. The late-nineteenth-cenury British statesman Lord Rosebery, clearly recognized that economic
interdependence could lead to strategic overextension: Our commerce is so universal and so penetrating that scarcely
any question can arise in any part of the world without involving British interests. This consideration, instead of
widening, rather circumscribes the field of our actions. For did we not strictly limit the principle of intervention we
should always be simultaneously engaged in some forty wars. 18
23
Golden Desert 2010
Hegemony Disad
24
Impact Turns
Hegemony kills the domestic economy
Layne, ’97 (Christopher, Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, “From Preponderance to
Offshore Balancing” International Security, Summer)
Is the strategy of preponderance directly responsible for America’s relative economic decline (or for making it worse
than it otherwise might have been)? This is a complex question. Defense spending does not invariably lead to economic
decline; indeed, under certain conditions it can stimulate economic growth.66 It could be argued in fact that America’s
sustained postwar economic growth would have been impossible without “military Keynesianism.”67 Nevertheless, the
cumulative effect of the high levels of national security—related spending required to support preponderance is that the
United States is less well off economically than it otherwise would have been. Gilpin has outlined the causal logic
supporting this conclusion. As he points out, the overhead costs of empire are high: “In order to maintain its dominant
position, a state must expend its resources on military forces, the financing of allies, foreign aid, and the costs associated
with maintaining the international economy. These protection and related costs are not productive investments; they
constitute an economic drain on the economy of the dominant state.”68 Although not conclusive, some evidence
suggests that, directly and indirectly, the strategy of preponderance has contributed significantly to the relative decline
of U.S. economic power. David Calleo has shown that the inflationary spiral ignited by the Vietnam War, coupled with
the dollar outflows required to sustain America’s preeminent military and economic position, were factors in
undermining U.S. economic competitiveness and relative economic power (reflected in the chronic balance-ofpayments and trade deficits the United States has incurred since 1971).69 The high levels of defense spending the
strategy requires also have significant opportunity costs, and affect long-term economic performance by diverting scarce
resources from the civilian economy. 70 Even though it constitutes a relatively small share of U.S. GNP, the adverse
economic impact of defense spending, as the economist Lloyd L. Dumas observes, can “be dramatically out of
proportion to its relative size” because it diverts from productive uses “substantial amounts of critical economic
resources.”71
Hegemony undermines the economy – trades off with domestic investments
Gholz, 97 (Eugene Gholz and Daryl Press were doctoral candidates in the Dept of Political Science at MIT, Harvey
Sapolsky is Prof of Public Policy and Organization in the Dept of Political Science at MIT, International Security,
Spring 1997)
Advocates of a larger defense budget often point out that America’s defense spending as a share of GDP has dropped
to pre—Cold War levels, largely because of the steady growth of the U.S. economy. This statistic indicates a reduction
in the defense budget’s drain on the economy, but the fact remains that America is buying as much military capability as
it bought during typical Cold War years. Unless this military capability is needed, America is wasting valuable resources.
Even for the United States, the cost of keeping armed and involved beyond security needs is large. The United States
could pay for a robust defense, fully capable of protecting its security and economic interests anywhere in the world,
with a budget of $120 billion—half the current size but still significantly higher than the world’s second biggest defense
budget.12 Spending twice that, as the United States currently does, deprives taxpayers of the fruit of their labor and
society of the resources to engage domestic problems. Advocates of continued military activism argue that their policy
is a form of insurance. Insurance is intended to mitigate the costs of unlikely events, but military engagement abroad
accomplishes the reverse: it magnifies the costs and risks of faraway wars by involving Americans directly in them. Its
hefty premiums sap U.S. prosperity.
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Golden Desert 2010
Hegemony Disad
25
Impact Turns
US hegemony leads to terrorism and counter-hegemonic balancing
Layne, 2 (Christopher, Associate Professor in the School of International Studies at University of Miami, The
Washington Quarterly, “U.S. Response to the ‘Looking Glass’”, Volume 25, Issue 2, L/N)
The U.S. role in the Gulf has rendered it vulnerable to a hegemonic backlash on several levels. First, some important
states in the region (including Iran and Iraq) aligned against the United States because they resented its intrusion into
regional affairs. Second, in the Gulf and the Middle East, the self-perception among both elites and the general public
that the region has long been a victim of "Western imperialism" is widespread. In this vein, the United States is viewed
as just the latest extraregional power whose imperial aspirations weigh on the region, which brings a third factor into
play. Because of its interest in oil, the United States is supporting regimes -- Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf
emirates -- whose domestic political legitimacy is contested. Whatever strategic considerations dictate that Washington
prop up these regimes, that it does so makes the United States a lightning rod for those within these countries who are
politically disaffected. Moreover, these regimes are not blind to the domestic challenges to their grip on power. Because
they are concerned about inflaming public opinion (the much talked about "street"), both their loyalty and utility as U.S.
allies are, to put it charitably, suspect. Finally, although U.S. hegemony is manifested primarily in its overwhelming
economic and military muscle, the cultural dimension to U.S. preeminence is also important. The events of September
11 have brought into sharp focus the enormous cultural clash, which inescapably has overtones of a "clash of
civilizations," between Islamic fundamentalism and U.S. liberal ideology.The terrorism of Osama bin Laden results in
part from this cultural chasm, as well as from more traditional geopolitical grievances. In a real sense, bin Laden's brand
of terrorism -- the most dramatic illustration of U.S. vulnerability to the kind of "asymmetric warfare" of which some
defense experts have warned -- is the counterhegemonic balancing of the very weak. For all of these reasons, the
hegemonic role that the strategy of preponderance assigns to the United States as the Gulf's stabilizer was bound to
provoke a multilayered backlash against U.S. predominance in the region. Indeed, as Richard K. Betts, an acknowledged
expert on strategy, presciently observed several years ago, "It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be
hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the United States had not been identified so long as
the mainstay of Israel, the shah of Iran, and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on Islam."
n15 (Betts was referring to the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center.)
Extinction
Alexander, 3---professor and director of the Inter-University for Terrorism Studies (Yonah , Washington Times, 8/28)
Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international
community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of
civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or
irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September
11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center
of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of
1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each
suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire
arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal
nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the
manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the
religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by
terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new
scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of
current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear
and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.
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