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KAM Tan / 79-381 (Fall 2012)
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Macroeconomic impacts of peak oil: implications
for growth in the 21st century
Kevin Alastair M. Tan
Carnegie Mellon University
Since the emergence of our species, the fortunes of human societies have been closely
linked to their energy supply. This relationship remains equally important in the present day.
Despite continuous gains in energy efficiency, global energy consumption has risen
exponentially, closely mimicking patterns of economic growth. In response to the meteoric rise
of oil prices during the mid-2000s, there have been fresh concerns over the world’s ability to
maintain a growing energy supply. Oil production has remained steady since mid-2004
(Tverberg 2012; Rapier, 86), despite record-high prices and vigorous investment. These
developments, along with the rapid growth seen in newly-industrialized countries, cast serious
doubts on the ability of oil producers to satiate demand (Rapier, 87). Consequently, many
economists cite tight oil supply as a primary cause of the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent
continued economic malaise (Hamilton et al. 2009; Tverberg 2012). Regardless of the exact
timing of peak oil, the macroeconomic impacts of an inelastic oil supply are already evident; a
stagnant or declining energy supply is simply at odds with our growth-based economic
paradigm. It will be very difficult for alternative energy sources and efficiency gains to
compensate for ever-increasing energy demand alongside declining oil production.
Energy and Wealth – Historical Relationships
It is important to characterize the historical relationships between energy and wealth,
as it is integral in framing peak oil within a broad historical context. They key to understanding
these relationships is through the concept of energy return on investment (EROI). Simply put,
EROI is the ratio of the amount of usable energy acquired to the amount of effort—or energy—
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expended in attaining it. Even the evolutionary success of the human species can be attributed
to energy utilization. With the advent of bipedalism, humans only required a quarter of the
energy per unit of travel compared to other primates. Additionally, the discovery of fire
externalized the significant energy requirements of digestion and temperature regulation. The
resultant surplus of energy was then redirected to brain function, giving rise to humans’
superior cognitive abilities (Brown et al. 2011; Hall & Clitgaard, 42-44).
In pre-agricultural societies, the EROI of hunting and gathering dictated population size
and standard-of-living. If the round-trip distance of gathering the required amount of food
exceeded 11 miles, EROI dropped substantially, as this required an additional days’ work (Hall
& Klitgaard, 44). Hunter-gatherer communities were generally placated with an EROI at or
above 10kcal gained to 1kcal expended. When EROI dropped below that threshold,
communities became strained; the most common resolution was migration. Periods of
competition and unfavorable climate conditions dropped EROI below 10:1 with varying
frequency, spurring waves of human migrations (Brown et al. 2011).
The agricultural revolution dramatically raised the EROI of food. The abundance of
energy enabled the formation of cities, bureaucracies, and governments—in other words,
civilization. However, the pre-industrial equivalent of Jevon’s Paradox is that gains in
agricultural yields will be outweighed by corresponding increases in population and societal
complexity (Hall & Klitgaard, 48). The net effect was a decrease in nutritional standards for the
masses, and a general deprecation of quality-of-life compared to hunting and gathering
(Tainter 191). As agricultural societies grew in terms of population and GDP, they eventually
reached the production capacity of their territorial environment. Thus, in order to grow further,
civilizations needed to use strategies of territorial expansion and subjugation (Hall & Klitgaard,
57; Tainter, 192).
While initial expansion is quite fruitful, continued expansion gradually
decreases in EROI until expansion is no longer viable. As territory expands and energy supply
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grows, Jevon’s Paradox strikes again and gains are outweighed by corresponding increases in
population and bureaucratic complexity. Additionally, territorial expansions result in increased
military expenditures for defense; militaries tend to dominate civilizations before they collapse
(Tainter, 193). Thus, the EROI of territorial expansion eventually drops below the threshold of
viability (Hall & Klitgaard, 57)
The rise and fall of Roman civilization is a classic example of the outlined
developmental trajectory. The Romans were very adept at maximizing energy yields from their
lands, using efficacious agricultural practices and advanced technologies such as viaducts
(Tainter, 128). This gave them a stark EROI advantage over surrounding civilizations (Hall &
Klitgaard, 58). Nevertheless, the Romans were still restrained by the biological limits of the
land. Thus, they engaged in a robust strategy of territorial expansion to maintain a growing
energy supply. As they conquered land, they cultivated them to their maximum potential
through the application of Roman knowledge and technology (Tainter, 129-131). Most of the
additional production was exported to core regions and the state (military, food subsidies,
etc.). For a time, this strategy worked quite well; large urban centers like Constantinople and
Rome enjoyed per-capita GDPs equivalent to today’s upper-middle income countries (Hall &
Klitgaard, 59). Eventually, the energy requirements of maintaining a vast territory—
transportation, defense, bureaucracies, commodities chains—exceeded environmentallylimited production capacity, with further territorial expansions resulting in diminishing returns
or outright failure. At this point, the empire was under an incredible amount of stress. It took
just one Barbarian invasion to induce the collapse of Western Roman Empire, ushering in a
new era colloquially referred to as the Dark Ages (Tainter, 148; Hall & Klitgaard, 59). This
trajectory of growth, limits to growth, stagnation, and collapse has been ubiquitous in empires
throughout the world, from the Amerindian civilizations, to the Chinese dynasties, and even the
Soviet Union (Tainter, 193).
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The Hydrocarbon Revolution: Rise of the West
The fall of the
Roman Empire resulted
in a rapid depopulation of
the European continent
as life-support systems
like viaducts and food
distribution networks fell
into
disrepair
Klitgaard, 67).
(Hall
Hydrocarbon energy resulted in a
corresponding increase in GDP
Source: Hall & Klitgaard
&
Europe
was an economic and cultural backwater. For several centuries before the rise of the West, the
world’s superpowers were India, China, and the Ottoman Empire (Marks, 124). Due to favorable
climactic conditions, education, and technological prowess, these regions enjoyed much
higher EROIs compared to Europe, as Roman knowledge and infrastructure had been long lost
(Hall & Klitgaard, 67). European travelers (i.e. Marco Polo) often sought to emulate the
bountiful agriculture found in these superpowers. Foreign goods—particularly from India and
China—flooded European markets, as the energy-starved and primitive industries of Europe
could not compete with established industrial powerhouses (Marks, 125). As Europe had little
to sell to the world market, there was a millennium of continuous trade deficit, which further
trapped Europe in a cycle of poverty (Tainter, 191).
Europe’s economic fortunes began to change during the 16th century renaissance,
which coincided with the beginning of colonialism in the Americas. The ecological richness of
unspoiled American land provided European powers with high-EROI sources of energy,
primarily in the form of timber, sugar, cotton, and fish (Marks, 125). However, coloniallysourced energy gains were eclipsed by the mass adoption of coal, which first began in 1750s
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Britain (Hall & Klitgaard, 69). Coal—a product of millions of years’ worth of compressed
biomass—exceeded all previous energy sources in abundance, energy density, and usability by
several orders-of-magnitude. For the first time, humanity could transcend the limits to growth
imposed by annual solar energy flows—limits that had plagued all successful civilizations
since the agricultural revolution. The end of the “biological old regime” in Europe marked the
true beginning of the rise of the West (Marks, 126).
The beginnings of industrialization utilized traditional sources of energy, namely hydropower. However, the true potential of industrialization was unleashed by the adoption of fossil
energy (Smil, 1-3). Due to the abundance of energy, machines became ubiquitous and could be
scaled up exponentially. The adoption of fossil energy in transportation introduced rapid
mobility to the masses, effectively compressing space and time. All of these factors resulted in
unprecedented gains in economic productivity, socioeconomic complexity, and population size
(Brown et al. 2012). This new-found energy, wealth, and technology spurred widespread and
systematic European conquest of the Americas, Asia, and Africa, further fueling the West’s
meteoric rise. By the mid-19th century, the West had attained unquestioned economic,
geopolitical, and military dominance the world over. Regions still stuck in the “biological old
regime” entered a poverty trap due to limited energy access alongside varying degrees of
economic, political, and military subjugation—regions now referred to as the “developing
world” (Marks, 205-7)
Neoliberalism – Energy, Debt and Growth
In the decades following World War II, widespread reforms of economic liberalization,
financial deregulation, and privatization have brought with it a new economic and geopolitical
paradigm commonly referred to as “neoliberalism.” The resurgence of laissez-faire ideology
was a response to widespread stagflation in the developed world. The perceived inefficiencies
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of Keynesian economics and the welfare state were blamed as the primary cause of economic
malaise; thus, these systems were eschewed in favor of the private sector and market forces
(Hamilton et al. 2009). Aided by the efforts of transnational institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization, the world’s markets—
particularly in the developing world—had become much freer by the end of the 1980’s. This had
the effect of accelerating the currents of globalization, bringing about a new level of economic
integration and interdependency throughout the capitalist world—the mass delocalization of
commodity chains (Hall & Klitgaard, 191-192).
With economic liberalization and relaxed labor laws, neoliberalism spurred the
deindustrialization of high-income countries. Freer markets made it viable for rich-world
companies to access the low-cost labor and commodities markets of the developing world.
Furthermore, the erosion of labor protections and deunionization made it much easier to
outsource (Hall & Klitgaard, 193). In effect, this externalized much of the energy costs of
developed nations, as energy-intensive industries such as manufacturing were outsourced to
developing nations (Smil, 88). Thus, economies increased their dependence on oil, as
transportation distances grew exponentially. The green revolution is also thought to be a
derivative of neoliberal currents (Marks, 186). The green revolution increased agricultural
productivity by 200-300%, resulting in a corresponding increase in world population. This was
possible primarily due to the
use of hydrocarbon
energy
inputs in agriculture: fertilizers,
pesticides, mechanized farming
techniques, and increasinglydelocalized food chains. Thus,
Tight correlation of food and oil prices. Source: UN FAO
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food prices became tightly coupled with oil prices (Hall & Klitgaard, 385-6). Overall,
neoliberalism increased the “energy overhead” of economic activity.
Neoliberal
deregulation
of
the financial industry has caused it
to become the dominant force in
shaping
the
world
economy
Source: Hamilton et al. 2009
(Hamilton et al 2009). “No matter
where you are in the world, you can’t
do anything big without the approval
of Wall Street” (Hall & Klitgaard, 191). Deregulation has facilitated the availability of credit, both
public and private. The advent of complicated financial instruments such as derivatives serve
as robust mechanisms of credit creation through the speculation or hedging of the value of
other assets, called underliers. Underliers are a combination of commodities and other
financial products such as mortgages, stocks, and bonds—in other words, the creation of
credit through debt (Hall & Klitgaard, 197-9). Consequently, debt levels in rich countries have
skyrocketed, often exceeding value of national GDPs two-or-threefold. Much of the economic
growth seen in the neoliberal era can be attributed to debt (i.e. deficit spending), and its
consequences have been felt in the form of financial crises and austerity measures (Hamilton
et al. 2009).
Mainstream economists cite economic growth as a reliable apparatus for sustaining
high debt loads, as growth facilitates the relatively painless distribution of debt to the rest of
the economy (Hall & Klitgaard, 195). Thus, the assumption of indefinite economic growth
serves as a postulate for the contemporary financial system—debt would not be fundable
without it. In a world with an expanding energy supply, this postulate has held true. However,
the looming specter of peak oil questions the ability of the world’s energy supply to fuel the
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requisite economic growth. Is the debt-based growth of the neoliberal era analogous to the
overexpansion seen in agricultural civilizations reaching their energetic limits? Can the world
economy transcend Jevon’s paradox and grow despite steady or declining energy
consumption? Perhaps more so than any other time in history, the neoliberal era has created
an economic system that is incredibly sensitive to fluctuations in energy supply.
Macroeconomic Impacts of Energy Scarcity
Though
still
raising
some contention, the causal
relationship
between
energy
supply and economic growth
has been well established by a
plethora of historical, economic,
and ecological studies, which
generally conclude that the
capacity to increase energy
consumption is a prerequisite
for economic growth (Brown et
al. 2011; Tverberg 2012; Hirsch et
Wealth and energy consumption have a strong relationship: spread
is due to differing customs and climates. Source: Hamilton et al.
2009
al. 2005; Rapier, 11; Hall & Klitgaard, 34; Tainter, 37). Throughout the history of humanity,
“most metrics of wellbeing, such as GDP and literacy, were all positively correlated with, and
caused by, energy consumption” (Brown et al. 2012). Since World War II, eleven out of the
twelve global recessions were preceded by oil price shocks (Tverberg 2012). In the age of
petroleum, growth seems to stop when oil expenditures exceed ~6% of GDP, whether in
individual countries or the entire world (Hall & Klitgaard, 378). Compounded by the volatility
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Petroleum expenditures exceeding ~6% of GDP stops economic growth. (Source: Hall &
Klitgaard)
induced by neoliberal reforms (i.e. financial deregulation), prominent economists point to the
record-breaking oil shock of 2006-2008 as the primary cause of the financial crisis and Great
Recession. The general consensus is that meaningful economic growth—at least in advanced
economies—will not occur unless there is a substantial increase in oil supply (Hamilton et al.
2009).
Energy price shocks induce negative feedback loops of dampened economic activity
that spread quickly throughout the world economy (Brown et al. 2011). The neoliberal
delocalization of economies results in increased sensitivity to transportation costs, which are
even more pertinent in the United States, which is almost wholly dependent on automobile
transportation. Due to the green revolution, food prices have become tightly coupled to oil
prices. The 2006-2008 oil shock caused the largest food crisis in recent memory; millions were
pushed into in water-stressed regions such as the Sahel, while developed nations saw
unprecedented use of food subsidy programs, and even desperate acts food scavenging (Hall
& Klitgaard, 269). Also, production costs will rise as prices soar for basic commodities such as
metals and plastics, which tend to be very petroleum-intensive, not to mention that industrial
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production is energy-intensive in itself (Hamilton et al. 2009). The price of oil alternatives will
also soar, as demand shifts towards them. The impact of an oil shock will propagate
throughout the global economy, acting as a robust inflationary pressure, resulting in higher
interest rates and more expensive credit. Increased energy expenditures results in capital
flight, as oil expenditures generally do not feed back into the economies of oil consumers (Hall
& Klitgaard, 271).
Thus, the discretionary spending of consumers is set to decrease due to higher costs,
less credit, and asset devaluation (real estate, etc.), which will quickly stall economic growth
and contract the labor market, dampening economic activity even further. State finances will
also become strained due to general inflation, shrinking tax revenues, and increased use of
social welfare services (Hamilton et al. 2009). As seen with previous oil shocks, inherent
weaknesses in economies and governments tend to be revealed, resulting in price crashes,
currency devaluations, political upheaval, and social unrest (Hall & Klitgaard, 280). In the
United States, recession-inspired social and political movements, such as #Occupy and the
Tea Party, have been visible but fairly benign. The same does not hold true in the rest of the
developed world, which has seen dramatic shifts in political power along with endemic social
unrest.
Supply Estimates and Production Forecasts
Since the 2006-2008 oil shock, prices have remained at near historical highs; an
astonishing feat given the world’s continued economic malaise. Despite vigorous investments
in oil exploration, world oil production seems to have hit an apparent production cap of around
75 million barrels-per-day (mbd) in place since mid-2004 (Murray & King 2012). With a
production cap in place, demand eventually outpaces supply, and price will increase until it
results in demand destruction (i.e. recession). Once oil prices drop sufficiently, demand will
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begin to increase in response
to economic growth, repeating
the cycle once more. Thus far,
there are no indications of an
end to this pattern of volatile
price swings, despite signs of
adaption to higher oil prices,
such as gains energy efficiency
Declining rates of oil production growth. (Source: Tverberg 2012)
(especially in transportation) and utilization of alternative energy sources (Tverberg 2012).
The apparent production cap in oil production may be resultant of the lower EROIs of
the remaining oil supply. Oil fields that are the easiest to develop (ones with the highest EROIs)
are often consumed first, with order of field development generally coinciding with desirability
(Rapier, 94). For example, the two “megafields” of Saudi Arabia and Mexico were discovered in
the 1940’s and have been the largest oil fields found to date. These megafields contain very
high-quality oil that takes comparatively little effort to extract. However, production from these
fields has peaked due to the geophysical dynamics of oil extraction, namely the reduction of
internal pressure as more oil is extracted from the field (Rapier, 97). As the most desirable
fields are depleted, production shifts to less desirable fields that tend to be smaller in size and
contain lower-quality oil. More recent discoveries also tend to be more inaccessible, such as
deep sea or Arctic oil production. Producing from these locations is technically challenging
and costly, both in monetary and energetic terms (Rapier, 97-99). Since the 2000’s, there has
been an investment boom in “unconventional” sources of oil, such as tar sands or shale oil.
These sources contain oil that is extremely difficult to process, being in the form of amorphous
solids or oily rocks. Extraction and processing of these sources is much more difficult and
energy-intensive, as it is more akin to metal mining than oil drilling. Extraction involves the use
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of bulldozers, dump-trucks, and other heavy machinery (Smil, 204-205). Processing is very
energy and water-intensive, and results in enormous amounts of environmentally-hazardous
waste products (Rapier, 88). As a result, the EROI of unconventional oil sources is very low,
sometimes approaching 3:1, which is the minimum thermodynamically viable EROI for
biological systems (Brown et al. 2011). Thus, oil production from newer sites may not be able
to counteract declines in old sites. It is striking that four-fifths of today’s oil production still
comes from fields discovered before 1970 (Smil, 189).
Peak oil critics cite
comparisons
of
estimated
ultimately-recoverable
oil
reserves versus consumption
patterns. Many publications
show that the volume of oil
reserves
vastly
outweighs
consumption by an average
of 40 years (Smil, 187). However, reliable data on oil reserves is hard to come by, as estimates
are usually conducted by oil producers using opaque and non-standardized methodologies.
Many also speculate that reserve estimates are manipulated for political or economic reasons.
During the mid-1980’s, many OPEC countries doubled or even tripled their reserve estimates,
despite little change in rates of new discovery (Smil, 188). Leaked documents authored by
leading OPEC geologists state that Middle Eastern oil reserves are overestimated by 50-100%.
Furthermore, in several geological conferences, the former head geologist of Saudi Aramco has
expressed his belief that global oil reserves are overestimated by 20-30% (Rapier, 85).
Credibility is hard to assess, as gains could be had by either over or underestimating oil
reserves. Scientific institutions often use forecasting techniques based on the “Hubbert
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Curve.” Hubbert was
an
eminent
geologist
USGS
who
fit
production patterns
onto
a
normal
distribution
(Smil,
188).
curve
He
accurately predicted
peak oil production
Disparity between production-based
versus reserve-based oil forecasts.
(Source: Rapier)
of individual oil fields
to entire countries,
including the United States—however, his model is not infallible, and cannot account for
unexpected events such as war, revolution, or recession (Smil, 190). Production-based
forecasts predict global peak within 2010-2020, while reserve-based forecasts predict peak
beyond 2050 (Rapier, 87).
Growth in the 21st Century?
There has been a sharp disparity in economic performance between the developed
world and newly-industrialized countries (NICs) since the Great Recession. While most highincome countries have yet to recover, NICs are once again enjoying rapid and sustained
economic growth. Though meaningful growth is still only enjoyed by a minority in the
developing world, the pace and scale of “the rise of the rest” is still unprecedented. Modern
middle-class lifestyles have become attainable for billions around the world. This is one of
humanity’s greatest achievements, but unfortunately, the specter of peak oil knows no bounds.
Industrialization is a very energy and resource-intensive process. While per-capita energy and
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resource consumption in NICs is still miniscule compared to rich nations, their populations are
much larger and continue to grow. Compounded with their adoption of modern energyintensive lifestyles (cars, meat, etc.), global demand for energy and oil is set to double by 2035
(EIA 2012). This trajectory seems incongruous with the world’s biophysical realities.
While production from individual oil fields can be forecasted to a reasonable degree of
accuracy, forecasts for global oil production are fraught with uncertainty. Any number of
unexpected events could dramatically influence oil production: economic shifts, climate
change, geopolitical conflict, or even the adoption of a revolutionary energy source. However,
within academia and the scientific community, there seems to be a convergence in research
and opinion that alludes to the relative imminence of peak oil, and the severity of its
consequences (Murray & King 2012; Brown et al. 2012; Hirsch et al. 2005; Rapier, 45). The
assumption held by Smil and others—that the last half of our remaining hydrocarbon supply
will be of comparable benefit to the first half—is fundamentally flawed. Our remaining
hydrocarbon supply is will feature much lower EROIs than what we have enjoyed, as
production costs increase with difficulty of extraction and processing (Rapier, 99). Additionally,
rapid economic and population growth will increase demand for some time to come.
Developing nations are at a natural advantage in ‘bear’ energy market, as much lower percapita energy consumption cushions the economic impact of high prices (Tvelberg 2012; Hall
& Klitgaard, 321). The United States is in one of the worst positions during a period of energy
scarcity, as automobile dependence and low-density urban planning compounds the impact of
energy prices. Studies commissioned by energy departments and militaries around the world
have concluded that peak oil “presents the world with an unprecedented risk management
problem” and that a successful transition away from oil requires ten-to-twenty years of
intense preparation before peak oil hits (Hirsch et al. 2005; Rapier, 100)
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Humanity owes its ascent to advantageous evolutionary changes (bipedalism) that
enabled our bodies to use energy much more efficiently. The discovery of fire and cooking
externalized much of our metabolic energy needs, enabling dramatic increases in brain volume
and intelligence relative to other primates. Agriculture provided the abundance of energy
needed for humans to move beyond sustenance. As fewer people need to work the land,
specialization of labor was made possible, laying the foundations for the development of
complex civilization. In the “biological old regime,” civilizations that reached their biophysical
limits to growth invariably stagnated and collapsed. Modern civilization has overcome these
limits with the use of condensed energy sources: initially with the use of coal, then with oil and
natural gas. As our fuels increased in energy density and EROI, humanity sustained growth at
an exponential pace. With a growing population, mass industrialization in developing countries
and a growth-based economic paradigm, Jevon’s paradox is unlikely to be overcome.
Humanity’s continued growth and prosperity is contingent upon the adoption of abundant,
energy-dense, high-EROI sources of energy. The twenty-first century finds humanity at the
crossroads: coercive action could put us on a path of sustainability and prosperity, while
continued inaction will inevitably lead to societal and ecological collapse, global depopulation,
and unimaginable strife—the realization of the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth.
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