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Linking Data to Optimal Policy Campbell Leith Glasgow March 2016 Campbell Leith (Glasgow) Linking Data to Optimal Policy March 2016 1 / 16 Agenda - Linking Data to Optimal Policy Q: Can we explain evolution of debt AND ‡uctuations in the monetary/…scal policy mix? A: Yes, but need to add political economy elements to the policy problem. Q: What are the relevant political economy mechanisms we need to add? Campbell Leith (Glasgow) Linking Data to Optimal Policy March 2016 2 / 16 The Data and the Policy Mix Davig and Leeper (2006), Bianchi (2012), Bianchi and Ilut(2015) and Chen, Leeper and Leith (2015) - relatively frequent switches between active/passive monetary and …scal policies. Campbell Leith (Glasgow) Linking Data to Optimal Policy March 2016 3 / 16 Explaining the Data/Policy Mix Leeper and Leith(2016) - Optimal monetary …scal/monetary policy in std. (but non-linear) new Keynesian model. Ramsey/Commitment policy too e¤ective in controlling in‡ation to explain the data even with longer-term debt. Time-consistent policy can generate far greater volatility. Dependence of policy mix on debt levels and maturity may help explain some variation in the observed policy mix conventional assignment - with low debt/long maturities monetary policy stabilizes in‡ation, taxation stabilizes debt. unconventional assignment - with high debt/short maturities roles are reversed. Leith and Liu(2016) - Strategic Interactions between time-consistent monetary/…scal policy also important. Campbell Leith (Glasgow) Linking Data to Optimal Policy March 2016 4 / 16 Explaining the Data/Policy Mix Chen, Leeper and Leith(2016) Linearised New Keynesian Model Fiscal Policy - Switches between active/passive rules and Stackelberg leader. Monetary Policy - Switches between more/less conservative follower. Campbell Leith (Glasgow) Linking Data to Optimal Policy March 2016 5 / 16 Explaining the Data/Policy Mix US Debt/GDP and Active/Passive/Optimal Policy 140.0 120.0 Optimal Fiscal Policy 100.0 80.0 Debt/GDP Debt-GDP Ratio 60.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 Year Campbell Leith (Glasgow) Linking Data to Optimal Policy March 2016 6 / 16 Explaining the Data/Policy Mix US Debt/GDP and Active/Passive/Optimal Policy 140.0 120.0 Optimal Fiscal Policy Passive Fiscal Policy 100.0 80.0 Debt/GDP Debt-GDP Ratio 60.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 Year Campbell Leith (Glasgow) Linking Data to Optimal Policy March 2016 7 / 16 Explaining the Data/Policy Mix US Debt/GDP and Active/Passive/Optimal Policy 140.0 120.0 Optimal Fiscal Policy Passive Fiscal Policy Less Conservative Monetary Policy 100.0 80.0 Debt/GDP Debt-GDP Ratio 60.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 Year Campbell Leith (Glasgow) Linking Data to Optimal Policy March 2016 8 / 16 Political Economy Alesina and Passalaqua(2016) survey possible explanations of the de…cit bias: De…cits and Elections - …scal illusion/political business cycles. Social Con‡ict - wars of attrition. Debt as a Strategic Variable. Bargaining in the Legislature. Intergenerational Redistribution. Rent Seeking/Lobbyists. Political Scientists: Elite (not Popular) Polarization - Barber and McCarty (2013, chpt 2). Inequality - .McCarty(2016) Campbell Leith (Glasgow) Linking Data to Optimal Policy March 2016 9 / 16 Political Economy - US US Debt/GDP & Party of President 140.0 120.0 100.0 80.0 Debt/GDP 60.0 40.0 20.0 Dem 0.0 1945 Rep 1955 Dem 1965 Rep Dem 1975 Rep Dem 1985 1995 Rep 2005 Year Campbell Leith (Glasgow) Linking Data to Optimal Policy March 2016 10 / 16 Political Economy - US US Debt/GDP, Party of President and Roll-Call Polarisation Conservative 140.0 120.0 Mean House Republican 100.0 80.0 Debt/GDP Mean House Democrat 60.0 40.0 20.0 Dem 0.0 1945 Rep 1955 Dem 1965 Rep Dem 1975 Rep Dem 1985 1995 Rep 2005 Liberal Year Campbell Leith (Glasgow) Linking Data to Optimal Policy March 2016 11 / 16 Political Economy - US US Debt/GDP, Party of President and Income Inequality Quintile Ratio=19 140.0 120.0 100.0 80.0 Debt/GDP Debt-GDP Ratio 60.0 40.0 Inequality 20.0 Dem 0.0 1945 Rep 1955 Dem 1965 Rep Dem 1975 Rep Dem 1985 1995 Year Campbell Leith (Glasgow) Linking Data to Optimal Policy Rep 2005Quintile Ratio = 0.5 March 2016 12 / 16 Political Economy - UK UK Debt/GDP & Party of Government 250 200 Lab Con Lab 1955 1965 Con Con Lab Lab 150 Debt/GDP 100 50 0 1945 1975 1985 1995 2005 Year Campbell Leith (Glasgow) Linking Data to Optimal Policy March 2016 13 / 16 Political Economy - UK UK Debt/GDP, Party of Government & Manifesto Polarisation Right 250 200 Conservative Manifesto 150 Debt/GDP 100 Labour Manifesto 50 Lab Con Lab Con Lab Con 1975 1985 Lab 0 1945 1955 1965 1995 2005 Left Year Campbell Leith (Glasgow) Linking Data to Optimal Policy March 2016 14 / 16 Political Economy - UK UK Debt/GDP, Party of Government & Income Inequality 250 Quintile Ratio =5 200 Lab Con Lab Con Con Lab Lab 150 Inequality Debt/GDP Debt-GDP Ratio 100 50 Quintile Ratio = 0 0 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 Year Campbell Leith (Glasgow) Linking Data to Optimal Policy March 2016 15 / 16 Conclusions Time-consistent optimal policy can begin to explain evolution of debt/policy mix when we allow for nominal debt debt maturity structure endogenous state-dependent change in policy mix strategic interactions between monetary and …scal policy makers. Political economy issues may also be important. What changed with President Reagan? Why the di¤erence between US Republicans and UK Conservatives? Is it Divided Government vs Parliamentary system? i.e. bargaining vs median voter? Is there a role for polarization and/or inequality? Campbell Leith (Glasgow) Linking Data to Optimal Policy March 2016 16 / 16