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Understanding Afghanistan’s Recent Economic Development: A Comparative Analysis with Pakistan1
By
Wesley Oliphant
University of California, Irvine
Abstract: It is often assumed that Afghanistan’s economic problems stemmed from the internal
warfare that began in 1978 and continues to the present. But are the causes of its economic
problems much deeper? I consider this question by comparing it from 1961 to 2006 with Pakistan
(a neighboring country with a similarly low level of development in the early 1960s) in three
agricultural statistics: agricultural output growth, labor productivity growth in agriculture and
total factor productivity (TFP) growth in agriculture. Because it constitutes such a large portion of
GDP, opium data is included for Afghanistan. I find for all three measurements Afghanistan fell
behind Pakistan well before 1978 providing evidence that more than just conflict explains
Afghanistan’s lack of development. The fact that the exact timing Afghanistan fell behind Pakistan
was when Green Revolution technology entered the region and given Afghanistan adopted little
such technology relative to Pakistan, I find evidence the failure to adopt such technology was at
least partly responsible. This paper is the first to calculate the agricultural labor productivity and
total factor productivity in agriculture for Afghanistan.
I.
Introduction
Today, Afghanistan stands out for all the wrong reasons. In addition to having major internal
problems including a strong insurgency and corrupt central government, Afghanistan is ranked among
the worst on a variety of economic indicators including GDP per capita and literacy. Why is Afghanistan
in the economic state that it is? It is often assumed that Afghanistan’s economic problems are due to
the internal warfare that has racked the country since 1978. But are its economic problems much
deeper? I will consider this question by comparing it with Pakistan over the past four and a half decades
(1961 to 2006) in agriculture - looking at the agricultural output growth and the corresponding labor
productivity growth rates and total factor productivity (TFP) growth rates.
Afghanistan is widely recognized as less developed than Pakistan, but the timing of this divergence is
not well known or understood. There are two possible hypotheses. The first is that Afghanistan’s
economy was on par with Pakistan – growing at about the same rate but then falling behind in the late
1970s when the large scale internal warfare began. The second hypothesis is that prior to the late 1970s
Afghanistan was already falling behind due to failed development and the conflict only exacerbated it.
Which of the two stories is more accurate?
1
For their helpful suggestions, I am grateful to Dan Bogart, Michelle Garfinkel, Jonathan Cook, Michael McBride, Gary
Richardson, and Stergios Skaperdas.
1
World Bank estimates of GDP per capita imply the first theory is correct. Examining GDP per capita in
both countries as shown in figure 1, Afghanistan appears to begin falling behind Pakistan precisely in
1978.
Figure 1: GDP per capita (current US$) - Afghanistan (blue), Pakistan (red)
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
1970
1980
1990
2000
Source: W orld Bank
Still, the per capita graph is far from definitive for two reasons. First, it excludes opium which
constitutes a major part of the Afghan economy (see section 2.2.2). Second, the quality of this data is
less than clear because the source offers no description of how the data were constructed or the data’s
sources. For example, since there was a lack of sources on Afghanistan’s industrial and services output
before 2001, did they construct the GDP measurement based only on agriculture? Also, what were the
sources of the data for Afghanistan’s agricultural sector?
To better determine the primacy of conflict regarding Afghanistan’s lack of development, I will instead
examine the countries’ agricultural output growth. I will also examine the growth in labor productivity
and total factor productivity (TFP) in agriculture for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
In contrast to the World Bank estimate, this paper’s calculations are more reliable. First, I include
opium data in the calculations for Afghanistan. Opium is included to assure that if Afghanistan fell
behind and remained behind Pakistan, the divergence was not because some major Afghan crop was
excluded. Second, I show where all my data comes from and how each of the calculations was
constructed. Third, my data are comprehensive enough that I can point to which crops were growing
more quickly in Pakistan than Afghanistan – e.g., wheat (see figure 2 below) – and whether inputs like
2
labor were growing faster in Pakistan (see figure 8 below). In other words, I can provide a much clearer
look at the agricultural sectors of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
I concentrate on agriculture as it was and remains the most important sector for Afghanistan’s
development. Agriculture accounts for 31% of Afghanistan’s GDP, but this sector absorbs at least 80% of
its labor force (CIA World Fact Book).2 Agriculture also constitutes a large portion of Pakistan’s labor
force – from over 70% in the 1960s to 43% today. I concentrate on agriculture also because much of the
development literature asserts agricultural productivity increases are the key to a developing country’s
economic progress (e.g., Gollin, Parente and Rogerson, 2002).3 Instead of figure 1, my calculations lead
me to conclude that Afghanistan’s did not begin to fall behind Pakistan in 1978 but instead long before
that year – in the middle to late 1960s.
Several papers have examined TFP growth in agriculture for Pakistan. Wizarat (1981) computed
agricultural TFP for Pakistan for 1953-54 to 1978-79 using crop data along with some inputs. Rosegrant
and Evenson (1993) estimated TFP growth for the period 1956-1985 also using crop data and land, labor,
tractors, fertilizer, irrigation and animal labor as inputs. Khan (1994) estimates the crop sub-sector as
well for 1980 to 1993 while Khan (1997) expands the sample period from 1960 to 1996. S. Ali (2004)
undertakes the TFP calculation for Pakistan for 1960 to 1996 using seventeen crop and livestock
products along with the inputs of land, labor, tractors, tubewells, work animals, fertilizers and pesticides.
A. Ali et al. (2008) undertake this calculation for 1971 to 2006 (by decade) using thirty-three crops and
livestock products and the inputs of land, labor, capital, fertilizer, pesticide consumption, fodder and
wheat straw and concentrates. My study provides a more comprehensive coverage of crops and
livestock as it contains sixty-one Pakistani crops and livestock products.
A few papers discuss Afghanistan’s agriculture.4 Most are written very recently and deal with current
agricultural projects and how to improve them, but do not refer to Afghanistan’s economy and
agriculture in the past.5
2
The labor force and GDP estimates are for 2008 and do not include opium.
3
As an example, the paper by Gollin and al. (2002) asserts that agricultural productivity increases are the key to
development as they allow more workers who would otherwise be needed to produce subsistence crops to move
from agriculture to the secondary and tertiary sectors.
4
While there are books on Afghanistan’s culture, ethnicities, political history and conflict (e.g., Dupree 1980, Emadi
2005, Hopkins 2008) there is little on Afghanistan’s economy aside from Fry (1974) and Ford (1986).
5
Agricultural output measurements are mentioned in Ford (1986). But it is unclear what components were used to
make this measurement such as whether wheat, barley and opium were included.
3
In contrast to previous research, I compare the data provided by the Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO) with other research (see tables 1 and 2 below) and the results with other
comparable studies (see table 7).6 As stated earlier in this section, I also add opium data to the
Afghanistan calculations from 1980 to 2007. In addition, this paper is the first research paper to
calculate Afghanistan’s agricultural labor productivity and its agricultural TFP growth.7
I find evidence that Afghanistan was already falling behind Pakistan in the middle to late 1960s.
Afghanistan’s agricultural output was rising very slowly during the 1960s and 1970s, falling during the
1980s and rising slowly thereafter while Pakistan’s was rising quickly throughout with divergence
beginning between 1967 and 1968. In terms of labor productivity, I find Afghanistan was stagnant during
the period when Afghanistan was stable but declines for most of the period of internal warfare with
divergence starting between 1967 and 1968. In contrast, Pakistan rises in labor productivity throughout
the entire sample period. Regardless of the share of income attributed to labor and land, I find that
Afghanistan and Pakistan diverge by the mid to late 1960s with Afghanistan declining from the late
1960s until the late 1980s while Pakistan continues to grow. While I find evidence that opium
production was profitable and grew quickly, the substitution to opium production does not explain the
decline in agricultural output found during the late 1970s through the 1990s as opium’s inclusion does
not change the trends of agricultural output growth.
By looking into Afghanistan’s agricultural economic history, this paper aims to provide some insight on
how to better develop the Afghan economy. If conflict is not the only cause behind Afghanistan’s
economic problems, then improving the economy might be achieved with policies that go beyond
reducing conflict.
The paper proceeds as follows. I discuss the historical and economic background of both Afghanistan
and Pakistan in section 2. The data relevant for the comparison is presented in section 3. In section 4, I
discuss the methodology used to obtain labor productivity and then TFP. In section 5, I discuss the
results. Section 6 concludes.
6
The FAO is a United Nations organization dedicated to eliminating hunger.
7
Ford (1986) mentions agricultural output per capita (how it changed from 1965 to 1976) but not agricultural
output per agricultural worker.
4
II. Historical and Economic Background
Before discussing each country’s economic statistics over the sample period, I want to provide a brief
account of each country’s history and economics before and during the sample period. This will provide
some background on these countries during this period and facilitate understanding of the ensuing
graphs and calculations.
A. Afghanistan
For most of the 20th century, the ruling family that governed Afghanistan as a monarchy since 1929
attempted to develop and stabilize the country by economic and social reforms that included greater
rights for women, expanded education and expanded irrigation. For example, the reign of Muhammad
Zahir Shah who was the monarch from 1933 to 1973 was marked by cautious attempts to undertake
Western reforms and included a transition to a constitutional monarchy in 1964. In 1973, there was a
fairly bloodless coup caused by the cousin of the King and former Prime Minister (1953-1963) who set
up a (nominal) Republic and appointed himself its President (Ford, 1986).8 In 1978, major conflict began
as Daoud Khan was deposed (and murdered) by an Afghan Marxist party that seized control of the
government and tried to impose Marxism on the population.
This imposition of Marxist policy was met by massive resistance by Afghans – first escalating into
open rebellion and then leading to the entry of Soviet forces into Afghanistan in December 1979. They
quickly seized the cities and fighting was consistently conducted in the rural areas (Jalali and Grau, 1999).
The provinces involved in the fighting were in the east (Adkin and Yousaf, 2001) and to a lesser extent
the south and some parts of the west of the country (Roy, 1986). The northern and central provinces
were largely untouched. Given that the Soviets conducted a scorched earth campaign in the rural areas
where most of the population was concentrated, the Afghan-Soviet conflict led to significant loss of
Afghan lives and millions of Afghans fleeing abroad – mainly to Iran and Pakistan. In 1989, the Soviets
withdrew leaving behind a Soviet installed government.
In 1992, this government was overthrown and factional fighting ensued between different
Mujahedeen groups. In 1994, the Taliban emerged in the southern city of Kandahar and with the
promise of security and swift justice was quickly able to gain the upper hand. In a few years, they took
over most of the country. By 1996, they took the capital of Kabul and pushed anti-Taliban forces north
and by 2000 they controlled about 95% of the country. Due to the Taliban’s association with Al Qaeda
and the terrorist attacks of 9/11, anti-Taliban forces (the Northern Alliance) with the help of the US and
8
This description of the coup d’etat appears in Chapter 4 of Ford’s book.
5
the UK pushed the Taliban out of the country and into Western Pakistan by late 2001. A new
government under Hamid Karzai came to power by a loya jirga in 2002.9 He was elected President in
2004 and then again in 2009 – the second time under suspicion of widespread fraud. Meanwhile, an
insurgency has been mounting since 2002 and has gained strength over the past few years.
As stated in section Ι, Afghanistan then as now was an agricultural economy. The major crops grown in
Afghanistan were wheat, rice, maize and later opium (see below).
Afghanistan had three consecutive five year development plans starting in 1955.10 Prior to these plans,
attempts at development had been undertaken, but were not serious or coordinated. Despite the
greater attention to and coordination of development for these plans, the results of these three plans
were unsuccessful in generating an improved standard of living (Ford, 1986).
During the first and second five year plans from 1955 to 1966, the emphasis in time and money was
on industry and infrastructure. Faster development was believed to come from industrializing the
country rather than trying to improve the agriculture (Economic Survey 1957). So, there was little
funding for commercial fertilizers or agricultural technology and capital. In addition, only around a fourth
to a third of the small budget allotted for agriculture in the second five year plan was actually
implemented (US Agricultural Team Review of Afghanistan 1967).11 The Afghan government took some
steps to improve agriculture via irrigation and roads. These steps helped reduce the high transport costs
of selling surplus produce. For example, by 1966 1200 miles of paved roads were built (Fry, 1974).
In the third five year plan, spending on agricultural development and irrigation increased from about
$56.5 million to $124 million according to the Ministry of Planning (US Agricultural Team Review of
Afghanistan 1967). This spending was partly used to increase the availability of commercial fertilizers
along with improved types of seeds.12 In addition, the Afghan government in 1967 provided 1.2 million
pounds of improved wheat seeds and 15,000 tons of chemical (commercial) fertilizers that were
sufficient for 138,000 acres of land. Still, these numbers are very small compared to the total area of
9
This refers to a grand assembly of tribal elders who decide matters of importance – only meeting when deemed necessary.
The authority of this body is considered absolute.
10
A fourth five year development plan was implemented just after the third ended in 1971 but was later replaced in 1973 by
consecutive one year development plans.
11
As implied below, most of the money went elsewhere – primarily to industrial development and infrastructure.
12
There two types of improved seeds available in the late 1960s in the region: IRRI (International Rice Research Institute) for
rice and Mexi-Pak for wheat. The IRRI varieties were about three times more prolific as local varieties in Afghanistan, India and
Pakistan. The Mexi-Pak seeds refer to seeds developed in Mexico in the mid-1950s and then introduced to the Central Asian
region a decade later. The Green Revolution refers to the introduction of high-yielding seeds and the increased use of fertilizers.
6
land used for wheat and the amount of improved seeds and commercial fertilizer needed to cover such
an area.13 In other words, despite the large increase in investment in agriculture, Afghanistan only
adopted the Green Revolution technologies on a very small scale.
Coming to power in 1973, President Daoud Khan was primarily concerned with internal maneuvering
between competing factions and Afghanistan’s dependence on the Soviet Union. His economic policies
amounted to nationalizing most of the economy. From 1975 to 1976, all banks were nationalized along
with most industries.14 The government focused on developing heavy industries. Despite the
government’s efforts and the resulting increased output in these larger industries, the smaller privately
controlled industries contributed more to the country’s economy in terms of domestic output and to
exports (Ford, 1986).
After Daoud’s death in 1978, the new Marxist government attempted to impose Marxist economic
policies and concentrated their funding more on state owned industries and mining than all
governments beforehand. This government went further in terms of nationalization and extended its
control over the public sector and government ministry operations. The state owned industries and
mining received twice as much investment funding than agriculture in 1981 and three times by 1982
(Ford, 1986). In the late 1960s and 1970s, agriculture received around 25-35% of the budget compared
with only 10% by the early 1980s. They also concentrated funding on the communications and transport
sectors by forming state-owned transport companies that used Soviet and Czech built trucks (Ford,
1986).
The government’s economic policies seem to have failed. The lack of concentration on agriculture led
to inadequate funding for it (e.g., improved seeds). The development programs were severely limited by
institutional constraints such as the lack of sufficiently trained personnel and information resources.
There was also damage to infrastructure partly from the internal fighting that caused transport costs to
rise.
After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Afghanistan’s Soviet-backed government remained in power for
another three years due to Soviet financial backing. For several years thereafter, the country was beset
with heavy fighting between rival anti-Soviet factions and no effective government let alone an
economic policy. After coming to power with their capture of the capital in 1996, the Taliban’s emphasis
was not on economic policy but instead on security, enforcing their brand of Islam and defeating the
13
On average, the number of acres of production for wheat in Afghanistan was around 5.5 million for the sample period.
14
These industries were previously owned by Afghanistan’s oldest, largest and most successful bank: Bank-i-Melli.
7
remaining anti-Taliban forces in the north. But starting in 2001, aid increased dramatically and
development projects were undertaken with the financial and logistical help of NATO and numerous
government and non-government organizations.
Before 1980, opium production was negligible in Afghanistan. But by 1980, opium had become a
major crop. It was used as a source of income for the Mujahedeen fighting the Soviet Union and later
each other and then by the Taliban and the warlords. The production steadily increased up to 2008 except in 2001 when the Taliban imposed a successful ban on opium production. This ban caused
production to plunge from 2000’s 3300 metric tons to 185 but recovered in 2002 back to 3400 metric
tons (UNODC, 2002).
Unlike other countries, which are considered dependent on their natural resources to generate
revenue (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Nigeria), Afghanistan can be described as an aid dependent country. Due
to its prime location between the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East along with the fact that it has
often served as a buffer between major powers, the country’s leaders have traditionally used the
competition between these powers for influence within the country to obtain much foreign aid. Total
aid was high in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s making Afghanistan one of the highest recipients of
assistance on a per capita basis (Fry, 1974). It then fell to much lower levels during the late 1970s, 1980s
and 1990s.15 By the early 2000s, it increased dramatically – again becoming one of the top recipients of
aid according to the CIA World Factbook.
B. Pakistan
For most of Pakistan’s history, the country has alternated between civilian presidencies and military
dictators. The civilian presidents were Iskander Mirza (1956-1958), Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-1973), Fazal
Ilahi Chaudhry (1973-1978), Benazir Bhutto (1988-1990; 1993-1996) and Nawaz Sharif (1990-1993;
1997-1999). The military dictators were Ayub Khan (1958-1969), Yahya Khan (1969-1971), Muhammad
Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) and Pervez Musharaff (1999-2008).16
Agriculture in Pakistan in the mid-1950s accounted for over 53% of its GDP and over 75% of its labor
force (Falcon and Stern, 1970). By the end of the 1960s, agriculture accounted for 45.5% of GDP as the
country had improved its diversification of the economy (Economic Survey 1969) albeit over 70% of its
15
The statistics for the 1980s seem counterintuitive in light of US support for the Mujahedeen fighters. However, this aid was
distributed to Pakistan which then (in probably much smaller amounts) went to these fighters in the form of guns and not to
the government for economic development. The data on aid are available from the author upon request.
16
Although he was only President from 1971 to 1973, Zulfikar Bhutto was the dominant political figure of the 1970s being the
Prime Minister from 1973 to 1977.
8
work force was still in agriculture (Falcon and Stern, 1970).17 By 2007, its percentage of GDP in
agriculture and percentage of labor in agriculture had declined significantly to 20% and 45% respectively.
Unlike Afghanistan, Pakistan had at least some production in a wider variety of crops than Afghanistan.
Pakistan was created from the periphery on both the East and West of the political and economic
centers of the British Indian Raj. Upon its formation in 1947, the country lacked a civil bureaucracy and
many of the other necessities for governance including an army (albeit Afghanistan lacked a national
army then as well). In addition, over eight million Indian Muslim refugees entered Pakistan fearing India
would be ruled by a Hindu dominated government with a Hindu agenda.18
Consequently, the first decade after Pakistan became independent was spent establishing the
government and its authority as well as assimilating the then millions of recent refugees.19 As such,
economic development was not the emphasis of government policy.
Like Afghanistan, Pakistan’s development plans were also undertaken in five year periods with the
first occurring from 1955 to 1959, the second 1960 to 1964 and the third 1965 to 1969 (Falcon and Stern,
1970). It was not, however, until 1958 that the new government under General Ayub Khan prioritized
economic development and in particular agriculture. He focused on agriculture due to that sector’s
inability to keep up with population growth.
From 1958 the Ayub Khan government reserved an increasing amount of development expenditure
for agriculture. While the First Plan only allocated 7% of total development expenditure to agriculture,
the Second Plan allocated 13.3% and the Third Plan 13.8% (Falcon and Stern, 1970).20
Ayub Khan’s government promoted through subsidies and tax waivers the greater use of commercial
fertilizers, pesticides, better seeds and greater irrigation.21 For example, the subsidy in Pakistan
provided during the stated dates was about 35% for commercial fertilizer – that is, 35% of the price of
17
The difference between GNP and GDP is negligible as there were few citizens of these countries working abroad and few
citizens of other countries working within one of these countries during the sample period.
18
The bright side for Pakistan was that millions of these refugees were educated and brought their human capital and some
financial capital with them.
19
There was the pressing need to construct government offices and build or replace power, transport and communications
facilities which had been disrupted or destroyed during the turmoil following Partition. Changes were also needed to its
commercial and industrial organization. In addition, the army needed to be built from the units that had left the British-Indian
military establishment (Burki and Laporte Jr., 1984). Meanwhile, the bureaucracy was created and mandated solely to maintain
stability.
20
Each of the first three plans had a similar total outlay.
21
Provision of seeds was also helped by imports and local multiplication.
9
fertilizer is paid by the government (Falcon and Stern, 1970).22 Consequently, substantial progress was
made in these areas.23 In contrast to Afghanistan, by 1968 353,000 tons of fertilizer was being used (cf.
15,000 for Afghanistan) and enough yield improving wheat seeds were used so that 5.85 million acres
was under the high yielding wheat seed (cf. 138,000 for Afghanistan) and covered about one-third of the
area for wheat farming (cf. less than 2% for Afghanistan).24 It should also be noted that the US provided
$2.5 billion in economic aid and $700 million in military aid from 1954 to 1964 – around 30% of annual
GDP for that period. Due to these factors, the overall economy grew 6.8% during the 1960s.
Economic policy during most of the 1970s was dominated by President Zulfikar Bhutto. He conducted
a series of nationalizations – including most of the banks and insurance industries along with all flour,
rice and cotton mills throughout the country. The government, however, was unable to simultaneously
manage and develop all these industries. Agriculture during this decade was beset by a series of weather
catastrophes. Furthermore, US aid decreased during the 1970s – with most of the $2.57 billion in aid
from 1965 to 1979 (about 14% of annual GDP for this period) coming in the late 1960s and very early
1970s. These factors contributed to a lower growth rate of 4.8% for the decade.
The 1980s were dominated by General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq who was generally considered a
Muslim fundamentalist. His economic policy saw a gradual reversal of the nationalization policies of
Zulfikar Bhutto. He also opened Pakistan to more foreign investment and encouraged foreign trade.
American aid also increased during the 1980s (due to the indirect support for the Mujahedeen in
Afghanistan) totaling about $5 billion (about 13% of annual GDP for this period) (Newsweek October 21,
2009). In the early 1980s, there was also huge growth in worker remittances from Pakistanis working in
the Middle East – constituting $3 billion per year or around 10% of GDP per year (Gardi and LaPorte Jr.,
1984). Consequently, this decade was marked by a stronger growth rate of 6.5% a year.
The 1990s saw much less economic progress under the civilian governments of Benezir Bhutto and
Nawaz Sharif. Some reforms were undertaken such as the privatizing of some public sector companies,
22
As noted by Falcon and Stern (1970), the subsidies were insufficient as there were shortages. This problem was alleviated
with the government’s decision to allow private fertilizer distribution in 1964. By July of that year, a 250,000 ton surplus turned
into a 150,000 deficit of unfilled orders.
23
Groundwater supply increased by 250% and fertilizer by 400% from 1959 to 1965. The amount of agricultural land increased
by an annual average of 2.4% between 1958 and 1969 compared with an average of 1.5% from 1955 to 1957. The number of
acres under the improved wheat seed went from 12,000 in 1965/66 to over 5 million acres by 1968/69 (Falcon and Stern, 1970).
Improved rice seed started at the same time and grew so quickly that by 1968/69 there were about 760,000 acres using this.
The production of wheat rose to 6.5 million tons in 1968/69 from 4.3 million tons in 1966/67 (Falcon and Stern, 1970) while the
production of rice rose to 2 million tons in 1968/69 from 1.3 million in 1966/67.
24
According to the FAO, wheat farming area in 1968 was about 15 million acres for Pakistan.
10
loosening of administrative constraints on the private sector, encouraging of foreign investment along
with the abolition of subsidies for pesticides and fertilizers. But the decade’s frequent changes in
government (four times), corruption and other domestic problems stunted development. Meanwhile US
aid for this decade fell to $429 million in economic assistance and $5.2 million in military assistance (.7%
of annual GDP for the period) due to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s pursuit of a
nuclear weapon during this period and its testing of one in 1998. Consequently, the Pakistan economy
experienced a slower 4.6% annual growth in the 1990s (Pakistan Accountancy 2006).
Since 2000, the Pakistani government has made substantial economic reforms – e.g., aggressively
cutting tariffs and assisting exports by improving ports, roads, electricity supplies and irrigation projects.
Up to 2008, the growth rate averaged 5%. US aid also picked up during this decade due in part to
Pakistan’s participation in the War on Terror - $9 billion in military assistance and $3.6 billion for
economic assistance (about 15% of annual GDP for the period).
Pakistan was involved in two wars with India. The first was in 1965. The second was in 1971 that
resulted in the loss of Eastern Pakistan (present day Bangladesh) and almost tipped the economy into a
recession. Also, Pakistan has experienced several military coups. Despite these events, it still did not
suffer the same internal fighting and economic disruption that Afghanistan did and has enjoyed positive
growth rates since 1951 according to the Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics.
III. Data
A. Data Sources
Much of the data were collected from the FAO.25 This source reports data for the production of crops
and the land used and the yields for the crops of Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as the quantities of
livestock products for 1961 to 2007.26 I obtained data on the countries’ population and agricultural labor
force (using decennial census data) for 1961 to 2007.27 In addition, statistics on the amount of fertilizer
consumed, the number of tractors used and for Pakistan the number of combine harvesters/threshers
25
Many of the sources for Afghanistan use the Afghan calendar which provides years different from the Gregorian calendar
used in the United States and most of the world. To translate a year of the Afghan calendar to a year in the Gregorian, one
needs to add 621. Other conversions undertaken in this study were of seers to pounds (1 seer = 2.057 pounds), hectares to
acres (1 hectare =2.47 acres) and jiribs to acres (1 jirib = .4788 acres).
26
Livestock products refer to any product coming from an animal such as milk or meat. Processed products like cheese were
excluded as only a few were listed and there were no accompanying price data. Processed products constitute at most less than
1% of total agricultural production.
27
The agricultural labor force includes all those who are part of the economically active population and are working or seeking
work in agriculture, hunting, fishing or forestry. The numbers for the last three for both Afghanistan and Pakistan are very small.
11
used each year are reported. Farm gate price data for crops and livestock products were provided for
Pakistan for 1966-2007 in Pakistani rupees and for 1991-2007 in US dollars and for Afghanistan for 19912007 in new Afghanis along with CPI data for both countries.28
Data were also obtained from other sources. For example, Afghanistan’s opium statistics are reported
in the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Exchange rate data for Afghanistan were
obtained from the CIA World Fact Book covering 1955-2007. The Economic Survey of Asia and the Far
East provided acreage and production for Pakistan from 1955 to 1969. The Afghan Survey of Progress
provided acreage and production for some of Afghanistan’s crops (e.g., cotton) from 1956 to 1969.29
Crop quantities for wheat, rice and maize from non-FAO sources are available from the author upon
request.
When possible, I compared the FAO data with the same data from other sources. I do so by
calculating the number of standard deviations the FAO data was from observations made from a
comparable source – the UN Survey of Asia and the Far East - for the overlapping years of 1961 to 1969
for the production of wheat, rice, barley and maize for both countries. I tested how the data compare as
I have found some published data on Afghanistan to be questionable.30 The results appear in tables 1
and 2.
28
The new Afghani replaced the old Afghani in January 2003. The conversion rate was 1000 old Afghanis to 1 new Afghani.
29
The Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East is a UN publication with economic stats on many countries in Asia. The Afghan
Survey of Progress was an annual publication provided by the Afghan government from 1959 to 1971 listing various economic
statistics in English and reporting on the amount of progress in development to persuade foreign investors to put their money
there. They were released annually during the 1960s and early 1970s and usually covered the previous five years’ worth of data.
It should be noted the Afghan Survey of Progress does not provide the amount of area and production for each agricultural
product as it grouped some into categories such as fruit.
30
One piece of data I found problematic was the FAO’s estimate of agricultural land for Afghanistan – at around half the total
area of the country despite the terrain and other estimates of arable land being only 15% with the amount cultivated around
5%.
12
Table 1: Number of Standard Deviations (Afghanistan) - FAO and UN Survey
Wheat
Rice
Barley
Maize
1961
0
0
0
0
1962
0.41
-0.10
0.15
0
1963
-0.49
-0.10
0.15
-0.41
1964
0.74
0.65
0.11
-0.41
1965
0.42
-1.29
0.11
-0.63
1966
0.52
-0.10
0.21
-0.41
1967
-1.07
-1.63
0.60
-0.57
1968
0
0
0
0
1969
-0.35
0
0
0
Table 2: Number of Standard Deviations (Pakistan) - FAO and UN Survey
Wheat
Rice
Barley
Maize
1961
0.03
2.90
-0.44
-0.37
1962
0.04
2.68
-0.31
-0.05
1963
0.05
3.21
-0.81
-0.13
1964
0.04
3.17
0.15
0.27
1965
0.04
3.17
-0.12
0.34
1966
0.04
2.89
1.42
0.46
1967
0.06
3.37
0.50
0.51
1968
0.06
3.42
-0.26
3.70
1969
0.10
3.55
0.01
1.86
As can be seen, I did find statistically significant (above 2 standard deviations) differences for Pakistan
rice. To correct for this problem, I multiplied the FAO numbers by a constant factor that eliminated the
statistical difference for production. Comparisons with the Afghanistan data reported in Ford (1986) and
comparisons with that of the Pakistan census data for Pakistan agriculture in 1973-74 and 1982-83
provide either exactly the same or very similar estimates for crop data.
Just because the FAO data are different from another source, however, does not imply the FAO
version is wrong. For example, the FAO’s Afghanistan population estimates are likely more accurate than
that of the Economic Survey as they are much lower – accounting for the overestimates of population
the Afghan government was inclined to offer for political reasons.31 In addition, the FAO population
estimate is found to be significantly closer to (only 7% higher than) a census estimate done in 1979 by
31
According to Afghan experts such as Nigel Allan, the Afghan government might inflate the numbers of particular tribal or
ethnic identification – leading to a higher total population – due to the belief that each group’s allocation of positions of power
depended upon it.
13
the Marxist government at the time with technical assistance from the UN.32 The source(s) for each set
of data appear in appendix A.
As stated in section II.A, data that are particularly important from 1980 onwards in Afghanistan are
opium quantities. Usually, statistics on illegal activities are omitted from the economic analysis due
either to a lack of data and/or the belief that such activities constitute a small or at least constant share
of the economy making their omission relatively unimportant for growth rates. However, opium data for
Afghanistan are obtainable, and the data suggest opium constituted a significant amount of agricultural
production from 1980 (see section III.B) and varied considerably over time as a share of agricultural
production. For all data subsequently presented and where relevant, opium was included.
B. Crop Data
For agricultural output, I use only the crops that I had quantities for for the entire sample period or
the crops that started to be planted in the sample period and whose price data were available.33
Together they constitute 95% of the area used for agriculture and 84% of the agricultural crop
production for Afghanistan and for Pakistan 74% of the area and 97% of its agricultural crop production.
Similarly, I only used livestock products that I had quantities for for the whole period and whose price
data were available. For Afghanistan, these livestock products accounted for 98% of the livestock
products available and for Pakistan accounted for 98.5% of the livestock products available.34
32
Although a 7% difference sounds huge by American standards, it is very close for Afghanistan considering the many problems
with measuring the population.
33
This means that crops who suddenly appeared within the sample period in amounts suggesting the crop was grown but not
measured for an earlier part of the sample period were excluded.
For Afghanistan, the crops (in alphabetical order) used in the agricultural output calculations are the following: apples, apricots,
barley, grapes, linseed, maize, millet, nuts, opium, oranges, peaches & nectarines, plums & sloes, potatoes, pulses, rice, sesame
seed, sugar cane, sunflower seed, and wheat. The livestock products are camel meat, camel milk, cattle meat, chicken meat,
cow milk, game meat, goat meat, goat milk, hen eggs, natural honey, sheep meat, sheep milk, silk worm cocoons, and wool. For
Pakistan, the crops (in alphabetical order) used in the agricultural output calculations are the following: almonds, apples,
apricots, bananas, barley, beans, castor oil seed, chick peas, chillies and peppers, dates, tropical fresh fruit, garlic, grapes,
groundnuts, jute, lemons & limes, lentils, linseed, maize, mangoes, millet, nuts, onions, opium, oranges, peaches & nectarines,
peas (dry), plums & sloes, potatoes, pulses, rapeseed, rice, safflower seed, seed cotton, sesame seed, sorghum, soybeans,
spices, sugar beet, sugar cane, sunflower seed, sweet potatoes, tangerines, tobacco, vegetables, walnuts and wheat. Pakistan’s
livestock products are buffalo meat, buffalo milk, cattle meat, chicken meat, cow milk, duck meat, game meat, goat meat, goat
milk, hen eggs, natural honey, sheep meat, sheep milk and wool.
34
I could not account for processed livestock or processed crop products as there were no price data. However, their share of
production was negligible.
14
The graphs of the yield per acre stats for Afghanistan’s three top crops in production: wheat, rice and
maize appear in figures 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Please note the blue line represents Afghanistan and the
red line Pakistan.
Figure 2: Wheat Yield Per Acre (pounds) – Afghanistan (blue), Pakistan (red)
2,500
2,250
2,000
1,750
1,500
1,250
1,000
750
500
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: FAO, Econ Survey of Asia and the Far East, Afghan Survey of Progress
One major observation for wheat is that Afghanistan initially had a higher yield per acre than Pakistan.
Another important observation is that, while Afghanistan’s yield per acre for wheat stagnated (until the
early 2000s), Pakistan’s yield per acre gradually increased starting in the late 1960s and surpassed
Afghanistan before 1970. The differential then continues to diverge increasingly.
15
Figure 3: Rice Yield Per Acre (pounds) – Afghanistan (blue), Pakistan (red)
3,200
2,800
2,400
2,000
1,600
1,200
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: FAO, Econ Survey of Asia and the Far East, Afghan Survey of Progress
For rice, Afghanistan’s yield per acre again is also initially higher than Pakistan’s. Although
Afghanistan’s yield per acre increases from the 1960s to the early 1980s, its rice yield is still surpassed by
Pakistan by the late 1960s. This timing implies the importance of Pakistan’s adoption of Green
Revolution seeds. Pakistan’s yield per acre, however, does not increasingly diverge from Afghanistan’s
and the two countries’ rice yields converge toward the end of the sample period.
16
Figure 4: Maize Yield Per Acre (pounds) – Afghanistan (blue), Pakistan (red)
3,200
2,800
2,400
2,000
1,600
1,200
800
400
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: FAO, Econ Survey of Asia and the Far East, Afghan Survey of Progress
For maize, again note that Afghanistan’s yield per acre was initially above Pakistan’s yet still stagnant
throughout most of the sample period. Also note, however, that Pakistan’s yield per acre was also
stagnant until the early 1990s but then surpasses Afghanistan in the early 2000s. Below, I will examine
whether agricultural output, labor productivity and TFP for Afghanistan diverge from Pakistan in their
growth rates before 1978 as occurred for the yields per acre for wheat and rice.
As shown in figure 5 below, opium production grew from 221 tons in 1980 to 9036 in 2007.
Figure 5: Afghanistan Opium Production (tons)
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
1980
1985
1990
1995
Source: UNODC
17
2000
2005
In fact, by 2007 opium was estimated to be 50% of Afghanistan’s GDP according to the UNODC.35
Looking at opium’s yield per acre over time in figure 6, two points are significant. First, opium’s yield
per acre is variable but generally constant from 1986 to 2007 – rising only about 5 pounds per acre from
the beginning to the end of the period.
Figure 6: Afghanistan Opium Yield Per Acre (pounds)
45
40
35
30
25
20
1987
1992
1997
2002
2007
Source: UNODC
The sharp fall in production and yields in 2001 is the result of the opium ban imposed by the Taliban that
brought opium production down considerably from around 3600 tons in 2000 to 200 in 2001 (UNODC).
The opium ban was followed by the fall of the Taliban and the resumption of a relaxed policy toward
opium production (Macdonald, 2007).36
At this point, it is important to mention a significant point about the methodology. Namely, there are
problems with converting the dollar denominated farm gate opium prices per pound into Afghanis. In
January 2003, a new form of currency was created by the Afghan government called the new Afghani
that replaced the old Afghani at 1000 to 1. Since all crop prices for Afghanistan are in new Afghanis
regardless of year, the opium prices in dollars need to be converted into new Afghanis for all years. The
official exchange rate for the number of Afghanis per dollar from 1982 to 1996 was 50.6 and from 2002
to 2007 it was 50 with a gap in between. Since there is no evidence of any major changes in Afghanistan
35
This percentage would of course include the money involved in the transportation and distribution of opium.
36
There is even the possibility that the opium ban was rescinded by the Taliban several days before September 11 .
th
18
in the factors affecting the exchange rate such as the Afghan annual inflation rate and the inflation rate
was low from 1996 to 2003 in the US, I use 50 Afghanis per dollar for 1996 to 2003 as well.37
Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that the value of opium production might be understated for
these years.
Calculations of crop revenue per acre for 1991 to 2007 for the main crops in Afghanistan appear in
table 3.
Table 3: Revenue per Acre (Afghanis)
Barley
Maize
Millet
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
3,000
2,200
2,800
2,500
2,600
8,400
15,000
17,800
18,300
7,200
10,300
14,400
8,600
9,100
13,000
15,800
16,100
12,000
10,700
12,000
13,000
13,700
18,000
12,100
15,500
18,400
10,200
23,200
33,200
8,600
17,600
12,400
29,700
29,900
1,500
1,400
1,400
1,400
2,600
3,500
4,400
5,300
6,600
6,800
6,500
6,500
7,100
8,500
7,600
10,300
11,000
Rice
Wheat
Opium
5,400
4,800
4,800
5,300
13,800
15,600
15,000
21,000
23,300
22,800
17,000
18,000
28,500
19,200
23,900
29,300
29,600
1,600
1,600
1,600
1,600
2,900
4,400
6,300
7,800
9,100
5,500
6,600
11,400
8,900
8,700
12,400
10,300
13,800
------29,200
20,100
19,100
33,300
28,100
40,600
22,600
140,800
232,400
257,600
59,700
81,300
70,300
73,900
Sources: FAO and UNODC
Opium is by far the top crop in terms of the revenue per acre in 2002 and 2003 and is almost always far
above the other main crops throughout this period. For example, in 1997 the Afghanis per acre
generated for wheat, rice, and maize are 6,000, 15,000 and 12,000 respectively. In contrast, the amount
generated per acre for opium is over 33,000 Afghanis. This huge differential is in spite of the previously
stated fact that a much lower tonnage of opium is generated per acre relative to the grain crops. The
higher revenue per acre for opium is clearly seen in figure 7 which shows the revenue per acre for the
37
Afghan inflation rates fell only by 6 percentage points from 1994 to 1995 and remained the same at least from 1995 to 1998.
19
six main crops of Afghanistan: barley, maize, millet, opium, rice and wheat – the spike for opium being
due to the large fall in supply caused by the Taliban opium ban.
Figure 7: Afghan Revenue (Acre)–Barley(blue), Maize(red), Millet(green), Opium(black), Rice(green), Wheat(purple)
300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
Sources: FAO, UNODC
C.
Data Inputs
To calculate TFP growth, I include the growth of labor, land, capital and fertilizer. Figures 8 and 9
display the growth of labor and land, respectively. For Afghanistan and Pakistan, the total land used for
the production of agricultural products is the summation of the area used for the production of all crops
grown for a given year.38 For Afghanistan, this area summation includes the area allocated for opium.39
Setting the amount of agricultural labor and agricultural land in 1961 as the base year (normalized to
100), we see from figures 8 and 9 that Pakistan had higher growth in both.
38
I calculate the total land this way because as noted earlier (footnote 31) the FAO numbers were unconvincing.
39
It should be noted that the amount of land allocated to opium production is not available prior to 1986.
20
Figure 8: Agricultural Labor 1961=100 – Afghanistan (blue), Pakistan (red)
260
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Source: FAO
Figure 9: Agricultural Land 1961=100 – Afghanistan (blue), Pakistan (red)
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: FAO, UNODC
As stated in section ΙΙΙ.A, the agricultural labor force statistics are obtained from the FAO. Over the
sample period, agricultural labor increased by 141% in Pakistan while only increasing by 90% in
Afghanistan.
The trend in the labor force over time for both countries is the same except for the late 1970s and
1980s when Afghanistan’s population was falling while Pakistan’s population continued to grow.
21
Afghanistan’s population loss was due to the loss of life and heavy migration out of the country due to
the aforementioned internal rebellion against the Marxist Afghan government of the late 1970s and
then the Soviet invasion of the 1980s (see section ΙΙ.A). Afghan refugees fled to Pakistan, Iran, India,
Australia, the EU, and North America but primarily to Pakistan and Iran. To get an idea of the scale,
according to a New York Times article from 1988 there were about 3 million Afghans in all of Pakistan
that year and about the same in 1990 according to the UN and Government of Pakistan – out of a
population estimated at 14 million according to the Afghan Census of 1979. Thomas Eighmy – a
Research Associate at the Afghan Studies Center in the University of Nebraska at Omaha – estimates
from refugee sources that the number of refugees in Iran by 1990 was about 1.3 million.40 This migration
did not affect the Pakistani agricultural labor force as Afghanis went to refugee camps.
Afghanistan’s agricultural land growth was stagnant – growing about 2.5% – while Pakistan’s
agricultural land increased by 79.2%. In fact, Afghanistan’s amount of agricultural land is below that of
1961 for the sample period after 1978 despite the fact that opium is included. The land is likely
uncultivated due to the millions of Afghanis who fled or died during this period.41 Land cultivation picks
up in 1992 but then falls again in 1998 and then rises from 2002 on. The trough in 2001 is partly due to
the Taliban prohibition of opium for that particular year (see section ΙΙ.A). Other peaks and troughs have
to do with favorable or unfavorable weather conditions (e.g., drought).
Following the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) macroeconometric model (1983),
tractors are used as a proxy for new agricultural capital in the TFP calculations. The growth in tractors is
much greater for Pakistan. For the 1961-2007 period, the number of tractors grows for Afghanistan by
almost 500% while in Pakistan by almost 8,700% or an annual percentage rate of 3.5% for Afghanistan
and 10.2% for Pakistan.
These trends are similar for fertilizer as the annual growth rate is 7.2% for Afghanistan and is 10.9%
for Pakistan. Fertilizer is important as well to the agricultural production process as it is a raw material
for agricultural production. Its importance only grows over time as fertilizer is essential for farmers to
40
For Afghanistan, it is possible the agricultural labor force for the end of the sample period was overestimated since some
people counted as part of the agricultural labor force could be involved instead in the fighting (at least part time). However,
given that it takes about a 35,000 decrease in the size of the agricultural labor force for 2006 for its sample period growth to
decrease even by 1% and most estimates indicate at most 30,000 in the Taliban, this discrepancy in agricultural labor numbers
are not enough to overturn the conclusion.
41
Other reasons include market collapse or distribution collapse.
22
reap the gains of Green Revolution agriculture as the greater productivity from improved seeds requires
large quantities of fertilizer.42
IV. Methodology
For real agricultural output, I would have ideally estimated it for Afghanistan by multiplying the price
times the quantity for each crop for each year, summing up these products and then deflating each
year’s total by that year’s Consumer Price Index (CPI). Unfortunately, I do not have enough data for such
a calculation for Afghanistan.43
Instead and as discussed in more detail in appendix A, because I have price data for 1991 to 2007 I
estimate real agricultural output for each year by multiplying the quantities of crops and livestock
products for every year by their respective prices in the 1991 base year and then repeating the
calculation for the 1992 base year and so on until the 2007 base year. I then take the average of the
agricultural output from the different base year calculations to obtain the agricultural output for each
year. Using a single base year would not have been optimal since it assumes relative prices are constant.
The lack of constant relative prices can be seen from table 4 which shows the relative prices of
Afghanistan’s six main crops that as stated in section ΙΙΙ.B are barley, maize, millet, opium, rice and
wheat. The differential in relative prices is particularly pronounced for opium and is shown in figure 10.
42
It should also be noted throughout the paper that growth in Afghanistan and Pakistan can come from more than just
productivity increases but from increases in the inputs themselves as their agricultural economies are not at a point of
diminishing returns for these inputs as is so with developed countries like the US.
43
I only have price data for each crop for 1991-2007 and CPI data for 1961-1969 and 1991-1998 thus allowing such a calculation
to extend only from 1991 to 1998.
23
Table 4: Relative Prices
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Opium/Barley
Opium/Maize
Opium/Millet
Opium/Rice
Opium/Wheat
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
1,770
627
2,865
1,770
3,135
4,827
1,696
4,410
2,324
4,827
4,702
3,598
9,225
4,937
10,099
6,924
10,385
15,525
12,372
16,994
5,449
8,640
12,370
9,499
13,540
106,416
131,955
199,702
139,034
218,601
188,159
267,384
273,002
199,227
298,840
2,374,482
2,100,503
3,042,173
2,874,373
3,330,066
1,030,902
907,194
1,248,134
1,608,500
1,366,256
1,188,592
1,116,243
1,395,835
1,205,333
1,930,345
375,954
339,276
391,891
461,115
541,960
444,874
400,579
440,205
522,790
608,775
372,467
335,382
368,558
437,702
509,693
Barley/Maize
Barley/Millet
Barley/Rice
Barley/Wheat
Maize/Millet
Maize/Rice
Maize/Wheat
0.39
1.64
1.00
1.80
4.18
2.54
4.57
0.39
1.64
1.00
1.80
4.18
2.54
4.57
0.39
1.64
1.00
1.80
4.18
2.54
4.57
0.35
1.62
1.00
1.77
4.57
2.82
5.00
0.35
0.91
0.48
1.00
2.60
1.37
2.85
0.77
1.96
1.05
2.15
2.56
1.37
2.81
1.50
2.24
1.79
2.45
1.49
1.19
1.64
1.59
2.27
1.74
2.49
1.43
1.10
1.57
1.24
1.88
1.31
2.05
1.51
1.05
1.66
1.42
1.45
1.06
1.59
1.02
0.75
1.12
0.88
1.28
1.21
1.40
1.45
1.37
1.59
0.88
1.21
1.56
1.33
1.38
1.77
1.51
0.94
1.17
1.01
1.62
1.25
1.08
1.73
0.90
1.04
1.23
1.44
1.16
1.36
1.60
0.90
0.99
1.18
1.37
1.10
1.31
1.52
0.90
0.99
1.18
1.37
1.10
1.31
1.52
24
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Millet/Rice
Millet/Wheat
Rice/Wheat
0.61
1.09
1.80
0.61
1.09
1.80
0.61
1.09
1.80
0.62
1.09
1.77
0.53
1.09
2.08
0.54
1.09
2.05
0.80
1.09
1.37
0.77
1.09
1.43
0.70
1.09
1.57
0.73
1.09
1.50
0.94
1.09
1.16
1.29
1.09
0.85
0.86
1.38
1.60
1.18
1.38
1.18
1.19
1.38
1.16
1.19
1.38
1.16
Figure 10: Opium Relative Prices – Maize (red), Barley (blue), Rice (black), Millet (green), Wheat (blue/green)
3,500,000
3,000,000
2,500,000
2,000,000
1,500,000
1,000,000
500,000
0
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
Sources: FAO, UNODC
To test the robustness of the base year average technique, I conduct a comparison of the calculations
of agricultural output growth using this base year average for Pakistan with those found from the usual
CPI deflated calculations for Pakistan. I find their growth rates to be similar over time. Again, for more
details please see appendix A.
25
Before calculating the TFP, I calculate labor productivity by dividing the real agricultural output by the
agricultural labor force:
Labor productivity = real agricultural output/agricultural labor force
I then normalize the labor productivity for 1961 at 100 for both countries and see how much it changes
over the sample period. Next, I calculate the labor productivity of Pakistan and divide it by Afghanistan’s
after converting Afghanistan’s agricultural output into $ via Afghanistan’s annual, official exchange rates.
This calculation is made to see how productivity grew in Pakistan relative to Afghanistan and whether
and when divergence occurs.
As for TFP, two major techniques are used to calculate it: the arithmetic technique and the TornqvistTheil technique.44 The arithmetic index is used for this paper due to data availability.
First, I calculate the agricultural output growth (relative to 1961) from the agricultural output numbers
found by the method discussed above. I then subtract the growth of land, labor, capital (tractors) and
fertilizer to account for as many inputs as possible given data availability. The equation form is
%∆ in TFP = %∆ in Real Agricultural Output – αL*(%∆ in Agricultural Labor) – αT*(%∆ in Agricultural Land)
– αK*(%∆ in Agricultural Capital) - αF*(%∆ in Fertilizer)
where αL, αT, αK and αF represent the share of income going to labor, land, capital and fertilizer
respectively. The sample period for this method extends only to 2002 as I only have data on fertilizer up
to this year.
I vary the share of income to labor within a range suggested by the International Labor Organization
(ILO).45 According to the ILO, labor shares are typically between 40 and 60 percent of GDP and are
generally higher for industrialized countries versus developing countries. Some work assumes the labor
share of GDP for a developing country like India is 40% (e.g., Popkin et al., 2001). Our estimates initially
assume this percentage for both countries. The second method calculates TFP with the labor share of
income equal to 60%.
44
The Tornqvist-Theil method can be written as the following:
ln (TFPt/TFPt-1) = (1/2)∑(Rit+Rit-1)ln(Yit/Yit-1) – (1/2)∑(Sjt + Sjt-1)ln(Xjt/Xjt-1)…..
I
j
where Rit is the share of output i in total revenue, Yit is quantity of output i, Sjt is the share of input j in the total cost of inputs in
time period t and Xjt is input j in time period t. The advantage of this method is it allows periodic changes in the revenue shares
of output and cost shares of inputs – preventing the possibility of overestimation and underestimation from a fixed weight
procedure.
45
According to their website, the ILO is an organization devoted to advancing opportunities for women and men to obtain
decent and productive work in conditions of freedom, equity, security and human dignity.
26
The share of capital was estimated by obtaining a measure of the annual rental cost of capital. To
obtain it, I calculate the product of the number of tractors in 2007, the price of tractors in 2007 and the
sum of the interest rate in 2007 and tractor depreciation for Pakistan. This product is then divided by
the total income to agriculture (measured as real agricultural output) in 2007:
αK = capital rental rate = *(Price per tractor)*(Quantity of tractors)*(δ+r)+ / (Total value of agriculture)
where δ is the depreciation rate and r is the interest rate. The depreciation rate used is 10%, and the
interest rate used is estimated at 9.2%. Including the other data, I estimate the share of income to
capital to be 1.5%.46 I obtain an estimate of the depreciation rate in Pakistan from another study on
Pakistan’s agricultural TFP (Ali et al., 2008), obtain the interest rate from 2007 from the State Bank of
Pakistan and attain the price per tractor from a major website providing prices on tractors in Pakistan.47
The share of fertilizer was estimated by obtaining a measure of the annual cost of fertilizer. To obtain
it, I multiplied the quantity of fertilizer in 2002 by the price of fertilizer in 2002 divided by the total
income to agriculture (measured as real agricultural output) in 2002:
αF = [(Price per ton)*(Tons of fertilizer)] / (Total value of agriculture)
Plugging in the information, I estimate the share of income to fertilizer to be 1.2%.48 The land share is
the residual or one minus the share of income to labor, capital and fertilizer. Consequently, I first use αL
=.4, αT = .573, αK = .015 and αF = .012 and then αL =.6, αT = .373 and αK = .015 and αK = .012 to calculate
TFP.
I undertake a few checks on accuracy. For Pakistan, I check the results from using tractors by
calculating the TFP growth for combine harvesters/threshers. Also for Pakistan, I compare my TFP
calculations to the calculations of TFP growth found in the other studies on Pakistan’s agricultural TFP
mentioned above when the time periods calculated overlap.
V. Results
Taking the average of the growth for each base year used and including opium, I obtain figure 11 for
the agricultural output growth for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
46
As stated above, other studies of Pakistan TFP growth have used pesticide consumption as another input. However, these
data are unavailable for Afghanistan.
47
It is called alibaba.com and is China’s biggest e-commerce company.
48
The price of fertilizer was calculated as a weighted average of the prices for different types of fertilizer (e.g., urea) with the
weight for each type being its share of the total output of fertilizer for 2002 among those fertilizers with a recorded quantity for
that year.
27
Figure 11: Agricultural Output 1961=100 – Afghanistan (blue), Pakistan (red)
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: FAO, UNODC
Afghanistan’s agricultural output grew 86.67% during the sample period and Pakistan’s agricultural
output grew 469.01% – an average annual growth of 1.40% for Afghanistan and 3.94% for Pakistan. To
put this differential in context, a growth rate of 1.40% annually means it takes about 50 years to double
output while at 3.94% it takes less than 18 years to double output.
Afghanistan’s output grows slightly until the late 1970s and then begins to decline, only making a
sustained recovery by the early 1990s. In contrast, Pakistan’s agricultural output continues to grow
throughout. These results raise the possibility that Afghanistan was falling behind Pakistan before 1978.
Using the real agricultural output calculations found from the average of the base years, I obtain labor
productivity whose growth over time is shown for both countries in figure 12:
Figure 12: Labor Productivity 1961=100 – Afghanistan (blue), Pakistan (red)
28
240
200
160
120
80
40
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: FAO, UNODC
Divergence in labor productivity growth is quick. Afghanistan basically stagnated during the 1960s,
1970s and early 1980s and then declined from the mid 1980s until the early 2000s. Pakistan, on the
other hand, shows a sustained increase in labor productivity throughout the sample period. In numbers,
labor productivity fell by 14.94% for Afghanistan for the sample period while Pakistan’s labor
productivity grew by 113.29%. The numbers imply an average annual growth of -0.36% for Afghanistan
and 1.70% for Pakistan.
The stagnation and decline in Afghanistan coincides with the periods of large scale fighting within the
country but equally important the period of stability was marked by stagnation as well. These results
support the alternative hypothesis expressed in section Ι that the country was already falling behind
Pakistan even during the periods of stability and that the internal fighting only worsened this situation.
The likelihood of the alternative hypothesis is further apparent by looking at the relative productivity of
Pakistan to that of Afghanistan over time as shown in figure 13 – the relative productivity rises
throughout the period.
29
Figure 13: Pakistan Labor Productivity Relative to Afghanistan Labor Productivity
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: FAO, UNODC
The spike in 2001 has to do with the collapse of output for a year in Afghanistan due to the temporary
prohibition of opium by the Taliban. A gap exists for 1979 to 1981 as this calculation required the output
of both countries be denominated in the same currency and no information on exchange rates for
Afghanistan exists for these three years. Nevertheless, the increasing gap over time and the fact that the
gap starts long before 1978 is clear.
Using the ILO recommendation for developing countries of .4 for the share of income going to labor
and .6 for land, I obtain the results that appear in table 5.
30
Table 5 – Growth of Agricultural Output, Inputs, TFP
1961-2002
Afghanistan
Pakistan
Output Growth (%)
39.0
343.2
Labor Growth (%)
65.1
122.7
-24.9
61.8
1790.9
6297.6
34.2
6285.0
5.2
81.3
Average Annual TFP Growth (%)
0.2
1.9
TFP Growth (%)
-12.8
69.1
-0.5
1.7
αL=.4
Land Growth (%)
αT=.573
Capital Growth (%)
αK=.015
Fertilizer Growth (%)
αF=.012
TFP Growth (%)
(αL=.4,αT=.573,αK=.015,αF=.012)
(αL=.6,αT=.373,αK=.015,αF=.012)
Average Annual TFP Growth (%)
The TFP growth for Afghanistan is calculated as 5.2% for 1961 to 2002 and for Pakistan is about 81.3%.
These growth rates mean an annual growth of 0.2% for Afghanistan and 1.9% for Pakistan. Thus, TFP
growth is responsible for about 13% of agricultural output growth for Afghanistan and about 24% for
Pakistan.
If instead we increase the share of income to labor to about .6 (the highest value for the ILO range)
and so .373 for land and .015 for capital and .012 for fertilizer, I obtain the results shown in the last two
rows of table 5. I find the TFP growth rate is -12.8% for Afghanistan and 69.1% for Pakistan. These
growth rates convert to an annual growth of -0.5% for Afghanistan and 1.7% for Pakistan. So, under this
labor share, TFP growth makes a negative contribution to output growth for Afghanistan while it is 20%
of output growth for Pakistan. So, regardless of the labor share being .4 or .6 there is a very clear trend
in the TFP growth – Afghanistan is essentially static or declining a little while Pakistan rises dramatically.
The graphs for the calculations of TFP for both countries appear in figures 14 and 15 below.
31
Figure 14: TFP 1961=100 (labor share=.4, land=.573, capital=.015, fertilizer=.012)–Afghanistan (blue), Pakistan (red)
240
200
160
120
80
40
0
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
Sources: FAO, UNODC
32
1995
2000
2005
Figure 15: TFP 1961=100 (labor share=.6, land=.373, capital=.015, fertilizer=.012) - Afghanistan (blue), Pakistan (red)
240
200
160
120
80
40
0
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: FAO, UNODC
The gaps in the lines for Afghanistan in both graphs are due to the lack of data on fertilizer consumption
for Afghanistan for 1994 and 1995. Nevertheless, we can see from both graphs the divergence between
Afghanistan and Pakistan in growth began in the mid to late 1960s.
The TFP calculations for Pakistan are supported by using the only other form of agricultural capital for
Pakistan for which we have data: combine thresher/harvesters. For a labor share of .4, the TFP growth
rate is 59.3%. For a labor share of .6, the TFP growth rate for Pakistan is 47.1%. They are about 20%
smaller than the calculation using tractors but are still much higher than for Afghanistan. The divergence
between Afghanistan and Pakistan also begins long before 1978 in the mid to late 1960s regardless of
labor share.
The results are not affected by the inclusion of opium. For example, figure 16 shows the growth of
agricultural output for both countries when opium is excluded from Afghanistan’s agricultural output.
When opium is excluded, Afghanistan still begins to fall behind Pakistan in the middle to late 1960s. This
finding is unsurprising, as opium output is negligible until 1980. In addition, Afghanistan also has a
similar trend as in figure 11 – e.g., slightly declining during the 1980s before picking up in the 1990s.49
49
When opium is excluded a major dip does not occur for Afghanistan in 2001 due to the opium and the increase following
2001 is not as dramatic. A major drop in output occurs in 1998 to 2001 due to a major drought that occurred at the time.
33
Figure 16: Agricultural Output 1961=100 – Afghanistan without Opium (blue), Pakistan (red)
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: FAO, UNODC
The comparisons of my estimates for Pakistan with that of other studies on Pakistan appear in table 6.
I use my estimates found from setting the share of labor equal to .6.
Table 6: Comparisons of Pakistan TFP with Other Studies
Study
Technique
Their Estimate
(Annual %)
0.9
2.3
1.8
1.9
My Estimate
(Annual %)
1.6
1.6
1.8
2.5
Differential (%)
Arithmetic
Tornqvist-Thiel
Arithmetic
Tornqvist-Thiel
Sample
Period
1960-1996
1960-1996
1980-1993
1965-1975
Khan (1997)
S. Ali (2004)
Khan (1994)
Rosegrant &
Everson (1994)
A. Ali et al.
(2008)
Tornqvist-Thiel
1975-1985
1971-1980
-0.4
1.0
1.2
2.0
1.6
1.0
1981-1990
1991-2000
2001-2006
2.2
2.5
2.9
0.8
2.5
N/A
-1.4
0.0
0.7
-0.7
0.0
0.6
Of the eight estimates provided of annual TFP growth, I find my estimates differ from theirs by more
than 1% for only two.
Taken together, the results argue for the second hypothesis. That is, Afghanistan was already
diverging away from Pakistan prior to 1978 in that Pakistan grew throughout the entire period while
34
Afghanistan was not. Furthermore, the agricultural output and labor productivity trends over time imply
the internal warfare during the 1980s and 1990s exacerbated the economic problems in Afghanistan and
worsened the divergence.
From figures 11, 12, 14 and 15, there is evidence that Afghanistan fell behind Pakistan in the mid to
late 1960s. This period also happens to be the same time that Green Revolution technology entered the
region. But as discussed in section 2, no major adoption of such technology occurred in Afghanistan
while much more did in Pakistan. As stated in section II, the Afghan government in 1967 provided an
amount of improved wheat seeds and chemical (commercial) fertilizers sufficient for only 138,000 acres
of land or about 2% of the land for wheat. This number compares with over 30% for Pakistan. The timing
and the statistics provide evidence that the failure to adopt such technology at least partly explains why
Afghanistan fell behind Pakistan.
Conclusion
This paper seeks to answer whether Afghanistan’s economic problems are only due to the internal
warfare it has experienced since 1978 or also due to other economic problems. To do so, I examine
whether Afghanistan’s growth in agricultural output, labor productivity and TFP fell behind Pakistan
during/after 1978 or before using data on crops and livestock for 1961 to 2007. Because opium is so
important to Afghanistan’s economy and to assure Afghanistan’s growth rates did not diverge and
remain diverged from Pakistan’s just because a major crop was omitted, I included this crop in
Afghanistan’s production numbers.
The calculations provide evidence of the second hypothesis that prior to the late 1970s Afghanistan
was already falling behind and the conflict only exacerbated the divergence. This divergence prior to
1978 occurs for all three measurements of agricultural output, labor productivity and TFP. This trend of
Afghanistan falling behind Pakistan in growth occurs long before the year major conflict began provides
evidence that Afghanistan’s lack of development is at the very least not completely or mainly due to
conflict. Instead, the timing of when Afghanistan falls behind along with the much smaller adoption rate
of Green Revolution technology by Afghanistan vis-à-vis Pakistan implies Afghanistan’s failure to adopt
might have been at least partly responsible for why it fell behind.
35
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Afghanistan Department of Statistics, Survey of Progress, 1961-1962, Kabul: Ministry of Planning, 1962.
Afghanistan Department of Statistics, Survey of Progress, 1967-1968, Kabul: Ministry of Planning, 1968.
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Ali, S. Total Factor Productivity Growth in Pakistan’s Agriculture, 1960-1996. The Pakistan Development
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36
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Emadi, Hafizullah. Culture and Customs of Afghanistan, London: Greenwood Press, 2005.
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Country Study. The American University, 1986.
Fry, Maxwell. The Afghan Economy, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974.
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37
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004. Kabul: Counter Narcotics
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Appendix A
Data Sources:
GDP per capita
Wheat yield per acre
Rice yield per acre
Maize yield per acre
Opium production
Opium yield per acre
Agricultural Labor
Agricultural Land
Tractors
Fertilizer
Afghanistan Agricultural Output
Pakistan Agricultural Output
Labor Productivity
Afghanistan Agricultural TFP
Pakistan Agricultural TFP
World Bank
FAO, Econ Survey of Asia and Far East, Afghan Survey of Progress
FAO, Afghan Survey of Progress
FAO, Econ Survey of Asia and the Far East, Afghan Survey of Progress
UNODC
UNODC
FAO
FAO
FAO
FAO
FAO, UNODC
FAO
FAO, Econ Survey of Asia and the Far East, Afghan Survey of Progress
FAO, UNODC, ILO
FAO, ILO
Agricultural Output Calculation Technique
To prevent the growth rates being dependent on the particular relative weights (in the form of prices) given to
the different crops and livestock products for a particular year, I used the following method of calculating the
agricultural output. Suppose Afghanistan had only two crops: wheat and maize. Using 1991 as a base year, I obtain
the agricultural output for a given year by multiplying the 1991 prices for that crop times its quantity for that year
and then summing up the products. For the 1991 base year, the agricultural output for 1967 would be
1967 Output1991 prices = Pwheat 1991 * Qwheat 1967 + Pmaize 1991 * Qmaize 1967
I would then do the same except using 1992 as the base year
1967 Output1992 prices = Pwheat 1992 * Qwheat 1967 + Pmaize 1992 * Qmaize 1967
38
and then so on for 1993 prices, 1994 prices and so on until 2007 prices. I would then take the totals of production
for each year at different base prices and average them. The base year average of the 1967 production would be
1967 Output = (1/17)*[1967 Output1991+1967 Output1992+1967 Output1993+…+1967 Output2007]
The base year average of the 1968 production would be
1968 Output = (1/17)*[1968 Output1991+1968 Output1992+1968 Output1993+…+1968 Output2007]
From these numbers I would then calculate the growth.
To check the robustness of my base year calculations, I calculate Pakistan’s real agricultural output using the CPI
deflated method from 1966 to 2005. I find the overall agricultural output growth for 1966-2005 (the period where I
have data) is similar to the growth found from using the different base years for that same time period as shown in
figure 17.
Figure 17: Pakistan Agricultural Output 1966=100 – CPI Deflated (blue), Base Year Average (red)
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Source: FAO
The CPI deflated growth rate is 315.5% for 1966-2005 while the growth rate for average of the base years is 339%.
These calculations provide evidence that our estimates from the base year average are not that different from the
preferred CPI deflated estimates. Applying the base year average, I find agricultural output per worker in Pakistan
increases from $1458 in 1961 to $3111 in 2006 or by 113%.
39