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DRAFT – Not for distribution or quotation THE EFFECT OF ECUADORIAN ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION ON POVERTY AND INEQUALITY John Doe1 ABSTRACT. The goal of this paper is to examine the effects of economic openness on Ecuadorian poverty and income inequality via simulation modeling. Ecuador’s success at meeting policy recommendations of the Washington Consensus and meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in relation to Human Development Indicators (HDI) is also be reviewed. Macroeconomic simulations, based on a social accounting matrix calibrated to a base year of 2000 show that liberalization has not been accompanied by rapid poverty eradication or improvement in the distribution of income largely due public sector corruption. I. INTRODUCTION “Economic openness generates domestic ‘losers’. These losers, whoever they are, will ask for redistribution and governments, accordingly, will respond by increasing expenditures, social security transfers, or public consumption if they want to silent opposition to internationalization.” (Lartey et al. 2008. p. 6). The goal of this paper is to examine the effects of globalization on Ecuadorian poverty and income inequality through the use of a social accounting matrix (SAM) calibrated to a base year of 2000. The broad conclusion is that Ecuadorian liberalization has not been a catalyst for reducing poverty due to widespread government corruption. Figure 1 and Table 1 below show Ecuador’s “corruption perceptions index” as calculated by Transparency International. 1 Version: 1.1. December 11, 2010;. I would like to thank..... All remaining errors are my own. c 2010 Robert Roe. John Doe FIGURE 1: 2010 Corruption Perception Index2 Ecuador Corruption Index: 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2.5 2.3 2.1 2 2.2 2.5 Source: Transparency International (2010) and Author’s Calculations TABLE 1: Ecuadorian Corruption Index (2005-2010) The paper is organized as follows: the following section reviews some recent economic history of Ecuador, including time series for openness, inflation, fiscal and foreign deficits as share of GDP, among other indicators. The third section presents the simulation model. The fourth section presents the results of the simulations based on a social accounting matrix calibrated to a 2 THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN ECUADOR base year of 2000. The final section draws conclusions based on the evidence presented in section II and the simulations presented in section IV. II. ECUADORIAN ECONOMY & POLICIES: BRIEF OVERVIEW III.1: ECUADORIAN LIBERALIZATION: Figure 1 shows the sum of imports, M, plus exports, E, as a share of GDP as a measure of openness. Note that openness has increased steadily over the period, rising from less than 30 percent of GDP to more than 70 percent by 2008. By comparison to other Latin American countries, Ecuador is relatively open, although many smaller countries show openness measures that exceed 100 percent of GDP. The date of liberalization for the Ecuadorian economy is 1974 based on the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP as illustrated in Figure 2 below. FIGURE 2: Ecuador’s economic liberalization as measured by calculating [(E+M) / Y] for Ecuador (1960-2009) However, 1974 is an early date of liberalization for Latin America and was Ecuador’s large increase in [(E+M) / Y] was driven primarily by rising oil prices, making it an artificial date of 3 John Doe review for this paper. By reviewing foreign direct investment, it appears that capital account liberalization began in 1993 as seen in Figure 2 below. FIGURE 3: Foreign Direct Investment, net (BoP, current US) for Ecuador (1976-2009) FIGURE 4: Tariff Rate for Ecuador (1993-2008) 4 THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN ECUADOR Figure 3 above illustrates a reduction in tariffs somewhere between 2000 and 2004, another key indicator of the liberalization of the Ecuadorian economy. Given the dollarization of the Ecuadorian economy in 2000 and the reduction in tariffs over the same period, a SAM calibrated to a base year of 2000 will be utilized to perform counterfactual simulations in which tariffs are not reduced and exports plus imports over GDP do not continue to rise after 2000. A Solow economic growth model which takes into account the “law of diminishing returns to individual factors of production” which “create endogenous changes in the capital-output ratio” that inhibit growth could be used to forecast GDP/capita growth, but would not assess changes in poverty or income inequality since it is a one-sector model. (Ray 1998, p. 64-67) For this project, the SAM will be sufficient for counterfactual modeling. Expectations are that the richest Latin American countries, which are “better endowed in skilled labor,” (Lartey et al. 2008, p. 13) are less likely to generate income equality from internationalization compared to poorer Latin American counties in which there are a greater “abundance of factors related to lower income groups (unskilled labor).” Considering this context, it can be presumed that liberalization in Ecuador will “induce greater demands for redistribution.” Due to large oil and mineral resources in Ecuador and the skilled jobs required for the extraction of such, Ecuador is “better endowed in skilled labor.” Ecuadorian President Correa has attempted to offset the economic “losers” of liberalization through a series of social spending programs while battling rising deficits through austerity measures. The effects of these policies on poverty and income inequality are unknown given their recent implementation. III.1: INCOME INEQUALITY IN ECUADOR: With GDP per capita at $1770 in 2009, Ecuador is considered a lower middle income country. In Ecuador the wealthiest 10% of the population possess over 43% of the country’s wealth while the poorest 10% hold only 1%. 5 John Doe FIGURE 5: Ecuadorian Income Distribution for Ecuador (1994-2007) Two measurements of poverty will be utilized in this paper. The poverty headcount, which counts the fraction of individuals living below the poverty line, does not take into account the depth of poverty. The poverty gap “look[s] at the total shortfall of poor incomes from the poverty line and express[es] this shortfall as a fraction of national income (as in the poverty gap) or as a fraction of the total income required to bring all the poor to the poverty line” (Ray, 1998, p. 2889) and is a more useful measure of poverty. Issues with both the poverty gap and poverty headcount are that they do not take into account the “relative deprivation” (Ray, 1998, p. 288-9) of the poor. In addition, in a household living below the poverty line, the elderly, children, or women may receive a smaller share of nourishment and other essentials, which is difficult to track. Figure 6 shows a steady decline in the poverty headcount and poverty gap when measured at $2/day. At the current rate of decline, Ecuador should meet the MDG goal of halving poverty as measured by headcount. The Gini Index, which is calculated from the Lorenz curve, “measures the degree of inequality in the distribution of family income in a country.” (CIA, 2010) It ranges between 0, which would indicate that every household in a country possessed an equal share of wealth, to 1, which indicates a single household possess all of a country’s wealth. Ecuador ranks 31st (worst) in the 6 THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN ECUADOR world with a Gini Index of 47.9 (as of 2009), which is the 3rd best in Latin and South America; only Argentina (45.7) and Uruguay (45.2) have lower Gini indexes. For comparison, the United States Gini Index is 45. As we can see in Figure 6 below, income inequality is rising (based on the Gini coefficient) while poverty is falling (based on poverty headcount and gap). This is not an unusual occurrence in developing economies. In Ecuador, recent government social policies have focused on reallocating wealth to those living below the poverty line. Redistributing wealth in this manner raises incomes and consumption in the short run which may inhibit unskilled workers from gaining the education and training necessary for skilled work in the future, creating cycles of poverty fueled by government transfers. That is to say, there is a potential trade-off between greater consumption in the short run for lower consumption in the long run via government transfers of this kind. (Ray, 1998, p. 288-9) FIGURE 6: Ecuadorian Poverty Headcount & Gap Compared to the Gini Coefficient for Ecuador (1987-2007) In section IV of this paper, I will present non-liberalized model simulations of the Ecuadorian economy to examine how these three indicators have been affected by liberalization. 7 John Doe III.2: DOLLARIZATION OF ECUADORIAN ECONOMY: The financial crisis of 1999-2000 was created by “institutional weaknesses in Ecuador” due in part to “exogenous and policyinduced shocks” and during which confidence in the Ecuadorian banking system and currency declined rapidly. (Jacome et al. 2010. pg. 7) This led to Ecuador replacing the Sucre with the U.S. dollar as legal tender. “In general, the most important rationale for dollarization has been the desire to import a tested monetary policy framework that facilitates preserving price stability and contributes to fostering economic growth.” (Jacome et al. 2010. pgs. 3-4) The Ecuadorian financial system has enjoyed stable inflation of consumer prices of 2-8% since the financial crisis and dollarization of the economy with GDP growing at an average of 3.68% since 2000, which is essentially the same as the US. A benefit of Ecuador’s dollarization is the avoidance of Dutch Disease. Dutch Disease occurs when a country’s revenues increase due to a reliance on a natural resource, such as oil, causing the currency to appreciate. This appreciation causes a decline in the manufacturing sector due to exports becoming more expensive in the global marketplace. Gibson (Lecture) III.3: According to data from the WDI (2010), GDP per CAPITA GROWTH: GDP per capita has risen at an average rate of 2.38% since 1960, with growth of 3.68% since recovering from a major economic crisis and subsequent dollarization of the economy in 2000. The rise in GDP per capita rise has created growth in the middle class and is largely driven by the increased output of oil. For example, in 2004, oil output doubled and Ecuador’s GDP per capita rose by 6.9%. The effects of liberalization on GDP per capita growth are ambiguous given Ecuador’s reliance on oil exports. 8 THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN ECUADOR FIGURE 7: Price of Oil Compared to GDP per Capita for Ecuador (1960-2009) Ecuador’s economy relies heavily on the approximately 480,000 barrels of oil produced each day, making it the 5th largest supplier of oil in Latin and South America. 180,000 barrels are consumed in Ecuador with 300,000 barrels being exported abroad, primarily to the United States. The export of oil constitutes approximately ¼ of Ecuador’s public sector revenues and ½ total export revenue. (CIA, 2010) Total oil reserves are estimated to be 6.5 billion barrels. “The Andean nation’s ‘persistent conflicts’ with oil companies have made a recovery in output ‘impossible’ further limiting government revenue.” (Fertl, 2010) At current production Ecuador will enjoy the benefits of oil production for approximately 36 years. Without sufficient technological advancements in petroleum extraction or growth in other sectors of the economy, Ecuador faces income contraction when production decreases or ceases. While Ecuador exports heavy refined products, it must import lighter products such as gasoline, diesel, and liquefied petroleum due to limited 9 John Doe refining capacity. Due to the cost of import petroleum products being greater than export petroleum products, increases in oil prices (globally) have a lower effect on Ecuadorian income than they would if refining heavy petroleum products in-country. (EIA, 2010) Attempts to increase oil output have met with opposition from private firms. The Ecuadorian government is looking to increase its share of oil revenue by “transforming existing contracts with foreign oil companies into service agreements” by the end of 2010. In so doing, oil companies will receive a flat fee, with all oil “considered state property.” The government’s hope is that their share of oil revenues will increase under this new Hydrocarbon Law. (EIA, 2010) Privatization, deregulation, and property rights, three of the ten recommendations made by the economist John Williamson in the Washington Consensus, are seemingly being ignored by President Correa’s policies, a worrying policy change in Ecuador during a period of strong GDP/capita growth. (Williamson, 1990) Overall, according to data from the World Bank (2010), “low private investment remains the main bottleneck for sustained high economic growth in Ecuador.” The new constitution, poor investment conditions, and increased state intervention in “’strategic’ areas, such as energy, banking and telecommunications” continue to limit private investment. III.4: FOREIGN TRADE: Ecuador is typical of a developing country in that it is an exporter of raw materials and cash crops and an importer of capital goods and heavily reliant on oil exports, Ecuadorian income is highly correlated to international oil prices. With Ecuador protected from the effects of Dutch Dieses by the dollarization of the economy in 2000, entrepreneurs in the manufacturing sector are able to “compete and learn new technologies on the job rather than in the abstract” by “exporting to competitive markets [which] may create positive externalities.” (Ray, 1998. p. 682-683) 10 THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN ECUADOR FIGURE 8: Top 10 Export Commodities for Ecuador (2007-2009) “Ecuador’s most recent constitution, promulgated in October 2008, established broad new guidelines for trade, giving priority to local production.” (Foreign Trade Information System, 2010) Ray (1998. p. 678) argues that preferential credit and import policies are necessary to combat high domestic interest rates in order to spur investment and growth. Figure 9 below illustrates the increased competitiveness of Ecuadorian exports and the lower cost of imports through a lower exchange rate due to the dollarization of the economy in 2000. 11 John Doe FIGURE 9: Real Effective Exchange Rate Index (1980-2009) FIGURE 10: Top 10 Import Commodities for Ecuador (2007-2009) High interest rates on private capital continue to be a limiting factor in alternative products reaching world markets. President Correa’s decision in 2008 to default on its $31.6 million 12 THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN ECUADOR interest payment for global bonds effectively closed international capital markets to Ecuador. Considering that President Correa has called Ecuador’s $10 billion in foreign debt “immoral and illegitimate” (Romero, 2008) future interest payments are in doubt, creating difficulty in acquiring foreign private capital. Venezuela continues to be a major lender to Ecuador, making possible such irrational fiscal decisions by government. Ecuador’s constitutional reforms of 2008 are still evolving, but one key change is new trade guidelines which provide priority to local production. For example, the Foreign Trade Information System (2010) reports “price band total duties as high as 85.5 percent and 46 percent have been applied to chicken parts and pork, respectively, restricting those imports.” Ecuador joined the WTO in 1996, setting tariff rates at 30% or less with the exception of agricultural products covered by the pre-existing Andean Price Band System (APBS). In 2007 and 2008 Ecuador “reduced tariffs on 3,267 tariff lines and increased them on 1,612 tariff lines.” (Foreign Trade Information System, 2010) Overall, it appears Ecuadorian trade policies are focused on protecting the most vulnerable portion of the population from international competition. However, greater research on this point is not realistic given the scope of this paper. It is therefore sufficient to say that Ecuadorian foreign trade policies are in keeping with WTO and Andean trade guidelines while attempting to protect the domestic agricultural sector. This protectionism coupled to re-imposing capital controls via Ecuador’s 2008 default, implies that the counterfactual simulation presented in section 4 of this paper may be in-line with current Ecuadorian policy. III.5: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: There have been significant increases in spending for social services which created a government deficit in 2009 due to low oil prices, lower demand for exports due to the global economic slowdown, and higher import prices. “Given the country's 13 John Doe dire financial and capital account situation, we stress that the risks of a broader balance of payments crisis emerging over the next 18 months remains pronounced… Ecuador will experience another current account shortfall in 2010, driven in large measure through the country's burgeoning trade deficit, forecast to come in at 0.11% of GDP (US$262mn).” (Business Monitor International, 2010) Williamson (1990) argued “that large and sustained fiscal deficits are a primary source of macroeconomic dislocation in the forms of inflation, payments deficits, and capital flight,” unless the deficits are being used for infrastructure development. Unfortunately, infrastructure development is currently limited given Ecuador’s limited access to foreign credit. Considering that current deficits are being used for social programs focused on the redistribution of wealth, these policy decisions may not be the best for long term economic growth. However, from Figure 11 below, it appears the Ecuadorian economy has been moving towards a positive balance of payments over the prior 32 year period illustrated. FIGURE 11: Balance of Payments for Ecuador (1976-2008) 14 THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN ECUADOR III.6: REMITTANCES: A hidden “benefit” of Ecuadorian economic and political instability was the waves of emigration prior to and during the 1999-2000 fiscal crisis. Remittances can be an important element household income for the poorest portion of the population. Household income is expressed as in equation Yh above with remittances entering the equation as foreign transfers (Tr*). According to Acosta et al. (2007), “countries that receive remittances have lower poverty levels.” Furthermore, a 10 percent increase in remittances equates to a 3.5 percent decline in poverty headcount. As the Ecuadorian economy improves, remittances have fallen to a little over 4% of GDP from their high of 8.2% in 2000. As supported by the Solow growth model mentioned in Developmental Economics (Ray, 1998) if emigrants return to the country with sufficient capital, GDP per capita will remain unchanged or rise, however, if these workers return with little to no capital, GDP per capita will fall, especially for lower income families. FIGURE 12: Worker’s Remittances as a Percentage of GDP for Ecuador (1986-2009) III.6: LABOR FORCE: The Ecuadorian formal sector labor force consists of 8.3% engaged in agriculture, 21.8% in industry and 69.8% in services. 15 John Doe Employment in Employment in Employment in AGRICULTURE (% of INDUSTRY (% of total SERVICES (% of total total employment) employment) employment) 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Source: WDI (2010) 6.4 6.9 7.5 7.9 6.6 7.3 7 6.2 6.6 6.8 7.3 7.5 8.5 7.7 8.6 9.1 9.3 8.3 8.3 25 24.2 25.2 23.7 24.3 24.9 22.8 21.9 21.6 22.3 21.4 23.4 23.9 24.3 22.5 21.7 21.4 21.2 21.8 68.6 68.9 67.3 68.3 69.1 67.7 70.2 71.9 71.8 70.8 71.2 69.1 67.6 67.5 68.9 69.2 69.3 70.4 69.8 TABLE 2: Percent of Labor Force per Sector This classification of labor into these three sectors does not provide a wide enough view to ascertain the health of the Ecuadorian economy in that the large services sector could be “symptomatic of the development of the unorganized or informal sector” due to the service sector proving a “fallback option for laborers lacking an industrial job” during the urbanization of the economy. (Ray, 1998.p.38) However, urban population growth has slowed and formal sector unemployment has remained relatively steady at 8-10% over the prior 10 year period. From this data it is not possible to ascertain whether Ecuador has reached the Lewis Turning Point. If wages had continued to rise, given stable unemployment, it may have been possible to make this conclusion. However, total compensation of employees including remittances is still 16 THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN ECUADOR 1/5th of its 1988 high of 146% of GDP. When reviewing actual compensation/remittances amounts versus as a percentage of GDP, the same correlation presents itself. FIGURE 13: Urban Growth Rate for Ecuador (1960-2009) The percentage of women working in the formal sector has increased 45% since 1980, a major driver of economic growth (see Figure 14 below). Coupled to the emergence of women in the formal sector workforce is a significant reduction in birthrates (see Figure 15 below), which increases capital per individual worker due to lower population growth, which was 1.5% in Ecuador in 2009. (U.S. Department of State, 2010) The MDG target of “full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people” is on-track in Ecuador. The MDG goals of improving child mortality and improving maternal health seem to be unaffected by liberalization and continue to decline at a steady rate (see Figure 15 below). In regards to the MDG goal of “Universal Primary Education,” Ecuador is doing poorly, greatly reducing its ability to compete in global markets (see Figure 16 below). In addition, the reduction 17 John Doe of women receiving primary education threatens Ecuador reaching the MDG goal of continued improvement in labor force participation for women. FIGURE 14: Labor Participation Rate (Percent Over 15 Years of Age) for Ecuador (1980-2008) FIGURE 15: Birth & Infant Mortality Rates for Ecuador (1960-2009) 18 THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN ECUADOR FIGURE 16: Percent of Labor Force with Primary Education for Ecuador (2001-2006) III.8: ECONOMIC POLICIES: President Correa’s broad social and constitutional reforms may create greater income equality due to transfers of capital and land to the poorest of the population, but they are also acting as inhibitors to foreign investment due to increasingly autocratic policies. (Fleischman, 2010) Furthermore, without sufficient investment in human capital education, etc, transfers of income to the poor is a short run boost to consumption. After passing a wide reform of the constitution in 2008, President Correa now “talks about re-orienting the private sector, also called the strategic sector, to serve ‘the social interest.’” Furthermore, “the Ecuadorian constitution– whose enactment and ratification was praised by the contentious Secretary General of the Organization of American States, Jose Miguel Insulza– is a document that empowers the government against democracy, individual rights and private property.( Fleischman, 2010) Austere fiscal policies coupled to large social spending programs and increasing government control over media outlets and private businesses have weakened 19 John Doe President Correa’s approval ratings and further hamper international investment. “Ecuador will seek $1.1 billion in loans from domestic investors and $3.86 billion from foreign lenders to cover the budget deficit [2010], according to the proposed budget.” (Gill, 2010) FIGURE 17: GDP Growth and Current Account Balance A major focus of Correa’s social spending plan is to “expropriate unused and unproductive agricultural land, or raise taxes on those properties to force its owners to sell.” (Fertl, 2010) This focus on improving the lives of indigenous peasants may raise consumption in the short run, but without improvements in education and access to capital, these programs will not prepare the workforce for the skilled jobs necessary for competition in the global market. III.9: WASHINGTON CONSENSUS: Besides previously mentioned issues in regards to policies on foreign direct investment, public expenditure priorities, trade policy, deregulation, and fiscal deficits, Ecuador is moving in a positive direction in regards to property rights, but is still significantly lagging most of Latin and South America with only Bolivia and Venezuela scoring lower. According to the Heritage Foundation, Ecuador scored 20 out of 100 in a Property Rights 20 THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN ECUADOR Index compared to the rest of South America. Part of the government’s recent social agenda is to provide indigenous farmers with titles to land they’ve been farming for generations, however the results of those policies have yet to be seen and they may infringe upon the property rights of current large land owners. (Fertl, 2010) Overall, it appears Ecuador is not following the recommended policies of the Washington Consensus. IV. SIMULATION MODEL: SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRIX (SAM) The simulation model solves for 12 variables [X, C, I, E, Yh, i, Yd, p, M, er, e(Ms), Y] using 28 fixed parameters, comprising 3 SAM identities and 9 behavioral equations. While this provides the economist opportunity to run 336 different experiments with the model, it is the goal of this paper to focus on counterfactual simulations examining the effects of economic openness. The first SAM identity is aggregate demand (X), which is expressed as: X = AX + C + I + G + E where X is the gross value of production, A is value of intermediate goods per unit of output, C is real consumption of domestic goods and is expressed as: C = cBar + mpc(Yd) where cBar is autonomous consumption and mpc is the marginal propensity to consume out of household disposable income. The SAM identity Yd will be defined below. I is investment and is expressed as: I = Ibar – bi in which Ibar is autonomous investment, b is interest sensitivity of investment, and i is the domestic interest rate. G is government expenditure on goods produced by local firms, and E is net exports less competitive imports which is expressed by: E = E0 [(ep*/p)ε] 21 John Doe where E0 are SAM competitive imports, e is the nominal exchange rate, ε is the elasticity of net competitive exports in relation to the real exchange rate, p* is foreign price and p is domestic price, which is expressed as: p = (1+tind)(1+τ)(pA+wl+e mf) where tind is indirect taxes, τ is the markup, w is the wage rate, l is the labor coefficient, and mf is the non-competitive import coefficient for firms. The second SAM identity is the income of households (Yh) which is expressed by: Yh = wlX + (1-sf)rK + Tr + Tr* + Wg + iDg where the parameter sf is firm’s savings rate, r is the level of international reserves in the central bank, K is the capital stock, Tr are domestic transfers, Tr* are foreign transfers, Wg are government wages, and Dg is government debt. The third SAM identity is disposal income (Yd), which is expressed as: Yd = Yh(1-t) where t is the direct tax on households. There are 5 other behavioral equations that require defining. The first is: Ms = KmY – Hi where Ms is the money supply, Km is the transactions coefficient in the demand for money, H is the speculative coefficient for money and Y is GDP, which is expressed as: Y = C + I + (G+Wg) + E – M in which M is expressed as: M = mfX + mi(I) where mi is the non-competitive import coefficient for investment. The fourth behavioral equation is: ∆R = E - erM + F(i-i*) 22 THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN ECUADOR where F is the capital flow parameter, which is the sensitivity of foreign investment to the interest rate differential and in which i* is the foreign interest rate. The final behavioral equation is: er = ep*/p IV. COUNTERFACTUAL SAM MODELING I calibrate a counterfactual model, which operates as if the Ecuadorian economy had not liberalized, to GDP, as seen in Figure 18 below. In all Figures listed in Section IV: “Sim” is the SAM’s simulation of the “Actual” data, “Actual” is the real data for Ecuador, while “CF” represents the counterfactual result. GDP was used to calibrate simulations to actual data as shown in Figure 18 below: FIGURE 18: Actual and Simulated Ecuadorian Incomes (2000-2009) The per year growth rate changes made to the model to simulate deliberalization are listed in Table 2 below. 23 John Doe Parameter / Variable Base Simulation G 0.01 Counterfactual Simulation 0.1 Tr 0.01 0.03 Tr_star 0.05 0.065 ws 0.05 0.07 wu 0.01 0.02 e_n 0.07 0.02 Ibar 0.03 0.08 Ms 0.03 0.08 ε 3.5 2.5 (dI/I)/di -3 -3 (dMd/Md)/di 2 2 -0.1 0 t* growth Source: Author’s calculations TABLE 2: Counterfactual Simulation Changes to SAM As we can see from Table 3, aggregate demand (X) growth decreased from 6.5% to 4.5% per year. The reduction was driven primarily by decreases in consumption (C) and net exports (NX), as would be expected in closing the economy. However, as illustrated in Table 2 above government spending (G) was increased by 10% per year in the counterfactual simulation and the money supply was increased by 8% to drive income growth. Other drivers of income growth included raising foreign transfers (Tr*) from 5% to 6.5%, and raising autonomous investment (Ibar) from 3% to 8%. Given historical evidence presented earlier in this paper, greater emigration and remittances is plausible. Interest rates (i) fell at unrealistic rates, which can in part be contributed to the 8% growth of the money supply (Ms). Given the dollarization of the economy, it is questionable whether Ecuador would have the freedom to raise the money supply by 8% per annum, however, changes to these parameters was necessary to simulate parallel GDP growth (do you mean even at the slower rate?) 24 THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN ECUADOR Macroeconomic Indicator X Liberalized Growth Rate 0.065 Counterfactual Growth Rate 0.045 C 0.056 0.045 I -0.021 0.123 E 0.106 -0.002 M 0.088 0.051 i 0.200 -2.190 unrealistic e_n*(1+t_star) 0.055 0.020 Source: Author’s Calculations (2010) TABLE 3: Income Growth Rate Comparison Between Liberalized and Closed Ecuadorian Economy SAM Simulations The effects of nonliberalization on Ecuadorian poverty, inflation, and government deficits, are illustrated in Figures 19-23 below. FIGURE 19: Actual and Simulated per Year Inflation for Ecuador (2000-2009) Figure 19 illustrates that counterfactual inflation would increase at approximately the same levels as in the open economy simulation. Growth rates for ws were increased from 5% per year in the 25 John Doe open market simulation to 7% per year in the closed economy simulation while wu was increased from 1% to 2% to achieve this result. FIGURE 20: Actual and Simulated Fiscal Deficits for Ecuador (2000-2009) In order to maintain parallel income growth, fiscal deficits rise at an unsustainable rate in the closed economy model in part due to government spending increasing from 5% to 10% per annum. Maintaining government spending growth at 5% per year, as modeled in the open economy simulation, reduces deficit growth, but does not (no contractions in formal writing) 26 THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN ECUADOR solve the issue of rising deficits. FIGURE 20a: Actual and Simulated Fiscal Deficits for Ecuador (2000-2009) The reduction in government spending has profound impact on poverty growth as measured by the poverty gap as illustrated in Figure 21 below. The poverty gap rises at 2.97% per year in the open economy simulation, 2.46% in the closed economy simulation with government spending set at 10% growth, and with government spending growth reduced to 5% per year, the poverty gap increases at only 0.4% per year. These results illustrate that increases in government spending are not the solution to reducing poverty. The Gini coefficient and poverty headcount are relatively unaffected by the changes in government spending as illustrated in Figures 22 and 23. However, the growth rate of the Gini coefficient slows from 0.55% per year to 0.2% per year in both closed economy scenarios. 27 John Doe FIGURE 21: Actual and Simulated Poverty Gap for Ecuador (2000-2009) FIGURE 21: Actual and Simulated Gini Coefficients for Ecuador (2000-2009) 28 THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN ECUADOR FIGURE 22: Actual and Simulated Poverty Head Count for Ecuador (2000-2009) V. CONCLUSIONS The growth reduction in the poverty gap and the Gini coefficient were expected as globalization causes greater income inequality as profits are increased and labor receives a decreasing share. However, poverty and income inequality were not decreasing in the closed economy simulations, but rising at slower rates while the poverty headcount grew 0.06% more quickly in both the closed economy simulations, illustrating that closing the Ecuadorian economy is not the solution to lowering poverty, but would lower income inequality. While it was possible to create a counterfactual simulation in which GDP rises at the same rate as in the original simulation, given Ecuador’s reliance on oil exports for ½ of public sector revenue, oil would continue to be exported while other sectors of the economy close to globalization. This could account for a continued rise in poverty. Current Ecuadorian policies are focused on short-run increases in consumption and agriculture reform, which will do little to improve Ecuador’s global competitive edge, excluding the 29 John Doe agricultural sector. With less than 33% of the population having primary education and the country reliant on oil income, it is the contention of this paper that poverty and income inequality will continue to rise unless unskilled workers are properly trained. In the counterfactual simulation, employment growth slows from 5.8% to 4% per year, a worrying prospect for Ecuador reaching the Lewis Turning Point, as wages will not rise with less workers being employed in the formal sector. As evidenced in this paper, closing the Ecuadorian economy is not the solutions to reducing poverty or income inequality. V. REFERENCES Acosta, Pablo & Calderón, Cesar & Fajnzylber, Pablo & Lopez, Humberto. What is the Impact of International Remittances on Poverty and Inequality in Latin America? The World Bank, 2007. BBC News: Ecuador declares state of emergency amid 'coup attempt,' 30 September, 2010, Accessed at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11447519 on 26 Nov, 2010. BBC News: Profile: Ecuador's Rafael Correa. 30 September, 2010, Accessed at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11449110 on 26 Nov, 2010. Business Monitor International: Ecuador: Balance Of Payments Dynamics Remains Precarious, Jun 22 2010. http://store.businessmonitor.com/article/360949. Accessed Nov 24, 2010. CIA. World Factbook – Ecuador. Available from CIA website: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ec.html. Accessed on November 20, 2010. Clayton, Jessica Audrey & Warin, Thierry, A Note of Remittances in El Salvador and Ecuador: An Analysis of Household Survey Data. Cirano, Montreal 2010. comtrade.un.org. Ecuador- Imports: CIF, by origin; Exports: FOB, by last known destination. Accessed on 22 November, 2010. DRDB. Rafael Correa: another Latin American president with an econ Ph.D. 14 Oct, 2006, http://www.bankresearch.org/economicpolicyblog/2006/10/rafael_correa_a.html, accessed on Nov 26, 2010. 30 THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN ECUADOR Fertl, Duroyan. Ecuador: Correa vows to ‘radicalise revolution’. Green Left. October 17, 2010. Fleischman, Luis. 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Published April 1990 by Peterson Institute for International Economics 31 John Doe Before showing this to anyone make sure that 1. All references are actually cited in the paper and 2. The citations in the paper link to a reference in the bib. Nice job Jeff… 32