Download PDF

PROCEEDINGS
OF THE
SECOND ,,INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE
.
OF
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMISTS
HELD AT
CORNELL UNIVERSITY,
ITHACA; NEW YORK,
AUGUST 18 TO AUGUST 29, 1930
U:l]e <Gollegiatc lgress
GEORGE BANTA PUBLISHING COMPANY
MENASHA, WISCONSIN
1930
I
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS AS APPLIED ECONOMICS
A.
w.
ASHBY
wAL ES,
0
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF
ABERYSTWYTH,
wALES
in agricultural economics it has always seemed to
me that the philosophy of economic science with which we are
provided in the general studies of method in economics, and in
general statements of the aims of economic science, is quite inadequate for our purposes. Agricultural economics is an "applied
science," that is, it is a methodical pu~suit of knowledge of economic processes and organisation in agriculture and of their results,
for the purpose of stabilising, adapting or modifying them; and, if
and when necessary, of changing their results. The application
of knowledge to an industry does not necessarily mean changing
the forms of organisation or structure of the industry or even
making any change in its processes. The most complete and reliable information may confirm the ·usefulnesses, desirability, and
value of the existing organisation and processes. But this is not
often the case, and had there been expectations that this result
would arise from the study of agricultural economics probably
there would not have been any such study.
In all "applied"- sciences there is an underlying assumption that
the results of study will lead to desirable change, to development
and progress. The study of agricultural economics grew out of a
more or less dearly recognised need for knowledge of economic
organisation and economic processes in the industry which could
be used for intelligent modification of existing forms and conditions. Agricultural economics is not a "pure science," for the
study is not pursued, nor is the organisation maintained to pursue
it, maintained to produce "knowledge for knowledge's sake."
There are necessarily times when agricultural economists must
specially claim to be free to pursue knowledge in their sphere without restriction and without thought of its possible effects; and
they will of course always claim "freedom of science" to explore
their universe and "academic freedom" to proclaim results.
Scientists engaged in an "applied science" do not usually apply
their knowledge: they usually apply their methods of study to
what are apparently weak spots in the industry. They produce
their results, and they sometimes indicate how these results affect
the consideration of processes or forms of organisation. They may
I
N MY WORK
308
A. W.
ASHBY
even go further and indicate the modifications which seem, as the
result of their investigations, to be necessary or desirable. Some
studies are directed not, apparently, to weak spots in organisation
or processes but to these in general. But no one will object to the
statement that any weaknesses discovered in such investigations are
given greater attention than evidences of strength or of stability.
This condition may alter as the science develops and at some points
knowledge may lead quite as clearly to preservation or conservation
as to change, but this is not to be expected for some time to come.
If agricultural economi9 is not an applied science in this sense,
then it can only be an industrial branch of "political economy" or
"economic science." Studies will be pursued and organisations
maintained to procure knowledge and to proclaim it. The result
may be "pure knowledge," whatever that may be. But whenever
the result is real knowledge we may rest assured that someone will
use it either in whole or in part. And we have always to remember
that "laws" or "principles" of the "purest" of pure economics have
been used, particularly in politics but also in industrial administration. These uses perhaps have been more frequently of a negative
or conservative than of a positive or constructive character, but
negative uses of ideas, principles, and even knowledge in social
life may sometimes be as important as constructive uses. The negative here as everywhere is merely the first step to a positive attitude.
Industry is a social activity. Economics is a social science. The
pursuit of agriculture is a social activity, and agricultural economics
is a part of a social science of economics, which is only one of the
social sciences.
From these points of view I would examine the position of agricultural economics and in part that of the agricultural economist.
If anyone accuses me of being an idealist, or of trying to make a
philosophy, I can only say that my record as a fact-finder will show
that I have done a fair share of work in that sphere. My dissatisfaction with mere fact-finding drives me to consider its basis.
The outstanding fact about any branch of applied economics,
and about agricultural economics in particular, is that its results,
its knowledge (sometimes more properly perhaps, its "information") will be used for purposes of manipulative or directive acts
in the sphere of economics or politics. These acts may be those of
individuals, of groups or their leaders, or of administrators or
AGRICULTURAL AS APPLIED ECONOMICS
309
statesmen. They may apply to one business, to group interests or
collective businesses, or to economic organisation of the state or
world-community.
There is a theory, or as I would prefer to call it, a suggestion
(occasionally treated as a dogma), that agricultural economics is
concerned only with natural forces in that part of the economic
universe occupied by agriculture and agriculturists. Agricultural
economics, it is said, is a naturalistic science, that is, it should pursue
its studies with reference only to phenomena or facts; and it has
nothing whatever to do with "values" or assessments of phenomena
or "facts" J?y human or social standards. There is also a suggestion
that agricultural economics as an industrial branch of pure economics is a study in pursuit of pure knowledge, which sometimes
means that it is an essay or series of essays in logic. And it matters
not that logic may be deductive or inductive: the results are logical and impersonal.
This, of course, is not true. Some processes in inductive logic
in the social sciences are quite personal, and some in deductive
logic are intensely so. Logic does not give mechanical results of
mechanical processes. But neither of these represents the true
position of agricultural economics as a branch of social science, and
I shall not make any apologies for applying some of the principles
of other social sciences to agricultural economics.
If we deal with economics by the methods of the naturalistic
sciences we should arrive at something like natural law, but as a
matter of fact we never do. Social life is not a "natural fact."
"The form of social life at present under our eye is not the result
of inevitable processes, but, in great part at least, the result
of definite acts of choice made by particular men and groups of
men." In so far as existing society-including the economic organisation of agriculture-is the result of past choice and past
acts of will, so the social life of the future may be transformed
by new acts of will. Practically speaking, we can apply the conceptions of natural science to the economic systems only when we
use the conception of the "economic man." Then we regard the
system as a ground arranged for a scramble in which men give .
as little and get as much as possible. But we do not now accept
this principle of self-interest, at least in its crude form. We
know that self-interest is and must be checked by law, by economic
conventions, and by morals.
310
,A. W.
ASHBY
We do not accept the principle of self-interest in the science of
politics and have not accepted it for about 80 years. "Political
man" is not concerned with giving the least and getting the most.
"Political man" is concerned with the establishment and maintenance of order, the creation and extension of liberty, and the
establishment and maintenance of good government. If we apply
the political principle to economic organisation, then we view it
not as a naturalistic world, but as a cooperative enterprise for maintaining and developing civilised life. (The specific objects sought
by "economic man" may be discussed later.)
We may then, take as our fundamental principle iq economics
the division and specialisation of function because of its importance in production. Our fundamental problem is, then, the
coordination of functions to secure the greatest order in the distribution of functions themselves and the greatest order in the distribution and the use of the goods and services produced. Or,
accepting the principle that division and specialisation of function
will lead to production at least cost or on the most economical
lines, then our problem is that of combining the pursuit of least
cost with that of the highest possible degree of order and security.
It is because no one believes in the naturalistic scheme of economic organisation that every one not merely accepts but gladly sees
the political and social organisations interfering to qualify the
results of the economic organisation. In the naturalistic system
of economics the fact that the economic system does not need a
man-although that man still needs food, clothing, and housing
(and the health and well-being of society requires that he receive
these and live in civilised decency )-means that this man is not
a part of the economic system. The unemployed are irrelevant to
the naturalistic economic system. Their wants are not relevant to
that system because they are not backed by purchasing power. But
the naturalistic economists never yet had courage to suggest that
the unemployed be shot-as we shoot unnecessary horses-although some of their simpler and more truthful followers in the
world of business have privately held views somewhat of this
. character.
I use this illustration because it is one of which the principles
have long received recognition. But should we apply the naturalistic conceptions to agricultural economics we shall soon find ourselves faced with the same sort of dilemma. The farmer who
AGRICULTURAL AS APPLIED ECONOMICS
311
loses his economic position because of the advance of technical
processes or economic organisation in the industry has just as much
right to the support and assistance of society as the urban unemployed. He is a member of society, and society suffers when he
suffers beyond a certain degree.
Just at the point at which the economic system breaks down the
political and social systems take up the task of making civilised
life possible. They are able to, and in fact are obliged to, because
they are informed by better philosophies of the social life.
If our economic system is a natural system, it must be what it
is, and what it is it will be. That is not to say it will not change,
for if we believe in evolution in the natural world we believe in
change in that world. But the seeds of all the change in future
natural worlds are here in the present. This is true of the economic
world also, but the seeds of change in the economic world are in
the minds and hearts of men as well as in the economic phenomena
themselves. Man does not change the stars, he only changes his
thoughts and develops his knowledge of them. Man does select
and breed plants and thus changes the plants that grow. But he
cannot put into plants anything that is not already there. He uses
directive thought and develops them. In economics, man can at
least use as much directive thought as in applied botany, and he
may put into the economic system some things which are not now
there. When man begins to use directive thought in applied botany
or in applied economics he asks not only "What is?" but "What
ought to be?" or "What is required?"
We are then brought to the fact that in applied economics we
are not only concerned with facts, but with values. What ought
to be has to be considered equally with what is and with what ir
coming. Where we pass from the world of what is to ideas of
what ought to be, we no longer deal with a world which is in any
sense naturalistic, or with any world by the methods of naturalistic
science. 1 The natural sciences deal with a universe that not only
1
Throughout this paper the phrase "what ought to be" is used in the sense of
what ought to be from the economic point of view, i.e. from the point of view of
economic health in existing society. It has reference to what is now economically
possible. in existing society, or what may reasonably be achieved in the near future.
There are points at which ethical and political considerations may join with
economic considerations in the total social consideration of what ought to be, but
the economist is primarily concerned with what ought to be from his own standpoint of the production, distribution, and use of goods and services provided by
the economic system. The general tendency of economics is to lay emphasis on
312
A. W.
ASHBY
is but will be. We deal with a world that is, but a world that will
be as man makes it, and as we help him to make it.
What I have said contains no implication that there are no
"natural facts" in the existing economic system; nor does it imply
that I depreciate knowledge or the pursuit of knowledge of those
facts. "Facts" in the economic world are mere existences; they are
in no sense "inevitables." Laws in the economic world, if any,
are mere existences and they are not inevitable. Economic laws
are mere general tendencies in the existing scheme of things.
Change the existing scheme and the law disappears. And most
economic laws require modification from time to time.
Any fundamental laws of the economic universe can only arise
from the nature of man now applied in that universe-his aptitudes, his capacities, his desires. If we admit that man has aptitudes and abilities which are not now used in economic organisation and desires which are not strongly expressed in it, and we
begin to apply new aptitudes and abilities and to express new
desires, then the economic system will change. There are many
illustrations of such changes.
When we have described our facts, when we have discovered
their several tendencies, it is not sufficient for us to say "Here is
what is," or "That is how it came to be," and "This is what is coming or may be expected." It is for, us to say (from the point of
view of economics) what change is desirable, what is the best
method by which change may be secured, what degree of change
will be possible in a given time by a given method, and possibly
what consequential change will follow on any change that is made.
Applied botany and applied genetics in animal breeding decide
what change is desirable and the methods by which change may
be brought about, and in some degree they hope in the future to
estimate possible rates of change and to anticipate, at least, some
consequential changes. 2
In short, it is not for the economist, much less the agricultural
production and distribution with the greater emphasis on production. Agricultural
economics, until quite recently, has dealt mainly with production. Any attempt at
economic synthesis ought to go far beyond the system of preliminary production.
'The modern chemist, probably, is much more proud of his achievements in
synthesis than of chose in analysis. Synthetic chemistry has certainly done immense
service to mankind and has brought high recognition to the whole science. It is no
less scientific than the analytic chemistry upon which it is founded. And there is no
a priori reason why a synthetic economics should be less scientific than the mere
analytic.
AGRICULTURAL AS APPLIED ECONOMICS
313
economist, i:o regard as sacred a system of thought which he has
created for his own convenience. It is certainly not for the economist to regard as sacred an economic organisation constructed during the last century by men less intelligent than himself. When
the economists have finished their work on what is; when they
have reached their forecasts of what is coming; then their task is
to conceive an economic policy, that is, to conceive a deliberate
control of production and consumption of wealth for the sake of
a clearly conceived life of man in civilised society.
Before proceeding further with this discussion perhaps I ought
to offer some ideas as to studies in agricultural economics.
Economic systems are made largely if not wholly by behaviour
systems in men and groups of men, but not, mark, by any one
behaviour system which is common to all men at all times. The
predominant economic systems have been made by men who have
been dominant in economic organisations. If we can change the
behaviour systems of the men who dominate economic organisation,
we can change the economic system itself. Incidentally, the first
thing we attempt when we direct attention to farm management
data or marketing data, and try to get knowledge applied, is to
try to change the behaviour systems of men, so I presume that
no one of the "practical" persons amongst us will say that behaviour systems cannot be changed. We can and do change behaviour systems of men in individual businesses, in groups or in
nations.
Possibly the economic system has been regarded as a scramble
because so many economic relations are the result of mere casual
impact. Many of the relations into which farmers enter are really
of, the nature of accidental impacts. A man who wants to be a
tenant "must get land," but it is often an accident which piece of
land he gets. The impact between owner and tenant is not even
inevitable for on some occasions tenants may not get land and on
some ,occasions owners may not find tenants. A wheat producer
must sell wheat, but it is largely a matter of accident to whom he
sells it. If we could build up continued relationships, continuous
cooperation, we leave behind the idea of scramble and put the idea
of organised relationships in its place.
In dealing with complexities of social phenomena we have to be
careful not to proceed too rapidly to lay out the apparent or the
supposed uniformity. There are some cases, as in the so-called
314
A. W.
ASHBY·
theories of wages, in which we may have to be satisfied with the
description of the complexities and where, if we are honest, we
shall not try to make logical uniformity where none exists. H. G.
Wells (in "The World of William Clissold") speaks of "the
scholar's hate of irreducible complexity," and there is no doubt
that those of us who have been brought up on logical systems like
to see our way through a series of complex phenomena as quickly
as possible, and feel baffied and ineffective when we cannot do so.
Unless I am mistaken there.are some aspects of existing marketing
systems which show irreducible complexities and in regard to which
logical reduction may not be possible.
It may seem a strange thought, but there are probably case~ in
which we shall never find order and uniformity until we have
applied standards of what ought to be, and reorganised systems.
Everyone believes that the world in which we live possesses a
certain kind and measure of regularity. Every action which we
voluntarily perform, and every expectation which we entertain,
carries the implication of such a belief. This is true of course of
the economic world; but it does not follow that there is "uniformity
of nature" in the economic world. Here phase follows phase in
constant flow, but every phase is unique. Phases in social life are
not often if ever repeated. The so-called "repetitions" in social
life are never more than vague resemblances. But there is a view
that the economic world is nevertheless made up of uniformities,
of causal sequences repeated again and again, which collectively
embody laws which are general over a given population in a given
state of civilisation. If this exists there cannot be more. In
economics there is no such thing as that unbroken experience in
time and space which is supposed to establish the uniformity of
nature and which, it is said, makes inference from experience
possible. Yet we sometimes talk as if by processes of inductive
logic, by the help of scientific methods, we can map out the whole
of economic reality into a scheme of definite causes direct!¥ connected with well-defined effects, which together form sequences
whose recurrence in different combinations makes the changing
pattern of the economic universe.
Within a given space and a given time, or more properly within
a society consisting of a group of people living in one area over
one period, there are tendencies in certain directions which can be
measured, there are experiences from which inferences can be
AGRICULTURAL AS APPLIED ECONOMICS
315
drawn, and there are uniformities which make possible some explanations and which give rise to expectations. Our universe is
much more complicated than is usually suggested. Here it is very
rare that anything happens through the operation of a single cause,
or yet through the simple cooperation of many causes each adding
its unqualified contribution to the total effect. Causes can never
be completely isolated, and their operation is never unqualified.
Sequences, so far as we know, are never exactly repeated. There
is always the factor of human reactions in the course of economic
relations. In economics "things" are never related to "things"
except through man. And in the end we have to remember that
all our calculations are mere approximations, and that we cannot
rely on the repetition of the phenomena in the same relations
and in the same quantities. In economics we are dealing with
human history, and this has hitherto proved to be inherently incalculable.3 No two human beings, it is said, exactly resemble each
other. Certainly, for economic purposes, no two groups of human
beings exactly resemble each other, and no two groups (whether
separated by space or time or even by mere economic and social
barriers) ever live in exactly the same circumstances. When we
change the circumstances, we change the human beings, and when
we change the human beings we begin to change the circumstances.
Unless psychologists and economists can get together and obtain
a common measure of these reactions there is no hope of certainty
in economic calculations.
3
The present positiOn in economics seems to be that minor occurrences are becoming predictable, while major occurrences come entirely unexpectedly. Could
we, for instance, foresee in 1920 the coming popularity and cheapness of artificial
silk, and the consequent effect on cotton and wool? Could we forsee about that
date, the spread of the combine-harvester and its probable effects on wheat production and on farm organization in some regions? Can we predict the future effects of
the combine-harvester from the study of changes following the introduction of the
self-binder? Are there any known scientific means by which we can predict changes
in the location of production, or changes in consumption? Who predicted the
substitution of the horse, and in part of the railway, by the automobile and its
associates? All these questions are important even in agricultural economics.
Even the prediction of minor occurrences depends on the assumptions of a static
world, or of steady and known trends. The use of correlation studies is particularly
dependent on these assumptions. And it is probable that in these studies quite
insufficient attention is paid to "residual factors," especially when these represent
the beginnings of what may be described as catastrophic or at lease as radical
changes. Even where the results of quantitative analysis more or less coincide
with the expectations from preliminary observation and deductive analysis, and
a high degree of correlation between quantities of factors is obtained, we cannot
be certain of the future repetition of relations and quantities, especially where
the intelligence of man may introduce new factors.
316
A.
w.
ASHBY
While I regard this as true I still say that it is a wise and necessary procedure to press mechanical theories to their limits. It is
necessary to search for what can be measured, and for methods
of measurement and calculation. Mechanical research along the
lines of mechanical theories is essential. The greater the obscurity,
the less the certainty, the greater the necessity for methodical
analysis and for the closest possible measurements. The analysis
will deal with what is, how it came to be, and in some cases with
what is coming and what is becoming. (I would distinguish between the last two. By "coming" is implied temporary changes
such as trade or "financial" fluctuations, and so forth, which alter
conditions but do not necessarily have great effects on existing
forms of organisation. By "becoming" is implied tendency
towards change in essential forms and in some cases in processes.) 4
Essentially, we attempt to interpret human action and reaction
in the processes and forms of economic organisation but within the
whole environment of the social life. There is no "system of
laws," no set of general principles, nor even of statements of
facts, or explanations of facts, which can be complete or exhaustive
for any considerable amount of time. Experience accumulates,
new facts are observed, new forms display themselves, and all
such formulae must be from time to time broken up and moulded
afresh. But more than this, processes and forms must be moulded
to social needs.
As workers in applied economics we cannot accept the idea that
economic development be left to chance or to the working out of
such rough uniformities as may exist in the economic universe.
Our very existence implies that economic occurrences may be
planned for and directed, at least to some extent. Either things
are left to chance, or are directed. If they are left to chance there
is no applied economics.
But so far we have not reached one of the most essential facts in
the philosophical basis of applied economics-that it not only rests
on the expectations of change and the possibility of directing
change, but also on the essential validity of the ideal in social life.
In all social science we are faced with the queer situation that we
have to treat the ideal as reality. To the leader of men in individual businesses, in groups large and small, in economic or in poli' Becoming means to pass from one state to another: to come or grow to be.
AGRICULTURAL AS APPLIED ECONOMICS
317
tical groups, the ideal is a magnet drawing on; and to the led
amongst men the ideal is a direction-pointer; while to those whose
interests would be injured by the establishment of the ideal, it is
a bogey whose advance has to be obstructed by every possible
means.
In passing we may note that one of the characteristic means of
attempting to obstruct the establishment of the ide.al is that of
going out to meet it, and of establishing a new position in the
direction of the ideal itself. One way of reforming economic institutions is that of preaching their replacement by an ideal institution which is entirely different, and thus making those most
directly interested in the existing institution reform it in order to
kill the bogey.
In any case, the men and women who have ideas and ideals, who
begin to create new values, or to lay varying emphasis on existing
values, represent the growth points in social life. The ideas and
the activities of these persons are all-important to the work of the
applied economist. It may be that when we have really begun
to be masters in our science and in its methods we shall pay more
attention to what is coming and particularly to what is becoming
(as defined above) than to what is general or to what has been.
We are then brought back to the subject of values or what ought
to be, to which we have hitherto given so little of methodical
thought. The science of politics has conceptions of "the good"
or the desirable, one might almost say of the "necessary," which are
at least useful-the conceptions of liberty, of social order, of good
government; but economics has no such terms and no such conceptions. Ethics, also, not only seeks to explain how systems of
morals arose, but it seeks to show what systems of morals are
necessary to a stable or a satisfactory social life. The obligation
on applied economics to deal with what is necessary to the stable
or satisfactory social life is no less than in the case of ethics. It
is mere convention and bad tradition which leads us to ignore
this obligation. But it is a sign of hope that the obligation is
ignored far more in the theory than in the. practice of applied
economics, especially agricultural economics. Every one of us who
goes out to advise a farmer, or a group of farmers, a cooperative
society, a political administrator, has some sort of ideas as to
"values" and as to what ought to be. The strange thing is that
we are not willing to submit these ideas to the same sort of logical
318
A.
w.
ASHBY
analysis as we apply to facts which are more clearly of an external
character. And yet we cannot have an applied science as a branch
of social science without this analysis. In applied economics we
need conceptions such as that of an adequate industrial security,
adequate standard of living, adequate leisure, economical consumption and so forth. These, of course, like "economic laws,"
would not be absolute or universal, but would be relative to existing society and to its possibilities. And we may start to discover
what is economically good or necessary by the same means as we
try to discover what is true of existing things. There are, in fact,
no other means than the human mind and the implements which it
is trained to use. If we leave what ought to be merely to personal
and unchecked prejudice or predilection, we can have no applied
science but only the haphazard and often conflicting activities
of a group of persons. Our standards of what is desirable, "what
ought to be," must be made both rational and objective.
In so for as we can develop standards of what ought to be or
of what is necessary, and in so far as we can get these adopted,
just in so far shall we begin to bring true order into the economic
system. If we desire truth in the sense of the true principles, the
application of which will bring health into economic organs of
the body politic, and of the social organism, we may seek it in
the accurate description and analysis of existing things but we shall
not find it there in its entirety.
In farm management economics we are using standards such as
yield per acre, or per cow or per hen; standards of acres per man
or acres per horse; standards of age-weight in meat animals; or of
hours' work per acre on crops. These are "efficiency" standards, but
this efficiency has reference to a purpose which can only be that
of providing society with all the present means of decent living
with the least possible expenditure of economic resources consistent
with contin~ous provision of equal or increasing means at a constant or diminishing expenditure of resources. When we look for
these standards we do not look for the average or even for the
type at the point o~ greatest concentration. We do not look for
the norm in the sense of a typical example, but for the norm in
the sense of either a model or an authoritative rule. When we
relate such efficiency standards to rates of profits we begin to
create standards of profits. If a certain yield per cow in milk
production, or a number of crop-acres per man in crop production,
AGRICULTURAL AS APPLIED ECONOMICS
319
is related to a certain standard of profits, and we make a standard
of the yield, or of the crop-acres, we begin to make a standard of
the. profits also. This might be sound practice if all incomes arising
from the production were determined by the profits, or even if all
· were determined by production. As we know that they are not, it
is necessary to consider standards in distribution also. By using
these norms in the stimulation of industrial efficiency we envisage,
possibly create, constant struggle; and possibly constant rise in
efficiency and tot·al income. We must then envisage constant adjustment in distribution and unless we set up norms for this also
we leave it to chance. It is indeed necessary to ask what is the
nature, or the validity, of the standards of profits which are
related to standards of efficiency. Do they relate only to comparative rates of profit within one branch of agriculture, to comparative profits in agriculture in general, to comparative profits
or earnings in other industries, or to the average earnings of
all occupied persons in the country? This question is important,
for the farmer's reward is determined in the process of distribution as well as in the process of production of wealth, and the pursuit of efficiency standards may merely tend to enrich other people.
In the marketing branch of agricultural economics we have also
need of some standards. Many investigations are concerned with
what may be called the physical economy of marketing-cutting out
superfluous handling or trading, improving methods of handling,
grading, storing, and so forth, and in general, cutting down the
material cost, or improving the service of marketing organisation.
But the practical man does not forget that markets function not
only in the distribution of goods (produce) but also in the distribution of wealth. There is an efficiency of marketing organisations as wealth distributors as well as their efficiency as distributors
of goods. The whole cooperative movement bears witness to the
recognition of this duality. When a cooperative society limits interest on capital per se to 5 per cent or 6 per cent it sets one norm
in the marketing system. But, on economic grounds, what should
be the earnings of a wholesaler (or a retailer) with a known
capital, a known turnover and a known (average or normal) rate
of risk? No one knows; yet, by implication, we are all ready to
suggest that we know what the minimum rate of profit or earnings
of a farmer should be.
The general position is that agriculture, as a depressed or sup-
320
A.
w.
ASHBY
pressed industry, needs to make a start on the scientific establishment of norms other than those of industrial efficiency. Many of
the modern and rising economic institutions have as their objects
the establishment of norms in expectations and conduct which will
lead to desirable norms in distribution, consumption, and conditions of life. This is the case with the trade union and the
cooperative society, and in some degree with the trust, the cartel,
and other forms of trade agreement. It is certainly true of the
"trade unionism" involved in the method of collective agreement
now being used in determining prices of farm products.
So I make a plea for the study of such standards as tend to be
established in the distribution of wealth, and for the objective
analysis of the economic possibilities of the establishment of other
and more satisfactory norms. While we attempt to regulate and
direct production towards efficiency we cannot leave distribution
to the free play of haphazard forces. It is not improbable that
the study of distribution of wealth from this point of view will
favorably react on the work relating to production.
The ultimate purpose of all analytical studies is the provision
of information for a new synthesis; and the synthesis cannot be
left entirely to the untrained and unscientific mind.