Download Network Centric Bridges to Legacy Systems

Implementation of Network
Centric Systems
Success, Challenges, and Lessons
Learned
Main objective is to develop insights regarding the implementation of
Network Centric Warfare systems and technologies by examining three
discrete case studies
• One case study focusing on a system
that was canceled
• One case study focusing on a qualified
success
• One case study on a more
robust success
Agenda
•Network Centric Evolution Overview
• Network Centric Conceptual Breakdown
• Network Centric Program Challenges
• Network Centric Bridges to Legacy Systems
• Network Centric Program Successes
• Network Centric Leap Ahead Potential
• Keys to Successful Network Centric Transitions
It is very difficult to progress at equal speed on development for all
equipment necessary to achieve a fully network centric system
American Soldier Evolution Example
1914
1944
1965
World War I
World War II
Vietnam
Source: webs.lansnet.com
Source: army.mil
Equipment
Evolution
Equipment
Evolution
Equipment
Evolution
Source: americanhistory.si.edu
Source: bllklly.com
Source: www.army.mil
Source: 101.abn.com
2003
2007
?
Wearable Computers
Gulf War II
Land Warrior
Source: Aimpoint
Source: Sistemi Compositi
Equipment
Evolution
Source: army-technology.com
Full integration of
communications and
situational awareness
systems
Equipment
Leap
Source: US Army
Source: militaryfactory.com
Source: Thales
Source: Empics
Source: news.bbc.co.uk
Network Centric evolution’s pace is increasing with the leaps in
capability becoming more dramatic with each generation
Future Network
Centric Soldier
Source: digitalbattle.com
Agenda
• Network Centric Evolution Overview
• Network Centric Conceptual Breakdown
• Network Centric Program Failures
• Network Centric Bridges to Legacy Systems
• Network Centric Program Successes
• Network Centric Leap Ahead Potential
• Keys to Successful Network Centric Transitions
Network Centricity is a continuously developing cycle that takes
careful planning if militaries are to maximize potential benefits to
address strategic objectives
Network Centric Cycle
Strategic Objectives
Government
Requirements
Con. Ops & Mission
Capabilities
International
Interoperability
Force
Multiplication
National Defense
Situational
Awareness
Defense Industrial
Development and
Sustainment
Command and
Control
Network Centric Elements
Blue Force
Tracking
Communication
Connectivity
Integration
Systems
Rapid Response
Homeland Security
Interoperability
Force Transformation
Joint Operations
Flexible Response
Sustainability
Precision
Capabilities
Battle
Management
Systems
Maintaining the proper order of approach on network centric
development is critical to ensure programs remain on schedule and
within budget
Defense
Industry
Response
Agenda
• Network Centric Evolution Overview
• Network Centric Conceptual Breakdown
• Network Centric Program Challenges: Land Warrior
• Network Centric Bridges to Legacy Systems
• Network Centric Program Successes
• Network Centric Leap Ahead Potential
• Keys to Successful Network Centric Transitions
Land Warrior is a 1st generation, modular, integrated fighting system for
all types of individual infantrymen
• For all forms of infantry: Ranger, Airborne, Light,
Mechanized, Air Assault
• Latest, cutting edge Soldier System
• Includes everything a dismounted soldier wears and
carries integrated into a close combat fighting system
that:
– Enhances tactical awareness, lethality and survivability
– Connects individual soldiers into the broader battlefield
Network
Land Warrior incorporates 5 integrated sub-systems
Land Warrior Components and System Architecture Overview
Weapon Subsystem
• Built around the M-4
Carbine
Source: fas.org
• The Weapon Sub-system includes
video-camera and laser range-finder /
digital compass (LRF/DC)
•When LRF / DC is coupled with GPS,
soldier can call in accurate indirect fire
Protective Clothing & Individual
Equipment
• Consisted of a frame
designed on automotive
racing technologies and
bends to soldiers natural
movements
• The LW body armor is supposed to
provide improved ballistic protection at a
•In conjunction with camera, soldier can reduced weight
fire around corners
•Includes a modular upgrade plate to
protect soldiers against small arms
threat
Spin off efforts of the Land Warrior concept included the XM-8, a
cancelled assault rifle, and the earlier OCIW integrated weapon,
another cancelled network centric effort
Land Warrior incorporates 5 integrated sub-systems
Land Warrior Components and System Architecture Overview
Integrated Helmet System
• Was designed to
provide ballistic
protection at less weight
•Helmet-mounted display allows soldier
to view computer generated graphical
data, maps, intelligence, troop locations
and imagery from weapon-mounted
thermal weapon sight (TWS) and video
camera
Computer / Radio Sub-system
•Attached to soldiers loadbearing frame, 400 Mhz
• A hand-grip wired to the pack and
attached to the chest acts as a computer
mouse and allows wearer to change
screens, key on the radio, change
frequencies and send digital information.
•Two types of sub-system
•Leader: two radios and a flat panel
display
•Soldiers: one radio
Land Warrior incorporates 5 integrated sub-systems
Land Warrior Components and System Architecture Overview
Software Subsystem
• Addresses the soldier’s core
battlefield functions, display
management, and mission equipment
and supply
• Includes tactical and mission support
modules, maps and tactical overlays,
and the ability to capture and display
video images
•Also contains a power management
module
Highlights
Head’s up display facilitates Blue Force
Tracking
Radio-headsets and noise-canceling, overthe-ear headphones that fit into each helmet
Body armor contains a transmitter for
wireless network, capable of transmitting
encrypted data for up to a KM
Also includes a lithium-ion battery pack and
a GPS transponder System operated from a
gun-grip shaped controller or buttons on the
M-4
Land Warrior was initially envisioned to provide a transformational leap
ahead system that would dramatically enhance infantry capabilities
Land Warrior Program History: Development
• Program Origins:
•Requirement stated in August 1994
• Contract awarded to Hughes Aircraft Company (later Raytheon)
•Plans formed to develop two blocs:
•IOC = LW Block 1
•Stryker Interoperable = LW Block 2
•Program Troubles
•Program costs soared to $85,000 / unit
•System weight reached 40 lbs / unit)
• Intense program to replace military equipment with COTS technologies in
order to lower cost and weight
•System found too fragile in testing in early 2000s
Land Warrior has struggled to deliver optimal results that match the level
of investment the US Army has committed to the program
Land Warrior Program History: Development
• New Leadership:
• In June 2002, Program Executive Office (PEO) established to provide centralized
management for equipping the “soldier as system” rather than a piecemeal approach
•February 2003: General Dynamics awarded a $60 million contract to enhance Block 1
capability
• ~ late 2002 – 2003, program re-scoped to focus on providing some level of enhanced
capability to Stryker brigades either training for or deployed to Iraq
•Elements of the system provided to commanders individually
•Field Trials and Deployment
•2006 – 2007 extensive field trials at Ft. Lewis, WA
• 2006 Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP)
•2007 – 230 of the 440 produced systems are deployed with 4-9 infantry in Iraq
•Full systems provided only to squad commanders
•Sgts, Lts, Cpts have full systems while Pvts and Cpls have
blue force tracking beacons to relay positions to commanders
Mixed Reviews for Land Warrior
Response to Land Warrior
Insights
•Land Warrior was seeking to provide
revolutionary capabilities when the
soldiers really needed evolutionary
capabilities that will work on the
battlefield
•Key concerns:
•Weight: Some reports have weight
down to 7 – 10 lbs
•Unclear how much capability it
retain
•Cost: between $85K USD and $101K
USD per system
•Power sources: Can power up in
vehicles, but soldiers need to carry
several replacement batteries into battle
Negative
“ “We see (Land Warrior) as a plus, but we also
know that we’ve got to lighten the load on the
soldier”
--Gen. Richard Cody, Army Vice Chief of Staff
“Its just a bunch of stuff we don’t use, taking the
place of useful stuff, like guns . . . It makes you
a slower, heavier target.”
--Sgt. James Young, M-240 gunner training with LW at Ft.
Lewis
“We have pretty much removed most of the
funding for the Land Warrior program. Land
Warrior along the way, really had some
problems”
--Lt. Gen. David Melcher, Deputy Chief of Staff for Army G-8
Mixed reviews for Land Warrior
Response to Land Warrior
Positive
“If given the choice I would not go outside the
wire without it (Land Warrior”
--US Army Sergeant Daniel Garza, 4-9 Infantry Stryker
Battalion
“It provides a sense of comfort in reducing the
fratricide potential … Everyone knows where
everyone else is on the battlefield and everyone
knows where everyone else’s direct fire is”
--US Army Capt. Mike Williams, Company A Commander, 49 Infantry Stryker Battalion
“(Land Warrior) has preformed above my
expectations over here”
“Now is the time to actually reinforce success so
we don’t drag this out again”
-- Lt. Col. Brian Cummings, Land Warrior Product Manager
“Let’s not start over … Let’s build on our
successes with Land Warrior
-- Col. Richard Hansen, Land Warrior Project Manager
arguing for the continuation of the program
Insights
• Certain elements of Land Warriors
suite of technologies have been wellreceived
•Scaling back of Land Warrior and
distributing the entirety of the
system only to squad leaders
appears to have increased the
effectiveness of the system
Despite multiple setbacks and challenges within the Land Warrior
development the program did yield some successful technologies
and some beneficial insights about soldier systems and NCW
Land Warrior Benefits, Drawbacks, and Paths Forward
Drawbacks
Benefits
• Enhanced Soldier Situational Awareness
• Enhanced Soldier lethality from concealment
• System remains too heavy despite significant
weight savings
• Development of the system failed to lower system
cost to acceptable levels
• Provide increased communications
• Access to Boomerang anti-sniper system
• Allowed for improved unit cohesion in cluttered
urban environments
• Despite spending $2+ billion on R&D only 13 of
the 19 identified capabilities gaps
were addressed
Paths Forward
• Field a small
number of units,
less than 500, to
forces in Iraq to
continue gaining
battlefield insights
• Gather what information can be extracted from the cancelled Land
Warrior system
• Continue the Rapid Fielding Initiatives to provide troops in the field
solutions
• Wait for Future Combat Systems maturity in 2013 (?) before
attempting a second Future Soldier System
Early combat reports validated that there is merit in the Land Warrior
network centric concept even if the program overreached current
capabilities
Land Warrior will act as a springboard for future efforts in network
centric soldier systems but the program failed to achieve its highly
ambitious goals that were laid out in 1996
Land Warrior Conclusions for Network Centric Evolution
• Land Warrior’s goals were ambitious and had to be scaled back
–Future Network Centric efforts need to keep budget in mind as well as capability
enhancement
–Budget needs to be considered comprehensively for research and development,
procurement, and sustainment making life cycle cost assessments critical for appropriate
planning
• Balancing desire for revolutionary systems and capabilities with the need for
immediately effective and field-able evolutionary enhancements of
capabilities
• Capable technology does not ensure that a military is well positioned to adapt
that technology
• Land Warrior, a program that, despite offering potential benefits, did not
provide enough of a network centric advantage to justify its spiraling cost
• Does every soldier need to be wired?
Agenda
• Network Centric Evolution Overview
• Network Centric Conceptual Breakdown
• Network Centric Program Challenges: Land Warrior
• Network Centric Bridges to Legacy Systems: Bowman
• Network Centric Program Successes
• Network Centric Leap Ahead Potential
• Keys to Successful Network Centric Transitions
Bowman is a radio and communications system linking vehicles
throughout the UK military—land, sea and air
Bowman Components and System Architecture Overview
Principle Capability Categories
Bowman Component Pieces
• Secure Voice
• Messaging
and data
transfer
Source: ITT
• Situational Awareness
• Battlefield
Applications
Source: armedfroces.co.uk
System Architecture
• Bowman is an open architecture
system design to utilize
software growth to adapt
hardware solutions
Source: National Audit Office
• The software design is intend to
be backwards compatible and
completely network scalable
Source: CD
Once completed Bowman with create a network centric system that
incorporates a maximum of 30,000 platforms including ships,
aircraft, and land vehicles
The critical need for Bowman is evident when considering it was created
to replace the Clansman radios that were fielded in the 1970s with
expected 15 year life and were in service well into the late 1990s
Land Warrior Program History: Development
• Program Origins:
•Requirement stated in 1989 General Staff Requirement seeking a
replacement to ageing Clansman radio system
•GSR later modified to incorporate the changing post-Cold War security
environment
•Contract awarded to Archer
•Program Troubles
•Original contract resulted in failure in 2000
•Archer failed to deliver the requirement within budget and time
•MoD cessation of contract
Bowman System is a fundamental part of the UK digitalization process
Land Warrior Program History: Development
• New Leadership:
•Re-bidding process won by CDC Systems UK Ltd, now General Dynamics UK
• New contracts involves 48,000 radios, 30,000 computers being installed on more
than 30,000 platforms as well as training
•Field Trials and Deployment
• March 2003, initial technical field trials with 40 Land-Rover-borne installations
• July 2003, training for the initial battalion begins
• March 2004, first Brigade operational field trial conducted using two mechanized
battle groups and a brigade HQ (245 vehicles and over 2000 personnel)
•Declared in service on 26 March 2004
•By January 2007, 7000 vehicles had been converted (all services)
Bowman has had a number of key successes and is still a key element of the UK
MoD’s communications and NWC plan
Bowman Program History: Development
• Key Successes:
•Bowman signals an improvement over Clansman, particularly by:
• Providing secure communications over greater ranges
• Enhanced situational awareness, though not down to individual platform
level
•But it has been plagued by a series of significant technological, training and
deployment issues
Still, Bowman’s development and deployment has been a very difficult process
and is still troubled by a range of types of key concerns
Bowman Program History: Development
• Key Issues and Concerns:
• Concerns over the software applications (ComBAT Infrastructure and Platform
software) BCIP
•Planning for data transmission “involves unacceptably lengthy processes intolerant to
even trivial errors and may only be undertaken by experts.”
•Sustainability / power supply
•UK National Audit Office Report in Mid-2006:
• A number of key functions, including the system’s ability to transmit data, to
handle large quantities of data in headquarters, the ability of system managers to
manage the network effectively, and the ability to interchange data with other
nations’ forces and with other UK communications systems were rated as having
“very limited capability at this stage.”
Bowman Program History: Development
• Key Issues and Concerns:
•Training: System is hard to use
•2004 radiation burns
• Weight: System is too heavy in nearly all configurations
• Expectations: Set by “military specifiers denied hands-on experience of battlefield
digitization systems
•Mid-2005: Program Re-cast
•Increased funding allocation (GBP 121 million) and extended timescale to late-2007
have been granted in order to achieve expected capability
•Also a decision to triple training facilities (from 21 to 71)
•Add another 24 million GBP of cost and an estimated 204 million GBP in
operating costs over 25 years
•Total funding now over 2.5 billion GBP
•A 3rd operational field trial will be conducted at the end of 2007.
Bowman began as a program to replace the outdated Clansman radio
and was evolved to become a fully network centric solution to
address the operational requirements of the 21st century battle space
Bowman Program History
Development
1988
1993
Bowman
feasibility studies
launched
1995
1st unit begins
Bowman
conversion
2002
1997
2003
1998
1999
Air, Land, and
Sea systems
conversion
continuing
Bowman
deployed to
Iraq
2004
Bowman
without CIP
declared In
Service
2000
Continuing challenges prompt the
decision to field Bowman in increments
and recompete the contract
1st
Field
Trials
Bowman expanded to a full
ComBAT management system
known as CIP
Production
1996
Termination of
Original
Bowman
program
Initial Planned
Service Entry
Date
General
Dynamics UK
selected as Prime
Contractor
2001
1994
Bowman 6
years overdue
New Bowman contract
for supply and support
Expected development and
initial manufacturing period
2005
2006
CIP declared
In Service
Unforeseen challenges in bridging the legacy fleet and integrating
force wide communications were the principle reasons for the long
delays and budget creep of the Bowman program
2007
Bowman has not lived up to its billing, however it has provided the
capability enhancements that the British military required
Response to Bowman
Positive
“We’re delighted to have delivered the 10,000th
vehicle”
--Navy Commodore Jay Hart, commenting on Bowman
instillation at General Dynamics UK facility
Bowman is providing “more robust tactical
Internet, greater ability to interconnect in the
field, planning tools and additional hardware
such as the Tactical Network-level Gateway
(TNG)."
--David Jarrett, prime contractor General Dynamics
“Vehicle User Data Terminals are being returned
at a rate of 90 a month compared to our
predictions of 25 a month”
-- Ministry of Defence response over concerns of Bowman
repair rates and reflective of the overall improvements in the
program
Negative
“Bowman equipment is under a three year
warranty which means our troops cannot fix it
if something breaks”
-- Gen. Sir Richard Dannatt, Head of the Army, British Military
“MPs recently criticized the MoD for spending
£2.4 billion on Bowman radios that soldiers
said were too heavy to carry and could not
communicate with the radios of their allies in
Iraq”
--Reports out of London carried in the The Times, on September
25, 2007
“Bowman was better than Clansman, but was too
heavy and so complicated that it required a
substantial amount of training”
--Soldiers reviews out of Basra and operations in Iraq
“(MOD) seriously under-estimated the challenges
involved in both delivering it and sustaining it”
--Public Accounts Committee
Bowman has overcome a large number of challenges to reach fielding
and is continuing to undergo adjustments
Bowman Benefits, Drawbacks, and Paths Forward
Benefits
Drawbacks
• Currently providing improved battlefield coordination in Iraq
• Not currently synchronized with international
allied systems
• Provides encrypted communications capable of
both data and voice transmissions
• Does not currently satisfy soldier demands for a
lighter system
• Provides full spectrum joint
interoperability
• Program remains significantly behind schedule
despite improvements in the
delivery
timetable
Paths Forward
• Fielding of Bowman is proceeding despite soldier concerns due to the age of the legacy
system and the requirement to field a new solution immediately
• Though not perfect the Bowman system has met enough of the Ministry of Defense’s
network centric requirements that it is being applied to all land vehicles
• Further refinements of the system are expected to continue, especially in regards to man
packs where technology evolution should improve the system over time
Determination to succeed and effective program re-scoping allowed
the British military to save the Bowman program from failure and
provide a network centric bridge to future systems
Bowman, despite its shortcomings, is a success in bridging the
legacy system of the British military with the digital network centric
solutions of the future
Bowman Conclusions for Network Centric Evolution
• As understandings of the challenges facing a “bridge” system became clearer the
Bowman program was re-aligned to provide technology increments in order to address
gaps in legacy systems
–Re-alignment took time and money but allowed the program to remain within feasibility and
still provide a network centric capability that had not been present before
• Fielding an imperfect solution does not necessarily mean that a program was a failure
–Do not sacrifice “good” solutions in pursuit of “perfect” solutions that may not be realistic
• Re-scoping programs in mid development should not be seen as a failure of
understanding the Network Centric process, but rather as a necessary step to contain
program creep and meet requirements
–Bowman illustrates how critical initial planning can be and how important firmly limiting the
goals of a program are in regards to the program’s ability to succeed
The Ministry of Defense’s flexibility and understanding of the
critical nature of Bowman provided the program the long term
support necessary for success
Agenda
• Network Centric Evolution Overview
• Network Centric Conceptual Breakdown
• Network Centric Program Challenges: Land Warrior
• Network Centric Bridges to Legacy Systems: Bowman
• Network Centric Program Successes: Infanterist der Zukunft
• Network Centric Leap Ahead Potential
• Keys to Successful Network Centric Transitions
IdZ is one of the more robust soldier systems in development and has
been successfully deployed in a limited scope to German troops in
both Kosovo and Afghanistan
IdZ Overview
•The System
•The IdZ equipment is designed to enhance soldier mobility, protection and
performance significantly, particularly during night operations
•Being developed by EADS. Follow-up system being developed by
Rheinmetall
•It also enables individual combat troops to connect with network-based
.operational command and control systems
•Kits focused on squad capability rather than individual capability
IdZ Overview
•The System (cont)
•The systems included two sets of ten kits for each squad commander plus
nine squad members.
•Each kit comprises:
.
•A Heckler & Koch G36 5.56 mm rifle
•A NavICom, C4I system developed by Thales
• A Thales Angenieux Lucie image intensifying helmet-mounted night vision
goggles
• An Oerlikon Contraves weapon mounted laser system together with eye
protection glasses and an ear protection sub-system
• NBC Protection subsystem
• A ballistic and stab protection vest
• And a load-carrying vest.
• Kits also include mini / micro UAVs, MP7 PDW, Anti-tank rocket launcher, MG4 light
machine gun, KM2000 knife
Germany intends to incorporate a helmet mounted heads up display
in the next generation of the Infanterist der Zukunft
Infanterist der Zukunft (IdZ) Components and System Architecture Overview
Principle Components
• Protective Clothing and
Individual Equip.
• Computer/Radio Sub
system
Source: EADS
Source: danmil.de
Source: H&K
• Weapon Subsystem
System Architecture
• IdZ was never intended to replace all systems in the military and
as such was created with an open architecture that facilitated
integration
• Two tier approach with commanders and critical forces equipped
with the IdZ system and less critical ones with the reduced Soldat
im Einsatz
Germany’s two tiered approach kept both budgets and technology
in mind during planning, allowing the military to take network
centric steps while still modernizing other equipment
IdZ Overview
•The System (cont)
.
IdZ Overview
• The Program
• December 2004, EADS awarded contract to deliver 196 kits (69.7
million Euros), which would service ~ 2,000 soldiers
•ESB prototype trialed in Kosovo in 2002
•EADS awarded a follow-up contract (10 million Euros) to produce 150
systems to meet an urgent operational requirement in Afghanistan
•IdZ Version 1 delivered to Special Operations Unit between 2005 and
2007
•IdZ Version 2 prototype to be delivered in Q2 of 2008
Though perhaps not the most robust network centric solution, the
German approach has provided both near term capability and a
springboard for future system integration
Infanterist der Zukunft (IdZ) Program History
Development
Initial concept
trials conducted
at Prizren in
Kosovo
2002
1,600 version one models
order for delivery and
testing
2003
2004
1st system handed
over to the Army
inspectorate at
Hammelburg Infantry
School
2005
2006
2007
Two IdZ-ES (version
two) demonstrators are
to be handed over for
testing
2008
Rheinmetall Defence issued a
contract to begin development
of the second version of IdZ
2009
Initial
production of
version two
IdZ
Production
Germany’s IdZ program has relied heavily on COTS solutions
allowing the Bundeswher to limit budget risk in early stages of the
program
Performance by the German military utilizing IdZ has been positive
with plans in the works to proceed on a second generation
Response to IDz
Positive
Negative
“It is well ahead of any other European project in
terms of maturity”
“They had too many (electronic/software
devices). You can’t force the soldier to do
things he doesn’t think are important, because
he’s going to turn it right off”
--US Army, Electronic Warfare and Sensors Directorate
“The ‘infantryman of the future’ is an integrated
system-oriented approach to the aspects of
self-protection, communication, guidance,
navigation, and armaments….IDZ demonstrates
the performance gains of new technology in
networked operations for the protection of
soldiers”
--Bernhard Gerwert, Head of EADS Defense Electronics
“We’re convinced that the Future Soldier system
(IdZ) order lays the groundwork for long-term,
intensive cooperation in equipping the hardhitting, fast moving forces that are going to
play a key role in future crisis”
-- Klaus Eberhardt, Chairman of the Executive Board of
Rheinmetall AG
-- Statement by Arne Lamberth Coordinator for the Swedish
Markus program, in reference to tests on the IdZ system
“The main problem is weight, as you increase
capability you add both power and weight
problems”
--Dr. Karl-Heinz Rippert, IdZ Project Manageer for the German
Federal Office for Defence Technology and Procurement
German forces are currently using the mountain version of the IdZ to
improve capabilities in Afghanistan
IDz Benefits, Drawbacks, and Paths Forward
Benefits
• Approached the program as a group of soldiers and did not
overburden every soldier
• Elite forces can be equipped with more advanced solutions that
can be spiraled out as these systems mature
• Provides systems immediately as opposed an indefinite
time in the future
Drawbacks
• Does not provide a network
centric evolution for the entire
force
• May cause interoperability
challenges that are not currently
present for the legacy systems
Paths Forward
• Germany is continuing development work on the successful IdZ system
• Gradual fielding has allowed Germany to appropriately tailor its systems to soldier
requirements that are arising from the modern battlefield
• To address challenges of weight and power, Germany has chosen to scale back the
system and wait for technology developments to catch up to military requirements
For the capabilities provided the IdZ program has experienced very
few drawbacks reflecting how beneficial the network centric
process can be when properly managed
Though small in scale the IdZ provides a solid example of how the
Network Centric process can be managed to produce both near and
long term benefits
IDz Conclusions for Network Centric Evolution
• Network Centric capabilities can be achieved in the most critical areas without creating
an entirely network centric force
• Basing Network Centric solutions around a group of platforms (soldiers in this case)
may be a more efficient means of creating sustainable networks
–In the case of the IdZ, by utilizing a ten man team as opposed to a “soldier as a system”
concept the Germans are able to limit the negative aspects of the system, such as weight
• By limiting the scope on initial efforts the German military was able to confirm which
COTS systems were most beneficial, which systems needed improvement, and which
should be removed without expending inordinate amounts of resources
–The IdZ program also forms an excellent test bed for doctrine evolution as it approached
change in steps instead of leaps
• Finally, the IdZ program was envisioned in spirals that would allow improvement on the
system without forcing the German military to commit to a long term program whose
rewards are not yet clear
Adaptation of a gradual approach to Network Centric warfare
allows for both incorporation of current technologies and
appropriate positioning for long term applications
Agenda
• Network Centric Evolution Overview
• Network Centric Conceptual Breakdown
• Network Centric Program Failures
• Network Centric Bridges to Legacy Systems
• Network Centric Program Successes
• Network Centric Leap Ahead Potential
• Keys to Successful Network Centric Transitions
Malaysia entered its 9th Defense Plan 2006-2010 with developing network
centric capability as a key component of overall modernization efforts:
prior communications were handled by an outdated phone system
Malaysian Network Centric Activities – PX2000
PX2000 Background
• PX2000 integrates all Services, the Joint HQ
and Intelligence Agencies at the Strategic
level
– System linked all air stations, capital ships
and battalion CPs into the network
• Implementation occurred during 2001 to
2004 and enhancements will continue in the
future
Principle Components
Satellite
Terminals
Radio
Systems
System still in
development
• To date the PX2000 has network Malaysia’s
Joint Force structure, Early Warning
System, Air Defense System, and Air
Mission Planning and Management System
Battle Management
System
• PX2000 linked not only terrestrial systems
but also integrated satellite solutions into
the network
• Based on COTS and
Windows OS
• Continuing work will begin to integrate low
level commanders, non-military security
agencies, and potentially friendly militaries
(within security limitations)
Bizsat.jp
SINCGARS
Software
based
operator
interfaces
Key Features
• Integrated Geographical
Information System (GIS)
• Real-time system alerts • Automatic Data escalation
and dissemination
• Integrated browsing for
remote access
• Designed to be locally
supportable
PX2000 was envisioned, from the beginning, as a component of the
broader Malaysian strategic network that would grow to encompass
tactical requirements to create a network centric force
Malaysia’s success implementing the PX2000 system was what
facilitated the planning for the next step
Malaysian Network Centric Activities – PX2000
PX2000 System Architecture - Present
PX2000 System Architecture -Future
Joint HQ
Joint HQ
Air Force HQ
Air Force HQ
Air Ops
Center
Navy HQ
Fleet Ops
Command
Navy HQ
Army HQ
Intelligence HQ
?
Army HQ
Intelligence HQ
Air Ops
Center
Fleet Ops
Command
4 Divisions
4 Divisions
?
Airbases
3 HQ
Areas
13 Brigades
Aircraft
Bases/
Ships
Airbases
3 HQ
Areas
13 Brigades
Mid-Small
Vessels
Bases/
Ships
Battalion Command Posts
Battalion
Command
Posts
Rapidly evolving from a strategic concept, to a strategic application,
to a tactical widespread network reflects the benefits of properly
approaching the network centric process
Company Command Cars
Platoon Commanders
Battle Management System
While not prefect, and still under continuing refinement, the PX2000
undertaking helped Malaysia significantly advance into the network
centric era
Network Centric Leap Ahead Conclusions – Malaysian Example
Malaysian Market Driver
Lesson Learned
1
Malaysia remained focused on
achieving the strategic
objectives of the their Network
Centric efforts
By keeping objectives constrained by good
planning, the process of converting to a
network centric force has faced fewer delays
and challenges
2
Strategically, Malaysia views
joint capabilities as the most
critical and has centered
efforts on these systems
Prioritizing network centric capabilities has
ensured that critical programs are not
undermined by “nice to have” systems
3
By utilizing COTS solutions
Malaysia has been able to rapidly
leap forward without bankrupting
their budget
For nation’s to skip steps in the Network
Centric process it becomes critical to
customize existing solutions rather than
develop unique alternatives
At times it may be necessary to scale back the
Once planning had been completed
initial presence of domestic firms until these
Malaysia relied on industry to
4
firms are truly ready support a nation’s
provide the leap ahead
network centric efforts
technologies
By approaching the entire process with a well developed plan
Malaysia was able to avoid the pitfalls usually associated with
efforts to skip generational developments
Agenda
• Network Centric Evolution Overview
• Network Centric Conceptual Breakdown
• Network Centric Program Failures
• Network Centric Bridges to Legacy Systems
• Network Centric Program Successes
• Network Centric Leap Ahead Potential
• Keys to Successful Network Centric Transitions
Conclusions