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Wireless LAN Insecurity Update 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. LtCol, USAF, Medical Corps Staff Anesthesiologist Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland E-mail: rob--at--notbob.com Web site: http://www.notbob.com Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Disclaimer: Fair Use of Online Resouces FAIR USE NOTICE: This contains copyrighted material, which is reproduced under the Fair Use Provision of Title 17, U.S.C. Section 107, and is posted for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research. This material is posted without profit for the benefit of those who, by accessing this material, are expressing a prior interest in this information for research and educational purposes. In order to educate health care providers and other professionals, this presentation contains graphics and information obtained on the internet which may be copyrighted According to Sections 107 and 504c of United States Code title 17, this material is considered to be “fair use” of copyrighted intellectual property; it is to be used for noncommercial purposes only “Fair Use” is the use of a copyrighted work for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use, the factors to be considered shall include: – The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; – The nature of the copyrighted work; – The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and – The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The purpose and character of this presentation is for nonprofit educational purposes in support of Homeland Defense and internet security; the nature of the copyrighted work is individual graphics and quotes; the amount and substantiality of the portion used is minimal; and the effect on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted use is negligible. In fact, the hyperlink references crediting the original sources should increase the market value of said copyrighted works by increasing traffic to the websites presenting this material. This presentation was produced in the United States Air Force medical environment in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The views expressed in this presentation and linked-to material are those of the author(s) of said material and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense, the United States government, or the AOMPS. Nor do educational links to internet websites or reference sources constitute any kind or degree of verification or validation of information presented therein. Nobody paid me squat to write this stuff, by the way Point of Contact for questions regarding copyright infringement shall be the current U.S. Department of Defense designated agent to receive notification of claimed DMCA copyright infringement (courtesy of Department of Redundancy Department [DoRD]) Financial Disclosure: I am a Microsoft shareholder, so I can parody and provide commentary upon the products and services of the Microsoft Corporation with impunity Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXIV Network Abuse Costs $$$: 2003 Data from U.S. FBI Where’s Wireless??? WLAN Abuse 2004: Number 5 with a Bullet Multiple Winblows XP/2000 vulnerabilities The Basic Network Security Pyramid Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Wireless Security 2003 Rob’s 2003 WLAN Security Pyramid Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXIV XXV Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXIV What this talk is about Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV What this talk is about Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Wardriving Update Late 2004 Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV What this talk is about Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Wardriving Update Late 2004 Step 1: Physical Security and Wireless Policy Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV What this talk is about Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Wardriving Update Late 2004 Step 1: Physical Security and Wireless Policy Step 2: OS, Firmware Updates; MAC Filtering; SSID Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV What this talk is about Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Wardriving Update Late 2004 Step 1: Physical Security and Wireless Policy Step 2: OS, Firmware Updates; MAC Filtering; SSID Step 3: Change AP PW; WPA if possible, else WEP Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV What this talk is about Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Wardriving Update Late 2004 Step 1: Physical Security and Wireless Policy Step 2: OS, Firmware Updates; MAC Filtering; SSID Step 3: Change AP PW; WPA if possible, else WEP Step 4: Toward 802.11i/WPA2 for Home/SOHO use Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV What this talk is about Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Wardriving Update Late 2004 Step 1: Physical Security and Wireless Policy Step 2: OS, Firmware Updates; MAC Filtering; SSID Step 3: Change AP PW; WPA if possible, else WEP Step 4: Toward 802.11i/WPA2 for Home/SOHO use Step 5: CSE: OS Updates, Vulnerability News Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV What this talk is about Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Wardriving Update Late 2004 Step 1: Physical Security and Wireless Policy Step 2: OS, Firmware Updates; MAC Filtering; SSID Step 3: Change AP PW; WPA if possible, else WEP Step 4: Toward 802.11i/WPA2 for Home/SOHO use Step 5: CSE: OS Updates, Vulnerability News Future Wireless Security Topics Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Dusko and Vlado Say: Be Responsible with your WLAN-kwon-do! This talk is not a WLAN Cracking HOWTO; this is HOWNOTTO on getting 0wn3d Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXIV You can’t afford perfect security “The only secure computer is one that is unplugged, locked in a secure vault that only one person knows the combination to, and that person died last year.” Eckel, G and Steen, W., Intranet Working, New Riders, 1996, p. 419 Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXIV What this talk is about Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXIV XXV Introduction to Wireless vs. Wired Networking Wired Networking Inexpensive infrastructure (CAT5 cable + NICs) Expensive deployment (drilling through walls) Reconfiguring network topology difficult Difficult (not impossible!) to intercept communication Worldwide exposure to intruders if connected to Net Fast! (10/100 Mbps Ethernet Gigabit ethernet…) Negligible interference from environment Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Basic Wired Network Topology Firewall Router Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXIV Introduction to Wireless vs. Wired Networking Wireless Networking Expensive infrastructure (clients+APs=cha-ching!) Inexpensive deployment (protocols supported in OSes) Reconfiguring network topology trivial (?too trivial?) Ridiculously easy to intercept communication Geographically constrained exposure to intruders* Relatively Slow (“11Mbps” marketingspeak = 5 Mbps) Massive environmental interference (ISM, path loss) Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. *ad hoc intranetworks CIA XXV Quick Review of WLAN Security Terminology SSID (ESSID): Service Set Identifier = name for WLAN network; sent out as plain text in every packet; broadcast by default by most access points AP: Access point: WLAN “router” that talks to client cards WEP: Wired Equivalent Protocol; broken and easily crackable encryption scheme; not “Wired Equivalent Privacy”, et al. MAC: Unique Media Access Control ID number hard-coded into every networking device; spoofable via software WPA: Upgrade to WEP security; uses TKIP to rotate encryption keys for each packet and generate different keys for each computer 802.1x (not to be confused with 802.11x): User authentication mechanism using EAP protocol; separate from encryption 802.11i/WPA2: Major upgrade to security; uses new AES crypto algorithm vs. RC4; part of RSN: Robust Security Network Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. TSN = transitional security network with RSN + TKIP instead of CCMP with AES; more on this later CIA XXV Basic Wireless Network Topology Infrastructure Mode (using AP) Firewall Access Point Advantages: AP security; isolated net connection Disadvantages: AP cost, complexity; broadcast range Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXIV Basic Wireless Network Topology P2P Ad Hoc Networks Firewall Advantages: no addt’l hardware; geographically constrained Disadvantages: unmanaged P2Pnet issues; geo. constrained Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. STA 2003 Authentication Default: Open authentication (+/- MAC/SSID filtering) “granted” “give me access” Shared Key Auth (WEP, WPA PSK) “granted” Authentication response Authentication challenge “give me access” Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Generic Wireless Security Exploits Physical Theft Eavesdropping Data Modification Identity Spoofing/Masquerading Denial of Service (DoS) Theft of Internet Service Injection of Bad Things via Wireless WLAN as new modem (network soft spot) Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Generic Wireless Network Exploits Physical Theft (Before) Firewall Access Point Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXIV Generic Wireless Network Exploits Physical Theft (After) Firewall Access Point Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXIV Generic Wireless Network Exploits Eavesdropping Case 1: Wardriving Firewall Access Point Gotcha! Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXIV Generic Wireless Network Exploits Eavesdropping Case 2: Office Building Tabloid Firewall Access Point Terrorist Your Competitor Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXIV Generic Wireless Network Exploits Eavesdropping Case 3: Rogue APs Firewall Access Point Rogue Access Point Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXIV The 100 meter myth Increasingly powerful 802.11x clients available 200 mW PCMCIA cards advertise 6000+ ft range http://products.wi-fiplanet.com/wifi/pc_card_16-bit/1058052117.html Many WiFi® adapters have external antenna connections; even homemade antennas work well Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Generic Wireless Network Exploits Identity Spoofing MAC Address: 0000deadbeef; SSID: default Looks like your company’s IP to the FBI! Bob Firewall Access Point Alice Cats Spoof MAC Address: 0000deadbeef; SSID: default Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. STA 2003 Generic Wireless Network Exploits Denial of Service (DoS) microwave oven Cell phone Firewall Access Point Bluetooth device Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. 2.4 GHz jammer STA 2003 Wild Wild WiFi®: WiFi Hog • Designed to hijack open (public) nodes • Could easily be used to hijack commercial or home access points with inadequate security “Only traffic originating from the Wifi-Hogger's IP address may access the connection, otherwise the PVJ (portable video jammer) is switched on, blocking others from accessing the open node.” http://www.mle.ie/~jonah/projects/wifihog.html Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV What this talk is about Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Wardriving Update Late 2004 Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Wardriving Update late 2004 → Mid Sept 04 (same area wardriven in Sep 03); 30 minute drive Residential neighborhoods/business district 5 dBi omnidirectional, magnetic, car-mounted antenna → TCP/IP disabled on card purposely unable to connect/get IP address (thus legal) 126 APs located; 1 Peer located 97 APs with no security (77%) Of 30 with security, only 13 (43%) 802.11g (likely WPA compliant out of box) 62 APs with default SSID bespeaking ignorant owners (49%) one FAKE-AP (first time: counterfeit AP signals) http://www.blackalchemy.to/project/fakeap/ Worldwide Wardrive 4 (http://www.worldwidewardrive.org/): of 228,537 APs logged, only 61.6% enabled WEP (or better) security; 31.4% used default SSID (note: Lots of smart non-Merkins included) → → Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Disable prior to wardrive to prevent autoconnection to discovered APs Note! What this talk is about Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Wardriving Update Late 2004 Step 1: Physical Security and Wireless Policy Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Locking It Down: Step 1.1 Physical Security Secure your laptop/PDA physically – Windoze XP stores WPA PW and automagically reconnects on startup BIOS password at least in case WLAN device is stolen! Secure your access points (locked closets vs. desk) – Remember, reset button on back of AP = Poof! No Security Wise placement of APs/directional antennas to minimize RF leak If possible, minimize AP RF power output to least useful Audit your coverage: Warwalk/drive/sit yourself! Reference: http://techrepublic.com.com/5100-6329-5054057.html?tag=hdi Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Locking It Down: Step 1.2 Wireless Policy (Authority) will be in charge of establishing and enforcing WLAN standards; any implementation that deviates from standard must be approved by (authority) (Authority) will be the only one(s) installing/modifying/ maintaining APs; (Users) will not install APs Only (authorized user type list) can use the WLAN; all others require explicit permission from (authority) All WLAN devices must be secured according to standards set by (authority) All communications must be encrypted using (standard) All (users) must register WLAN devices with (authority) Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. For good example: http://www.ksu.edu/policies/ppm/3480.html CIA XXV What this talk is about Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Wardriving Update Late 2004 Step 1: Physical Security and Wireless Policy Step 2: OS, Firmware Updates; MAC Filtering; SSID Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Locking It Down: Step 2.1 OS/Firmware Updates Windows XP Service Pack 2 (SP2) – Until Sep 04, very cumbersome process to implement WPA (see notbob.com) – Now, SP2 incorporates new WZC and WPA functionality (finally) Apple Macintosh: Need firmware upgrade to AirPort Extreme 11g (b sol) – “WPA requires an AirPort Extreme base station and AirPort Extreme or AirPort clients running Mac OS X v10.3 (Panther), or later. Use of Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) reduces the maximum number of network users. Computers with wireless cards that only support WEP cannot join an AirPort network that has WPA enabled.” – Client: http://www.apple.com/support/downloads/airportupdate.html – AP: http://www.apple.com/support/downloads/airportextremefwupdate.html Linux: Support depends on chipset; http://hostap.epitest.fi/wpa_supplicant/ also see http://www.linux-sec.net/Wireless/WPA/#WPA for mondo links Make sure you are running latest version of your AP’s firmware; visit manufacturer’s website every few months at least Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV WPA under WinXP SP1 vs. SP2 Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV MAC/SSID Vulnerability MAC = media access control address Hardcoded in all NICs Easily Spoofed under Win 9x, Linux; New! WinXP spoofing via freeware Mac Makeup app: http://www.gorlani.com/publicprj/macmakeup/macmakeup.asp SSID = Service Set Identifier Used to define networks By default, broadcast in the clear by access points Will be given out by AP if client configured with “any” or blank SSID Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV MAC Address Spoofing edit /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-eth0 (assuming it's your eth0 network card that you want to change the MAC for), and add a line like this: MACADDR=AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF (Obviously you want to substitute the MAC address you want in place of AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF) Then "/sbin/ifdown eth0", "/sbin/ifup eth0", and you should be up and running with the new MAC address. You can use "/sbin/ifconfig eth0" to verify that the new MAC address is in effect -- it shows up in the 'HWaddr' entry on the first line that ifconfig prints Orinoco Gold on Win 98SE (YMMV RTFM HTH) Red Hat Linux http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=bb8vft%24lma%241%40news01.intel.com&oe=UTF-8&output=gplain CIA XXV Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. Locking It Down Step 2.2 MAC Filtering Better than nothing; will keep out your neighbors To find your adapters’ MAC addresses, under Windows: start | run | cmd | ipconfig/all ; listed as physical address Best to explicitly allow only your own MACs; explicit deny is for open APs that are subject to annoying users (without the sense to spoof their MAC addys) Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Default SSIDs 3Com: comcomcom Cisco: 2, tsunami, WaveLAN Network Compaq: Compaq With AP manufacturer, trivial to determine default DLink: WLAN Administrator Intel: 101, 195, xlan, intel username/password! Linksys: linksys, Wireless Netgear: Wireless Zcomax: any, mello, Test Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. http://www.cirt.net/cgi-bin/ssids.pl http://www.iss.net/wireless/WLAN_FAQ.php CIA XXV Locking It Down Step 2.2 (cont’d) SSID Rules Change from default Don’t broadcast if possible (WPA flaky sometimes) Don’t make it your family/business name Don’t make it interesting to h@X0rS; boring is good: ex: thisAP Make it hard to guess (e.g., not Default1) Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. use this if possible CIA XXV What this talk is about Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Wardriving Update Late 2004 Step 1: Physical Security and Wireless Policy Step 2: OS, Firmware Updates; MAC Filtering; SSID Step 3: Change AP PW; WPA if possible, else WEP Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Locking It Down Step 3.1 Change yer freakin’ default AP password! Every script kiddie and her dog knows the default passwords for major manufacturers! Pick a new, secure PW Disable remote router administration and Universal Plug and Play (if router doesn’t have nice check box, get Steve Gibson’s UnPlug n’ Pray here: http://grc.com/UnPnP/UnPnP.htm ) While you’re at it, enable router’s firewall function: block anonymous WAN reqests & filter NAT redirection to keep local LAN users from accessing port-forwarded services on router Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. http://www.linksys.com/download/vertxt/befsr81v2_ver.txt CIA XXV Locking It Down Step 3.2 Use Encryption Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Encryption Basics XOR Logic Gate Need to hide message (plaintext) = needle Generate random stuff (encryption key) = piece of hay Multiply random stuff (keystream) = haystack Hide message in haystack (XOR) needle+haystack (ciphertext) http://www.mesda.com/files/infosecurity200309.pdf; http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/electronic/xor.html Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. Intro to Encryption: http://home.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto/jscrypt.htm CIA XXV WEP…what is WEP? Wired Equivalent Protocol (NOT Wireless Encryption Privacy) First defined in 1999 ANSI/IEEE Std. 802.11, section 8.2 http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/802.11-1999.pdf Never intended to provide strong security; Goals: “Reasonably strong” (dependent on key length) “Self-synchronizing” (for “best effort” delivery) “Efficient” (low processor overhead) “Exportable” (pre-1999 ITAR climate [Phil Zimmerman]) “Optional” (so lusers don’t whine to hardware manufacturers when they mess up WEP on their networks– DISABLED out of the box by all OEMs as of 2004 AFAIK*) *AFAIK= As far as I know Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV How is WEP supposed to work? • Secret key combined with IV, run through WEP cipher PRNG (RC4) • Plaintext XORed with key sequence (irreversible without key) • Ciphertext output sent over airwaves after encapsulation into IP packets Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/802.11-1999.pdf CIA XXV What is RC4? One encryption algorithm (many others: DES, IDEA, Blowfish, AES, etc.) Efficient streaming cipher (low overhead)-- used in SSL encryption (online banking, etc.) Proprietary trade secret of RSA Inc. http://www.rsasecurity.com Presumed RC4 source code uploaded to Usenet newsgroup sci.crypt 13 Sep 1994…all open source RC4 implementations based on this anonymous post (including WEP)! From: [email protected] (An0nYm0Us UsEr) Newsgroups: sci.crypt Subject: RC4 ? Date: 13 Sep 1994 21:30:36 GMT Organization: Global Anonymous Remail Services Ltd. Lines: 83 Message-ID: <[email protected]> NNTP-Posting-Host: xs1.xs4all.nl X-Comment: This message did not originate from the above address. X-Comment: It was automatically remailed by an anonymous mailservice. X-Comment: Info: [email protected], Subject: remailer-help X-Comment: Please report inappropriate use to <[email protected]> SUBJECT: RC4 Source Code I've tested this. It is compatible with the RC4 object module that comes in the various RSA toolkits. /* rc4.h */ http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=35gtd7%24404%40ccu2.auckland.ac.nz&oe=UTF-8&output=gplain Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Why is WEP Broken? First paper: Fluhrer, Mantin, Shamir (encryption flaws) http://www.securityfocus.com/data/library/rc4_ksaproc.pdf WEP attack using FMS method: Stubblefield, Ionnidis, Rubin http://www.cs.rice.edu/~astubble/wep/ WEP standard implements RC4 improperly http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/technotes/wep.html Flaws in key scheduling algorithm Large number of weak keys encryption easily cracked IV is sent in the clear with each chunk– subtract 24 bits of IV from encryption key length Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. http://wombat.doc.ic.ac.uk/foldoc/foldoc.cgi?RC4 CIA XXV Enabling WEP Orinoco Gold on Win 98SE Linksys pic modified from: http://www.timhiggins.com/Reviews/images/scrnshots/linksys_wap54g_setup.jpg CIA XXV Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. Advanced WEP Freeware key generators create pseudorandom keys for you to enter Rotate keys frequently (weekly for business, monthly for home at minimum) Make sure highest key-length WEP is enabled (remember, 64 bit WEP key is really just 40 bits long [thanks, marketing!]) Upgrade WEP to WPA as soon as possible (look for WPA support for all new hardware) Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Bbbbut…isn’t WEP broken? Yes, but…just because your front door can be picked, doesn’t mean you shouldn’t lock it! Never be low hanging fruit for attackers Lots of old hardware (pre-2004) can’t support WPA, let alone WPA2: WEP is the only option If you just enable WEP more secure than 60-75% of WLAN users (according to wardriving data) If you enable WEP + change SSID from default + change AP logon/pw: more secure than 95% of lusers Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Quick Fix for WEP: WPA WPA = “WiFiTM Protected Access” Available as software/firmware upgrade for most chipsets/manufacturers now or soon Subset of new (Jun 04) 802.11i security architecture Patches major vulnerabilities in WEP: TKIP fixes IV weakness, adds MIC, key mixing, rekeying Supports enterprise user authentication via EAP and 802.1X SOHO mode: Pre-Shared Key (PSK): autorotates key for you http://www.newswireless.net/articles/021123-protect.html Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV TKIP Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Look for the WPA label… Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Enabling WPA PSK in Windoze XP SP2 Make sure wireless connection works with WEP first Have wired connection to prevent disconnection with changes Upgrade Windows XP SP1 to SP2 (Windoze Update) Pick a good pre-shared key (PSK)! http://wifinetnews.com/archives/002452.html Upgrade client firmware to support WPA Implement WPA PSK on router (may need to upgrade firmware) Implement WPA on Windows XP using WZC (Wireless Zero Configuration) See my separate step-by-step guide on WPA in XP: http://www.notbob.com/wlani Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Step 4: Step Implement Step 3: Make 2: Step Implement WPA 1: sure Upgrade PSK supplicant WPA under XPonto network supports AP SP2 router connections WPA Take Home Message Everyone in this room should be using WPA instead of WEP at all times right now! Definitely worth upgrading hardware to support WPA Hospitals/Medical Offices: Legal risks of NOT using WPA (due diligence) given WEP vulnerabilities Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV What this talk is about Brief Review of Wireless LAN (WLAN) tech Wardriving Update Late 2004 Step 1: Physical Security and Wireless Policy Step 2: OS, Firmware Updates; MAC Filtering; SSID Step 3: Change AP PW; WPA if possible, else WEP Step 4: Toward 802.11i/WPA2 for Home/SOHO use Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV WPA Upgrade: IEEE 802.11i/WPA2 802.1X port-based authentication– requires dedicated authentication server (or server process in AP) RADIUS authentication: for enterprises only IEEE 802.11i = WPA + RSN; finally ratified Jun 04 Uses CCMP (counter mode with cipher block chaining [CBC] message authentication code protocol) for enhanced privacy, data integrity, and authentication RSN: Robust Security Network 802.1X + EAP + AES (non-RC4 encryption protocol) – will likely need hardware upgrade to run RSN without major hit on throughput; likely available in “mature” form in 2005-6 CBC: http://pedia.nodeworks.com/C/CI/CIP/Ciph er_Block_Chaining/ 802.11i (excellent): http://www.commsdesign.com/design_library/cd/wl/OEG20021126S0003 802.11i (advanced): http://csrc.nist.gov/wireless/S10_802.11i%20Overview-jw1.pdf RSN: http://www.nwfusion.com/news/tech/2003/0526techupdate.html CIA XXV Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. AES Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Rijndael (Reign-Dahl) is AES Rijndael is a symmetric block cipher, designed by Belgian/Flemish cryptologists Joan Daemen (Yó-ahn Dáh-mun) ́ and Vincent Rijmen (Rýe-mun) Time to crack @ 255 keys/sec: 149 trillion years Basic advantage of AES is its efficiency and low overhead: easier to implement than its competitors for AES standard For WiFi®, requires dedicated chip to process cipher in real time Official NIST AES Specs: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf Intro to AES: http://www.nwfusion.com/details/597.html?def Very High Level AES mathematical explanation: http://islab.oregonstate.edu/koc/ece575/aes/intro.pdf “How is that pronounced ? If you're Dutch, Flemish, Indonesian, Surinamer or South-African, it's pronounced like you think it should be. Otherwise, you could pronounce it like "Reign Dahl", "Rain Doll", "Rhine Dahl". We're not picky. As long as you make it sound different from "Region Deal".” http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/ Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV from: http://www.wi-fi.org/OpenSection/pdf/Wi-Fi_ProtectedAccessWebcast_2003.pdf Do you really need WPA2? WPA fixes all known problems with WEP If you avoid choosing weak passphrase subject to dictionary attack, WPA should suffice for most home/SOHO users for now (2005) As of Oct 04, WPA has not been broken RC4 will eventually succumb to Moore’s Law will need to move to AES in the future AES support in WPA2 probably involves upgrading your hardware: business decision (risk/benefit ratio) See Q&A section here: http://www.wi-fi.org/OpenSection/protected_access.asp Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Advanced WLAN Security: Topology Options “Safe Side” “Unsafe Side” Firewall Treat all wireless communication as insecure Put AP on “unsafe” side of firewall Use VPN (private tunnel) through internet to reach internal network Impractical for SOHO networks (expensive; throughput hit) Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Step 5: CSE Continuing Security Education All users should keep up with major security developments, including WLAN security Excellent resources: Internet Storm Center http://isc.sans.org News.com http://www.news.com Wireless News Factor http://wireless.newsfactor.com WiFi Planet http://www.wi-fiplanet.com/ NetworkWorldFusion http://www.nwfusion.com/topics/security.html Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Future Wireless Security Issues 2 Privacy: Sniffing your car’s radio stations “Red Means Stop, Ya Moron!”: 802.11p DOS: Wireless Jammers for Jesus Wireless Viruses: Don’t get stung by Mosquitoes RFIDS: The Next Security Threat? Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Privacy: Sniffing your car’s radio Device sniffs what radio station you are listening to http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A60013-2004Oct24.html Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV “Hey, buddy, I’m talking to you” 802.11p is a new IEEE spec to implement WiFi® for vehicles “Emergency vehicles might use broadcast via wireless to change traffic signals in order to speed themselves along. Cars might also "communicate" with one another, as an exchange of Wi-Fi signals makes it possible to sound proximity alerts when two vehicles come too close to one another.” Just imagine the potential for chaos when criminals can change traffic lights remotely, or when pranksters activate all the proximity alerts simultaneously… http://www.wi-fiplanet.com/columns/article.php/3422251 Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV DOS: Wireless Jammers for Jesus Mexico: Cell phone jammers installed in churches…would likely nuke nearby WiFi as well… http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/ptech/10/19/cellphonejammers.ap/ Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Don’t Get Stung Copy protection built into “smart” cellphone game “Mosquitoes” rewritten as Trojan to call expensive premium numbers using embedded Symbian OS “Sooner or later, I expect I will be advising people not to run unknown applications for their refrigerators and cars,” he says. “It is becoming more of a danger as we embed OS into more of our lives.” --Panda Software CTO Patrick Hinojosa http://wireless.newsfactor.com/story.xhtml?story_title=Mosquito-Trojan--Copy-Protection-Gone-Wrong&story_id=26310&category=wlssecurity Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV RFID Security: Brave New World? RFIDs are poised to become ubiquitous RFIDs have no security and can be hacked “The thinking is, security is a secondary issue right now that will be fixed once deployments are underway” – Jeff Woods, Gartner Research Director Ya, that strategy has worked so well for Windows XP, WEP, Iraq… http://enterprise-security-today.newsfactor.com/story.xhtml?story_title=RFID--The-Next-Security-Nightmare-&story_id=26104&category=mobsec Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Patch OS frequently to plug security holes; read media for new WLAN exploits Change default admin logon/pw; disable remote admin Weekly or automatically Got WPA? Prevent theft; BIOS pw; encrypt files; backup data; disaster plan WPA2= 802.1X, 802.11i, RSN; VPN + RADIUS for enterprises only if no WPA; rotate keys manually Implement now; choose secure PSK Change default; don’t broadcast Implement MAC filtering Implement and enforce wireless security AUP/TOS WLAN Security Basics Checklist Pay attention to geographical location of AP (parking lot coverage) Disable file & print sharing if not needed; never share root Disable SSID broadcasting (default = enabled for most products) Change the SSID to something non-default and boring Upgrade firmware of AP/client to increase security (WPA) Change default admin login/password for AP; disable remote admin Configure AP to enable MAC address filtering (not perfect, yes…) Enable WPA PSK now! For enterprises: RADIUS, WPA2 Only use WEP as last resort (legacy hardware; rotate keys often) Wardrive yourself to audit your security (got rogue teenager AP?) Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV The Tao of Network Security 1994-1999: Information Access Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV The Tao of Network Security 1994-1999: 2000-2005: Information Access Information Denial Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Addendum: It’s the Basics, Stupid http://www.canada.com/technology/story.html?id=80bc4cc6-f3e3-4960-9b70-91c260e63931 Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Remember: Common Threats Are Common! “Wired” attacks are still much more common than WLAN exploits: Buffer Overflow attacks based on Windoze vulnerabilities (increasingly zero-day exploits): Sasser, CHM, etc. Phishing for passwords, bank accounts (↑↑ sophistication) M$ Outlook/OE exploits: worms, viruses, blended threats Hostile websites: spyware, malware, browser hijacking Keystroke loggers: disgruntled employees, spouses, kids IM attacks: embedded malign URLs, spim, predators… Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Are Most Users too Stupid for the Internet? • Why not require a license for internet access? • Wired Article: “Are You Too Stupid to Surf?” • http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,60416,00.html • Several Downsides: • • • • People don’t trust the Gummint (look at TIAO Initiative furor) Money Your Grandma wouldn’t pass the test…ever. If stupid Merkins are kept offline, how about the rest of the world we haven’t “liberated”…yet? Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Are Most Users too Stupid for the Internet? How to get H@cked and 0wn3d in 7 easy Steps: • Never update your Anti-virus program’s definitions • In fact, let the free version on your new computer expire • • • • • • Click on all e-mail attachments with wild abandon Never use a firewall (equivalent: Windoze fw only) Keep thinking that OS security updates are for girlie men Go to naughty sites and install all “required” programs Use insecure, older versions of apps due to nostalgia Ignore computer security alerts in the news (news.com) Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV References Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Online Resources WLAN Specifications •WiFiTM Alliance (formerly WECA): http://www.wi-fi.org/ •IEEE 802.11: http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/portfolio.html •IEEE 802.11i: restricted: http://standards.ieee.org/reading/ieee/std/lanman/restricted/802.11i-2004.pdf •Lots of interesting unrestricted IEEE documents: http://www.ieee802.org/11/Documents/DocumentHolder/ •Bluetooth: https://www.bluetooth.org/ •HIPERLAN/2: Official Specs: http://www.hiperlan2.com IEEE Communications Overview: http://www.ihpffo.de/systems/Doc/Vorlesung/MC/ %DCbung/Gruppe7-Hiperlan/0130khun.pdf •HiSWAN: http://www.arib.or.jp/mmac/e/index.htm •Avian IP Transport Protocol (RFC 1149): http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1149.txt?number=1149 Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Wardriving Software NetStumbler http://www.netstumbler.com/ MacStumbler http://www.macstumbler.com/ BSDAirtools http://www.dachb0den.com/projects/bsd-airtools.html AirSnort http://airsnort.shmoo.com/ Kismet http://www.kismetwireless.net/ Wellenreiter http://www.wellenreiter.net/ Lots of other tools: http://wardrive.net/wardriving/tools Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXIV Online Resources Basic 802.11 Security •WLAN Security FAQ (ISS): http://www.iss.net/wireless/WLAN_FAQ.php (old) •WEP Specifications: http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/download/802.11-1999.pdf •WEP Insecurity: http://ftp.die.net/mirror/papers/802.11/wep_attack.html (no longer on: http://www.cs.rice.edu/~astubble/wep/wep_attack.html ) •WPA/WPA2: http://www.wi-fi.org/OpenSection/protected_access.asp •Wardriving: http://www.wardriving.com ; www.sans.org/rr/papers/68/174.pdf •Netstumbler: http://www.netstumbler.com •Wireless Glossary: http://www.devx.com/wireless/Door/11333 (heh heh) •Build your own Cantenna: http://www.turnpoint.net/wireless/cantennahowto.html Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Online Resources Advanced WLAN Security/Continuing Security Education •SANS: http://www.sans.org •Internet Storm Center http://isc.sans.org •Wireless LAN Security Site: http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/IEEE/ •News.com http://www.news.com •Wireless News Factor http://wireless.newsfactor.com •WiFi Planet http://www.wi-fiplanet.com/ •NetworkWorldFusion http://www.nwfusion.com/topics/security.html •Google it: search Google for “WLAN security” and/or “WiFi security” •Cool list of WLAN Security Links: http://www.corecom.com/html/wlan.html •Still More whitepapers: http://www.wlana.org/learning_center.html Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Online Resources AFH Topics •People are stupid: Wireless Equivalent Privacy: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&q=%22Wireless+Equivalent+Privacy%22&btnG=Google+Search •People are stupid 2: Wireless Encryption Protocol: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&q=%22Wireless+Encryption+Protocol%22 •HAARP: http://www.haarp.alaska.edu/haarp/ ; http://www.vs.afrl.af.mil/Factsheets/haarp.html •ECHELON: http://www.europarl.eu.int/tempcom/echelon/ pdf/rapport_echelon_en.pdf •TEMPEST: http://www.cwrl.utexas.edu/~benjamin/316kfall/316ktexts/tempest1.html Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXIV Offline Resources Books/Articles: Computer Security Essentials Skoudis, Ed, Counterhack, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall PTR 2002. ISBN 0-13-033273-9 (amazing book! dozens of black hat techniques with countermeasures) Cheswick WR, Bellovin SM, Firewalls and Internet Security: Repelling the Wily Hacker, New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company 1994. ISBN 0-201-63357-4 (a classic) Chapman, D. Brent and Zwicky, Elizabeth D., Building Internet Firewalls, Sebastopol, CA: O'Reilly & Associates, 1995. ISBN 1-156592-124-0 (first edition includes excellent appendix on basics of ISO/OSI TCP/IP stack) Anonymous, Maximum Security, Fourth Ed., Indianapolis: SAMS Publishing Dec 2002 (excellent resource) Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV Offline Resources Books/Articles: WLAN Security Duntemann J, Jeff Duntemann’s Drive-by WiFi Guide, Scottsdale: Paraglyph Press, 2003. ISBN 1-932111-74-3 (very readable & entertaining; most practical 3-space reference thus far) Peikari C, Fogie S, Wireless Maximum Security, Indianapolis: Sams Publishing, 2003. ISBN 0-672-32488-1 (contains some errors [er, Wireless Equivalent Privacy? To paraphrase the song, 1/3 ain’t good.]) Edney J, Arbaugh WA, Real 802.11 Security: WiFi Protected Access and 802.11i, Boston (etc.): Addison-Wesley, 2004 (almost incomprehensible at times, but good reference) Vladimirov A, Gavrilenko K, Mikhailovsky A, Wi-Foo: The Secrets of Wireless Hacking, Boston (etc.), Addison-Wesley, 2004 (Good overview of WLAN security from Black Hat perspective; grammatical issues) Copyright (C) 2005 Robert C. Jones, M.D. All Rights Reserved. CIA XXV