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Transcript
Overview

Understand the key events that shaped the outcome
of World War II in the Pacific Theater
Interwar Airpower Review
 Axis Powers
 Japan – Dysfunctional split between Army and Navy. Limited airpower in
support of Japanese Army. Naval air was formidable, but was designed around
the protection on the fleet, not a separate sustained air campaign
 Allies
 United States – Reasonably balanced force between the Army and Navy.
Precision daylight strategic bombing viewed as key to victory.
 Once America entered World War II:
 Allies adopted a Germany First Strategy
 For the majority of the war , Airpower in the Pacific Theater was Tactical in
nature supporting fleet operations or close air support of island invasions
Strategic means designed to strike at the sources of an enemy’s military, economic, or political power.
Tactical means designed to directly support a military operation or to attack enemy military units
Japan 1944-1945(prior to Aerial Attack)
 By June 1944,
 Japan was blockaded by US Navy
 By the summer of 1944, the
Japanese had exhausted the
possibility of forcing their
economy into direct war
activities. The civilian
population was underfed, was
receiving practically no new
clothing or miscellaneous
civilian supplies, and was being
worked to a degree of fatigue
which was reflected in rising
rates of absenteeism.
Japan 1944-1945(prior to Aerial Attack)
 Pacific Island Campaign had been costly against a determined foe
 Pearl Harbor
 Russian Post-War Intentions
6000
5000
4000
3000
Navy
2000
1000
0
Marines
Strategic Bombing
 The total tonnage of bombs dropped by Allied planes in the Pacific war was
656,400. Of this, 160,800 tons, or 24 percent, were dropped on the home
islands of Japan
3,500
4,708
April-July 1945
8,115
Urban Areas
10,600
Aircraft Factories
Oil Refineries
14,150
Munitions
Misc Industry
104,000
Airfields/Seaports
U.S. Bombs Dropped by
Strategic Bombing (in Tons)
 No formal unconditional surrender
 With industry dispersed U.S. area bombing intensifies and invasion plans are
being finalized
August 6th & 9th, 1945
Did the Atomic Bomb Need to be Dropped?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7XuhLTbQ4Q&list=PLF9164368020C289D
It’s August 5th, 1945…you are advising
President Truman…your recommendation is?
Atomic Bomb: Necessity?
Why the bomb was needed or justified:
 The Japanese had demonstrated near-fanatical resistance, fighting to almost





the last man on Pacific islands, committing mass suicide on Saipan and
unleashing kamikaze attacks at Okinawa. Fire bombing had killed 100,000 in
Tokyo with no discernible political effect. Only the atomic bomb could jolt
Japan's leadership to surrender.
With only two bombs ready (and a third on the way by late August 1945) it was
too risky to "waste" one in a demonstration over an unpopulated area.
An invasion of Japan would have caused casualties on both sides that could
easily have exceeded the toll at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The two targeted cities would have been firebombed anyway.
Immediate use of the bomb convinced the world of its horror and prevented
future use when nuclear stockpiles were far larger.
The bomb's use impressed the Soviet Union and halted the war quickly enough
that the USSR did not demand joint occupation of Japan.
Atomic Bomb: Necessity?
Why the bomb was not needed, or unjustified:
 Japan was ready to call it quits anyway. More than 60 of its cities had been
destroyed by conventional bombing, the home islands were being blockaded by







the American Navy, and the Soviet Union entered the war by attacking Japanese
troops in Manchuria.
American refusal to modify its "unconditional surrender" demand to allow the
Japanese to keep their emperor needlessly prolonged Japan's resistance.
A demonstration explosion over Tokyo harbor would have convinced Japan's
leaders to quit without killing many people.
Even if Hiroshima was necessary, the U.S. did not give enough time for word to
filter out of its devastation before bombing Nagasaki.
The bomb was used partly to justify the $2 billion spent on its development.
The two cities were of limited military value. Civilians outnumbered troops in
Hiroshima five or six to one.
Japanese lives were sacrificed simply for power politics between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union.
Conventional firebombing would have caused as much significant damage
without making the U.S. the first nation to use nuclear weapons.
Strategic Bombing: USSBS
 The total tonnage of bombs dropped by Allied planes in the Pacific war was
656,400. Of this, 160,800 tons, or 24 percent, were dropped on the home
islands of Japan
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
Power (Electric/Coal)
%
of Japanese 2,000
Industrial
Capacity
Cal/day
Down
50%1945:
Public Though
1600 Cal/Day
Down
Defeat
Was40%
Inevitable
3,500
4,708
April-July 1945
8,115
Urban Areas
10,600
Aircraft Factories
Oil Refineries
14,150
30%
Munitions
20%
10%
0%
Jun-44
Dec-44
Worker
Absenteeism
Mar-45
Jun-45
Misc Industry
104,000
Aug 45
(Prior ABomb)
Airfields/Seaports
U.S. Bombs Dropped by
Strategic Bombing (in Tons)
 No formal unconditional surrender
 With industry dispersed U.S. area bombing intensifies and invasion plans are
being finalized
Importance of Airpower: Pacific
 Importance of carrier-based aviation
 Close Air Support
 Rapid and Sustained Airlift of Troops and Supplies
 Strategic Bombing
 Did the Atomic Bomb bring to fruition the dominance of
airpower that the interwar air theorists envisioned?