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第十單元(2) : Determining Optimal Level of Product Availability Determining Optimal Level of Product Availability Optimal Matching of Supply and Demand (III) 蔣明晃教授 【本著作除另有註明外,採取創用CC「姓名標示 -非商業性-相同方式分享」台灣3.0版授權釋出】 1 Revenue Sharing Contracts ► Manufacture charges the retailer a low wholesale price and shares a fraction of the revenue generated by the retailer. ► The retailer cost will be decreased due to lower overstock cost, thus, retailer will increase the level of product availability resulting higher profits for both manufacturer and retailer. Basher Eyre _Geograph 2 Revenue Sharing Contracts ► Manufacturer’s production cost = v ► Wholesale price charged by manufacturer = c ► Manufacturer shares a fraction f of the retailer’s revenue ► Retailer charges a retail price p and has a salvage value sR for unsold items. ► The understocking cost = Cu = (1-f)p – c ► The overstocking cost = Co = c – sR 3 Revenue Sharing Contracts CSL * probabilit y(demand O *) Cu (1 f ) p c Cu Co (1 f ) p sR Expected manufactur er' s profit (c v )O * fp(O * expected overstock at retailer ) Expected retailer' s profit (1 f ) p(O * expected overstock at retailer ) sR expected overstock at retailer - cO * 4 Revenue Sharing Contracts Cu for(1 f )p c ►CSL Example: TF y(demand charges only * probabilit O *) c = $10 each jacket, Cu and Co shares (1 f ) p f of sR the SA sells the jacket for p = $200 revenue to TF. Demand Expected manufactur er' s profitat this price is normal distributed with a mean 1000 and a standard (c v )O * fp(O * expected overstock at retailer ) deviation 300. Assume that no salvage value for any Expected s profit leftoverretailer' jackets. (1 f ) p(O * expected overstock at retailer ) sR expected overstock at retailer - cO * 5 Revenue Sharing Contracts 6 Wholesale Price c RevenueSharing Fraction f Optimal Order Size for SA Expected Overstock At SA Expected Profit for SA Expected Profit for TF $10 0.3 1440 10 0.5 10 Expected Supply Chain Profit 449 124273 59429 183702 1384 399 84735 98580 183315 0.7 1290 317 45503 136278 181781 10 0.9 1000 120 7606 158457 166063 20 0.3 1320 342 110523 71886 182409 20 0.5 1252 286 71601 109176 180777 20 0.7 1129 195 33455 142051 175506 Revenue Sharing Contracts ► Observations: revenue sharing with a lower wholesale price allows both retailers and manufactures to increase their profit. The revenue sharing encourages retailers to increase the level of product availability ► Applications: video rental industry, such as Blockbuster. 7 Contracts for Product Availability and Supply Chain Profits: Revenue Sharing Contracts ► The buyer pays a minimal amount for each unit purchased from the supplier but shares a fraction of the revenue for each unit sold ► Decreases the cost per unit charged to the retailer, which effectively decreases the cost of overstocking ► Have a similar effect as buyback contracts but eliminate the cost of returns 》 Lower retailer effort 》 Suited for products with low variable cost and a high cost of return 》 Result in supply chain information distortion ► Enabler: require an information infrastructure to monitor sales at retailer 8 Quantity Flexibility Contracts ► If a retailer order O units the manufacturer commits to supplying up to Q = (1+)O and the retailer commits to buying q = (1-)O ► How can quantity flexibility contracts help increase profitability? Wikipedia 9 Quantity Flexibility Contracts ► Manufacturing cost per unit: v ► Wholesale price: c ► Retailing price: p ► Retailer salvage value: SR ► Manufacture salvage value: SM ► Demand (2) 10 Quantity Flexibility Contracts ► Scenario: 》 Retailer orders O units, manufacture commits to supply Q units 》 Manufacturer produces Q units 》 Retailer purchases q units if demand R is less than q; R units of demand R is between q and Q; Q units if demand is higher than Q 11 Quantity Flexibility Contracts Expected quantity purchased by retailer Q QR qF (q ) Q[1 F (Q )] xf ( x )dx q = (1-)O Q = (1+)O q qF (q ) Q[1 F (Q )] [FS ( Q ) FS ( q )] [fS ( Expected quantity sold by retailer Q DR Q[1 F (Q )] xf ( x )dx 0 Q[1 F (Q )] FS ( 12 Q ) fS ( Q ) Q ) fS ( q )] Quantity Flexibility Contracts Expected overstock at retailer Q R DR Expected retailer profit D R p (Q R D R )s R Q R c Expected manufacture profit Q R c (Q Q R )s M Q v 13 Quantity Flexibility Contracts 14 Order size O Expected purchase by SA Expected sale by SA Expected profits for SA Expected profits for TF Expected supply chain profit Wholesal e price c 0.00 0.00 $100 1,000 1,000 880 $76,063 $90,000 $166,063 0.20 0.20 $100 1,050 1,024 968 $91,167 $89,830 $180,997 0.40 0.40 $100 1,070 1,011 994 $97,689 $86,122 $183,811 0.00 0.00 $110 962 962 860 $66,252 $96,200 $162,452 0.15 0.15 $110 1,014 1,009 945 $78,153 $99,282 $177,435 0.42 0.42 $110 1,048 1,007 993 $87,932 $95,879 $183,811 0.00 0.00 $120 924 924 838 $56,819 $101,640 $158,459 0.2 0.2 $120 1,000 1,000 955 $70,933 $108,000 $178,933 0.5 0.5 $120 1,040 1,003 996 $78,874 $104,803 $183,677 Quantity Flexibility Contract ► Common for components in the electronic and computer industry ► Example: 》 Benetton: retailer required to place order 7 months before delivery, but allow retailer to alter up to 30% quantity ordered in any color and assign to another color 3 months before delivery and allow retailer to alter up to 10% after the start of the season 15 Contracts for Product Availability and Supply Chain Profits: Quantity Flexibility Contracts ► Allows the buyer to modify the order (within limits) as demand visibility increases closer to the point of sale ► Better matching of supply and demand ► Increased overall supply chain profits if the supplier has flexible capacity ► Can be effective if a supplier sells to multiple retailers with independent demand 16 Contracts for Product Availability and Supply Chain Profits: Quantity Flexibility Contracts ► Downsize: 》 Supplier needs to have inventory or excess flexible capacity 》 Lower levels of information distortion than either buyback contracts or revenue sharing contracts due to aggregation of uncertainty from supplier 》 Lower retailer effort 17 Vendor-Managed Inventory(VMI) ► VMI: manufacturer or supplier is responsible for all decisions regarding product inventories at the retailer ► Requirements: share info from retailers ► Benefits: 》 Increase profit of manufacturer 本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊,依據 Microsoft服務合約及著作權法 第46、52、65條合理使用。 》 Improve manufacturer forecast accuracy 本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊,依據 Microsoft服務合約及著作權法 第46、52、65條合理使用。 》 Avoid double marginalization ► Drawbacks: 本作品轉載自Microsoft 》 Impact of productOffice substitution to bring higher inventory in 2007多媒體藝廊,依據 本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊,依據 retailer Microsoft服務合約及著作權法 第46、52、65條合理使用。 Microsoft服務合約及著作權法 第46、52、65條合理使用。 18 CPFR Model Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment 1. 協同合作協議 CP 2. 協同商業計劃 3. 共同的銷售預測 CF 4. 例外狀況的判定與 處理 5. 共同的訂單預測 CR 6. 例外狀況的判定與 處理 7. 訂單產生 本作品轉載自 Collaborative Planning, Forecasting and Replenishment ,瀏覽日期2012/03/23。依據著作權法 第46、52、65條合理使用。 19 導入CPFR的好處 ► 避免不必要庫存 –庫存成本 –報廢 –外部庫存 ► 提升流程效率 –訂單管理 –採購 –人力管理 CPFR ► 增加收益 –避免缺貨 –提高促銷效率 –提升業績 20 ► 提高物流利用率 –提高配送效率 –整合運輸管理 協同規劃,預測與補貨(Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment, CPFR) ► 目標: 》對共同作業過程,格式與績效指標的協調一致 》透過POS資料,分享一個共同預測與需求規劃 》在一個協調機制下,對需求滿足,滿足的優先次序 與供應分配的管理之相互溝通 》對未來促銷的預先通知以減少長鞭效應 》透過共同技術的分享,使需求,存貨與運送的資料 更透明化 21 協同規劃,預測與補貨(CPFR) ► 指導原則: 》共同交易架構的建立:語言,作業模式, 與資料標準 》企業的流程必須清楚定義 》作業的流程與共同的術語必須轉換成特定 與共同的標準 22 CPFR Roadmap ► Published by VICS (Interindustry Commerce Standard Association) ► Nine steps: 》 Develop guidelines for the relationships 》 Develop a joint business plan 》 Create a sales forecast 》 Identify exceptions for the sales forecast 》 Collaborate on exception items 》 Create an order forecast 》 Identify exceptions for the order forecast 》 Resolve/collaborate on exception items 》 Generate orders 23 協同規劃,預測與補貨(CPFR) ► 績效指標: 》預測準確度的提升 》顧客服務水準的提高 》缺貨率的降低 》存貨水準的降低 》較佳的財務資金結構 24 Contracts to Coordinate Supply Chain Costs ► Differences in costs at the buyer and supplier can lead to decisions that increase total supply chain costs 》 Example: Replenishment order size placed by the buyer. The buyer’s EOQ does not take into account the supplier’s costs. ► A quantity discount contract may encourage the buyer to purchase a larger quantity (which would be lower costs for the supplier), which would result in lower total supply chain costs but higher inventory levels and lot sizes ► Quantity discounts lead to information distortion because of order batching 25 Contracts to Increase Agent Effort ► There are many instances in a supply chain where an agent acts on the behalf of a principal and the agent’s actions affect the reward for the principal 》 Example: A car dealer who sells the cars of a manufacturer, as well as those of other manufacturers 》 Examples of contracts to increase agent effort include two-part tariffs (a franchise fee and sell product at cost) and threshold contracts (increasing margin to dealer for higher threshold) ► Threshold contracts increase information distortion, however. One way to offer threshold incentives over a rolling horizon. 26 本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊,依據Microsoft 服務合約及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。 Contracts to Induce Performance Improvement ► A buyer may want performance improvement from a supplier who otherwise would have little incentive to do so ► A shared savings contract provides the supplier with a fraction of the savings that result from the performance improvement such as lead time, quality ► Particularly effective where the benefit from improvement accrues primarily to the buyer, but where the effort for the improvement comes primarily from the supplier 27 版權聲明 頁碼 28 作品 授權條件 作者/來源 2 Geograph,作者:Basher Eyre。(http://www.geograph.org.uk/photo/834743) , 瀏覽日期:2012/02/24。該網站採取創用CC「姓名標示-相同方式分享」 2.0版授權釋出。 9 本作品轉載自WIKIPEDIA (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Dell_Logo.png),瀏覽日期 2012/03/02。 18 本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊,依據Microsoft服務合約 及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。 18 本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊,依據Microsoft服務合約 及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。 18 本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊,依據Microsoft服務合約 及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。 18 本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊,依據Microsoft服務合約 及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。 19 本作品轉載自 http://www.vics.org/docs/committees/cpfr/CPFR_Overview_USA4.pdf (頁11) ,瀏覽日期2012/03/23。依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理 使用。 版權聲明 頁碼 26 29 作品 授權條件 作者/來源 本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊,依據Microsoft服務合約 及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。