Download 下載講義

第十單元(2) ： Determining Optimal Level of Product Availability
Determining Optimal Level of
Product Availability
Optimal Matching of Supply and
Demand (III)
蔣明晃教授
【本著作除另有註明外，採取創用CC「姓名標示
－非商業性－相同方式分享」台灣3.0版授權釋出】
1
Revenue Sharing Contracts
► Manufacture charges the retailer a low wholesale
price and shares a fraction of the revenue generated
by the retailer.
► The retailer cost will be decreased due to lower
overstock cost, thus, retailer will increase the level of
product availability resulting higher profits for both
manufacturer and retailer.
Basher Eyre _Geograph
2
Revenue Sharing Contracts
► Manufacturer’s production cost = v
► Wholesale price charged by manufacturer = c
► Manufacturer shares a fraction f of the retailer’s
revenue
► Retailer charges a retail price p and has a salvage
value sR for unsold items.
► The understocking cost = Cu = (1-f)p – c
► The overstocking cost = Co = c – sR
3
Revenue Sharing Contracts
CSL *  probabilit y(demand  O *) 
Cu
(1  f ) p  c

Cu  Co (1  f ) p  sR
Expected manufactur er' s profit
 (c  v )O * fp(O *  expected overstock at retailer )
Expected retailer' s profit
 (1  f ) p(O *  expected overstock at retailer )
 sR  expected overstock at retailer - cO *
4
Revenue Sharing Contracts
Cu for(1
 f )p  c
►CSL
Example:
TF y(demand
charges only
*  probabilit
O *) c
 = $10
 each jacket,
Cu and
Co shares
(1  f ) p f of
sR the
SA sells the jacket for p = $200
revenue
to TF. Demand
Expected
manufactur
er' s profitat this price is normal
distributed with a mean 1000 and a standard
 (c  v )O * fp(O *  expected overstock at retailer )
deviation 300. Assume that no salvage value for any
Expected
s profit
leftoverretailer'
jackets.
 (1  f ) p(O *  expected overstock at retailer )
 sR  expected overstock at retailer - cO *
5
Revenue Sharing Contracts
6
Wholesale
Price c
RevenueSharing
Fraction f
Optimal
Order Size
for SA
Expected
Overstock
At SA
Expected
Profit for
SA
Expected
Profit for
TF
$10
0.3
1440
10
0.5
10
Expected
Supply
Chain Profit
449
124273
59429
183702
1384
399
84735
98580
183315
0.7
1290
317
45503
136278
181781
10
0.9
1000
120
7606
158457
166063
20
0.3
1320
342
110523
71886
182409
20
0.5
1252
286
71601
109176
180777
20
0.7
1129
195
33455
142051
175506
Revenue Sharing Contracts
► Observations: revenue sharing with a lower
wholesale price allows both retailers and
manufactures to increase their profit. The revenue
sharing encourages retailers to increase the level of
product availability
► Applications: video rental industry, such as
Blockbuster.
7
Contracts for Product Availability and Supply
Chain Profits: Revenue Sharing Contracts
► The buyer pays a minimal amount for each unit
purchased from the supplier but shares a fraction of
the revenue for each unit sold
► Decreases the cost per unit charged to the retailer,
which effectively decreases the cost of overstocking
► Have a similar effect as buyback contracts but
eliminate the cost of returns
》 Lower retailer effort
》 Suited for products with low variable cost and a high cost of return
》 Result in supply chain information distortion
► Enabler: require an information infrastructure to
monitor sales at retailer
8
Quantity Flexibility Contracts
► If a retailer order O units the manufacturer commits
to supplying up to Q = (1+)O and the retailer
commits to buying q = (1-)O
► How can quantity flexibility contracts help increase
profitability?
Wikipedia
9
Quantity Flexibility Contracts
► Manufacturing cost per unit: v
► Wholesale price: c
► Retailing price: p
► Retailer salvage value: SR
► Manufacture salvage value: SM
► Demand (2)
10
Quantity Flexibility Contracts
► Scenario:
》 Retailer orders O units, manufacture commits to supply Q
units
》 Manufacturer produces Q units
》 Retailer purchases q units if demand R is less than q; R
units of demand R is between q and Q; Q units if demand is
higher than Q
11
Quantity Flexibility Contracts
 Expected quantity purchased by retailer
Q
QR  qF (q )  Q[1  F (Q )]   xf ( x )dx
q = (1-)O
Q = (1+)O
q
 qF (q )  Q[1  F (Q )]   [FS (
Q

)  FS (
q

)]   [fS (
 Expected quantity sold by retailer
Q
DR  Q[1  F (Q )]   xf ( x )dx
0
 Q[1  F (Q )]  FS (
12
Q

)  fS (
Q

)
Q

)  fS (
q

)]
Quantity Flexibility Contracts
 Expected overstock at retailer
Q R  DR
 Expected retailer profit
D R  p  (Q R  D R )s R  Q R  c
 Expected manufacture profit
Q R  c  (Q  Q R )s M  Q  v
13
Quantity Flexibility Contracts
14
Order
size O
Expected
purchase
by SA
Expected
sale by
SA
Expected
profits for
SA
Expected
profits for
TF
Expected
supply
chain profit


Wholesal
e price c
0.00
0.00
$100
1,000
1,000
880
$76,063 $90,000
$166,063
0.20
0.20
$100
1,050
1,024
968
$91,167 $89,830
$180,997
0.40
0.40
$100
1,070
1,011
994
$97,689 $86,122
$183,811
0.00
0.00
$110
962
962
860
$66,252 $96,200
$162,452
0.15
0.15
$110
1,014
1,009
945
$78,153 $99,282
$177,435
0.42
0.42
$110
1,048
1,007
993
$87,932 $95,879
$183,811
0.00
0.00
$120
924
924
838
$56,819 $101,640
$158,459
0.2
0.2
$120
1,000
1,000
955
$70,933 $108,000
$178,933
0.5
0.5
$120
1,040
1,003
996
$78,874 $104,803
$183,677
Quantity Flexibility Contract
► Common for components in the electronic and
computer industry
► Example:
》 Benetton: retailer required to place order 7 months before
delivery, but allow retailer to alter up to 30% quantity ordered
in any color and assign to another color 3 months before
delivery and allow retailer to alter up to 10% after the start of
the season
15
Contracts for Product Availability and Supply
Chain Profits: Quantity Flexibility Contracts
► Allows the buyer to modify the order (within limits) as
demand visibility increases closer to the point of sale
► Better matching of supply and demand
► Increased overall supply chain profits if the supplier
has flexible capacity
► Can be effective if a supplier sells to multiple retailers
with independent demand
16
Contracts for Product Availability and Supply
Chain Profits: Quantity Flexibility Contracts
► Downsize:
》 Supplier needs to have inventory or excess flexible capacity
》 Lower levels of information distortion than either buyback
contracts or revenue sharing contracts due to aggregation of
uncertainty from supplier
》 Lower retailer effort
17
Vendor-Managed Inventory(VMI)
► VMI: manufacturer or supplier is responsible for all
decisions regarding product inventories at the retailer
► Requirements: share info from retailers
► Benefits:
》 Increase profit of manufacturer
本作品轉載自Microsoft Office
2007多媒體藝廊，依據
Microsoft服務合約及著作權法
第46、52、65條合理使用。
》 Improve manufacturer forecast accuracy
本作品轉載自Microsoft Office
2007多媒體藝廊，依據
Microsoft服務合約及著作權法
第46、52、65條合理使用。
》 Avoid double marginalization
► Drawbacks:
本作品轉載自Microsoft
》 Impact of
productOffice
substitution to bring higher
inventory in
2007多媒體藝廊，依據
本作品轉載自Microsoft Office
2007多媒體藝廊，依據
retailer Microsoft服務合約及著作權法
第46、52、65條合理使用。
Microsoft服務合約及著作權法
第46、52、65條合理使用。
18
CPFR Model
Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment
1. 協同合作協議
CP
2. 協同商業計劃
3. 共同的銷售預測
CF
4. 例外狀況的判定與
處理
5. 共同的訂單預測
CR
6. 例外狀況的判定與
處理
7. 訂單產生
本作品轉載自 Collaborative Planning, Forecasting and
Replenishment ，瀏覽日期2012/03/23。依據著作權法
第46、52、65條合理使用。
19
導入CPFR的好處
► 避免不必要庫存
–庫存成本
–報廢
–外部庫存
► 提升流程效率
–訂單管理
–採購
–人力管理
CPFR
► 增加收益
–避免缺貨
–提高促銷效率
–提升業績
20
► 提高物流利用率
–提高配送效率
–整合運輸管理
協同規劃，預測與補貨(Collaborative Planning,
Forecasting, and Replenishment, CPFR)
► 目標：
》對共同作業過程，格式與績效指標的協調一致
》透過POS資料，分享一個共同預測與需求規劃
》在一個協調機制下，對需求滿足，滿足的優先次序
與供應分配的管理之相互溝通
》對未來促銷的預先通知以減少長鞭效應
》透過共同技術的分享，使需求，存貨與運送的資料
更透明化
21
協同規劃，預測與補貨(CPFR)
► 指導原則：
》共同交易架構的建立：語言，作業模式，
與資料標準
》企業的流程必須清楚定義
》作業的流程與共同的術語必須轉換成特定
與共同的標準
22
CPFR Roadmap
► Published by VICS (Interindustry Commerce
Standard Association)
► Nine steps:
》 Develop guidelines for the relationships
》 Develop a joint business plan
》 Create a sales forecast
》 Identify exceptions for the sales forecast
》 Collaborate on exception items
》 Create an order forecast
》 Identify exceptions for the order forecast
》 Resolve/collaborate on exception items
》 Generate orders
23
協同規劃，預測與補貨(CPFR)
► 績效指標：
》預測準確度的提升
》顧客服務水準的提高
》缺貨率的降低
》存貨水準的降低
》較佳的財務資金結構
24
Contracts to Coordinate Supply Chain Costs
► Differences in costs at the buyer and supplier can lead to
decisions that increase total supply chain costs
》 Example: Replenishment order size placed by the buyer. The
buyer’s EOQ does not take into account the supplier’s costs.
► A quantity discount contract may encourage the buyer to
purchase a larger quantity (which would be lower costs for the
supplier), which would result in lower total supply chain costs
but higher inventory levels and lot sizes
► Quantity discounts lead to information distortion because of
order batching
25
Contracts to Increase Agent Effort
► There are many instances in a supply chain where an agent
acts on the behalf of a principal and the agent’s actions affect
the reward for the principal
》 Example: A car dealer who sells the cars of a manufacturer, as
well as those of other manufacturers
》 Examples of contracts to increase agent effort include two-part
tariffs (a franchise fee and sell product at cost) and threshold
contracts (increasing margin to dealer for higher threshold)
► Threshold contracts increase information distortion, however.
One way to offer threshold incentives over a rolling horizon.
26
本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊，依據Microsoft
服務合約及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。
Contracts to Induce Performance
Improvement
► A buyer may want performance improvement from a supplier
who otherwise would have little incentive to do so
► A shared savings contract provides the supplier with
a fraction of the savings that result from the performance
improvement such as lead time, quality
► Particularly effective where the benefit from improvement
accrues primarily to the buyer, but where the effort for the
improvement comes primarily from the supplier
27
版權聲明
頁碼
28
作品
授權條件
作者/來源
2
Geograph，作者：Basher Eyre。(http://www.geograph.org.uk/photo/834743) ，
瀏覽日期：2012/02/24。該網站採取創用CC「姓名標示－相同方式分享」
2.0版授權釋出。
9
本作品轉載自WIKIPEDIA
(http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Dell_Logo.png)，瀏覽日期
2012/03/02。
18
本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊，依據Microsoft服務合約
及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。
18
本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊，依據Microsoft服務合約
及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。
18
本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊，依據Microsoft服務合約
及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。
18
本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊，依據Microsoft服務合約
及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。
19
本作品轉載自 http://www.vics.org/docs/committees/cpfr/CPFR_Overview_USA4.pdf (頁11) ，瀏覽日期2012/03/23。依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理
使用。
版權聲明
頁碼
26
29
作品
授權條件
作者/來源
本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊，依據Microsoft服務合約
及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。