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Transcript
Regulation of Externalities
Market Efficiency & Market Failure
• Efficiency
– All goods worth more than they cost to produce get
produced (No DWL)
– No goods worth less than they cost to produce get
produced (No DWL)
– Aggregate well-being is maximized
• Why do we like free markets?
– In general, free markets produce efficient outcomes
– Interventions such as price controls, quantity limits,
minimum wages, cause DWL
• But – Under some circumstances, unfettered
markets fail to produce “best” outcomes
– Market Failures
Externalities
• Negative: Production or consumption of a
product harms others
– Pollution
– Loud Noise
– Blocked view
• Positive: Production or consumption of a
product benefit others
– Planting flowers
– Painting house
• Analytical Representation
– Why do externalities create DWL?
What’s the Inefficiency?
• With Negative Externalities, market quantity is
higher than social optimum and price is too low
Negative Externalities
S’=SMC
$
S=MC
PEfficient
PMarket
DWL
Demand
Q (Gallons of Gasoline)
QEfficient
QMarket
Solutions to Externality Problem
Traditional Economics Approach
• Negative externalities should be taxed
• Positive externalities should be subsidized
• Goal -Make market demand & supply
match “real” demand & supply
• Examples: Oil refinery, House Painting
Solutions to Externality Problems
Traditional Approach
• Taxes shift the supply curve. A per-unit tax equal to the
negative externality will align the market and social
marginal cost curves.
Negative Externalities with Taxes
STax = S’
$
S
PTax
Demand
QTax
Q (Gallons of Gasoline)
• Why is it hard to “correct” externalities with taxes?
• How can we measure the effect of externalities?
– Planting Trees, Oil Refinery, Logging?
New View of Externalities
Reciprocity & the Coase Theorem
• Ronald Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost”,
Journal of Law & Economics, 1960
• Suppose a candy maker works next to a doctor
– Candy maker produces a negative externality (noise)
– Noise harms doctors business
• Old view: Noise is bad, factory must be
restrained with rules or taxes
• Coase view: Allowing noise harms doctor, but
stopping noise harms factory
• Key insight -- may be more efficient to stop
doctor than to stop noise
Examples
• Case 1:
– Candy maker earns $40/hr from operating
– Doctor loses $60/hr when candy maker operates
• Case 2:
– Candy maker earns $60/hr from operating
– Doctor loses $40/hr when candy maker operates
• What is the efficient outcome in each case?
• What outcomes do markets produce?
– Liability for Noise Damage
– No Liability for Noise Damage
Examples, Continued
• Now suppose that the candy maker can
install soundproofing at a cost of $20.00
– What is the efficient outcome?
– What does the market produce in each case?
• Liability for Noise Damage
• No Liability for Noise Damage
The Coase Theorem
• When parties affected by externalities can
negotiate costlessly with each other and
property rights are clear, the efficient
outcome occurs regardless of who has
property rights.
New Solutions to Externality Problems
• When does the free market work best?
– Clear Property Rights
– Easy Bargaining
• How should we assign property rights?
– Cost of Compliance: Eg: Soundproofing
– Zoning
• Examples:
–
–
–
–
Airspace Rights
CO2 Emissions
Second-Hand Smoke
Chernobyl Reactors
• When are taxes & subsidies still the best option?
Transferable Air Rights
• Japan
– Construction boom in 1960’s caused disputes between builders &
homeowners
– Local law assigned rights specifying minimum sunlight a builder
had to provide to neighbors
– To construct a building that would block sunlight, builder needed
unanimous consent from neighbors.
– Sunshine rights were exclusive and divestible
• New York
–
–
–
–
Early 1900’s skyscraper boom affects neighboring property
Building Codes: 1916 -- setbacks, 1962 -- FAR’s
NYC proposes transferable air rights in 1980’s
Incentive for historic preservation (Trump Tower & Tiffany & Co.)
• Questions
– How does assignment of rights differ in NY & Japan?
– How do outcomes differ?
– LA & DC have height limits. How do outcomes compare?