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The role of political and economic factors in
Thailand's last two coups d' etat
Vrooman, Roger R.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/3220
NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA
THESIS
THE ROLE OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS
IN THAILAND’S LAST TWO COUPS D’ ETAT
by
Roger Vrooman
September 2007
Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:
Michael Malley
Robert Looney
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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: The Role of Political and Economic Factors in
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Thailand’s Last Two Coups D’ Etat
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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
Thailand has experienced numerous coups. The last two Thai coups (1991 and 2006) were against popularly
elected prime ministers. This thesis proposes and tests six hypotheses as the basis for each coup. The six hypotheses
are split evenly between three political and three economic hypotheses. After the case study of each coup, the last
chapter examines similarities and differences between the two coups. In the case of this thesis, the trend of the
political factors to cause political instability was supported. Although economic factors fluctuated, or in the case of
income inequality remained relatively constant, the three economic factors were not found as contributing to
Thailand’s political instability. Therefore, no combination of any of the six hypotheses tested was substantial enough
to be labeled as the cause of either coup.
14. SUBJECT TERMS Coup, Coup d’etat, Thai politics, Thai economics, Thai political parties.
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99
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
THE ROLE OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS IN THAILAND’S
LAST TWO COUPS D’ ETAT
Roger R. Vrooman
Major, United States Air Force
B.S., Troy State University, 1993
M.S., Southern Methodist University, 1999
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 2007
Author:
Roger Vrooman
Approved by:
Michael Malley, Ph.D.
Thesis Advisor
Robert Looney, Ph.D.
Second Reader
Douglas Porch, Ph.D.
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs
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ABSTRACT
Thailand has experienced numerous coups. The last two Thai coups (1991 and
2006) were against popularly elected prime ministers. This thesis proposes and tests six
hypotheses as the basis for each coup. The six hypotheses are split evenly between three
political and three economic hypotheses. After the case study of each coup, the last
chapter examines similarities and differences between the two coups. In the case of this
thesis, the trend of the political factors to cause political instability was supported.
Although economic factors fluctuated, or in the case of income inequality remained
relatively constant, the three economic factors were not found as contributing to
Thailand’s political instability. Therefore, no combination of any of the six hypotheses
tested was substantial enough to be labeled as the cause of either coup.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1
A.
PURPOSE.........................................................................................................1
B.
IMPORTANCE................................................................................................2
C.
LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................4
1.
Hypothesis I ..........................................................................................5
2.
Hypothesis II ........................................................................................6
3.
Hypothesis III .......................................................................................7
4.
Hypothesis IV .......................................................................................8
5.
Hypothesis V.........................................................................................9
6.
Hypothesis VI .....................................................................................10
D.
METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................11
II.
THAILAND COUP D’ETAT OF FEBRUARY 23, 1991 CASE STUDY.............13
A.
BACKGROUND ............................................................................................13
B.
POLITICAL FACTORS ...............................................................................14
1.
Political Participation ........................................................................14
2.
Foreign Influence ...............................................................................20
3.
Electoral Process ................................................................................21
C.
ECONOMIC FACTORS...............................................................................25
1.
Gross Domestic Product Performance.............................................25
2.
Income Inequality Performance .......................................................29
3.
Export-based Product Performance ................................................33
D.
CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................37
III.
THAILAND COUP D’ETAT OF SEPTEMBER 19, 2006 CASE STUDY ..........39
A.
BACKGROUND ............................................................................................39
B.
POLITICAL FACTORS ...............................................................................41
1.
Political Participation ........................................................................43
2.
Foreign Influence ...............................................................................49
3.
Electoral Process ................................................................................50
C.
ECONOMIC FACTORS...............................................................................54
1.
Gross Domestic Product Performance.............................................54
2.
Income Inequality Performance .......................................................57
3.
Export-based Product Performance ................................................59
D.
CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................65
IV.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS .........................................................................67
A.
INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................67
B.
HYPOTHESES ..............................................................................................67
1.
Hypothesis I ........................................................................................67
2.
Hypothesis II ......................................................................................68
3.
Hypothesis III .....................................................................................69
4.
Hypothesis IV .....................................................................................69
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C.
5.
Hypothesis V.......................................................................................70
6.
Hypothesis VI .....................................................................................71
CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................71
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................73
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................83
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 3
Figure 4
Figure 5
Figure 6
Figure 7
Figure 8
Figure 9
Figure 10
Figure 11
Figure 12
Figure 13
Figure 14
Thailand’s Gross Domestic Product (1985 – 1990).........................................26
Thailand’s Per Capita GDP (1980 – 1990) ......................................................28
Thailand’s Income/Consumption by Deciles (Percentage)..............................30
Thailand’s Gini Coefficient (1981-1992) ........................................................32
Thailand’s Total Exports (1985 – 1990)..........................................................34
Thai Exports by Sector (1983-1990)................................................................35
Thailand’s Exports versus Foreign Direct Investment (1985 – 1990).............36
Thailand’s Gross Domestic Product (2000 – 2005).........................................55
Thailand’s Per Capita GDP (1995-2005).........................................................56
Thailand’s Income/Consumption Share by Deciles (Percentage) ...................57
Thailand’s Gini Coefficient (1994 – 2002)......................................................58
Thailand’s Total Exports (2000 – 2005)..........................................................60
Thai Exports by Sector (1997-2006)................................................................63
Thailand’s Exports versus Foreign Direct Investment (2000-2005)................65
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1
Table 2
Table 3
Table 4
Table 5
Table 6
Table 7
Table 8
Table 9
Thailand’s Prime Minister Succession (1973 – 1988).....................................13
Election Results by Party, 1975 - 1988............................................................18
Thailand Parliamentary Elections (1975 – 1988) ............................................19
Thailand’s GDP Growth, Savings and Investment (1985 – 1990) ..................27
Thailand’s Prime Minister Succession (1988 – 2006).....................................41
Election Results by Party, 1992-1996..............................................................45
Thailand Election Results by Party, 2001........................................................46
Thailand Election Results by Party, 2005........................................................46
Thailand Parliamentary Elections (1992 – 2001) ............................................47
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank Dr. Tuong Vu and Dr. Michael Malley, my Thesis CoAdvisors, for their guidance, patience and assistance. Without their tireless devotion in
guiding me through this research, this project could not have been completed on time and
the quality of the product would not have been as polished. Very special thanks goes to
Dr. Robert Looney for taking over second reader duties, on very short notice, due to Dr.
Vu departing NPS. In addition, I would like to thank Professor Lawson (Research
Methods, NS2011) and Professor Conge (Research Colloquium, NS4080) for their expert
instruction. These two professors ensured I started with the right tools and frame of
mind. Besides the professional staff at the Naval Postgraduate School, I would like to
thank my wife, Thatsaphon, my daughters, Megan and Rachel, and my son, Fame for
their patience and support during this entire process. Finally, I would like to thank my
mom, Mary and good family friend, Judy Wise for the hours of proof reading they
graciously donated to me.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
The armed forces have three massive political advantages over civilian
organizations: a marked superiority in organization, a highly
emotionalized symbolic status, and a monopoly of arms. They form a
prestigious corporation or Order, enjoying overwhelming superiority in
the means of applying force. The wonder, therefore, is not why this rebels
against its civilian masters, but why it ever obeys them.1
S. E. Finer
A.
PURPOSE
In the aftermath of World War II, the number of independent countries in the
world has increased rapidly. When the United Nations (UN) Conference was held at San
Francisco, CA in 1945, 50 countries signed the charter; today, the UN has a membership
totaling 192 countries. Just 20 years ago, it was documented that half of the UN’s
sovereign nations have experienced an unconstitutional overthrow of their existing
governments at some point in their history.2 Thailand, unfortunately, has had a storied
history of coups, and at the present count has witnessed 18 coups since 1932. In most
cases, coup-makers claimed their actions were necessary to remove “overly corrupt”
political officials. The purpose of this thesis is to examine different hypotheses about the
political and economic factors that may have contributed to Thailand’s last two coups d’
etat, one in 1991 and the other in 2006. The argument of this thesis is that Thai military
leaders use “corruption” as a means to gain public support for their takeover, but the real
1 S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, (Boulder, CO: Printer
Publishers, 1988), 5.
2 Gregor Ferguson, COUP D’ETAT: A Practical Manual (Poole, Dorset: Arms and Armour Press;
New York, NY: Distributed in the USA by Sterling Publishing Company, 1987), 11.
1
explanation for an abundance of coups in Thailand is that the development of democratic
political institutions has lagged behind the development of the military as a political actor
in its own right.3
B.
IMPORTANCE
At this critical juncture in Thai politics, it is more important than ever to
understand what motivated Thai military leaders to oust the political leadership and to
identify measures that can be adopted to prevent future occurrences. Since the Thai
military coup of 1991 to oust Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhawan,4 Thailand’s
political and constitutional reforms had seemingly produced a stabilizing effect on the
government, and the Thai nation was eagerly awaiting a national election scheduled for
November 2006. It appeared Thai democracy was evolving and strengthening; even as
“late as July 2006, few analysts foresaw Thailand’s political situation deteriorating into a
coup d’ etat.”5 However, on 19 September 2006, the Thai military launched a successful,
bloodless coup against Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai party.
The significance of these last two coups was that for the first time in its short democratic
history, Thailand’s last two coups were targeted at popularly elected civilian prime
ministers.6
The current instability in Thailand’s political and economic environment casts
uncertainty over the United States’ priorities in the region. It is unfortunate because
Thailand and the United States have enjoyed strong, bilateral political and security
3 Thailand’s absolute monarchy was overthrown in 1932, and the next 41 years (1932 -1973) can be
best described as military dictatorship. The era of democratization began in 1973, when student-led
demonstrations forced the military government of General Thanom to resign and led to a “permanent”
constitution. While strides have been made in the last 34 years, Thailand does need more time to fully
develop its political and economic institutions. In my opinion, it could take several more decades for these
institutions to mature. For a further discussion on these events see: Jim LoGerfo and Daniel King,
"Thailand: Toward Democratic Stability," Journal of Democracy 7, no. 1, 1996, 102-117.
4 Also spelled Choonhavan in some literature. The first time a Thai name is used, it will be in the
form of first name and last name. Each subsequent time, only the first name, which is common in Thai
culture, will be used.
5 Colum Murphy, "For King and Country?" Wall Street Journal, September 21, 2006, Eastern Edition.
6 Even though Chatichai was previously in the military and held the rank of Major General, he was a
civilian businessman representing the Chart Thai political party when elected in 1988.
2
relationships since 1945. Among the 10 member countries of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),7 Thailand was one of the more politically stable and
economically dynamic countries in the region before the September 2006 military coup.
As one of the founding members of ASEAN, Thailand was a stabilizing presence and a
leader on many initiatives within the alliance. In addition, a strong ASEAN alliance is of
vital importance to the U.S. to ensure the balance of power within the Asian region
remains in check.8 Furthermore, it has always been an ASEAN goal to prevent any
power not in the ASEAN alliance from acquiring undue influence on a member country
or the region as a whole.9 The stability and status of ASEAN may now be in jeopardy in
light of Thailand’s current political struggles.10
In addition, Thailand is an important Asian partner in the war on terror and a
significant trade partner of the United States. Since the coup, terrorism has hit Bangkok
hard with the deaths of three individuals from a 31 December 2006 bombing. Little to no
progress has been made to slow down the insurgency in the southern provinces of
Thailand while the Thai currency has been appreciating with cases of severe fluctuations
adversely affecting the export market.11 The United States was poised to enter into a
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Thailand in 2006. “Following the coup (2006), U.S.
officials said that the FTA could not go forward without a return to democratic rule (in
Thailand). Although studies indicate a U.S.-Thailand FTA would increase trade and
investment for both countries and yield a net benefit for Thailand, negotiations must
address a list of challenging issues to reach a successful conclusion. Economic relations
with the United States are central to Thailand’s outward looking economic strategy. In
7 As of 8 April 2007, ASEAN is comprised of the following 10 member countries: Brunei Darussalam,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. For more
information about when these countries joined ASEAN see http://www.aseansec.org/4736.htm (accessed
April 8, 2007).
8 A strong ASEAN alliance is important for balancing power between East Asia’s main power
centers—China and Japan along with South Asia’s major power, India.
9 Amitav Acharya, "Will Asia's Past be its Future?" International Security 28, no. 3 (2004), 153.
10 Prime Minister Thaksin was poised to provide crucial leadership within ASEAN and push for
increased economic integration within the region. This may be in jeopardy now due to the coup.
11 For an article on a Garment Firm closing due to baht fluctuations affecting the export market see,
"Bangkok Post : Business News." http://www.bangkokpost.com/Business/10Aug2007_biz43.php.
(accessed August 11, 2007).
3
2005, the United States was Thailand’s second largest export market and its fifth largest
supplier of imports.”12
Because the United States has declared it will not renew
negotiations on the U.S.-Thailand FTA until democracy is restored, the future of U.S.Thai relations will likely depend on how quickly the political situation is resolved.13
Southeast Asian political stability is important because of U.S. strategic and
economic interests. One of the primary objectives of the United States National Security
Strategy is to foster transformational diplomacy and effective democracy.14 In addition,
the prevalence of coups in Thailand provides an ample opportunity to analyze the factors
leading to the overthrow of a government. This research will contribute in the analysis of
modern coup theory by assessing whether political and/or economic factors led to each
coup or political instability.
C.
LITERATURE REVIEW
An analysis of the theoretical framework on coup theory will assist in formulating
several hypotheses about which political and economic factors put a country at risk for a
coup.
It is commonly accepted that Luttwak, Huntington, Nordlinger, and Finer
produced the benchmark works on coups.15
In basic theoretical studies on coups,
Luttwak,16 Huntington,17 Nordlinger18 and Finer19 explained that both political and
economic factors provided powerful motives for the initiation of a coup. While each
author acknowledges the economic side, each focused primarily on political factors.
12 Emma Chanlett-Avery, “Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations,” CRS Report for Congress
(Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress), January 11, 2007, 12.
13 Ibid., 1.
14 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, DC: Office of the
President, March 2006, 33.
15 Steven R. David, Third World Coup d’Etat and International Security (Baltimore, MD: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1987), 171; Ferguson, 12.
16 Edward Luttwak, Coup d’Etat: A Practical Handbook (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1979).
17 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1968).
18 Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, 1977).
19 Finer.
4
Drawing from these works, this research will analyze and test six hypotheses (three
political and three economic) against factors and conditions leading up to Thailand’s last
two coups. The six hypotheses are as follows:
1.
Hypothesis I
Thailand’s last two coups were caused by a combination of a low level of political
participation and a weak multiparty political system.20 Huntington argues, “a low level
of participation also tends to weaken political parties vis-à-vis other political institutions
and social forces.”21 Specifically about Thailand circa 1968, Huntington stated:
In Thailand, the parties, when they exist, have little or no extraparliamentary organization. In general, each member must get elected
through his own efforts in his own province. Party labels are incidental.
Parties have never represented substantial social forces, but only cliques
and individuals within the top level of the ruling class.22
McCargo made the same point for contemporary Thai political parties:
Whilst traditional elites “accommodated” other actors by allowing them to
participate in electoral politics, the scope for free and fair electoral
contestation was very limited.23
Not much has changed from 1968. In order for political participation to increase,
there must be a stable political party system in place to articulate and aggregate societal
interests. Thailand currently has 12 political parties with the oldest one existing for 25
years and the newest one being just nine years old.24 So Thailand can certainly be
classified as a multiparty system today, but what was the situation before the coups in
1991 and 2006? Hicken elaborates on issues affecting the multiparty system in Thailand
from 1978 to 2001:
20 Huntington, 397-461.
21 Ibid., 402.
22 Ibid., 413-414.
23 Duncan McCargo, "Security, Development and Political Participation in Thailand: Alternative
Currencies of Legitimacy," 59.
24 Thai National Assembly, Available online. http://www.parliament.go.th/files/politi/d02.htm,
(accessed April 1, 2007).
5
In the seven elections between 1983 and 1996, an average of fifteen
parties competed in each election, twelve of which succeeded in winning
at least one seat in the House of Representatives. The average size of the
government coalition organized from those twelve legislative parties was
5.3. These larger multiparty coalition governments were notoriously
short-lived—between 1978 and 2001 the average duration of government
cabinets was just over eighteen months.25
This can pose a problem as Huntington argued that the likelihood of a coup doubles with
a multiparty system, like Thailand’s, versus those with a single party, dominant party or
two party systems.26 In order for a multiparty system to survive, it must be a strong
system that can only exist with a high level of mobilization, political participation,
willingness to compromise and the ability to adapt to changing situations.27 This thesis
will argue that none of these conditions existed within the Thai political system and that
this hypothesis will be judged as a factor that led to political instability.
2.
Hypothesis II
Thailand’s last two coups were caused, in part, by the weakness of global and
regional powers’ influence over Thailand’s internal political environment. According to
Luttwak, the level of support a country receives from international partners affects the
probability of a coup attempt.
A state must be substantially independent from the
international community, Luttwak claims, for a coup to have any chance of success.28 If
the state is substantially dependent on a foreign nation for its national security, coup
actors will need to gain the support for the coup from the foreign power. Coup-prone
countries need to balance their independence and interdependence amongst their global
and regional allies in order to maintain political and economic stability. In addition,
Luttwak warns that one should not underestimate the importance of support from
international partners for domestic political reform policies and the impact cooperation
25 Allen Hicken, "Party Fabrication: Constitutional Reform and the Rise of Thai Rak Thai," 388.
26 Huntington, 422-423.
27 Huntington, 424.
28 Luttwak, 43-45.
6
with neighboring nations can have on regional and international affairs.29 Both have an
enormous impact on political stability and can help deter the coup plotters.
An even
larger deterrent is foreign troop presence within the country. While an argument could be
made that the foreign powers may not wish to interfere in the host country’s political
scene, a large contingent of foreign combat troops would provide a significant obstacle
and risk for coup planners.30 Except for a few multinational exercises during each
calendar year, foreign troop presence in Thailand is minimal. This research will show
that there is not an overabundance of foreign influence over Thai politics and this
hypothesis will be confirmed.
3.
Hypothesis III
Thailand’s electoral process fostered political instability to the point of causing
the 1991 and 2006 coups.31 Was Thailand’s ever evolving electoral system leading to
political instability? Croissant states that to examine the political consequences of a
nation’s electoral system, “three functional demands can be discerned – representation,
integration and decision.”32 Croissant continued by defining each of the previous three
terms and listed questions to ask about each of the three categories:
First, elections ought to represent the people, i.e. the political will of the
voters. Therefore it is necessary that the electoral system is sufficiently
proportional to achieve an adequate conversion of the wide range of
pluralistic social interests into political mandates. The question is: do
electoral systems promote the representativeness of the elected
institutions?
Second, elections ought to integrate the people. An electoral system
which accomplishes successful integration is one that stimulates the
emergence of cohesive parties. It then contributes to integration in
parliament and does not merely produce individual and isolated
representatives. The question is: do electoral systems promote the
development of a well institutionalized party system?
29 Luttwak, 43-45.
30 Rosemary H.T. O’Kane, The Likelihood of Coup (Brookfield, VT: Gower Publishing Company,
1987), 86.
31 Aurel Croissant, “Electoral Politics in Southeast and East Asia: A Comparative Perspective.”
32 Ibid., 328.
7
Third, elections have to generate majorities large enough to ensure the
stability of government and its ability to govern. The question is: do
electoral systems promote the governability of the democratic system?33
Taking these questions into account, political instability should arise if 1) an elected
government that is not representative, 2) a party system that is not institutionalized or
cohesive, or 3) the majority produced is insufficient to govern effectively.34 This thesis
will contend that Thailand’s political organizations and procedures lack the strength
needed to prevent coups from happening.35 After this research is completed, I expect to
conclude that political factors are the underlying causes of political instability within
Thailand, and although instability itself did not cause either coup, it does seem to have
given the Thai military leaders the opportunity to launch each coup.
4.
Hypothesis IV
Thailand’s last two coups were caused by a decline in Thailand’s Gross Domestic
Product (GDP). Nordlinger offers this on economic downturns:
A government’s economic record is a critical performance criterion since
economic growth is highly valued the world over and all governments are
held at least partly responsible for the country’s economic health. Even
when the actual cause of a downturn is beyond government control the
incumbents are often blamed. And since virtually all governments
publicly assert their commitment to economic growth, the economic
record takes on further significance as criterion of governmental
performance.36
An economic downturn usually has adverse consequences on the population’s
incomes and salaries, and may persuade the military to intervene.37 Nordlinger goes on
33 Croissant, 328-329.
34 The party system data will be pulled from hypothesis I which studies Thailand’s political parties.
35 The strength of political organizations and procedures can be defined by the scope of support and
level of institutionalization. If only a small, upper-class group is involved in political organizations, the
scope is severely limited. To reach moderate institutionalization, political organizations and procedures
must be adaptable, complex, autonomous and coherent. For a more detailed discussion, see: Huntington,
12-32.
36 Nordlinger, 88.
37Ibid., 89.
8
to add, “Intervention against governments during periods of economic decline,
stagnation, or inflation is more common than at times of economic good health.”38 This
research will show that Thailand’s economy was not in decline or stagnating. To the
contrary, Thailand’s economy was growing up to the time of the two coups, and inflation
only came into the picture after the military had seized the government.
5.
Hypothesis V
Deterioration in Thailand’s income inequality, which reflected an increased
disparity between the rich and the poor, contributed to Thailand’s last two coups.39
Huntington argues that economic inequality is an important source of political instability,
declaring that:
Economic development increases economic inequality at the same time
that social mobilization decreases the legitimacy of that inequality. Both
aspects of modernization combine to produce political instability.40
There is no doubt that Thailand should be classified as a modernizing country in
the years just before both coups.41 On the other hand, if Thailand’s overall economy is
found to be expanding prior to the coups, but the income inequality gap is widening, it
may imply that the masses (majority) are not enjoying the benefits of growth and do not
have the means to participate in political institutions.
This can lead to political
instability, which is only a short step away from a coup. Luttwak argued:
38 Nordlinger, 89.
39 The income inequality gap is defined as the measure of relative income gains or losses between the
top and bottom 20 percent of the income bracket for Thailand. For instance, if the top 20 percent (the rich)
enjoyed a 33 percent rise in income during a five-year period, and during the same time period, the bottom
20 percent (the poor) only gained 11 percent, the gap will be assessed as widening/increasing (the rich get
richer and the poor get poorer, relatively speaking). The Gini coefficient and per capita GDP will also be
used to examine the income inequality gap. See Nordlinger, 58.
40 Huntington, 58-59.
41 Classified as a developing country by the World Bank,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20421402~pagePK:
64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html#East_Asia_and_Pacific; classified as a lowermiddle income developing country by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/9/2488552.pdf.
9
The city-dweller has escaped the crushing embrace of traditional society,
but not the effects of ignorance and insecurity. In these conditions the
mass of the people is politically passive and its relationship is one-way
only. The leadership speaks to them, lectures them, rouses hopes or fears,
but never listens; the bureaucracy taxes them, bullies them, takes their
sons away for the army, their labour for the roads, but gives very little in
return.42
Not only are the peasants in the country living in poverty, but city-dwellers cannot seem
to escape the poverty trap. This thesis will contend that income inequality in Thailand
was relatively stable and did not lead to political instability.
6.
Hypothesis VI
Thailand’s last two coups were caused by a downturn in its export-based
economic sector, which created economic instability that undermined political stability.43
O’Kane, the leading proponent of the hypothesis that coups are caused by economic
factors, contended that a large downturn in export-based economic conditions will
generate instability in the local economy, discredit the government and lead to a coup.44
O’Kane contended that economic performance was an important responsibility of the
government and was no easy task because export prices are determined on the global
market which cannot be controlled or influenced by any one government or country. A
severe downward trend in an export-based market can have catastrophic effects on
government planning and generate widespread dissatisfaction among key groups.45
While O’Kane praised Luttwak for digging below the surface and offering explicit
explanations for coups, she pointed out that he does not establish any causal connections
between his pre-conditions and coups.46 O’Kane does not fault him for this, as it was not
Luttwak’s intention. O’Kane argued the problem with the Luttwak approach was that it
42 Luttwak, 43-47.
43 O’Kane, 61.
44 O’Kane.
45 While an argument could be made that severe fluctuations either upward or downward can wreak
havoc on government planning, this research will focus on downward fluctuations. See O’Kane, 53.
46 O’Kane, 19.
10
assumed there was always a cadre eager to stage coups, and that groups should aim to
take the legal avenue of standing for election.47 This research will show that no severe
fluctuations or drops in Thailand’s export-based economy preceded the 1991 or 2006
coups. I expect this factor to be irrelevant to the Thai cases.
D.
METHODOLOGY
This thesis will use the comparative case study methodology and test all six
hypotheses to determine if any of the factors led to the latest two coups in Thailand’s
history (1991 and 2006). Some subjectivity will have to be used to judge the three
political factors and thus will make this category the most difficult to evaluate.
Economic factors provide a more objective view than the political factors. For each
economic factor, the previous 5 years of data (at a minimum) will be reviewed to identify
trends.48 If an economic factor were to sharply decline leading up to either coup, it will
be judged as a factor leading to the coup.
After completing the research on both political and economic factors, the results
will be analyzed to determine similarities, differences, and correlations between the two
coups. These factors were selected based upon the literature describing coup motives and
opportunities.
Important primary sources used will include interviews with Thai nationals and
personal experiences. Secondary sources will be predominantly used in this thesis.
Scholarly books, trade journals and periodicals will be used when proving claims in the
1991 coup.
Although there hasn’t been sufficient time for scholarly books to be
published on the Thai coup of 2006, there are numerous works in periodicals and
journals. Other secondary sources including Congressional Research Service (CRS) and
47 O’Kane, 19.
48 For the 1991 coup (1986-1990) and the 2006 coup (2001-2005). The literature doesn’t specify a
certain time frame to study. Case studies described used differing measurements (most were in the 3-4 year
range). Because the literature doesn’t give a set time period to measure, I chose the 5 year time period to
give an adequate analysis period leading up to each coup. Five years of data is a long enough period to
determine if any trends were taking place.
11
Thai media, i.e., Bangkok Post and The Nation (Bangkok) will be used. Thailand’s
political and economic data will be obtained from the World Bank, World Trade
Organization, the United Nations and the Human Development Reports.
12
II.
A.
THAILAND COUP D’ETAT OF FEBRUARY 23, 1991 CASE
STUDY
BACKGROUND
Since the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932, Thailand has been
characterized by a struggle for political stability. The coup against Prime Minister
Chatichai Choonhawan on February 23, 1991, was the seventeenth since the formation of
the constitutional monarchy in 1932.49 Since the period between 1932 and 1973 can be
characterized as being ruled primarily by military dictatorships, Table 1 depicts the 15
years leading to Chatichai’s election as prime minister.50 Additionally, Thailand’s first
chance to attempt democracy after the fall of complete military control of the government
was in 1973.51
PRIME MINISTER
YEARS IN OFFICE
REASON LEFT OFFICE
Mr. Sanya Dharmasakti
Oct 1973 – Feb 1975
General Election
Maj Gen M.R. Kukrit Pramoi
Mar 1975 – Apr 1976
PD/General Election52
M.R. Seni Pramoj
Apr 1976 – Oct 1976
Coup d’Etat
Mr. Tanin Kraivixien
Oct 1976 – Oct 1977
Coup d’Etat
General Kriangsak Chomanan
Nov 1977 – Mar 1980
Resignation
General Prem Tinsulanonda
Mar 1980 – Aug 1988
PD x3/General Election
Table 1
Thailand’s Prime Minister Succession (1973 – 1988)53
49 Chanlett-Avery, 1.
50 Chanlett-Avery describes military dictatorships being in control of Thailand from 1932 until the
early 1990s with brief periods of democracy in the 1970s and 1980s. With the election of Mr. Dharmasakti
in 1973, it was the infant beginnings of democracy in Thailand. See Chanlett-Avery, 6.
51 Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "State and Society in Thailand: How Fragile the Democracy?" Asian
Survey 33, no. 9 (Sep., 1993), 882.
52 PD = Parliament Dissolution.
53 See The Secretariat of the Cabinet, Royal Thai Government website,
http://www.cabinet.thaigov.go.th/eng/bb_main21.htm. (accessed May 11, 2007).
13
After the general election in 1973, Thailand witnessed two coups d’etat, a
resignation and three parliament dissolutions. This was business as usual in Thailand
with political regime change happening every couple of years. So it could be surmised
that after the general election of Prime Minister Choonhawan in 1988, he would be
leaving office one way or another in a couple of years.54 In fact, Chatichai’s term lasted
about two and a half years (August 1988 – February 1991). What led military leaders to
stage and execute a coup against Chatichai? The Thai military and opposition leaders
claimed corruption as a basis for the coup, but was that really the cause? Can this coup
can be explained by political and economic factors leading up to the junta seizing
control.55
B.
POLITICAL FACTORS
While exploring the impact of political participation, foreign influence, and the
electoral system, we should remember that Thailand had limited experience with
democracy prior to the coup of 1991. Up until that point, Thailand only had a
parliamentary-styled government since 1932.
1.
Political Participation
In modernizing states one-party systems tend to be more stable than
pluralistic party systems. Modernizing states with multiparty systems are,
for instance, much more prone to military intervention than modernizing
states with one party, with one dominant party, or with two parties.56
Can the coup against the Chatichai government be explained by a combination of
a low level of political participation and a weak multiparty political system as described
by Huntington?57 First, an examination of political party weaknesses will show a very
54 The most likely avenue to leave office would be through a parliament dissolution followed by a
general election. Being forced from office did not necessarily have to be as a result of a coup.
55 Corruption, or the West’s definition of corruption, is inherent in Thailand’s culture. Gifts of money,
Sin Nam Jai in Thai, are often given (and are expected to be given) to administrators, bureaucrats and
politicians. This can be called “greasing the wheel” or be used as a way of saying, “thanks for giving me
your attention.”
56 Huntington, 422.
57 Huntington, 397-461.
14
high number of parties gained cabinet seats and the severe fragmentation within the party
structure. Then, an assessment on the rise of the business elites within political parties
will display a shift in the composition and focus of parliament.
For political
participation, a review of election statistics focusing on political party support will reveal
that a very high percentage of Thai voters did cast ballots. After reviewing the election
statistics, an exploration of Thai citizens’ political rights and civil liberties should reveal
that Thailand constrained some rights and liberties of its populace which adversely
affected political participation.
Indicators of political party system weakness were splitting candidates between
parties and candidates switching affiliations after elections so they could be appointed to
Senate seats. Chambers added:
Yet, for the most part, Thai parties have been mere legal shells that
political power groups—factions—have switched into and out of with
great regularity, looking for the best deal (e.g., “expense” payments and
cabinet portfolios). This fragmented multiparty system ranks very high
among parliamentary democracies around the world. Indeed, among
eleven Asian democracies, Aurel Croissant found Thailand to have the
highest effective number of parties. The multitude of parties contributed
to coalition instability.58
Although the effective number of political parties has declined over the past five
elections leading up to the coup, there was still an “overabundance of political parties.”59
The effective number of parliamentary parties (by seats) in the last five elections was:
8.07 (1979), 5.6 (1983, before merger), 3.9 (1983, after merger), 6.1 (1986), and 7.8
(1988).60 After a brief attempt to merge parties in 1983, the number of political parties
doubled by the Chatichai election. “While there is very little agreement about what the
optimum number of parties should be, or just how many parties is too many, there was
58 Paul W. Chambers, "Evolving Toward What? Parties, Factions, and Coalition Behavior in Thailand
Today,” 497.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
15
widespread concern among Thai reformers that the larger number of parties had
undermined effective governance and contributed to short-lived governments.”61
The business elite started to take an interest in political office once Thai
democracy started taking root after a student uprising overthrew a military government in
1973.62 Since then, the struggle for political power has been waged between the business
elites and the military leaders, and has been cyclical. Englehart added:
In the late 1980s, this “demi-democracy” evolved into short-lived full
democracy when Prem resigned, and was replaced by Chatichai.
Chatichai was an elected member of parliament and the head of a political
party that formed a coalition government. Some members of his cabinet
were poorly educated rural politicians who could deliver votes but were
perceived by urban middle-class voters as entering government solely for
to make money through kickbacks, influence-peddling, and other forms of
corruption.63
The percentage of seats in the Thai Assembly occupied by business elites rose from 35
percent (93/269) in 1975 to 68 percent (243/357) in the 1988 election. The enormous
financial benefits derived from political power drove business elites to seek political
office. As an example, two local businessmen, Wichai Prasanmit and Suwat Liptapanlop
from Khorat successfully organized local elections and managed to help with Chatichai’s
election as prime minister.
Chatichai immediately hired Suwat to his cabinet and
installed Wichai to the Senate. With their new positions they were able to focus funding
of projects to their home province in Khorat. These projects included a major highway
project and private industrial real estate project, from which both Suwat and Wichai made
huge fortunes. Later they campaigned in their province and boasted about their success
in bringing investments into the area.64 These were the type of projects the military
leaders might have used as examples of corruption when they were tired of the business
elites running the country. McCargo expanded on the competing elites:
61 Allen Hicken, "Party Fabrication: Constitutional Reform and the Rise of Thai Rak Thai," 388.
62 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Christopher John Baker, Thailand, Economy and Politics, (Oxford, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2002), 314.
63 Neil A. Englehart, "Democracy and the Thai Middle Class: Globalization, Modernization, and
Constitutional Change," Asian Survey 43, no. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2003), 256.
64 Phongpaichit and Baker, 355-356.
16
While the rise of the business sector did increase the size of the middle
class – and thereby contribute to the strengthening of civil society – the
middle class generally acted primarily from economic self-interest rather
than political principle, as seen in the widespread middle class support for
the 23 February 1991 military coup.65
What made it easy for these business elites to get into political office? It is the
vast number of political parties that can be joined and/or started anew. By reviewing the
election results by party from 1975 to 1988 in Table 2, Thailand was classified as a weak
multiparty system as Huntington described.66 Even though an argument could be made
that the Social Action, Chat Thai, and Democrat parties dominated parliament from 1975
to 1988, this was still a three party system and considered “multiparty” by Huntington.67
To explain the relationship between business elites and the three aforementioned political
parties, Laothamatas offered:
Equally striking, the leadership of three ruling parties—Chart Thai, Social
Action, and Democrat—is increasingly controlled by big business. Chart
Thai’s leadership has been dominated by big business from the beginning,
and all top Social Action Party leaders with the exception of the chairman,
Air Chief Marshal and Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila, are now
individuals with big business backgrounds. Even more notable is the fact
that the Democrat Party, traditionally a mainstay of the middle classes, is
now permeated by big business.68
Also, those three dominant parties all originated in Bangkok and were comprised
primarily of business leaders and aristocrats.69 The rise of the business elites in politics
had helped to strengthen political participation within Thailand.
65 McCargo (2002), 61.
66 Huntington, 428-429.
67 Ibid., 428-429.
68 Anek Laothamatas, "Business and Politics in Thailand: New Patterns of Influence," 453.
69 Phongpaichit and Baker, 356-358. This gives the impression that these parties serve the interests of
the urban residents in Bangkok and do not represent the majority that live outside the capital’s boundaries.
17
Table 2
Election Results by Party, 1975 - 198870
What kind of voter turnout did Thailand experience between 1975 and 1988?
Other than a slight dip in 1976 (Votes/Registered Voters) and 1983 (Votes/Voting Age
Population), Thailand saw modest gains in total votes, registered voters, total population,
and voting age population. The Thai voters went to the polls and cast their ballots in
great numbers. The Thai elections held in this period did not require parties to run based
party-driven campaigns. When a rural voter went to cast his or her ballot, what did they
base their vote on? Callahan and McCargo argued that vote-buying had been prevalent in
the 1970s and 1980s, but “it would be simplistic to argue that vote-buying was the sole
70 Scanned from Table 10.3 in Phongpaichit and Baker, 362.
18
factor in the elections.”71 No controls were in place to control vote-buying, and it was
just part of the election process. Next, I would like to focus on the political rights and
civil liberties portion of this table.
Year
Total
Votes
Registered
Voters
1975
8,695,000
1976
Vote/
Vote/
Reg
Invalid
Total
Population
18,500,000
47.0%
N/A
41,896,000
18,902,400
46.0%
2
3
PF
9,084,104
20,791,018
43.7%
5.0%
42,960,000
18,902,400
48.1%
6
6
PF
1983
12,295,339
24,224,470
50.8%
4.1%
49,459,000
26,213,270
46.9%
3
4
PF
1986
15,104,400
24,600,000
61.4%
N/A
52,511,000
27,830,830
54.3%
3
3
PF
1988
16,944,931
26,658,637
63.6%
3.5%
54,326,000
30,965,820
54.7%
3
3
PF
Table 3
VAP
VAP
PR
CL
Status
Thailand Parliamentary Elections (1975 – 1988)72
Political rights and civil liberties are important factors in deciding the level of
political participation Thailand’s citizens may or may not enjoy. Freedom House breaks
political rights into three sub-categories (electoral process; political pluralism and
participation; and functioning of the government) and civil liberties into four subcategories (freedom of expression and belief; association and organizational rights; rule
of law; and personal autonomy and individual rights).73 During this time period, Thailand
has done a little better in the political rights but struggled with civil liberties. The trend
71 William A. Callahan and Duncan McCargo, "Vote-Buying in Thailand's Northeast: The July 1995
General Election," Asian Survey 36, no. 4 (Apr., 1996): 379-391, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=00044687%28199604%2936%3A4%3C376%3AVITNTJ%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R, (accessed August 23, 2007).
72 See the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance website,
http://www.idea.int/, (accessed June 1, 2007). For 1975, registered voters are approximate. For 1986, total
votes and registered voters are approximate. Terms are as follow: VAP=voting age population;
PR=political rights; CL=civil liberties; Invalid=the number of invalid votes (including blank votes), as
reported by each country; PF=partly free. PR and CL are two measurements of Political Rights and Civil
Liberties, which have been taken from Freedom House. Freedom House uses these two categories as
indicators of the levels of freedom in a country’s political system. A rating of 1 indicates the highest
degree of freedom and 7 the least amount of freedom. Each pair is averaged to determine an overall status
(1.0 – 2.5 = free, 3.0 – 5.0 = partly free, and 5.5 – 7.0 = not free). For more information, visit the Freedom
House website at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1, (accessed June 16, 2007).
73 See the Freedom House website at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1, (accessed
June 16, 2007).
19
would indicate that Thailand was progressing, ever so slightly, in these two categories.
Even so, Thailand was considered a “partly free” country during this time period and has
room for improvement.
The weakest links of Thailand’s political participation were the plurality of
Thailand’s political party structure, the convenience of party switching, and the ability to
dissolve and create new parties. In addition, political parties were numerous which led
increasingly toward factionalism within Thailand. During the 1980s, “democratization in
Thailand was constrained by the failure of political parties to institutionalize themselves
as true representatives of the people. They also failed to assume the responsibilities of
governance in a constructive, clean, and efficient manner, and to promote, either in
quantitative or qualitative terms, voluntary political participation.”74
Political
participation was a factor that strongly influenced political instability within Thailand,
and provided motive and opportunity for this coup. However, political participation
alone did not cause the 1991 coup because the political institutions had been in place
since the 1978 constitution. If political participation alone was the causal factor of the
coup, a coup should have occurred after either the 1979 or 1983 election when both the
Social Action and Chart Thai parties enjoyed a larger percentage of parliamentary seats
over the Democrat Party. Instead, the coup occurred when the three main parties were on
more equal footing within parliament.
2.
Foreign Influence
Was the 1991 coup consistent with Luttwak’s hypothesis that coups are more
likely when global and regional powers have little influence over a country’s internal
political environment?75 According to Luttwak, a coup was more likely to happen if
Thailand was relatively independent and not heavily influenced by a regional and/or
global entity.76 This section will review both regional and global power influence on
74 Paribatra, 884.
75 Luttwak, 43-45.
76 Ibid., 27.
20
Thailand.77 Specifically, a review of major bilateral and multilateral exercises that occur
within Thai borders will show there is not an abundance of foreign troops present within
Thailand for any type of extended engagement.78
Thailand, in the 1980s, did not have a large foreign military presence. The
multinational Exercise COBRA GOLD79 lasts 4-6 weeks and has less than a couple
thousand U.S. military forces within country.
The United States also has a Joint U.S.
Military Advisor Group Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI) detachment in Thailand with only a
couple hundred U.S. servicemen.80 Other than these two examples, Thailand did not
have to cooperate militarily within ASEAN, or with global or other regional actors.
In the instance of foreign troop presence within Thailand, foreign influence would
be classified as minimal. As such, there aren’t any major players, regionally or globally,
that had undue political influence over Thailand during the time period leading to the
1991 coup. Even if there was a large foreign troop presence within Thailand during this
period, I don’t think it would have affected the junta. Lack of foreign influence on
Thailand’s internal political processes gave the military leaders within Thailand the
opportunity to have minimal resistance when they attempted the coup but did not provide
a motive.
3.
Electoral Process
Did Thailand’s electoral process foster political instability to the point of causing
the 1991 coup?81 Elections prior to 1973 were characterized as token exercises because
77 The main regional actors of concern for Thailand are China, Japan and ASEAN. The main actors
on the global scale are the United Nations and the United States.
78 Exercises within Thailand generally last about two weeks with a one to two-week buildup prior to
exercise start, and a one to two-week shutdown period where equipment and personnel are reconstituted for
the return trip to country of origin. An extended engagement for the purposes of this research is longer
than two months.
79 Exercise COBRA GOLD started in 1982 between the Royal Thai Navy and the United States Navy
and Marine Corps. For more info see, http://www1.apaninfo.net/cobragold/History/tabid/2811/Default.aspx, (accessed July 11, 2007).
80 See the JUSMAGTHAI website, http://www.jusmagthai.com/, (accessed July 5, 2007).
81 Croissant, 361.
21
the results were known in advance and were never disputed.82 By contrast, elections held
between 1975 and 1988 witnessed “considerable changes both in terms of rules and
actors.
Competition is no longer predominantly between military-run parties and a
limited number of progressive intellectuals and local leaders, having shifted to contests
among members of the business community of different political orientations.”83 The
business elites that exploited Thailand’s political party institutions also took advantage of
the electoral process. McCargo pointed out:
Business actors who had started out as subordinate partners of generals
and senior civilian officials, were now gaining the upper hand. Using the
electoral process as a tool, they were gaining access to ministerial
positions through their bankrolling of election campaigns, parties, and
factions.84
As seen earlier, Croissant has posed three questions to test the effectiveness of a
country’s “electoral systems to promote: 1) Do electoral systems promote the
representativeness of the elected institutions, 2) Do electoral systems promote the
development of a well institutionalized party system, and 3) Do electoral systems
promote the governability of the democratic system?”85 By utilizing Croissant’s three
tests, the effectiveness of Thailand’s electoral system will be assessed.
What was the representativeness of Thailand’s elected institutions? Croissant’s
comparative study listed Thailand’s electoral system as having the characteristics of low
disproportionality.86 What does this mean? Croissant states, “low disproportionality,
results in an adequate conversion of the wide range of pluralistic social interests into
political mandates and a high representativeness of the parliament.”87 This equated to a
representative government. Hicken added on Thailand’s early electoral system, “The
82 Surin Maisrikrod and Duncan McCargo, “Electoral Politics: Commercialisation and Exclusion,” in
Kevin Hewison (ed.), Political Change in Thailand : Democracy and Participation, Politics in Asia Series,
(London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 140.
83 Maisrikrod and McCargo, 140.
84 McCargo (2002), 60.
85 Ibid., 328-329.
86 Croissant, 330.
87 Ibid.
22
block vote system is a relatively uncommon electoral system that combines multiseat
constituencies with multiple votes and the plurality rule.”88 Hicken further described the
electoral system based on the 1978 and 1991 constitutions with an appointed Senate,
party switching allowed, and party restrictions of having to field a full team of candidates
to contest a constituency.89
Rampant party switching will be shown as a severe
limitation of Thailand’s early electoral system.
Did Thailand’s electoral system promote a stable party system? Thailand’s party
system cannot be described as stable, but the electoral system is highly representative.
According to Croissant, this should lead to a multi-party system, which in fact,
Huntington argued was a major contributing factor to political instability.90 To judge the
effectiveness of how the electoral process contributed to party formation, it is necessary
to correlate the fragmentation and polarization of the party system.91
Based on
Chambers’ study on factions within Thai party systems, Thailand had an effective
number of electoral parties of just over nine parties.92 This put Thailand in the category
of high fragmentation. Croissant has labeled Thailand as a low polarized parliament, and
I tend to agree.93 When the two factors are combined, Thailand’s electoral system led to
high fragmentation coupled with low polarization. Croissant summarized:
88 Hicken, 384.
89 Ibid.
90 Huntington, 422-424.
91 “Fragmentation is segregated into High (extreme pluralism), Moderate (limited pluralism) and Low
(two-party or less systems). Polarization goes from low to high. High polarization equates to competition
between parties and takes a centrifugal direction, low polarization causes centripetal tendencies of
competition.” See Croissant, 333-336.
92 This effective number is based on the four elections leading to the 1991 coup. For more, see
Chambers (2003), 67.
93 Croissant, 335.
23
The highly fragmented party system in Thailand may not pose a great
threat to political stability and democracy, since it is balanced by low
levels of polarization. However, high fragmentation certainly is an
obstacle for institutional efficiency and effectiveness, and consequently,
for the governability of democratic regimes, because it tends to show
efficacy-reducing effects like short-lived multi-party coalition cabinets
within Thailand.94
What level of governability did Thailand’s electoral system dictate? “The effect
of electoral systems on the breadth of participation in government by political parties can
be measured by looking at their capability to produce so-called manufactured
majorities.”95 In other words, to be a majority, the party needs to win more than 50
percent of the parliamentary seats. With the pluralistic nature of the Thai electoral
system, it would be hard to imagine one of the nine effective electoral parties winning the
majority of the seats. In fact, the four elections leading to the coup all produced natural
minorities.96 Thailand’s electoral system was characterized as having a low capacity to
produce one-party majorities. Croissant explained:
The stronger the majoritarian effect of the electoral system, the more the
electoral system tends to concentrate the party system. The smaller the
effective parties in parliament and the higher the capacity of electoral
systems to create majorities, the more likely single party cabinets are.
Single party cabinets have a higher average life span than minority
cabinets or oversized coalition cabinets.97
Based on his study, Croissant ranked Thailand in last place (worst) for cabinet durability
in a ten Asian country comparison.98
On a positive note, Thailand’s electoral system promoted representativeness. On
the negative side, the weakness of Thailand’s political party fragmentation combined
94 Croissant, 336.
95 Ibid., 337.
96 The parties winning the last four elections and if effect being a natural minority are: 1988 (Chart
Thai, 24%), 1986 (Democrat, 29%), 1983 (Social Action, 28%), and 1979 (Social Action, 27%). For more
information, see Inter-Parliamentary Union at http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2311_arc.htm,
(accessed August 18, 2007).
97 Croissant, 338-339.
98 Ibid.
24
with low polarization led to a cabinet with a natural minority. This was due to the very
high number of effective electoral parties the system generated. The highest percentage
won by any single party, in the four elections leading up to the coup, was 29 percent in
1986. These factors combined to rank Thailand last in a ten country comparative study
on electoral politics in Southeast and East Asia.99 Thailand’s electoral process combined
with its party system has led to political instability.
C.
ECONOMIC FACTORS
Thailand, prior to the 1991 coup, had a market-based economy, which
transformed from a closed import substitution driven economy to a more open, liberal
export-based economy.100 This transformation began in the mid-1980s just prior to the
coup. After this transformation, Thailand’s economy grew enormously and was the result
of political stability in the 1980s. Dixon explained:
This period of stability and increasing democracy was intimately
connected with the Kingdom’s rapid economic growth. Political stability
was an important ingredient in Thailand’s attraction for foreign investors.
At the same time the sustained growth removed the military’s often used
excuse for intervening—ineffective development policies and a slowing of
growth.101
The three economic factors that will be reviewed are gross domestic product
performance, income inequality, and export-based product performance.
1.
Gross Domestic Product Performance
Can the 1991 coup in Thailand be explained by a decline in Thailand’s gross
domestic product (GDP)? In looking at GDP performance in Figure 1, Thailand’s GDP
was definitely on an upward trend and actually doubled during the five-year span
displayed. It would be hard to place blame for the coup on GDP performance.
99 Croissant, 338-339.
100 The time period presented here in this section is from 1973 to 1991.
101 Chris Dixon, The Thai Economy: Uneven Development and Internationalisation (London:
Routledge, 1999), 260.
25
Figure 1
Thailand’s Gross Domestic Product (1985 – 1990)102
By examining Table 4, Thailand’s real GDP growth was impressive during the
time period leading up to the coup. In fact, real GDP growth hit double digits after
Chatichai assumed office. The economy flourished under the presumption that Thailand
was politically stable.
Also noteworthy, gross national savings and gross domestic
investment percentages rose in each year leading up to the coup. Coincidentally, these
figures stabilized after the coup and actually began to decrease leading up to the financial
crisis.
102 Bank of Thailand, Available online.
http://www.bot.or.th/BotHomepage/databank/EconData/EconFinance/index04e.htm, (accessed 1 June
2007).
26
Year
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
Percentage Growth of
Real GDP
4.6
5.5
9.5
13.3
12.2
11.2
Table 4
Gross National Savings
as Percentage of GDP
24.4
26.5
27.3
30.0
31.6
32.8
Gross Domestic
Investment as
Percentage of GDP
28.2
25.9
27.9
32.6
35.1
41.4
Thailand’s GDP Growth, Savings and Investment (1985 – 1990)103
Did Thailand’s per capita GDP experience any downturns in the 1980s? By
reviewing Figure 2, per capita GDP grew during the ten-year period displayed. These
figures are based on the entire country and do not take regional view.
With the
liberalization rapid growth of the economy, urban centers tend to have higher per capita
earnings over their rural counterparts. Thailand was not different. Dixon pointed out
about the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR), “increasingly the most significant
disparity is between the BMR and the rest of the Kingdom. This is even more marked if
the analysis is undertaken at the level of the individual provinces.”104
103 Source: Bank of Thailand, in Phongpaichit and Baker, 157.
104 Dixon, 216.
27
Figure 2
Thailand’s Per Capita GDP (1980 – 1990)105
What events led to this positive economic growth? The first event was the oil
crisis in the late 1970s to early 1980s. Oil was Thailand’s top import item, and when the
bottom fell out of the oil market in the mid-1980s, this produced a lot of surplus capital
within Thailand. Second, the Thai government devalued the baht for the second time in
the 1980s.106 After devaluing the baht, Thailand had to come up with a new strategy to
address its balance of payments deficits. “The government now committed itself to a
strategy of exporting its way out of the payment crisis. In 1985, the government reduced
import taxes for materials used in exports, and abolished several export taxes.”107 This
105 Bank of Thailand, Available online.
http://www.bot.or.th/BotHomepage/databank/EconData/EconFinance/index04e.htm, (accessed 1 June
2007).
106 The baht was devalued twice in the early 80s--first, in 1981 and then later in 1984. Phongpaichit
and Baker, 155.
107 Phongpaichit and Baker, 156.
28
brought Thailand into the export-oriented global market, which had an enormous positive
impact on the Thai economy. Thailand’s GDP and per capita GDP made great gains
during the period leading up to the coup. With such solid gains, GDP performance did
not have an impact on the coup.
2.
Income Inequality Performance
The extremely high level of regional and personal income inequality that
prevails in Thailand reflects long-established trends which government
policy has done little to halt. In this respect the Thai experience is by no
means unique: policies aimed at redressing regional imbalance and income
inequalities tend to be implemented in a partial and under-funded manner
and run counter to much more vigorous and fully funded policies that
promote disparities.108
Was there a downturn in Thailand’s income inequality measures that contributed
to Thailand’s coup in 1991?109 According the Hypothesis V in chapter 1, rising income
inequality promoted political instability and increased the probability of a coup. This
section will analyze two inequality measures to assess whether Thailand’s income
inequality suffered any downturns.110 The conventional wisdom is that inequality was
growing. According to McCargo, “the Thai economy was growing rapidly, but this
economic growth was not shaped by any principles of equitable distribution.”111
In the years leading up to the 1991 coup, the income distribution remained pretty
stable. By analyzing the data in Figure 3, some startling facts jump out. The top 20
percent (richest) brought home over 50 percent of Thailand’s total income, and the
bottom 50 percent (poorest) only brought home about 20 percent of the total income. The
income distribution improved slightly between 1981 and 1988. This observation could be
explained by the increase in capital flows into the country after the export boom in 19851986. On the whole, the rich are very rich and the poor are very poor in Thailand.
Thailand’s economy has grown, but at the expense of the poor. Dixon explained:
108 Dixon, 237.
109 Nordlinger, 58.
110 The two inequality measurements are deciles percentage and the Gini coefficient.
111 McCargo (2002), 60.
29
The long-term expansion of GDP, including the acceleration of growth
since the mid-1980s, has delivered social benefits mainly in the form of
new employment opportunities rather than in general improvement in the
living standards of the bottom 20 per cent of income distribution.112
Figure 3
Thailand’s Income/Consumption by Deciles (Percentage)113
To further illustrate the point on income distribution, refer to Figure 4, which
displays Thailand’s Gini coefficient.114 Thailand’s Gini coefficient hovered between .4
and .5 from 1981 to 1992. To put this value into perspective, a report of Gini coefficients
112 Dixon, 222.
113 The World Bank Poverty Database: POVCALNET,
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp, (accessed 1 June 2007).
114 The Gini coefficient is defined as the most commonly used measure of inequality. The coefficient
varies between 0, which reflects complete equality and 1, which indicates complete inequality (one person
has all the income or consumption, all others have none). For more details, see The World Bank Poverty
website,http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,,contentMD
K:20238991~menuPK:492138~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:430367,00.html, (accessed 1
June 2007).
30
from the other Southeast Asian countries showed countries with both higher and lower
percentages than Thailand.115
Surprisingly, Malaysia was the only Southeast Asian
country that had a higher Gini coefficient than Thailand.
Malaysia’s was not
significantly higher, just a few percentage points. The Philippines was the closest in Gini
when compared to Thailand, but was slightly lower by a few points in each of the survey
years. Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia and Vietnam were the most surprising, as they were
significantly lower in their Gini stats. This meant that the income distribution in these
countries was more equal. Maybe that is due in part to each of these countries being
relatively poor and not having the inflow of capital like Thailand, Malaysia and the
Philippines.
115 The Southeast Asian countries were Malaysia, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines and
Vietnam. For more info see, The World Bank Poverty Database: POVCALNET,
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp, (accessed 1 June 2007).
31
Figure 4
Thailand’s Gini Coefficient (1981-1992)116
After analyzing the data, income distribution was relatively stable during the
years leading to the coup. Even though income distribution favored the rich in Thailand,
the evidence does not support income inequality as a primary factor for the military to
overthrow Chatichai.
Income inequality is the one economic factor that remained
relatively constant for the ten years leading up to the coup. As shown earlier, Thailand
was not doing very well regionally with respect to how equal the distribution of income
within the country.
116 The World Bank Poverty Database: POVCALNET,
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp, (accessed 1 June 2007).
32
3.
Export-based Product Performance
Did a downturn in Thailand’s export-based economic sector cause the coup in
1991?117
Thailand in the 1980s adopted the East Asia Economic Model (EAEM)
strategy. As Looney explains, “The strategy is built around two key features: (a) high
investment rates stemming mainly from foreign direct investment (FDI), and (b) an
outward orientation emphasizing labor intensive manufactured exports.”118 By looking
on the surface and remembering that Thailand emphasized an export-based economy
based on the EAEM, it was no surprise to see an upward trend in Thailand’s export-based
economic sector as depicted in Figure 5.119 Dixon explained the export market success:
It has been characterised by dramatic economic growth, restructuring of
exports and general internationalisation of the economy. While the degree
to which these developments can be linked to the period of formal SAPs
or changed domestic policy is highly questionable, the broad aims set out
by the World Bank in 1980—of opening up the economy and reorienting it
towards the export of manufactured goods—have been substantially
achieved.120
117 O’Kane, 61.
118 Robert Looney, "Thaksinomics: A New Asian Paradigm?" Journal of Social, Political & Economic
Studies 29, no. 1 (Spring, 2004), 68.
119 Labor intensive, manufactured products were the basis of Thailand’s export-based economy.
120 Dixon, 139.
33
Figure 5
Thailand’s Total Exports (1985 – 1990)121
Additionally, when Thailand switched to an export-based economic approach, its
main export sector switched as well. Up until 1985, agricultural products were the staple
of Thailand’s export sector. After 1985, manufactured goods and services rose to the top
of the export charts. As seen in Figure 6, 1984 was the turning year when agricultural
exports equaled manufactured exports. By 1990, over 70 percent of Thai exports were
manufactured products, and the agricultural sector was below 20 percent. Thailand had
made the switch to an export-driven economy fueled by manufactured products.
121 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) website,
http://stats.unctad.org/Handbook/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx (accessed 1 June 2007).
34
Figure 6
Thai Exports by Sector (1983-1990)122
The other important factor that helped drive exports even higher was the amount
of foreign direct investment (FDI) that began flowing into Thailand in the mid 1980s.
Many Asian countries found it very profitable to invest in Thailand’s manufacturing
sector and take advantage of cheap labor. Intuitively speaking, FDI should flow into
countries with a stable political system. Thailand was a unique case with FDI expanding
in the midst of political instability. Can any trends be spotted in Thailand during the
years leading up to the coup to see if there is any relationship between political
instability, export-based product performance and foreign investor strategy?
122 For more information, see the United Nations University website at
http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu11ee/uu11ee0x.htm.
35
Figure 7
Thailand’s Exports versus Foreign Direct Investment (1985 – 1990)123
The period of 1985 to 1990 saw a big growth in FDI which in turn spurred the
export economic sector to expand in Thailand. There was a stabilization period while
Thailand focused its economy toward export-driven, but overall, Thailand enjoyed
modest growth in exports because of steady inflows of FDI. Prem’s administration
continued to reap the benefits of increasing FDI into Thailand. With political unrest
building in the country, Prem resigned in 1988 and paved the way for a democratic
election, but not before FDI in Thailand finally broke the $1 billion annual threshold.
After the democratic election in 1988, FDI kept flowing and had risen by 250 percent to
$2.54 billion annually by 1991.
123 For export numbers see, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
website, http://stats.unctad.org/Handbook/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx (accessed 1 June 2007); for
FDI numbers see, Bank of Thailand, Foreign trade and Balance of Payments,
http://www.bot.or.th/bothomepage/databank/EconData/EconFinance/index03e.htm (accessed 1 June 2007).
36
After researching and analyzing Thailand’s export-based product performance
during the years leading up to the 1991 coup, it has been shown that there was not a
downturn in its export markets. Furthermore, increases in FDI during the period show
that foreign investors were content with how the political outlook was evolving in
Thailand. Dixon elaborated on political continuity:
There is little doubt that continuity contributed to the confidence of both
domestic and overseas investors. The confidence that stemmed from the
apparent establishment of stable and, at least quasi-democratic
government, was given a substantial boost following the elections of July
1988, with the appointment of a premier (Chatichai Choonhavan) and a
full cabinet who were all elected.124
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that export performance did not create economic
instability or play any significant part in undermining political stability. This case will
serve as an exception to O’Kane’s theory on export-based product performance and
political instability.125
D.
CONCLUSION
After analyzing the three political factors and three economic factors for the 1991
coup, it’s hard to imagine a case being made to blame Thailand’s economic performance
for the military to overthrow the government.
Rather, it is very easy to see that
Thailand’s electoral system was set up in a way that produced an extremely fragmented
political party system that, in turn, bred political instability.126 Thailand was relatively
independent which provided the Thai military the opportunity to stage the coup. While
I’m certain these factors were a leading contributor to overall political instability in
Thailand, were they the cause of this coup? The conclusion drawn here is that the
political factors led to political instability and helped facilitate a coup, but did not
actually cause the coup on their own.
124 Dixon, 126.
125 O’Kane, 61.
126 Croissant, 341.
37
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38
III.
THAILAND COUP D’ETAT OF SEPTEMBER 19, 2006 CASE
STUDY
The February 2005 election reaffirmed Thaksin’s reaffirmed Thaksin’s
overwhelming hold on power. With an individual so firmly entrenched in
office of prime minister, it is fitting to analyze how he got there in the first
place. Several factors contributed to Thaksin’s 2001 electoral landslide
and first single-party parliamentary majority, including (1) a preelection
willingness to spend lavish sums of money to both market his Thai Rak
Thai Party and buy up members of parliament, footloose factions, and vote
canvassers; (2) a new electoral system of single-member districts favoring
parties with more cash; (3) the rival Democrat Party’s PM Chuan
Leekpai’s perceived inability to stand up to foreign interests or cope with
the 1997 Asian financial crisis; (4) Thaksin’s use of national rhetoric and
promises to implement populist projects; (5) the popular view that Thaksin
would nevertheless, as a self-made billionaire strongman, successfully
rescued Thailand from the economic abyss. Yet since 2001, the new PM
has fortified his position to the point where fears echo that Thailand is
slipping under parliamentary tyranny akin to Italy on PM Silvio
Berlusconi.127
Paul W. Chambers
A.
BACKGROUND
With more than 15 years passing since the Chatichai coup, was it just a matter of
time before Thaksin’s administration was forcibly removed from office by a military
coup?128 Thaksin won landslide victories in two elections (2001 and 2005). He was also
the first popularly elected prime minister who completed his first four-year term, and won
his bid for reelection as the incumbent.129 Thaksin was immensely popular with the rural
community, and his administration had “virtually unassailable power.”130 Thaksin had
127 Chambers, "Evolving Toward What? Parties, Factions, and Coalition Behavior in Thailand
Today," 496.
128 If Thaksin’s administration was slipping into tyranny as Chambers espoused, it is little wonder the
military didn’t step in before it did.
129 Thitinan Pongsudhirak, "Thai Politics after the 6 February 2005 General Election," Trends in
Southeast Asia Series: 6(2005), (Singapore, ISEAS, 2005) 1.
130 Pongsudhirak, 1-3.
39
taken aggressive steps to prevent a coup against his administration, but on 19 September
2006 a successful, bloodless coup removed Thaksin and his administration from
power.131
Where did the process break down for Thailand? Thai political reformers had
learned much about the strength and weaknesses of Thai political and economic
structures, and the country survived arguably its worst economic emergency during the
1997 Asian financial crisis.132 From 1991 to 1997, six Thai administrations (see Table
5) assimilated these lessons learned and rewrote the Thai constitution twice with the
intent to strengthen the Thai political structure.133 “The “people’s constitution” of 1997
effectively marked the ascendancy of political participation as the dominant currency in
discourses of Thai power,” but did these effects lead to Thaksin’s demise?134
Even after the pro-democracy movement in 1992,135 “Thai democracy became
synonymous with cabinet instability, chronic political corruption, vote buying, and the
fusion of provincial crime with party politics.”136 As a testament to the political turmoil,
parliament was dissolved four times (see Table 5) prior to Thaksin getting elected in
2001. The one positive that can be garnered during this time period is that until the coup
in 2006, parliament had not been dissolved since the political reforms in 1997. This
showed that political stability is possible.
131 Among Thaksin’s coup preventative measures were: “1) appointment of his cousin as army
commander and chief, 2) Thaksin’s strong ties to the Thai Police, and 3) Thaksin’s control of the old types
of corruption (commission, leakage, and embezzlement).” See Pongsudhirak, 3.
132 For a detailed description of the Thai political reform process from 1992 through parliament
passing the 1997 constitution, see James Ockey, Making Democracy : Leadership, Class, Gender, and
Political Participation in Thailand (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004), 166-171.
133 Thai National Assembly, http://www.parliament.go.th/files/library/b05.htm, (accessed May 11,
2007).
134 McCargo (2002), 64.
135 For an explanation of events on the pro-demcracy movement of 1992, see Duncan McCargo and
Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand, (Copenhagen, Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian
Studies Press, 2005), 2-3; Englehart, 255-265.
136 Aurel Croissant and Daniel Pojar Jr., “Quo Vadis Thailand? Thai Politics after the 2005
Parliamentary Elections,” http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Jun/croissantJun05.asp, (accessed August
6, 2007).
40
PRIME MINISTER
YEARS IN OFFICE
REASON LEFT OFFICE
General Chatichai Choonhawan
Aug 1988 – Feb 1991
Coup d’Etat
Mr. Anand Panvarachun
Mar 1991 – Apr 1992
General Election
General Suchinda Krapravoon
Apr 1992 – Jun 1992
May Crisis Event
Mr. Anand Panyarachun
Jun 1992 – Sep 1992
PD/General Election137
Mr. Chuan Leekpai
Sep 1992 – Jul 1995
PD/General Election
Mr. Banharn Silapa-Archa
Jul 1995 – Nov 1996
PD/General Election
General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh
Nov 1996 – Nov 1997
Resignation: Economic Crisis
Mr. Chuan Leekpai
Nov 1997 – Feb 2001
PD/General Election
Police Lt Col (ret) Thaksin
Feb 2001 – Mar 2005
Term Ended
Police Lt Col (ret) Thaksin
Mar 2005 – Sep 2006
PD/State Administration Assembly138
General Surayad Chulanont
Sep 2006 – Present
N/A
Table 5
B.
Thailand’s Prime Minister Succession (1988 – 2006)139
POLITICAL FACTORS
Thailand’s political landscape leading up to the 2006 coup was forever changed
and molded by the adoption of a new constitution in 1997. King states:
The rules of the political game became in many ways significantly
different: there are increased guarantees of individual rights, an elected
Senate, a new Election Commission to supervise elections, separation of
the elected Parliament and the Cabinet (MPs or senators are no longer
allowed to simultaneously hold a cabinet post and a seat in Parliament), a
137 PD = parliament dissolution.
138 The Royal Thai Government website lists the events of 19 Sept 2006 as a state administration
assembly. The rest of the world classifies that event as a coup d’etat. For the rest of this paper, this event
will be referred to as a coup.
139 See The Secretariat of the Cabinet, Royal Thai Government website,
http://www.cabinet.thaigov.go.th/eng/bb_main21.htm, (accessed May 11, 2007).
41
new electoral system based on a combination of single-member districts
and a party-list system, and new requirements for candidates.140
On the surface, it looked like 1997 reformers attempted to solve many of the political
challenges that faced Thailand prior to the Chatichai coup. The changes this research
will focus on are the revisions made to the political party institution, guarantees of
individual rights, and the new electoral process.
The 1997 constitution was of great importance to Thailand’s political landscape.
This constitution indirectly led to Thailand’s prime minister being popularly elected to
two consecutive terms and “the first prime minister to preside over a one-party
government.”141 There had been military leaders that served consecutive terms, but this
was a first for popularly elected prime ministers and demonstrated that the 1997 political
reforms strengthened Thai democratic institutions. However, Thaksin’s first year in
office got off to a rough start as Jarvis pointed out:
Of most concern to outside observers have been the political uncertainties
surrounding the indictment, trial, and acquittal of Prime Minister Thaksin
over allegations of asset concealment and the repercussions of this for
policy continuity. These fears were not realized, however, with the
controversial acquittal of the prime minister by a slim 8-to-7 majority of
the constitutional court.142
With Thaksin on shaky ground to start his first term as prime minister, why were
there no coup attempts before, during, or after Thaksin’s trail and subsequent acquittal?
This verdict certainly gave the military motive for a coup, but democracy continued
uninterrupted and unscathed. Support for democracy within Thailand was strong and
should be credited for the political stability enjoyed in the early part of the twenty-first
140 Dan King, “Thailand,” in Ian Marsh, Jean Blondel , and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., Democracy,
Governance, and Economic Performance : East and Southeast Asia, (Tokyo, Japan ;; New York, NY,
USA: United Nations University Press, 1999), 215.
141 Pongsudhirak, 1.
142 Darryl S. L. Jarvis, "Problems and Prospects in Thaksin's Thailand: An Interim Assessment," Asian
Survey 42, no. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2002), 315.
42
century.143
Can any correlation be drawn between political participation, foreign
influence and electoral reform as the cause of the 2006 coup?
1.
Political Participation
In theory, political parties have played essential roles in democratic
regimes—aggregating interests, mobilizing social support, and giving
popular legitimacy to ruling elites. Yet the effectiveness of parties in
evolving democracies has often been quite dubious. Thai democracy has
been a case in point. How did the burgeoning Thai democracy and
evolving political party system allow for the advent of Thaksin?144
Can the Thaksin coup be explained by a combination of a low level of political
participation and a weak multiparty political system as described by Huntington?145 This
section will analyze Thailand’s political party transition from the aftermath of the
Chatichai coup to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and subsequent elections of Thaksin’s
Thai Rak Thai political party in 2001 and 2005. This analysis will reveal just how much
the 1997 constitution led to massive political party reforms. Next, a review of election
statistics and cabinet makeup will show increased voter participation and a move toward
a one-party dominant cabinet.146 Finally, an assessment of Thai citizens’ political rights
and civil liberties will attest that Thailand has made a concerted effort to improve
society’s ability to voice political concerns.
The main flaw with Thai political parties before the 1991 coup was there were
simply too many parties that won seats in parliament. This led to a severely fragmented
parliament, which on average, had been dissolved every two to three years. While the
143 See survey results from Robert B Albritton and Thawilwadee Bureekul, “Consolidating democracy
in Thailand: The First Four Years of Democracy under the Constitution of 1997,” King Prajadhipok’s
Institute, (July 12, 2006),
http://www.kpi.ac.th/kpien/index.php?option=com_docman&task=docclick&Itemid=28&bid=34&limitstar
t=0&limit=5, (accessed August 24, 2007).
144 Paul W. Chambers, "Evolving Toward What? Parties, Factions, and Coalition Behavior in
Thailand Today," 495.
145 Huntington, 397-461.
146 This analysis will focus on the 1995, 1996, 2001 and 2005 elections. These were selected to
compare two elections based on the 1991 constitution with two elections based on the 1997 constitution.
43
1997 reforms went a long way toward strengthening and limiting the numbers of political
parties, there will still some inherent challenges with Thailand’s political party
institution. Hicken elaborated:
Of the 43 parties that competed in at least one election between 1979 and
1996 only 10 survived to compete in the 2001 elections. These 10 were
joined in 2001 by 20 new parties. Over the same period parties on average
competed in fewer than 3 elections before disbanding. Party switching
prior to elections by both candidates and factions is rampant.147
The three main political party reforms addressed in 1997 were: 1) candidates had
to be members of a political party at least 90 days before elections, 2) elections had to be
held within 45 days of a dissolution of parliament, and 3) the creation of 100 party list
seats in parliament that were directly responsible to the party.148 The first two reforms
addressed the problem of party switching that was rampant before the 1997 reforms.149
The last reform was targeted at strengthening and stabilizing the party system by
allowing technocrats a chance to gain a parliament seat without having to win the appeal
of voters.150 These reforms addressed some of the major issues with Thai political
parties, but did the new constitution address the problems of party factions and
defections? Chambers answered:
The rules disrupted the historical pattern of “over 80” party seats and led
to factional squabbling and ultimate party splits. Following the 2001
general election, TRT captured 248 out of 500 seats while the Democrats
won 128. The Democrats experienced severe factionalism, while the
much larger TRT party, never suffered defection.151
147 Allen Hicken, "The Politics of Economic Reform in Thailand: Crisis and Compromise," William
Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 638, (January 2004), 5.
148 For a complete summary of the 1997 reforms see Hicken (2006), 385; Chambers (2005), 505;
James Ockey, “Change and continuity in the Thai political party system," Asian Survey 43,
no. 4 (July 1, 2003), 667; and James Ockey, "VARIATIONS ON A THEME: Societal Cleavages and Party
Orientations Through Multiple Transitions in Thailand," Party Politics 11, no. 6 (November 1, 2005), 740743.
149 Hicken (2004), 5.
150 Ockey (2005), 741.
151 Chambers (2005), 505.
44
While significant efforts were made to reform political parties, can analyzing
election results before and after the 1997 reforms derive any patterns in cabinet structure?
By reviewing Table 6, there isn’t a big difference in cabinet make-up from earlier Thai
elections. These elections still led parties toward having to form coalitions and factions
to ensure a majority existed. However, by 1996, two parties were emerging as being
dominant over the smaller parties—the Democrats and New Aspiration. This was about
to change with the 1997 Asian financial crisis and subsequent 1997 constitution that
changed the political rules.
Table 6
Election Results by Party, 1992-1996152
Where you can see the real difference in cabinet composition is looking at the
elections of 2001 and 2005. In 2001, the Thai Rak Thai party came close to winning a
majority of the parliament seats (see Table 7), and by 2005, the Thai Rak Thai party was
the dominant party with a clear majority (see Table 8). The days of twenty parties
garnering seats in parliament were gone. Croissant explained the aftermath of the 2001
and 2005 elections:
152 Scanned from Table 12.1 in Phongpaichit and Baker, 422.
45
The trend is from highly fragmented individual political parties towards
deepening polarization between two larger political parties with different
political platforms and clearly distinguished groups of voters. While the
2001 election intensified this development, the 2005 election has
consolidated it.153
Table 7
Thailand Election Results by Party, 2001154
Table 8
Thailand Election Results by Party, 2005155
Voter registration and participation within Thailand was quite impressive. By
analyzing Table 9, the lowest turnout was 59 percent and largest turnout was nearly 70
percent. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance had not
153 Croissant (2005), 6.
154 Michael H. Nelson, “A Proportional Election System for Thailand?” King Prajadhipok’s Institute
Thai Politics Up-date No. 2, (June 6, 2007), 4.
155 Nelson, 6.
46
updated its database for the 2005 election, but Croissant reported the 2005 nation-wide
voter turnout was 75.1 percent.156 Thais were getting to the polls in increasing numbers.
Did the data on voter turnout from 2005 reveal any geographically based voting patterns?
As Croissant summarized:
Thai Rak Thai was strongly supported everywhere but in the South, which
the Democrat Party successfully regained. The fact remains that the
Democrat Party, despite loosing the election, was able to strengthen its
already powerful position in the South, which in turn deepens Thailand’s
political divide between the South and the rest.157
In the 2005 election, Thai Rak Thai finally succeeded in pulling more votes from
Bangkok than the Democrat Party.158 Thailand’s voters spoke with their ballots in record
numbers. The 2005 election solidified the Thai Rak Thai as the dominant party within
Thai politics.
Year
Total
Votes
Registered
Voters
1992
19,224,201
1995
Vote/
Vote/
Reg
Invalid
Total
Population
32,432,087
59.3%
4.3%
57,760,000
32,923,200
58.4%
3
4
PF
23,462,746
37,817,983
62.0%
3.8%
60,034,000
36,620,740
64.1%
3
4
PF
1996
24,060,744
38,564,836
62.4%
1.7%
60,652,000
36,997,720
65.0%
3
3
PF
2001
29,909,271
42,759,001
69.9%
N/A
62,862,098
42,663,353
70.1%
2
3
PF
Table 9
VAP
VAP
PR
CL
Status
Thailand Parliamentary Elections (1992 – 2001)159
156 Croissant reported this was a record high voter turnout for Thailand. For more, see Croissant
(2005), 9.
157 Croissant (2005), 8-10.
158 Croissant adds that Bangkok had been a former “stronghold” for the Democrats. For more see,
Croissant (2005), 9.
159 See the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance website,
http://www.idea.int/, (accessed June 1, 2007). For 1975, registered voters are approximate. For 1986, total
votes and registered voters are approximate. Terms are as follow: VAP=voting age population;
PR=political rights; CL=civil liberties; Invalid=the number of invalid votes (including blank votes), as
reported by each country; PF=partly free. PR and CL are two measurements of Political Rights and Civil
Liberties which have been taken from Freedom House which uses these two categories as indicators of the
levels of freedom in a country’s political system. A rating of 1 indicates the highest degree of freedom and
7 the least amount of freedom. Each pair is averaged to determine an overall status (1.0 – 2.5 = free, 3.0 –
5.0 = partly free, and 5.5 – 7.0 = not free). For more information, visit the Freedom House website at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1, (accessed June 16, 2007).
47
In the two elections after the Chatichai coup, Thailand’s civil liberties were rated
lower due to the censorship restrictions placed on Thai citizens by the temporary junta.160
Civil liberties returned back to normal Thai standards by the 1996 elections.
Thailand
has historically done a little better in the political rights but struggled with civil liberties.
According to Freedom House, from 2002 to 2005, the scores for political rights and civil
liberties were 2 and 3 respectively.161 The important difference was that Freedom House
finally removed the “partly free” moniker from Thailand and reported it as a “free”
country.162
This trend indicated that Thailand had progressed in strengthening its
democratic institutions. Most of Thailand’s recent improvements can be traced to 1997
reforms that emphasized citizens’ rights and liberties. As Case reported:
The Constitution also ranged widely across the social terrain, obliging the
state to provide national health care, welfare, and 12 years of public
schooling. Other clauses called for consumer rights, gender equality,
protection from domestic violence, and consultations with relevant NGOs
over projects having environmental impact.163
Political reforms had stabilized Thai political parties, but had the reforms gone
too far? Before the 1997 reforms, party hopping and weak multiparty factions were
rampant. The 1997 reforms addressed these issues, and the pendulum swung back and
created the environment for a dominant party to emerge. The voters, for the first time,
dealt Thailand a parliament with a single party holding a majority of the seats. Did
Thaksin’s administration gain too much control and force the military to react or become
marginalized? The evidence presented in this section showed positive steps were taken
and political participation improved within Thailand after the 1997 reforms in spite of the
160 See the Freedom House website at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1, (accessed
June 16, 2007).
161 See the Freedom House website at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1, (accessed
June 16, 2007).
162 Thailand was reported as a “free” country from 2002 to 2005. For more, see the Freedom House
website at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1, (accessed June 16, 2007).
163 William F. Case, "Thai Democracy, 2001: Out of Equilibrium," Asian Survey 41, no. 3 (May Jun., 2001), 535.
48
1997 Asian financial crisis. In the end, the military did not like the direction the country
was heading and intervened, but political participation and the political party institution
cannot be held accountable for this coup.
2.
Foreign Influence
Was the 2006 coup consistent with Luttwak’s hypothesis that global and regional
powers could influence a country’s internal political environment?164 This section will
review both regional and global power influence on Thailand.165 According to Luttwak,
a coup was more likely to happen if Thailand was relatively independent and not heavily
influenced by a regional and/or global entity.166 Independence in of itself isn’t a bad
indicator; it just implies that the perpetrators of the coup do not have to worry about
consultation and buy-in from an external entity.
A country should balance their
independence and interdependence to ensure political stability.
Thailand, in the 1990s and early 2000s, did not have a large foreign military
presence outside of two multinational exercises and the tsunami relief effort in 2004 to
2005. The multinational Exercise COBRA GOLD167 and Exercise COPE TIGER168 each
last 4-6 weeks and have less than a couple thousand U.S. military forces within country.
These exercises occurred within the first half of the calendar year.
It may be no
coincidence that the coup occurred after both exercises had been completed for the year.
The United States has a Joint U.S. Military Advisor Group Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI)
detachment and Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) detachment in Thailand
164 Luttwak, 43-45.
165 The main regional actors of concern for Thailand are China, Japan and ASEAN. The main actors
on the global scale are the United Nations and the United States.
166 Luttwak, 27.
167 Exercise COBRA GOLD started in 1982 between the Royal Thai Navy and the United States
Navy and Marine Corps. For more information see, http://www1.apaninfo.net/cobragold/History/tabid/2811/Default.aspx, (accessed July 11, 2007).
168 Exercise COPE TIGER began as a yearly exercise in 1994 and has grown to include the United
States, Thailand and Singapore. For more information see,
http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123039352, (accessed July 11, 2007).
49
with only a couple hundred U.S. servicemen.169 When a 9-magnitude earthquake struck
off the coast of Sumatra, Indonesia, a tsunami decimated areas of Thailand, Indonesia and
Sri Lanka.170 A U.S. led Combined Joint Task Force-736, headquartered at Utaphao,
Thailand coordinated the relief effort for the affected areas. An international military
force supported the effort along with non-governmental organizations. The scope and
magnitude of the relief effort was tremendous, but only lasted a few short months.
Other than these examples, Thailand has not had to cooperate militarily within
ASEAN, globally or with other regional actors. ASEAN held an inaugural defense
ministers’ meeting in 2006.171 Other than preliminary talks and meetings, this meeting
was not institutionalized, and greater military cooperation within ASEAN has not been
solidified.172 In the instance of foreign troop presence within Thailand, foreign influence
is classified as minimal. As such, there aren’t any major players, regionally or globally,
that had undue political influence over Thailand during the time period leading to the
2006 coup. This evidence supported Thailand as being relatively independent. As
defined by Luttwak, this provided opportunity for the military leaders to launch the coup
of 2006.
3.
Electoral Process
Did Thailand’s electoral process foster political instability to the point of causing
the 2006 coup? After the 1991 coup, there were two new constitutions ratified.173 The
drafters of the 1997 constitution aimed to reform the electoral system. As detailed by
Hicken:
169 See the JUSMAGTHAI website, http://www.jusmagthai.com/, (accessed July 5, 2007). For more
on JPAC, see http://www.jpac.pacom.mil/, (accessed July 11, 2007).
170 For more information on the tsunami relief effort, see http://www.pacom.mil/special/0412asia/,
(accessed July 11, 2007).
171 See the minutes from the first ASEAN defense ministers meeting at
http://www.aseansec.org/18412.htm, (accessed April 8, 2007).
172 For a detailed look at the ASEAN defense ministers meeting concept, see
http://www.aseansec.org/18511.htm, (accessed April 8, 2007).
173 The two constitutions adopted were in 1991 and 1997.
50
In 1997 Thailand adopted a new constitution which brought about
sweeping changes to its political and electoral landscape. Reforms
included the creation of an autonomous Electoral Commission to oversee
and administer elections, new rules governing the relationship between the
members of Parliament and the Cabinet, and the creation of an elected
Senate—the first ever in Thailand. The constitution also replaced the
Block Vote electoral system that had been in place for most of Thailand’s
electoral history with a parallel system made up of FPTP and list PR
elements.174
This new electoral system did not please everyone, especially some of the old elite.
Englehart added:
A new electoral system also drew criticism from some politicians.
Changes in the electoral law generated uncertainty for politicians who had
been successful under the old system. The new electoral law eliminated
multi-member plurality districts for elections to the lower house. This
system should reduce factionalism within parties and its attendant
corruption, as well as reducing the number of political parties.175
With a radically new electoral system that many politicians were skeptical about, how did
the new system stack up against Croissant’s three questions? What effect did the changes
have on Thailand’s electoral system before the coup of 2006?
What was the representativeness of Thailand’s elected institutions? Croissant’s
comparative study listed Thailand’s electoral system in 2001 as having the characteristics
of intermediate disproportionality.176 What does this mean? Croissant stated, “The
change in vote-seat deviation in the wake of electoral reforms is remarkable. Ironically,
this is the case for Thailand’s segmented system where the degree of electoral
disproportionality rose significantly after components of the proportional representation
system were introduced.”177 While representativeness was still a goal in Thai democratic
institutions, the political reformers chose to constrain representation while allowing the
174 Allen Hicken, “Thailand: Combating Corruption through Electoral Reform,” 1; FPTP = First Past
the Post and List PR = List Proportional Representation. For a description of each see
http://www.idea.int/esd/glossary.cfm.
175 Englehart, 269.
176 Croissant, 330.
177 Ibid., 331.
51
political parties to select parliament members from the party-list. This effort produced a
new electoral system that supported representativeness, just not to the degree of the pre1997 reforms.
Did Thailand’s electoral system promote a stable party system? As described
earlier, Thailand’s party system became more stable after the reforms of 1997, and the
electoral system is still very representative. To judge the effectiveness of how the
electoral process contributed to party formation, it is necessary to correlate the
fragmentation and polarization of the party system.178 Based on Chambers’ study on
factions within Thai party systems, in the four elections leading to the 2006 coup,
Thailand had an effective number of electoral parties of just fewer than six parties.179
With the adoption of the 1997 electoral reforms, the 2001 election was the lowest since
1979 with 4.03 effective electoral parties. This moved Thailand from the category of
high fragmentation to a more moderate level of fragmentation. Croissant also labeled
Thailand as a low polarized parliament.180
When the two factors are combined,
Thailand’s electoral system led to moderate fragmentation coupled with low polarization.
Croissant summarized:
There is widespread consensus among scholars that party systems have a
positive bearing on the institutional efficiency and effectiveness, and
consequently, on the governability of a political system, if (1) they are
fragmented moderately or weakly, and if (2) they are moderately to
weakly polarized.181
Thailand’s 1997 reforms helped balance fragmentation and polarization on a moderate
level, which by Croissant’s assertion gave Thailand’s political leaders the potential for an
efficient and effective system.
178 “Fragmentation is segregated into High (extreme pluralism), Moderate (limited pluralism) and
Low (two-party or less systems). Polarization goes from low to high. High polarization equates to
competition between parties and takes a centrifugal direction while low polarization causes centripetal
tendencies of competition.” See Croissant, 333-336.
179 Chambers (2003), 67.
180 Croissant, 335.
181 Ibid., 335.
52
What level of governability did Thailand’s electoral system dictate? “The effect
of electoral systems on the breadth of participation in government by political parties can
be measured by looking at their capability to produce so-called manufactured
majorities.”182 In other words, to be a majority, the party needs to win a majority of the
votes and seats. With the change toward a more segmented Thai electoral system, it
postured one of the six effective electoral parties to win a majority of the votes and seats.
In fact, the election in 2005 created a natural majority for Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party
that won 377 out of 500 house seats and over 61 percent of the popular vote.183
Thailand’s electoral system was characterized as having a much better capacity to
produce one-party majorities after the 1997 reforms. Croissant explained:
The stronger the majoritarian effect of the electoral system, the more the
electoral system tends to concentrate the party system. The smaller the
effective parties in parliament and the higher the capacity of electoral
systems to create majorities, the more likely single party cabinets are.
Single party cabinets have a higher average life span than minority
cabinets or oversized coalition cabinets.184
Thailand’s cabinet durability should have improved factoring in moving from highly to
moderately fragmented party system and being able to produce a natural majority.
Thailand’s reformed electoral system still promoted representativeness, and
Thailand’s political party fragmentation had made a positive move from high to
moderate. These were significant improvements. Polarization still was classified as low
to moderate and the electoral system in 2005 led to a cabinet with a natural majority.
This was due to reducing the effective electoral parties almost by 50 percent after the
1997 reforms. This set the stage for a political party to win a majority of the seats. In
fact, the highest percentage won by any single party, in the elections leading up to the
coup was 75 percent and was in 2005. The pendulum has swung from a weak multiparty
system to an electoral system capable of electing a one-party dominant majority.
182 Croissant, 337.
183 Nelson, 6.
184 Croissant 338-339.
53
Thailand’s electoral process combined with its party system had made vast improvements
that should have promoted political stability, and did not have a causal effect on the 2006
coup.
C.
ECONOMIC FACTORS
1.
Gross Domestic Product Performance
Did a decline in GDP performance cause the 2006 coup in Thailand? In looking
at GDP performance in Figure 8, Thailand’s GDP was definitely on an upward trend and
actually increased by 40 percent from 2000 to 2006.
According to the Economist and
UNCTAD, Thailand’s real GDP growth each year was: 2000 (2.17 percent), 2001 (5.31
percent), 2002 (7.03 percent), 2003 (6.17 percent), 2004 (4.46 percent), 2005 (4.5
percent), and 2006 (5.0 percent).185 These gains are not spectacular, but show sustained
and predictable growth. In fact, the gains exceeded what Jarvis predicted in 2002:
On the economic front, things are set to deteriorate with the economy
tending downward, albeit with GDP growth expected at around 3.5%, well
below what is needed to make meaningful inroads into developing
appropriate technology and education infrastructure that would better
place Thailand for the decade ahead.186
185 The 2001 to 2004 percentages compiled from the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) website, http://stats.unctad.org/Handbook/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx,
The 2005 to 2006 percentages compiled from The Economist website,
http://www.economist.com/countries/Thailand/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-Economic%20Structure.
186 Jarvis, 319.
54
Figure 8
Thailand’s Gross Domestic Product (2000 – 2005)187
Thailand’s per capita GDP (see Figure 9), suffered a downturn after the 1997
Asian financial crisis.
Similar to the other economic indicators, per capita GDP
rebounded after 2002 and had been growing at a steady pace. Per capita GDP was at its
highest level in history before the coup in 2006. If the Thai military leaders wanted
motive to intervene on behalf of Thailand’s citizen base, the most opportune time was
either right before or right after the 1997 financial crisis. This did not happen, and per
capita GDP was not a factor in the 2006 coup.
187 Bank of Thailand, Available online.
http://www.bot.or.th/BotHomepage/databank/EconData/EconFinance/index04e.htm, (accessed 1 June
2007).
55
Figure 9
Thailand’s Per Capita GDP (1995-2005)188
Although GDP growth was on an upward trend prior to the coup, Thailand did not
always enjoy GDP growth in the 1990s. There was stagnation in 1996 before the 1997
Asian financial crisis, and solid GDP growth did not return to Thailand until late 2002.
Dixon explained his concerns of the fallout starting in 1996:
During 1996 the almost zero growth of export earnings, widening balance
of payments deficit, the rapidly mounting private-sector debt, increasing
short-term speculative capital movements, and the over-heating of the
property and financial sectors were giving particular cause for concern.189
188 Bank of Thailand, Available online.
http://www.bot.or.th/BotHomepage/databank/EconData/EconFinance/index04e.htm, (accessed 1 June
2007).
189 Dixon, 239.
56
If downturn in GDP was a factor in political instability, the opportunity and motive for a
coup was in 1996 like Dixon stated. Why did a coup not occur from 1996 to 2002? In
the Thai case, a downturn in GDP by itself is not a sufficient condition for a coup to
occur.
2.
Income Inequality Performance
Did a downturn in Thailand’s income inequality measures contribute to
Thailand’s coup in 2006?190 In the years leading up to the 2006 coup, the income
distribution remained pretty stable. By analyzing the data in Figure 10, some startling
facts jump out. The top 20 percent (richest) bring home over 50 percent of Thailand’s
total income, the bottom 50 percent (poorest) only bring home about 20 percent of the
total income. The distribution stayed relatively consistent from 1996 to 2002.
Figure 10
Thailand’s Income/Consumption Share by Deciles (Percentage)191
190 Nordlinger, 58.
191 The World Bank Poverty Database: POVCALNET,
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp, (accessed 1 June 2007).
57
To further illustrate the point on income distribution, refer to Figure 11, which
displays Thailand’s Gini coefficient.192 Thailand’s Gini coefficient hovered between .4
and .5 from 1996 to 2002. To put this value into perspective, I compared other Southeast
Asian countries to Thailand during the same time period.193 Surprisingly, Malaysia,
Cambodia and the Philippines were the only Southeast Asian countries that had a higher
Gini coefficient than Thailand’s. Malaysia’s, Cambodia’s and the Philippines’ were not
significantly higher, just a few percentage points. Laos, Indonesia, and Vietnam were
significantly lower in their Gini stats meaning the income distribution in those countries
was more equal.
Figure 11
Thailand’s Gini Coefficient (1994 – 2002)194
192 The Gini coefficient is defined as the most commonly used measure of inequality. The coefficient
varies between 0, which reflects complete equality and 1, which indicates complete inequality (one person
has all the income or consumption, all others have none). For more details, see The World Bank Poverty
website,http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,,contentMD
K:20238991~menuPK:492138~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:430367,00.html. (accessed 1
June 2007).
193 The Southeast Asian countries were Malaysia, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines and
Vietnam. For more info see, The World Bank Poverty Database: POVCALNET,
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp, (accessed 1 June 2007).
194 The World Bank Poverty Database: POVCALNET,
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp, (accessed 1 June 2007).
58
After analyzing the data, income distribution was not a factor leading to the coup.
Income inequality had been so consistent over a long period of time that I deem income
distribution as a non-factor in the 2006 coup. Income inequality is the one economic
factor that remained relatively constant for the ten years leading up to the coup. As
shown earlier, Thailand is doing better regionally with respect to how equal the
distribution of income is among the populace in relative terms.195 In fact, in the years
just prior to the coup, the richest 20 percent in the country accounted for more than half
the country’s income. For a change to occur, the citizens will have to demand better
income equality.196
3.
Export-based Product Performance
Can Thailand’s coup in 2006 be explained by a downturn in its exports, which
created economic instability that undermined political stability?197 Thailand’s export
market, especially after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, was still heavily dependent on
global markets, most notably the United States and Japan. Jarvis stated:
The Thai economy continues to record positive growth rates despite
increased external risks associated with the slowdown in the U.S.
economy, the events of September 11, and continued malaise in the
Japanese economy. However, the revised GDP estimate for 2001 of 3.5%
indicates a sharp contraction on the previous growth performance of 5.7%
recorded for the first two quarters of 2000. This is important since exports
account for 65% of Thailand’s GDP, with just two countries, the U.S. and
Japan, absorbing 40% of Thai exports. Thailand is thus highly sensitive to
changes in external demand and particularly vulnerable to the fortunes of
the U.S. and Japanese economies.198
195 As Thailand’s Gini and deciles percentages have remained fairly constant between the two coups, a
few more Southeast Asian countries’ Gini index has risen: Malaysia, Cambodia, and the Philippines.
196 Voter participation reached 70 percent in the 2001 election. This percentage is to be lauded. If the
Thai middle class wants democracy, they need to make a stand and force a change. If this does not happen,
the ping-pong effect of election followed by parliament dissolution will keep happening. An interest in
shaping Thailand’s political institutions for the better can only be generated from the masses. On the
surface, it seemed as if the Thai middle class could care less when the military intervenes in politics.
197 O’Kane, 61.
198 Jarvis, 299-300.
59
Looking at Figure 12, Thailand’s exports made gains during the years leading up to the
2006 coup, but what accounted for the decline in 2001 to 2002?
Figure 12
Thailand’s Total Exports (2000 – 2005)199
To explain the slowdown in exports after the election in 2001, it is necessary to
review Thaksin’s early economic focus and the backlash it caused. Joshua Kurlantzick
stated:
Because of opposition to freer trade, populist leaders, such as Thailand’s
Thaksin Shinawatra and the Philippines’ Joseph Estrada, rose to power on
pledges to reverse economic cooperation. Once in office, these nationalist
populists made good on some of their promises. In just his first three
199 Bank of Thailand, Available online.
http://www.bot.or.th/BotHomepage/databank/EconData/EconFinance/index04e.htm, (accessed 1 June
2007).
60
months, Thaksin implemented a “Buy Thai” campaign, blamed foreign
investors for contributing to Thailand’s fiscal woes, and considered
instituting capital controls.200
By initially trying to increase domestic consumption, exports took a slight hit. The
category that produced the decline in 2001 and 2002 was the export in high-tech
products.201 In the high-tech category alone, there was a 10 percent drop from 2000 to
2001. This accounted for the downturn in exports in 2001. Although high-tech exports
gained from 2001 to 2002 by 6 percent, the 2002 high-tech exports were still 5 percent
behind the 2000 figure. In 2003, the high-tech exports rebounded with an 18 percent gain
over the 2002 figure and a 13 percent gain over the 2000 figure. The high-tech industry
completed the rebound with solid gains from 2004 to 2006. The export destinations
responsible for the drops in 2001 and 2002 were the North American Free Trade Alliance
(NAFTA), the European Union (EU), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN).202
Can the recovery in 2002 be credited to the Thaksin administration? To answer
this question it is necessary to understand Thaksin’s two-track plan. Looney described
the two-track plan as:
Thaksinomics is controversial. It is an eclectic strategy that combines the
traditional element of the EAEM model, emphasizing mass manufacturing
spearheaded by FDI – dubbed the First Track – and a more domestic focus
on local enterprises leveraging indigenous skills and resources, known as
the Second Track. A distinctive feature of Thaksinomics is the emphasis
given the Second Track.203
200 Kurlantzick, 24-25.
201 Bank of Thailand, Available online.
http://www.bot.or.th/BotHomepage/databank/EconData/EconFinance/index04e.htm, (accessed 1 June
2007).
202 In 2001, the exports dropped from the 2000 level by: NAFTA ($1.5 billion), EU ($1 billion), and
ASEAN ($1 billion). In 2002, the exports dropped from the 2000 level by: NAFTA ($1.3 billion) and EU
($1.5 billion). For more see the Bank of Thailand, Available online.
http://www.bot.or.th/BotHomepage/databank/EconData/EconFinance/index04e.htm, (accessed 1 June
2007).
203 Looney, 70-71.
61
By focusing on local entrepreneurs, Thaksin wanted to gradually shift the reliance on
export-based economy to the more reliable domestic market.204 Looney added that
Thaksin generated and promoted this plan to keep the Thai economy from feeling the
external economic market shocks.205 The export recovery that started in 2003 was in fact
due to Thaksin’s administration realizing the importance of a more liberal, open
economy. “The government’s economic policy, dubbed “Thaksinomics,” seems to have
undergone several conceptual adjustments in 2002. The inward-looking mode of the
Thai Rak Thai’s first year metamorphasized into an acceptance, even if a reluctant one, of
the importance of external forces to the Thai economy—foreign capital, investment,
markets, technology, and managerial skills.”206
By reviewing Figure 13, there was only a slight change in the export sector
percentages. Manufactured products now account for over 80 percent of the export
market. The agricultural sector was still the second largest sector, but was now below 10
percent of the export market. Mining and fisheries were close to becoming extinct in the
Thai export market. These percentages do not offer any evidence for the cause of the
2006 coup.
204 Looney, 71.
205 Ibid.
206 Alex M. Mutebi, "Thailand in 2002: Political Consolidation Amid Economic Uncertainties," Asian
Survey 43, no. 1, A Survey of Asia in 2002 (Jan. - Feb., 2003), 110-111.
62
Figure 13
Thai Exports by Sector (1997-2006)207
How did foreign investors see Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai administration? What
effect did the 1997 Asian financial crisis and 2001 election have on Thailand’s FDI?
Even though FDI picked up in 1998 following the financial crisis, the overall trend did
not look promising:
Short-term shocks aside, the current, longer-term trend in FDI has been
downward, and should serve as an ominous sign to Thai officials.
Thailand is viewed, increasingly, as a less attractive destination for
international investment, with risks to capital flows stemming from four
principal areas: (1) lack of corporate and financial sector reform; (2)
movement toward protectionism; (3) infrastructure and production
bottlenecks; and (4) increasing relative wage and production costs.208
207 Bank of Thailand, Available online.
http://www.bot.or.th/BotHomepage/databank/EconData/EconFinance/index04e.htm, (accessed 1 June
2007).
208 Jarvis, 313.
63
The real challenge for Thailand’s FDI to recover after the crisis was in the hands of its
neighbor, China:
Perhaps the greatest, longer-term structural predicament the Thai baht
faces is the continued interest in China, especially with the trading
opportunities that will arise from China’s entry into the World Trade
Organization. China already accounts for 50% of all FDI into Asia; a
figure that will likely increase in the near future. Demand for the baht,
along with other regional currencies, will likely remain depressed for the
short- to medium-term and result in lower valuations. Much like Vietnam,
Thailand is in danger of being overlooked as international investors look
toward emergent investment opportunities and lower cost structures in
China.209
Investors may not like or understand the authoritarian regime in China, but it
looked much more stable than Thailand’s economic and political situation. As seen in
Figure 14, FDI dropped significantly after the 2001 election but rebounded and improved
up to the 2006 coup.
The same countries responsible for the export drop were
responsible for decreased FDI in 2002: NAFTA, EU, and ASEAN.210 This showed a
positive correlation between FDI and the export market of Thailand. Ensure political
stability and capital will continue to flow into the country. This should have dissuaded
coup makers from initiating an act that produced political instability.
Even with
fluctuations shortly after the 2001 election, the Thaksin administration had shown
moderate gains up until the time of the coup in 2006. Export-based performance cannot
be blamed for the 2006 coup.
209 Jarvis, 302.
210 The sectors that saw a dip in FDI from the 2001 numbers were: Industry (-$1.1 billion), Trade (-$.4
billion), Mining (-$.6 billion), and Investment (-$.6 billion). For more, see the Bank of Thailand, Available
online. http://www.bot.or.th/BotHomepage/databank/EconData/EconFinance/index04e.htm, (accessed 1
June 2007).
64
Figure 14
D.
Thailand’s Exports versus Foreign Direct Investment (2000-2005)211
CONCLUSION
After the six hypotheses were tested against the data for the 2006 coup, the areas
that Thailand was weak in before the 1997 reforms turned out stronger and should have
led to increased political stability. The most notable improvement areas were in voter
participation, political party institutionalization and electoral reform. Thailand turned a
highly fragmented political party system into a more moderate level of fragmentation.
Thailand chose moderate versus drastic reforms. This decision improved the system
slightly instead of instituting major modifications. The economy slowed down during the
211 For export numbers see, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
website, http://stats.unctad.org/Handbook/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx (accessed 1 June 2007); for
FDI numbers see, Bank of Thailand, Foreign trade and Balance of Payments,
http://www.bot.or.th/bothomepage/databank/EconData/EconFinance/index03e.htm (accessed 1 June 2007).
65
first few years after Thaksin’s administration was elected. Thaksin was even indicted for
fraudulently not reporting his assets correctly. Surely with an impending court date and
the economy stalled, the time was ripe for the military to overthrow Thaksin at the
beginning of his term. Why did the coup not occur earlier during the rough times? The
opportunity was there as Thailand was not dependent on a foreign power, so the military
was free to stage a coup when it was in the military’s best interest. The evidence showed
the military had the best motive and opportunity to stage a coup in 2001 to 2002. The
evidence supported coups occurring at certain milestones, but that is not when the coups
happen in Thailand.
66
IV.
A.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
INTRODUCTION
This thesis raised the question of whether common political and economic factors
played a role in Thailand’s last two coups--1991 and 2006. When the hypotheses are
tested against the evidence for each coup, there are certain times the evidence points to
increased political instability. However, political instability does not always lead to a
coup. On the contrary, the 1991 and 2006 coups occurred when they were least expected.
There were other more opportune times for a coup, but the military chose not to
intervene.212
B.
HYPOTHESES
1.
Hypothesis I
Thailand’s last two coups were caused by a combination of a low level of political
participation and a weak multiparty political system.213
What can be said for level of
political participation when there is no protest over a military coup? Englehart stated:
There was relatively little protest over the 1991 coup. Despite the fact that
a democratically elected government had been overthrown, no crowds
emerged in Bangkok as they would under quite different circumstances in
1992. The Far Eastern Economic Review reported as the time that the
coup “was widely accepted, almost popular.” Indeed, the Thai stock
market rose after the coup—particularly after the NPKC named wellrespected diplomat and businessman Anand Panyarachun as prime
minister.214
Certainly a case was made for the weak mulitparty structure leading up to Chatichai’s
coup. The inadequacies with the political party system were overhauled and strengthened
212 Other more opportune times would be: (1) 1997 Asian financial crisis and (2) Thaksin’s early years
(2001 to 2002).
213 Huntington, 397-461.
214 Englehart, 258.
67
during the 1997 reforms. Voter participation continued to rise in Thailand and cannot be
blamed for either coup. As Englehart pointed out, the 1991 coup was not contested. The
2006 coup was not much different. As McCargo states:
The September 19 coup is a deeply anachronistic event that sets
Thailand’s political clock back by 15 long and bitter years. If the legacy
of the 1991 coup is anything to go by, popular disillusionment will
develop over time, too, with attendant consequences that could eventually
overshadow the military intervention itself. Simply put, Thailand’s
citizens have higher political expectations today than they did in 1991 and
are unlikely to find an extended period of quasi-military rule very
palatable.215
This “quasi-military rule” as McCargo defined it is almost a year old. There will be
much to study and learn about the political reforms proposed in the new constitution and
election scheduled toward the end of 2007.
While the evidence supported a weak
mulitparty system as leading to political instability, it alone is not a sufficient condition in
causing either coup.
2.
Hypothesis II
Thailand’s last two coups were caused by the weakness of global and regional
powers’ influence over Thailand’s internal political environment.
Other than one
multilateral military and a few bilateral exercises, there was not a lot of foreign troop
presence within Thailand’s borders. The single time Thailand did open the country to
foreign troop presence was immediately after the December 2004 tsunami.
This
combined task force was stationed throughout Thailand for about 60 days. This operation
was classified as humanitarian assistance, and all nations contributing were seen in a
favorable light, especially the host country, Thailand. The evidence supported Thailand
as being relatively independent, and as Luttwak proposed, presented the Thai military
leaders with the opportunity to launch both coups without interference from a foreign
power. This hypothesis has been confirmed, but only for providing opportunity and not
motive.
215 McCargo (2006), 2.
68
3.
Hypothesis III
Did Thailand’s electoral process foster political instability to the point of causing
both coups? In the time period leading to the 1991 coup, Thailand’s electoral system
promoted representativeness as this was noted as a strength, but the weakness of
Thailand’s political party fragmentation combined with low polarization could not
generate a majority-led cabinet. This was due to the very high number of effective
electoral parties the system generated.
While this led to political instability within
Thailand, it did not cause the coup.
In the years leading up to the 2006 coup, Thailand’s reformed electoral system
still promoted representativeness, and Thailand’s political party fragmentation moved
from high to moderate. Both of these are significant improvements. This set the stage
for a single party to win a majority of the seats. The pendulum had swung from a weak
multiparty system to an electoral system capable of electing a one-party dominant
majority. Thailand’s electoral process combined with its party system had made vast
improvements that should have promoted political stability, and did not have a causal
effect on the 2006 coup.
4.
Hypothesis IV
Thailand’s last two coups were caused by a downturn in Thailand’s Gross
Domestic Product (GDP).
Economics in general have helped maintain what little
political stability Thailand has enjoyed. Englehart’s characterization spanned both coup
periods:
69
The forces of economic globalization contributed powerfully to Thai
democratization in the 1990s. Thailand has steadily integrated into
international trade and financial networks since the mid-1980s, and one
consequence has been increased vulnerability to international public
opinion, especially among investors. The perception that investors were
worried about political instability and preferred democratic regimes helped
democracy activists push for the unamended passage of a new
constitution—aided in part by the currency collapse of 1997.216
Thailand’s GDP and per capita GDP grew in the years leading to each coup. There was
no stagnation in the economy. There were other times when GDP performance was
either not growing or even declining, but no coups occurred during those times of
economic downturn. GDP or per capita GDP performance did not cause either the 1991
or 2006 coup.
5.
Hypothesis V
Deterioration in Thailand’s income inequality, which led to an increased income
inequality gap between the rich and the poor, contributed to Thailand’s last two coups.217
Income distribution was relatively stable during the years leading to each coup. Even
though income distribution favored the rich in Thailand, the evidence does not support
income inequality as a primary factor for the military to stage a coup. On the whole,
Thailand’s economy and per capita income had risen over the past 30 years, but it had
been at the expense of the poor. Income inequality was not a factor leading to each coup.
216 Englehart, 265.
217 The income inequality gap is defined as the measure of relative income gains or losses between
the top and bottom 20 percent of the income bracket for Thailand. For instance, if the top 20 percent (the
rich) enjoyed a 33 percent rise in income during a five-year period, and during the same time period, the
bottom 20 percent (the poor) only gained 11 percent, the gap will be assessed as widening/increasing (the
rich get richer and the poor get poorer, relatively speaking). The Gini coefficient will also be used to
examine the income inequality gap. See Nordlinger, 58.
70
6.
Hypothesis VI
Thailand’s last two coups were caused by a downturn in its primary exports,
which created economic instability that undermined political stability.218 Exports were
on the rise leading up to each coup, but what about the time period between the coups?
The bubble popped in the summer of 1997 when declining exports put
pressure on the artificially pegged value of the baht. At the same time,
imports became much more expensive, and the value of personal income
and savings dropped sharply. Economic suffering generated fear of
undemocratic intervention in politics, such as military pressure on the
elected government, the installation of an unelected prime minister, or
even a coup.219
Why was there no coup in 1997 when exports were down? Why did the coups in 1991
and 2006 occur when exports were on the rise? Did a burgeoning economy present an
opportune time for the military to take over? The Thai military leaders may choose to act
when the economy is at its best. In any event, export-based product performance cannot
explain either of Thailand’s last two coups.
C.
CONCLUSION
After examining the evidence for the 1991 and 2006 coups, the evidence showed
that Thailand’s economic performance in the years leading up to each coup was not a
reason for the military to overthrow the government. Of the three economic factors,
income inequality needed the most attention from the Thai government. The peasants in
the rural areas have been left behind by the modernization transformation within
Thailand’s urban centers. Thaksin addressed the rural population’s concerns by creating
a party platform focused on the needs of the poor and underprivileged.
GDP
performance and the export-based economic sectors both were flourishing at the time of
each coup. These three economic factors were non-players in both coups.
218 O’Kane, 61.
219 Englehart, 266.
71
Thailand’s political factors contributed to overall political instability. Political
participation, the political party system, and the electoral process were factors that greatly
differed between the 1991 and 2006 coups. In 1991, Thailand’s electoral system was set
up to produce an extreme pluralistic political party system which was characterized by
rampant party switching and severe fragmentation. These factors combined and fostered
political instability. By contrast, Thai political reformers worked hard to change these
weak areas with the 1997 reforms. The most notable improvement areas were political
party institutionalization and electoral reform. Thailand turned a highly fragmented
political party system into a more moderate level of fragmentation. These reforms led to
a couple of first time events in Thai history: an incumbent prime minister that won
reelection and a dominant party majority in parliament for the Thai Rak Thai party in the
2005 election. Thailand strengthened its political institutions, but a coup still occurred.
The foreign influence hypothesis was the only hypothesis positively confirmed in
this research. The evidence supported Thailand as being a relatively independent nation
free from direct foreign influence. Not having to deal with external pressures certainly
made the coup leaders’ job much easier.
While this provided the coup makers
opportunity, it did not provide them with motive, and you need both opportunity and
motive to launch a coup.220
Why did the coup not occur during the rough times? The evidence presented
showed the military had the best motive and opportunity to stage a coup in other difficult
times, but that is not when the coups happen in Thailand. While I’m certain that political
participation and the electoral process were leading contributors to overall political
instability in Thailand they were not the cause of either coup. Thailand’s democratic
political institutions remained much weaker and less institutionalized than the military
and the monarchy, and when the military chooses to carry out a coup, there is little
democratic institutions can do to prevent it. The conclusion drawn here is that certain
political factors led to political instability, but do not necessarily cause a coup on their
own.
220 Luttwak.
72
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