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The crisis, the consolidation and Britain’s public finances Robert Chote Chairman St Catharine’s College, Cambridge, 30 April 2014 Outline • The Budget 2008 forecast • What happened instead • Impact on receipts and spending • Balancing the budget: will it happen and how? The outlook in March 2008 • Financial crisis underway, but impact on economy and public finances still expected to be modest • “Because of the changes made by this Government to entrench stability and increase the flexibility and resilience of our economy, I am able to report that the British economy will continue to grow through this year and beyond.” (Alistair Darling, 2008 Budget speech) • Outside forecasters only a bit more pessimistic March 2008 GDP growth forecasts Cumulative real GDP growth forecast for calendar years 2008 and 2009 Lloyds TSB Oxford Economics N IESR Da iwa Institute of Resea rch ITEM Club Liverpool Ma cro Research CBI Ba rcla ys Ca pita l HMT Foreca st Ca mbridge Econometrics Bea con Economic Foreca sting Morga n Sta nley ABN AMRO Da iwa Securities SMBC CEBR Lehma n Brothers Goldma n Sa chs Global Insight HSBC Hermes Citigroup Ingenious Securities Commerzba nk BN P Paribas Avera ge Outside Foreca st UBS Lomba rd Street Ca pita l Economics Experia n Business Stra tegies Sta nda rd Cha rtered Ba nk IN G Fina ncia l Ma rkets RBS Global Ba nk ing & Ma rkets Fortis Ba nk Dresdner Kleinwort Wa sserstein Deutsche Ba nk Economic Perspectives Outturn -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 Public sector net borrowing Budget 2008 50 48 Per cent of GDP 46 44 42 40 38 36 34 1996- 97 1999- 00 2002- 03 2005- 06 2008- 09 2011- 12 2014- 15 2017- 18 Current receipts Tota l mana ged expenditure Benign fiscal outlook reflected… • Real GDP growth dipping to 1¾% in 2008, then rising to 2½% • Nominal GDP growth steady at 4¾ – 5½% a year • Potential GDP growth steady at 2¾% a year (2½% assumed) • Financial sector profits recovering after brief disruption • Equity prices rising with money GDP • House prices flat in 2008, then growing with earnings • Housing transactions remaining at pre-crisis levels • CPI inflation stable at 2% from second half of 2009 onwards • Real earnings growth stable at around 2% • Little movement in Gilt rates But instead… Change from 07-08 to 12-13 Budget 08 Outturn Real GDP +13.8% –2.6% Nominal GDP +30.4% +7.9% Nominal wages and salaries +30.2% +8.7% Nominal consumer spending +29.1% +12.5% Nominal financial profits +53.8% +7.1% Nominal non-financial profits +28.7% +3.4% But instead… Change from 07-08 to 12-13 Budget 08 Outturn Employment +720k +294k Unemployment +235k +754k Consumer prices index +11.2% +17.5% Retail prices index +15.6% +17.4% Equity prices +15.3% –4.7% House prices +19.7% –2.3% Housing transactions +10.7% –36.5% Sterling oil prices +£11 +£34 10-year gilt yields –0.1ppt –3.0ppt Actual and potential GDP 140.0 130.0 120.0 Rea l GDP = 100 in 2007 Q4 110.0 100.0 90.0 80.0 20 06 20 07 2008 Actual 20 08 20 09 20 10 2008 Potential 20 11 20 12 20 13 2014 Actual 20 14 20 15 20 16 2014 Potential 20 17 Actual and potential GDP 140.0 130.0 120.0 Rea l GDP = 100 in 2007 Q4 110.0 Capital economics -6% 100.0 Fathom consulting -0.8% 90.0 80.0 20 06 20 07 2008 Actual 20 08 20 09 20 10 2008 Potential 20 11 20 12 20 13 2014 Actual 20 14 20 15 20 16 2014 Potential 20 17 Forecasts of potential GDP 120 Mar-08 Mar-10 Jun-10* 110 100 Mar-13 Mar-14 90 80 Actual output = 100 in Q4 2007 70 60 199601 *In 199903 200301 200603 June 2010 the OBR had not produced a historical potential output series 201001 201303 201701 O BR Budget 2014 O BR December 2013 O BR Budget 2013 O BR December 2012 O BR Budget 2012 O BR November 2011 O BR Budget 2011 O BR November 2010 O BR Budget June 2010 HMT Budget March 2010 HMT PBR 2009 HMT Budget 2009 HMT PBR 2008 Per cent of GDP The ‘hole’ in the public finances Deterioration in medium-term structural budget balance relative to March 2008 Budget forecast 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Policy measures post Budget 08 12.0 Perc cent of GDP 10.0 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0 0.0 - 2.0 Labour Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies Policy measures post Budget 08 12.0 Perc cent of GDP 10.0 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0 0.0 - 2.0 Labour Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies Coalition - Budget 2010 Policy measures post Budget 08 12.0 Perc cent of GDP 10.0 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0 0.0 - 2.0 Labour Coalition - Budget 2010 Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies Coalition - post Budget 2010 Policy measures post Budget 08 12.0 Perc cent of GDP 10.0 March 14: 8.6% 8.0 6.0 June 10: 5.8% March 10: 5.3% 4.0 The 'hole' 2.0 0.0 - 2.0 Labour Coalition - Budget 2010 NB: Measures include re-costing of previously implemented measures, notably 50p income tax rate Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies Coalition - post Budget 2010 Policy measures post Budget 08 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 Tax NB: Measures include re-costing of previously implemented measures, notably 50p income tax rate Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies 2015-16 Spending 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 Public sector net borrowing Budget 2008 50 48 Per cent of GDP 46 44 42 40 38 36 34 1996- 97 1999- 00 2002- 03 2005- 06 2008- 09 2011- 12 2014- 15 2017- 18 Current receipts Tota l mana ged expenditure Public spending and receipts Budget 2008 and March 2014 forecasts 50 48 Per cent of GDP 46 44 42 40 38 36 34 1996- 97 1999- 00 2002- 03 2005- 06 2008- 09 2011- 12 2014- 15 2017- 18 Tota l mana ged expenditure Current receipts Public spending and receipts March 2014 forecast: including and excluding post Budget 2008 measures 50 48 Per cent of GDP 46 44 42 40 38 36 34 1996- 97 1999- 00 2002- 03 2005- 06 2008- 09 2011- 12 2014- 15 2017- 18 Tota l mana ged expenditure Source: Institute for Fiscal Studies Current receipts Nominal GDP permanently lower 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 1996-97 2000-01 2004-05 Budget 2014 2008-09 Budget 2008 2012-13 2016-17 NGDP fell in this recession Changes over period of peak to trough fall in real GDP 30% 25% Rea l GDP 20% N omina l GDP 15% 10% 5% 0% - 5% - 10% 1979Q2 to 1981Q1 1990Q2 to 1991Q3 2008Q1 to 2009Q2 Nominal GDP since 2008 in the G7 20.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0% - 5.0% - 10.0% - 15.0% Cana da Fra nce Real GDP growth Germany Ita ly GDP deflator growth Japan United Kingdom United Sta tes N ominal GDP growth Spending or receipts problem? 2009-10: error relative to Budget 2008 forecast Cash % Nominal GDP* Receipts –£96bn –2.3% Spending +£25bn +6.7% *excluding revisions to 2007-08 NGDP) • Nominal GDP fell 1.2% from 2007-08 to 2009-10, compared to the Budget 2008 forecast of a 10% rise Public spending and receipts Budget 2008 1050 950 £ billion 850 750 650 550 450 350 250 1996- 97 1999- 00 2002- 03 2005- 06 2008- 09 2011- 12 2014- 15 2017- 18 Tota l ma na ged expenditure Current rece ipts Public spending and receipts March 2014 1050 950 £ billion 850 750 650 550 450 350 250 1996- 97 1999- 00 2002- 03 2005- 06 2008- 09 2011- 12 2014- 15 2017- 18 Tota l mana ged expenditure Current receipts Public spending and receipts Budget 2014 forecast: including and excluding post Budget 2008 measures 1050 950 £ billion 850 750 650 550 450 350 250 1996- 97 1999- 00 2002- 03 2005- 06 2008- 09 2011- 12 2014- 15 2017- 18 Tota l ma na ged expenditure Current rece ipts Receipts during the crisis Change in receipts between 2007-08 and 2009-10 (£bn) Excise duties Business rates Council tax VAT ex measures NICS Interest and dividends VAT reduction Income tax Onshore CT Capital taxes -12.0 -10.0 -8.0 -6.0 -4.0 -2.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 Why did receipts fall 07-08 to 09-10? • By a lot in cash terms: – Lower nominal GDP (including lower nominal labour income, consumer spending and profits) • But also somewhat as a share of NGDP: – Profits tend to be super-cyclical – Negative fiscal drag, thanks to weak earnings growth and stubborn consumer inflation – Disproportionate hit to revenue-rich financial sector – Asset prices and transactions weak relative to NGDP – Discretionary VAT cut The fall and rise in receipts Change in share of GDP Crisis (0910 v 07-08) Consolidation (18-19 v 09-10) –1.9 +2.0 Income tax and NICs VAT Onshore corporation tax UK oil and gas Capital taxes Fuel and excise duties Business rates and council tax Interest and dividends Other Total Memo: policy measures Memo: financial sector The fall and rise in receipts Change in share of GDP Crisis (0910 v 07-08) Consolidation (18-19 v 09-10) Total –1.9 +2.0 Memo: policy measures –0.7 +2.3 Memo: financial sector –0.5 +0.1 Income tax and NICs VAT Onshore corporation tax UK oil and gas Capital taxes Fuel and excise duties Business rates and council tax Interest and dividends Other The fall and rise in receipts Change in share of GDP Crisis (0910 v 07-08) Consolidation (18-19 v 09-10) Income tax and NICs –0.5 +0.2 VAT –0.4 +1.1 Onshore corporation tax –0.7 –0.0 UK oil and gas –0.1 –0.3 Capital taxes –0.7 +0.9 Fuel and excise duties +0.2 –0.5 Business rates and council tax +0.3 –0.4 Interest and dividends –0.3 +0.5 Other +0.2 +0.5 Total –1.9 +2.0 Memo: policy measures –0.7 +2.3 Memo: financial sector –0.5 +0.1 Public spending: rising or falling? Total managed expenditure, 2007-08=100 140 130 Index 120 110 100 90 80 2007-08 2009-10 2011-12 Nominal 2013-14 real terms 2015-16 % GDP 2017-18 Public spending during the crisis 2009-10 versus 2007-08 Total spending, of which Public services/admin (current + capital DEL) Social security tax credits and Central government debt interest Nominal % change Budget 08 Outturn +10.2% +14.7% Change in share of GDP Budget 08 Outturn Public spending during the crisis 2009-10 versus 2007-08 Nominal % change Budget 08 Outturn Total spending, of which +10.2% +14.7% Public services/admin (current + capital DEL) +9.8% +13.0% Social security tax credits +11.6% +19.6% +1.3% +1.0% and Central government debt interest Change in share of GDP Budget 08 Why did nominal spending rise more quickly than expected? • Public services: underspend in 07-08 plus stimulus spending • Welfare: unemployment higher than expected • Debt interest: more borrowing but lower borrowing costs Outturn Public spending during the crisis 2009-10 versus 2007-08 Nominal % change Change in share of GDP Budget 08 Outturn Budget 08 Outturn Total spending, of which +10.2% +14.7% 0 +6.5 Public services/admin (current + capital DEL) +9.8% +13.0% -0.1 +3.2 Social security tax credits +11.6% +19.6% +0.1 +2.4 +1.3% +1.0% -0.2 0 and Central government debt interest • Nominal spending and GDP were both expected to rise by c.10% in Budget 2008, leaving spending/GDP unchanged • But nominal spending rose by around 15% while nominal GDP fell by 1.2%, so spending jumped sharply as a share of GDP Welfare spending 14 Foreca st 12 Per cent of GDP 10 8 6 4 2 0 1983-84 Source: DWP, HMRC, O BR 1986-87 1989-90 1992-93 1995-96 Children a nd working a ge 1998-99 2001-02 2004-05 Pensioners 2007-08 2010-11 Tota l 2013-14 2016-17 Drivers of welfare spending Caseloads compared with Budget 2008 forecasts Thousands 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 State pension 0 -18 -18 -33 Housing benefit 21 165 557 833 JSA 66 270 636 440 DLA/PIP 15 24 40 33 Drivers of welfare spending Inflation, earnings and nominal GDP per capita (% change) Per cent 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 Total change between 2008-09 and 201213 RPI inflation 3.9 5.0 -1.4 4.6 5.6 18.8 ROSSI inflation 2.3 6.3 1.8 4.8 6.8 23.9 CPI inflation 1.8 5.2 1.1 3.1 5.2 17.4 Average earnings growth 0.6 3.0 1.0 2.7 1.0 8.5 Growth in nominal GDP -1.2 -1.4 were generally 4.1 uprated 2.4with ROSSI 0.7 and other 4.5 Priorper to 2011-12, means-tested benefits 16+ benefits with RPI (in 2010-11 these were uprated by +1.5% rather than -1.4%). The person baseline assumption since 2011-12 has been to uprate most benefits with CPI. Debt interest: rising from low base 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 1979/1980 1983/1984 1987/1988 1991/1992 1995/1996 Outturn 1999/2000 Bud 08 2003/2004 2007/2008 BUD14 2011/2012 2015/2016 Debt stock and debt interest 2007-08 2012-13 2018-19 535.6 731.2 - Average interest rate 4.7 4.6 - Debt interest 29.9 36.3 - 537.8 1185.2 1548.1 Average interest rate 4.7 1.8 4.0 Debt interest 30.2 47.6 75.2 Budget 2008 Cash PSND Budget 2014 Cash PSND Public spending and receipts Budget 2008 and March 2014 forecasts 50 48 Per cent of GDP 46 44 42 40 38 36 34 1996- 97 1999- 00 2002- 03 2005- 06 2008- 09 2011- 12 2014- 15 2017- 18 Total managed expenditure Current receipts Squaring the circle Change in share of GDP 2007-08 2018-19 Change PSNB 2.6 -0.2 -2.8 Welfare 10.2 11.2 1.0 Debt Interest 2.1 3.7 1.6 Other AME 5.8 6.9 1.1 Receipts 37.9 38.1 0.1 Departmental spending 22.5 16.1 -6.4 of which: capital 2.7 1.9 -0.7 of which: resource 19.8 14.2 -5.7 The squeeze on public spending 60 55 Annually managed expenditure (AME) Capital investment (CDEL) Day-to-day spending on public services (RDEL) 50 45 Per cent of nominal GDP 40 21.4 35 30 20.4 21.9 22.5 18.1 25 20 21.7 2.7 2.9 3.5 2.9 2.3 2.0 22.3 2.0 21.9 2.2 22.0 2.1 22.0 2.0 15 10 19.8 20.8 22.2 21.6 20.7 20.1 19.2 18.5 22.0 21.8 1.9 1.9 17.5 16.2 14.9 14.2 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 5 0 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 Source: O BR, HMT Memo: AME includes Single Use Military Equipment 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 The squeeze on public spending Government consumption of goods and services as a share of GDP 26 Forecast 24 Per cent 22 20 18 16 14 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 Source: O N S, O BR The squeeze on public spending Current Spending on public services and administration 24 Per cent of nominal GDP 20 16 11.9 11.4 10.7 10.0 9.1 8.6 7.9 12 8 4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.0 6.4 6.4 6.5 6.4 6.3 6.2 2011-12 2012-13 6.5 16.2 14.9 14.2 0 2009-10 2010-11 Other NHS (Health) 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 International development Implied PSCE in RDEL 2016-17 2017-18 Education PSCE in RDEL Plans for RDEL excluding depreciation upto 2015-16. Beyond 2015-16 based on implied PSCE in RDEL calculated from the Government assumption for TME. O ther includes unallocated amounts. Source: HM Treasury Budget 2014, HM Treasury Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses, July 2013 2018-19 Conclusion: will this happen? • Lots of uncertainties – Macro forecast and fiscal forecast – Assessment of potential and ‘hole’ in public finances • Policy choices – – – – We have to forecast on basis of Coalition policy, but Conservatives want more welfare cuts Labour see less need for balanced budget Lib Dems: more borrowing and tax?