Download What Is the Real Business Cycle Theory?

Survey of ECON
© KEVIN DIETSCH/UPI/LANDOV
Robert L. Sexton
Chapter 17
Issues in
Macroeconomic
Theory and Policy
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Chapter 17 Sections
– Problems in Implementing Fiscal and
Monetary Policy
– Rational Expectations and Real
Business Cycles
– Controversies in Macroeconomic
Policy
– The Financial Crisis of 2007–2009
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Problems in
Implementing Fiscal
and Monetary Policy
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Section 1
SECTION 1 QUESTIONS
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Possible Obstacles to
Effective Fiscal Policy
• We’ll begin our discussion with the
problems that fiscal policy makers must
consider.
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The Crowding-Out Effect
• The multiplier effect of an increase in
government purchases implies that the
increase in aggregate demand will tend
to be greater than the initial fiscal
stimulus, other things being equal.
• However, because all other things will
not tend to stay equal in this case, the
multiplier effect may not hold true.
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The Crowding-Out Effect
• When the government borrows money
to finance a deficit, it increases the
overall demand for money in the money
market, driving interest rates up.
• As a result of the higher interest rate,
consumers may decide against buying
some interest-sensitive goods, and
businesses may cancel or scale back
plans to expand or buy new capital
equipment.
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The Crowding-Out Effect
• In short, the higher interest rate will choke
off private spending on goods and
services, and as a result, the impact of the
increase in government purchases may be
smaller than we first assumed.
• Economists call this the crowding-out
effect.
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The Crowding-Out Effect
• An additional $10 billion of government
spending on aircraft carriers, other
things equal, would shift the aggregate
demand curve right by $10 billion times
the multiplier.
• However, as this process takes place,
interest rates rise, crowding out some
higher investment spending, shifting the
aggregate demand curve to the left.
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Exhibit 17.1: The Crowding-Out Effect
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Critics of the Crowding-Out
Effect
• Critics argue that the increase in government
purchases, particularly when the economy is
severely recessive, may actually improve
consumer and business expectations and
encourage private investment spending.
• It is also possible for monetary authorities to
increase money supply to offset the higher
interest rate resulting from the crowding-out
effect.
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The Crowding-Out Effect
in the Open Economy
• Another form of crowding out can take
place in international markets.
• Increased government spending, leads
to higher demand for money, and thus
drives up the interest rates (assuming
the money supply is unchanged).
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The Crowding-Out Effect in
the Open Economy
• The higher interest rates will attract funds
from abroad, which foreigners will first
have to convert from their currencies into
dollars.
• The increase in the demand for dollars
relative to other currencies will cause the
dollar to appreciate in value.
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The Crowding-Out Effect in
the Open Economy
• Foreign imports become relatively cheaper
in the United States, and U.S. exports
relatively more expensive in other
countries.
• The net exports (X – M) fall; because of
the higher relative price of the dollar,
foreign imports become cheaper for those
in the United States, and imports increase.
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The Crowding-Out Effect in
the Open Economy
• Because of the higher relative price of the
dollar, U.S.-made goods will become more
expensive to foreigners, and exports will
decrease.
• The net effect will be that fiscal policy will
have a smaller effect on aggregate
demand than it would otherwise.
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Time Lags in Fiscal
Policy Implementation
• It is important to recognize that, in a
democracy, fiscal policy is implemented
through the political process, and that
process takes time.
• Often, the lag between the time that a
fiscal response is desired and the time
an appropriate policy is implemented
and its effects felt is considerable.
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Time Lags in Fiscal Policy
Implementation
• Sometimes a fiscal policy designed to deal
with a contracting economy may actually
take effect during a period of economic
expansion, or vice versa, resulting in a
stabilization policy that actually
destabilizes the economy.
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The Recognition Lag
• Government tax or spending (fiscal policy)
changes require both congressional and
presidential approval.
• Suppose the economy is beginning
a downturn.
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The Recognition Lag
• It may take two or three months before
enough data are gathered to indicate the
actual presence of a downturn. This time
span is called the recognition lag.
• Sometimes a future downturn can be
forecast through econometric models or
by looking at the index of leading
indicators, but usually decision makers
are hesitant to plan policy on the basis of
forecasts that are not always accurate.
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The Implementation Lag
• Once policy makers decide that some
policy change is necessary, there is a
consultation phase, during which many
decisions with profound political
consequences must be made, so reaching
a decision is not always easy and usually
involves much compromise and a great
deal of time.
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The Implementation Lag
• Finally, once the House and Senate have
completed their separate deliberations and
have arrived at a final version of the bill, it
is presented to Congress for approval.
• After congressional approval is secured,
the bill then goes to the president for
approval or veto.
• These steps are all part of the
implementation lag.
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The Impact Lag
• Even after legislation is signed into law, it
takes time to bring about the actual fiscal
stimulus desired.
• If the legislation provides for a reduction in
withholding taxes, for example, it might
take a few months before the changes
actually show up in workers’ paychecks.
• Changes related to government purchases
are delayed for longer.
22
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The Impact Lag
• If the government increases spending for
public works projects such as sewer
systems, new highways, or urban renewal,
it takes time to draw up plans and get
permissions, to advertise for bids from
contractors, to get contracts, and then to
begin work.
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The Impact Lag
• Further delays may occur due to
government regulation.
• For example, an environmental impact
statement must be completed before
most public works projects can begin.
This process, called the impact lag, often
takes many months or years.
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Problems in Conducting
Monetary Policy
• The lag problem inherent in adopting fiscal
policy changes is less acute for monetary
policy, largely because the decisions are not
slowed by the same budgetary process.
• However, the length and variability of the
impact lag before its effects on output and
employment are felt is still significant, and the
time before the full price-level effects are felt is
even longer and more variable.
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Problems in Conducting
Monetary Policy
• According to the Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco
– The major effects of a change in policy on
growth in the overall production of goods
and services usually are felt within three
months to two years.
– The effects on inflation tend to involve even
longer lags, perhaps one to three years, or
more.
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How Do Commercial Banks Implement
the Fed’s Monetary Policies?
• One limitation of monetary policy is that
it ultimately must be carried out through
the commercial banking system.
• The Central Bank can change the
environment in which banks act, but the
banks themselves must take the steps
necessary to increase or decrease the
money supply.
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How Do Commercial Banks Implement
the Fed’s Monetary Policies?
•
•
Usually, when the Fed is trying to constrain
monetary expansion, there is no difficulty in
getting banks to make appropriate
responses.
Banks must meet their reserve requirements,
and if the Fed raises bank reserve
requirements, sells bonds, and/or raises the
discount rate, banks must obtain the
necessary cash or reserve deposits at the
Fed to meet their reserve requirements.
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How Do Commercial Banks Implement
the Fed’s Monetary Policies?
• In response, they will call in loans that
are due for collection, sell secondary
reserves, and so on, to obtain the
necessary reserves.
• In the process of contracting loans, they
lower the supply of money.
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How Do Commercial Banks Implement
the Fed’s Monetary Policies?
• When the Federal Reserve wants to
induce monetary expansion, however, it
can provide banks with excess reserves
(e.g., by lowering reserve requirements
or buying government bonds), but it
cannot force the banks to make loans,
thereby creating new money.
30
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How Do Commercial Banks Implement
the Fed’s Monetary Policies?
• Ordinarily, of course, banks want to
convert their excess reserves to earn
interest income by making loans.
• But in a deep recession or depression,
banks might be hesitant to make enough
loans to put all those reserves to work,
fearing that they will not be repaid.
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How Do Commercial Banks Implement
the Fed’s Monetary Policies?
• Their pessimism might lead them to
perceive that the risks of making loans to
many normally credit-worthy borrowers
outweigh any potential interest earnings.
• Banks maintaining excess reserves
rather than loaning them out was, in fact,
one of the monetary policy problems that
arose in the Great Depression.
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Banks That Are Not Part of the
Federal Reserve System and
Policy Implementation
• A second problem with monetary policy
relates to the fact that the Fed can control
deposit expansion at member banks, but it
has no control over global and nonbank
institutions that also issue credit (loan
money) but are not subject to reserve
requirement limitations, such as pension
funds and insurance companies.
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Banks That Are Not Part of the
Federal Reserve System and
Policy Implementation
• While the Fed may be able to predict the
impact of its monetary policies on
member bank loans, the actions of global
and nonbanking institutions can serve to
partially offset the impact of monetary
policies adopted by the Fed on the
money and loanable funds markets.
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Banks That Are Not Part of the
Federal Reserve System and
Policy Implementation
• There is a real question of how
precisely the Fed can control the shortrun real interest rates through its
monetary policy instruments.
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Fiscal and Monetary
Coordination Problems
• Another possible problem that arises out
of existing institutional policy making
arrangements is the coordination of fiscal
and monetary policy.
• Fiscal policy decisions are made by
Congress and the president, and
monetary policy making by the Federal
Reserve System.
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Fiscal and Monetary
Coordination Problems
• A macroeconomic problem arises if the
federal government’s fiscal decision
makers differ on policy objectives or
targets with the Fed’s monetary decision
makers.
– For example, the Fed may be more
concerned about keeping inflation low, while
fiscal policymakers may be more concerned
about keeping unemployment low.
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Alleviating Coordination
Problems
• In recognition of potential macroeconomic
policy coordination problems, the
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board
participates in meetings with top economic
advisers of the president.
– An attempt to reach a consensus on the
appropriate policy responses, both monetary
and fiscal, is made.
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Alleviating Coordination
Problems
• There is often some disagreement, and
the Fed occasionally works to partly
offset or even neutralize the effects of
fiscal policies that it views as
inappropriate.
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Alleviating Coordination
Problems
• Some people believe that monetary
policy should be more directly controlled
by the president and Congress, so that
all macroeconomic policy will be
determined more directly by the political
process.
• It is argued that such a move would
enhance coordination considerably.
40
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Alleviating Coordination
Problems
• Others argue that it is dangerous to turn
over control of the nation’s money stock
to politicians, rather than allowing
decisions to be made by technically
competent administrators who are more
focused on price stability and more
insulated from political pressures from
the public and from special interest
groups.
41
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Timing Is Critical
• The timing of fiscal policy and monetary
policy is crucial.
• Because of the significant lags before
the fiscal and monetary policy has its
impact, the increase in aggregate
demand may occur at the wrong time.
42
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Timing Is Critical
• Suppose the economy is currently
suffering from low levels of output and
high rates of unemployment.
• In response, policy makers decide to
increase government purchases and
implement a tax cut; alternatively, they
could have increased the money supply.
43
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Timing Is Critical
• But from the time when the policy makers
recognize the problem to the time when the
policies have a chance to work themselves
through the economy, business and
consumer confidence both increase,
increasing RGDP and employment.
44
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Timing Is Critical
• When the fiscal policy takes hold, the
policies will have the undesired effect of
causing inflation, with little permanent
effect on output and employment.
• Input owners requiring higher input
prices will result in a new long-run
equilibrium.
45
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Exhibit 17.2: Timing Expansionary Policy
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Imperfect Information
• In order to know how much to stimulate
the economy, policymakers must know
the size of the multiplier and by how
much RGDP should increase.
47
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Imperfect Information
• But some economists disagree on the
natural rate of real output (RGDPNR), and
it may be difficult to know where RGDP is
at any given moment in time; government
estimates are approximations and are
often corrected at a later period.
48
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Imperfect Information
• The government must also know the
exact MPC.
• If the estimate is too low, the multiplier
will be less than it should be and the
stimulus will be too small.
• If the estimate of MPC is too high, the
multiplier will be more than it should be
and the stimulus will be too large.
49
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Overall Problems with
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
• Much of macroeconomic policy in this country
is driven by the idea that the federal
government can counteract economic
fluctuations by stimulating the economy when it
is weak…
–
–
–
–
Increased government purchases
Tax cuts
Transfer payment increases
Easy money
• …or by restraining it when it is overheating.
50
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Overall Problems with
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
• But policy makers must adopt the right
policies in the right amounts at the right
time for such “stabilization” to do more
good than harm.
• And for government policy makers
to do this, they need far more accurate
and timely information than experts can
give them.
51
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Overall Problems with
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
• First, economists must know not only
which way the economy is heading, but
also how rapidly.
• However, no one knows exactly what the
economy will do, no matter how
sophisticated the econometric models
used.
52
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Overall Problems with
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
• Even if economists could provide
completely accurate economic forecasts
of what will happen if macroeconomic
policies are unchanged, they could not
be certain of how to best promote stable
economic growth.
53
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Overall Problems with
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
• If economists knew, for example, that the
economy was going to dip into another
recession in six months, they would then
need to know exactly how much each
possible policy would spur activity in order
to keep the economy stable.
54
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Overall Problems with
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
• But such precision is unattainable, given
the complex forecasting problems.
• Furthermore, economists aren’t always
sure what effect a policy will have on the
economy.
• It is widely assumed that an increase in
government purchases quickens economic
growth.
55
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Overall Problems with
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
• Increasing government purchases
increases the budget deficit, which could
send a frightening signal to the bond
markets.
• The result can drive up interest rates and
choke off economic activity.
56
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Overall Problems with
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
• Even when policy makers know which
direction to nudge the economy, they
can’t be sure which policy levers to pull,
or how hard to pull them, to fine-tune the
economy to stable economic growth.
57
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Overall Problems with
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
• A third crucial consideration is how long
it will take a policy before it has its effect
on the economy.
• Even when increased government
purchases or expansionary monetary
policy does give the economy a boost,
no one knows precisely how long it will
take to do so.
58
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Overall Problems with
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
• The boost may come very quickly, or
many months (or even years) in the
future, when it may add inflationary
pressures to an economy that is already
overheating, rather than helping the
economy recover from a recession.
59
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Overall Problems with
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
• Macroeconomic policy making is like
driving down a twisting road in a car with
an unpredictable lag and degree of
response in the steering mechanism.
• If you turn the wheel to the right, the car
will eventually veer to the right, but you
don’t know exactly when or how much.
60
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Overall Problems with
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
• There are severe practical difficulties in
trying to fine-tune the economy.
• Even the best forecasting models and
methods are far from perfect.
• Economists are not exactly sure where
the economy is or where or how fast it is
going, making it very difficult to
prescribe an effective policy.
61
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Overall Problems with
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
© MASTERFILE
• Even if we do know where the economy
is headed, we can not be sure how
large a policy’s effect will be or when it
will take effect.
62
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Section 1
63
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Rational Expectations
and Real Business Cycles
64
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Section 2
SECTION 2 QUESTIONS
65
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Rational Expectations and Real
Business Cycles
• Is it possible that people can anticipate
the plans of policymakers and alter their
behavior quickly to neutralize the
intended impact of government action?
– For example, if workers see that the
government is allowing the money supply to
expand rapidly, they may quickly demand
higher money wages to offset the anticipated
inflation.
66
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Rational Expectations and Real
Business Cycles
• In the extreme form, if people could
instantly recognize and respond to
government policy changes, it might be
impossible to alter real output or
unemployment levels through policy
actions, because government
policymakers could no longer surprise
households and firms.
67
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Rational Expectations and Real
Business Cycles
• An increasing number of economists
believe that there is at least some truth
to this point of view.
• At a minimum, most economists accept
the notion that real output and the
unemployment rate cannot be altered
with the ease that was earlier believed;
some believe that the unemployment
rate can seldom be influenced by fiscal
and monetary policies.
68
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The Rational
Expectations Theory
• The relatively new extension of
economic theory that leads to this
rather pessimistic conclusion regarding
the ability of macroeconomic policy to
achieve our economic goals is called
the theory of rational expectations.
69
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The Rational
Expectations Theory
THEORY OF RATIONAL
EXPECTATIONS
belief that workers and consumers
incorporate the likely consequences of
government policy
70
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The Rational
Expectations Theory
• The notion that expectations or
anticipations of future events are
relevant to economic theory is not new;
for decades, economists have
incorporated expectations into models
analyzing many forms of economic
behavior.
71
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The Rational
Expectations Theory
• Only in the recent past, however, has a
theory evolved that tries to incorporate
expectations as a central factor in the
analysis of the entire economy.
• The interest in rational expectations
has grown rapidly in the last decade.
72
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The Rational
Expectations Theory
• Acknowledged pioneers in the
development of the theory include
Professor Robert Lucas of the University
of Chicago and Professor Thomas Sargent
of the University of Minnesota.
• In 1995, Professor Lucas won the Nobel
Prize for his work in rational expectations.
73
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The Rational
Expectations Theory
• Rational expectations economists
believe that wages and prices are
flexible and that households and firms
incorporate the likely consequences of
government policy changes quickly into
their expectations.
74
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The Rational
Expectations Theory
• In addition, they also believe that the
economy is inherently stable after
macroeconomic shocks and that
tinkering with fiscal and monetary policy
cannot have the desired effect unless
households and firms are caught “off
guard” (and catching them off guard
gets harder the more you try to do it).
75
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Rational Expectations and the
Consequences of Government
Macroeconomic Policies
• This theory suggests that government
economic policies designed to alter
aggregate demand to meet
macroeconomic goals are of limited
effectiveness.
• When policy targets become public, it is
argued, people will alter their own
behavior from what it would otherwise
have been to maximize their own utility.
76
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Rational Expectations and the
Consequences of Government
Macroeconomic Policies
• In so doing, they largely negate the
intended impact of policy changes.
• If government policy seems tilted toward
permitting more inflation to try to reduce
unemployment, people start spending
their money faster than before, becoming
more adamant in their demands for
wages and other input prices, and so on.
77
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Rational Expectations and the
Consequences of Government
Macroeconomic Policies
• In the process of quickly altering their
behavior to reflect the likely
consequences of policy changes, they
make it more difficult (costly) for
government authorities to meet their
macroeconomic objectives.
78
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Rational Expectations and the
Consequences of Government
Macroeconomic Policies
• Rather than fooling people into
changing real wages, and therefore
unemployment, with inflation
“surprises,” changes in inflation are
quickly reflected into expectations with
little or no effect on unemployment or
real output even in the short run.
79
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Rational Expectations and the
Consequences of Government
Macroeconomic Policies
• As a consequence, policies intended to
reduce unemployment through stimulating
aggregate demand will often fail to have
the intended effect.
• Fiscal and monetary policy, according to
this view, will work only if the people are
caught off guard or are fooled by policies
and thus do not modify their behavior in a
way that reduces policy effectiveness.
80
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Anticipation of an
Expansionary Monetary Policy
• Consider the case in which an increase
in aggregate demand is a result of an
expansionary monetary policy.
• Because the predictable inflationary
consequences of that expansionary
policy, prices immediately adjust to a
new level.
81
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Anticipation of an
Expansionary Monetary Policy
• Consequently, in an effort to protect
themselves from the higher anticipated
inflation, workers ask for higher wages,
suppliers increase input prices, and
producers raise their product prices.
• Because wages, prices, and interest
rates are assumed to be flexible, the
adjustments take place immediately.
82
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Anticipation of an
Expansionary Monetary Policy
• This increase in input costs for wages,
interest, and raw materials causes the
aggregate supply curve to shift up or left.
• So the desired policy effect of greater real
output and reduced unemployment from a
shift in the aggregate demand curve is
offset by an upward or leftward shift in the
aggregate supply curve caused by an
increase in input costs.
83
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Exhibit 17.3: Rational Expectations and
the AD/AS Model
84
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Unanticipated
Expansionary Policy
• Again, consider the case of an increase
in aggregate demand that results from
an expansionary monetary policy.
• However, this time it is unanticipated.
• This unanticipated change in monetary
policy stimulates output and
employment in the short run, as the
equilibrium moves.
85
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Unanticipated
Expansionary Policy
• Because it is unanticipated, workers
and other input owners are expecting
the price level to remain at a lower
level.
• However, when input owners eventually
realize that the actual price level has
changed, they will require higher input
prices.
86
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Unanticipated
Expansionary Policy
• Therefore, when the expansionary policy
is unanticipated, it leads to a short-run
expansion in output and employment.
• But in the long run, the only impact of
the change in monetary policy is a
higher price level—inflation.
87
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Unanticipated
Expansionary Policy
• In short, when the change is correctly
anticipated, expansionary monetary (or
fiscal) policy does not result in a change in
real output.
• However, if the expansionary monetary
(fiscal) policy is unanticipated, the result is
a short-run increase in RGDP and
employment, but in the long run, it just
means a higher price level.
88
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Unanticipated
Expansionary Policy
• In fact, the only way that monetary or fiscal
policy can change output in the rational
expectations model is with a surprise—an
unanticipated change.
• For example, on April 18, 2001, between
regularly scheduled meetings of the Federal
Open Market Committee, the Fed surprised
financial markets with an aggressive halfpoint cut in the interest rate.
89
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Unanticipated
Expansionary Policy
• The Fed was trying to boost consumer
confidence and impact falling stock
market wealth.
• The surprise reduction in the interest
rate sent the stock market soaring as
the Dow posted its third largest singleday point gain, and the NASDAQ had
its fourth largest percentage gain.
90
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Unanticipated
Expansionary Policy
• Former Fed Chairman Greenspan
hoped that this move would shift the AD
curve rightward, leading to higher levels
of output.
91
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Exhibit 17.4: An Expansionary Policy that
Is Unanticipated
92
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When an Anticipated Expansionary
Policy Change Is Less than the
Actual Policy Change
• In the context of the rational expectations
model (wages and prices are flexible),
suppose people are expecting a large
increase in the money supply as a result
of expansionary monetary policy.
• Then the anticipated price level increases
when the anticipated aggregate demand
increases.
93
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When an Anticipated Expansionary
Policy Change Is Less than the
Actual Policy Change
• If people anticipate the new price level,
wages and other input prices adjust
quickly, and the SRAS shifts leftward.
• But what if the increase in the money
supply ends up being less than people
anticipated?
• Say the actual increase in the money
supply shifts less than expected.
94
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When an Anticipated Expansionary
Policy Change Is Less than the
Actual Policy Change
• Say the economy does not move to as
far a point as expected; this leads to a
higher price level but a lower level of
RGDP—a recession.
• That is, a policy designed to increase
output may actually reduce output if
prices and wages are flexible and the
expansionary effect is less than people
anticipated.
95
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Exhibit 17.5: An Actual Expansionary
Policy that Is Less than the
Anticipated Policy
96
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Critics of Rational
Expectations Theory
• Critics want to know whether households
and firms are completely informed about
the impact that, say, an increase in money
supply will have on the economy.
• In general, all citizens will not be
completely informed, but key players such
as corporations, financial institutions, and
labor organizations may well be informed
about the impact of these policy changes.
97
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Critics of Rational
Expectations Theory
• But other problems arise. For example, are
wages and other input prices really that
flexible?
• That is, even if decision makers could
anticipate the eventual effect of policy
changes on prices, those prices may still be
slow to adapt (e.g., what if you had just
signed a three-year labor or supply contract
when the new policy was implemented?).
98
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Critics of Rational
Expectations Theory
• Most economists reject the extreme
rational expectations model of complete
wage and price flexibility.
• In fact, most economists still believe a
short-run trade-off between inflation and
unemployment results because some
input prices are slow to adjust to changes
in the price level.
99
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Critics of Rational
Expectations Theory
• However, in the long run, the expected
inflation rate adjusts to changes in the
actual inflation rate at the natural rate of
unemployment, RGDPNR.
100
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New Keynesians and
Rational Expectations
• In the Keynesian model, wages and prices
are assumed to be inflexible.
• The same may be true for other input
suppliers. That is, firms may have
negotiated fixed-price contracts with their
suppliers for substantial periods of time.
101
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New Keynesians and Rational
Expectations
• When an increase in aggregate demand
from AD1 to AD2 is anticipated, the
SRAS curve shifts from SRAS1 to
SRAS3.
• However, because some wages and
input prices are inflexible in the short
run, in the Keynesian model SRAS may
only shift from SRAS1 to SRAS2, or from
point A to point B.
102
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Exhibit 17.6: New Keynesians and Rational
Expectations
103
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The Real Business Cycle
Theory
REAL BUSINESS CYCLE THEORY
the belief that economic fluctuations are
the result of external negative and positive
productivity shocks to the economy
• The real business cycle theory shares some of
the same assumptions as the rational
expectations theory: Households and firms
form their expectations rationally, and wages
and prices adjust quickly.
104
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What Is the Real Business
Cycle Theory?
• However, instead of unexpected changes
in the money supply causing fluctuations
in real GDP, the real business cycle
theorists believe that technological
changes lead to changes in the growth
rate of productivity.
105
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What Is the Real Business
Cycle Theory?
• In short, they believe that positive and negative
productivity shocks are the cause of the business
cycle.
• They believe real shocks such as new
technology (new products or production
methods), resource prices (such as oil), changes
in government regulation, unusually good or bad
weather, international disturbances, or any other
factor that can change productivity can cause
fluctuations in the economy.
106
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What Is the Real Business
Cycle Theory?
• In short, negative shocks cause recessions,
and positive shocks cause expansion.
• Real business cycle theorists believe that
significant changes in technology can lead to
stronger productivity growth and therefore
greater economic expansion.
– Productivity (output per worker) could fall as a
result of large increases in oil prices, similar to what
occurred in the 1970s.
107
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What Is the Real Business
Cycle Theory?
• With a negative productivity shock, the
marginal productivity of labor falls
leading to a fall in real wages and a
subsequent reduction in the quantity of
labor supplied as people choose to work
less.
108
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What Is the Real Business
Cycle Theory?
• Lower profit expectations cause firms to cut
back on new capital purchases (new or
remodeled plants and equipment) and lay off
workers.
• In short, several quarters of below-average
productivity output lead to declines in
investment and average hours worked as well
as an economy that finds itself in a recession.
– This event may have been the case in the 2001
recession.
109
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What Is the Real Business
Cycle Theory?
• Of course, the reverse could happen
after large, and perhaps unexpected,
productivity improvements.
• This scenario characterized the second
half of the 1990s and resulted in an
increase in the marginal productivity of
labor, higher real wages, and people
choosing to work more.
110
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What Is the Real Business
Cycle Theory?
• In addition, firms with expectations of
higher profits will invest in new capital and
equipment.
• Together, these factors will lead to an
increase in output consumption and
investment—an economic expansion.
111
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What Is the Real Business
Cycle Theory?
• In the real business cycle theory, it is the
potential output that fluctuates (the
LRAS); not the output deviating from
potential output—as is the case with
recessionary or inflationary gaps.
According to real business cycle
theorists, prices and wages are
sufficiently flexible that they adjust
quickly.
112
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What Is the Real Business
Cycle Theory?
• Because the economy is always
operating close to full employment, the
Fed just needs to keep an eye on
inflation and intervention should be
unnecessary.
• The empirical evidence shows a strong
correlation between declining productivity
and the business cycle.
113
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What Is the Real Business
Cycle Theory?
• However, some economists argue that
the causality could go in the opposite
direction—the recession causes the
declining productivity.
• Other critics argue that the model
assumes that wages and prices are
completely flexible, a claim that is at odds
with the facts.
114
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What Is the Real Business
Cycle Theory?
• And others believe that technology
shocks are incapable of explaining all of
the swings in productivity; they claim that
some of the changes must come from
aggregate demand.
• However, the real business cycle
theorists do force economists to think
more about the supply side.
115
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Section 2
116
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Controversies in
Macroeconomic Policy
117
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Section 3
SECTION 3 QUESTIONS
118
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Controversies in
Macroeconomic Policy
• Economies tend to fluctuate. Consumer
or business pessimism leads to a
reduction in aggregate demand.
• As aggregate demand falls, so does
output and employment.
• The rising unemployment and the fall in
income cause additional damage to the
economy.
119
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Controversies in
Macroeconomic Policy
• The economy is now operating to the left
of the LRAS (or inside its production
possibilities curve); resources are not
being used efficiently when actual output
is less than potential output.
• Many economists believe that in the
short run, policymakers have the ability
to alter aggregate demand.
120
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Controversies in
Macroeconomic Policy
• If the aggregate demand is insufficient,
policymakers can stimulate aggregate
demand by increasing government
spending, cutting taxes, and increasing
the growth rate of the money supply.
121
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Controversies in
Macroeconomic Policy
• If aggregate demand is excessive,
policymakers can reduce aggregate
demand by decreasing government
spending, increasing taxes, and reducing
the growth rate of the money supply.
122
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Controversies in
Macroeconomic Policy
• These macroeconomists are called
activists, and they believe that in the short
run, discretionary monetary and fiscal
policy can stimulate the economy that is in
a recessionary gap or dampen the
economy that is in an inflationary boom
with aggregate demand management.
123
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Controversies in
Macroeconomic Policy
• However, other economists believe that
aggregate demand stimulus cannot keep
the rate of unemployment below the
natural rate.
• Most accept the basic notion of the natural
rate hypothesis that suggests the
unemployment rate will be close to the
natural rate in the long run.
124
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Controversies in
Macroeconomic Policy
• Other economists, rational expectations
theorists, believe that government
economic policies designed to alter
aggregate demand are not all that
effective because households and firms
form expectations to economic policy
causing prices and wages to adjust
quickly, leaving the output roughly the
same but at a higher price level.
125
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Controversies in
Macroeconomic Policy
• To these economists, monetary and fiscal
policy will only work if it comes as a
surprise to the public.
• The real business cycle theorists believe
that economic fluctuations are the result of
external shocks to the economy.
• The shocks change productivity, which
shifts the LRAS.
126
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Controversies in
Macroeconomic Policy
• The real business cycle theorist, like the
new classical school (rational
expectations), believes that prices and
wages are flexible and that the market
adjusts quickly and restores full
employment at the new level of output.
• That is, fiscal or monetary policies are
not needed except to keep inflation in
check.
127
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Controversies in
Macroeconomic Policy
• However, most economists do not accept the
notion that households and firms have
rational expectations and that wages and
prices adjust quickly because of wage and
other input contracts.
• Even if households and firms formed rational
expectations, if prices and wages adjusted
slowly, expansionary monetary policy could
lead to a lower unemployment level.
128
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Controversies in
Macroeconomic Policy
• Most macroeconomists believe both that
monetary and fiscal policy can shift the
aggregate demand and that the
intervention can be counterproductive.
• Long and uncertain lags may lead to
policies that are counterproductive.
129
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Controversies in
Macroeconomic Policy
• In other words, the policies aimed at
closing a recessionary gap may cause
an inflationary gap if the stimulus occurs
at the wrong time.
• Or policies aimed at closing an
inflationary gap may overshoot the goal
and cause a recessionary gap.
• The problem is that we do not operate
with a crystal ball.
130
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Controversies in
Macroeconomic Policy
• For policymakers, timing and the exact
size of the stimulus are essential for
effective stabilization policies.
131
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Controversies in
Macroeconomic Policy
• Other economists believe that the potency
of expansionary fiscal policy will be
diminished by the crowding-out effect.
• That is, expansionary fiscal policy
increases the real interest rate when it
borrows money to finance its deficit, which
crowds out private investment.
132
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Controversies in
Macroeconomic Policy
• It is also possible that the economy is
stimulated with fiscal or monetary policy
in the short run for political gains that will
only be inflationary in the long run.
• Recall that expansionary monetary policy
lowers the real interest rate and
stimulates private investment.
133
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Controversies in
Macroeconomic Policy
• Other questions the policymakers will
have to answer are:
– What are the output effects of the fiscal or
monetary policy?
– What is the marginal propensity to consume
(MPC) of the tax cut?
– How much will the central bank have to
change the real interest rate to get the
desired change in residential and
commercial spending?
134
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Controversies in
Macroeconomic Policy
• For most economists, monetary policy is
the preferred tool for stabilization
because the inside lags (the time from
when a policy is needed to the time it is
implemented) are much shorter.
• Recall that the federal open market
committee (FOMC) meets eight times a
year.
135
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Controversies in
Macroeconomic Policy
• Fiscal policy requires Congress to
convene and debate the tax cuts or
expenditure increases.
• However, fiscal policy may be used in
special circumstances when monetary
policy alone cannot do the job.
136
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Controversies in
Macroeconomic Policy
• Automatic stabilizers (e.g., taxes that
impact disposable income and
unemployment compensation) are an
important part of fiscal policy and have a
much smaller lag because they are
implemented automatically.
137
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Policy Difficulties with
Supply Shocks
• Recall that a negative supply shock, like
those the United States experienced in
the 1970s and 2007–2009, leads to an
increase in the price level and a
reduction in real aggregate output
(RGDP), as seen in Exhibit 17.7.
138
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Exhibit 17.7: A Negative Supply Shock
139
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Policy Difficulties with
Supply Shocks
• After a negative demand shock (a
leftward shift in the AD curve), policy
makers can employ expansionary fiscal
and/or monetary policy, which can help
shift the economy back to its original
position. However, this is not the case
with a negative supply shock.
140
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Policy Difficulties with
Supply Shocks
• Suppose policy makers choose to use
expansionary fiscal and/or monetary
policy as a response to the recession
caused by the supply shock; this
increase in aggregate demand causes
an increase in aggregate output (RGDP)
but leads to even greater inflation.
141
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Policy Difficulties with
Supply Shocks
• If policy makers choose to use
contractionary fiscal and/or monetary
policy to control inflation, this decrease in
AD leads to a lower price level but
causes an even lower level of aggregate
output with higher rates of
unemployment.
142
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Exhibit 17.8: Policy Response to a
Supply Shock
143
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What Should the Central
Bank Do?
• Most economists believe that monetary
policy should take the lead in
stabilization policy and that the central
bank should be independent and
insulated from political pressure to avoid
political business cycles.
144
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What Should the Central
Bank Do?
• Political business cycles may occur if
central banks ally themselves with an
incumbent party and pursue expansionary
monetary policy prior to an election.
145
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What Should the Central
Bank Do?
• Even though the short-run impact may be
increased output, employment, and a
victory for the incumbent party in the
election, the long-run impact will be
inflation.
• So, faced with these potential problems,
how should the central bank set its
monetary policy?
146
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What Should the Central
Bank Do?
• Some macroeconomists believe that the
central bank should adopt rules, such as a
constant growth rate in the money supply.
• According to the rule advocates, if the
money supply were only allowed to
increase by say 3 to 5 percent per year
(enough to accommodate new economic
growth), the result would be less
uncertainty and greater economic stability.
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What Should the Central
Bank Do?
• In other words, if the fixed rule is followed and
the growth rate is 3 percent per year and the
monetary growth rate is 3 percent per year,
the average rate of inflation is zero.
• This situation seldom occurs, but it would add
credibility to the Federal Reserve as being
tough on inflation.
• It would make it clear that what the Fed says
it’s going to do is consistent with what it
actually does.
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Inflation Targeting
• Some macroeconomists believe that we
can do better than targeting the growth
rate of monetary aggregates.
• These economists believe we should
target the inflation rate.
• Targeting the inflation rate would require
the central bank to attempt to stay in a
certain band of inflation for a specified
period of time—say 2 to 3 percent.
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Inflation Targeting
• The key to targeting is that it enhances
credibility and could help to “anchor”
inflationary expectations and lead to
greater price stability.
• After all, successful monetary policy
hinges critically on the ability to manage
expectations.
150
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Inflation Targeting
• Several countries have inflation targets in
place: The Bank of England is at 2
percent; the Bank of Canada is at 2
percent; Brazil is at 4.5 percent; and Chile
is at the range between 2 percent and 4
percent.
• Empirical studies show a tendency for
inflation rates to fall in countries that use
inflation targeting.
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Inflation Targeting
• Critics of inflation targeting will argue
that central banks need flexibility, and
good leaders, like Volker and
Greenspan, proved that they can handle
the job without set rules or targets.
• In other words, the United States has
kept inflation low without rules or
targeting, so those opposed to targets
say, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”
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Inflation Targeting
• Others argue that it may cause banks to
focus too much attention on inflation at the
expense of other goals such as output and
employment.
• For example, a recessionary gap will
normally cause the central bank to lower
the interest rate to stimulate spending,
output, and employment, rather than just
focus on inflation.
153
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Inflation Targeting
• Some might ask: If the Fed is going to put
a target band on inflation, why not put one
on unemployment and long-term interest
rates, too?
154
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Targeting Inflation at Zero
• So, if central banks are targeting low inflation
rates of 2 percent, why not target inflation rates
at 0 percent?
• After all, we have seen the costs to inflation:
menu costs, changes in tax liabilities, changes
in the distribution of income—and it leads to a
distortion of the price system.
• However, these costs are probably small if
inflation rates are low and expected to stay
low.
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Targeting Inflation at Zero
• The other problem associated with a zero
inflation rate is that it would be difficult to
precisely hit the target all the time, and it
could lead to deflation (the average price
level of goods and services are falling) as
it did in Japan in the 1990s.
156
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Targeting Inflation at Zero
• Also, some macroeconomists worry that if
the inflation rate is targeted at zero, the
interest rate may fall to zero in a recession
and render expansionary macroeconomic
policy powerless.
• Other problems are unanticipated shocks
and unanticipated financial crises.
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Targeting Inflation at Zero
• Monetary authorities need the flexibility to
respond to these shocks by temporarily
going outside the target range.
• Recently, the Federal Reserve was there
to respond to the stock market crash of
October 19, 1987 and to the shock created
by the terrorists attacks on September 11,
2001, when the Federal Reserve made
massive discount loans to banks to avoid
a financial crisis.
158
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Targeting Inflation at Zero
• Critics of targeting a zero inflation rate
believe that achieving zero inflation is
almost impossible and the costs are too
high.
• The costs of disinflation (lowering the rate
of inflation) can be high.
• To reduce the inflation rate by 1 percent
may reduce output by as much as 5
percent. Disinflation is not painless.
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The Taylor Rule
• A variant of monetary rules and inflation
targeting is the Taylor rule.
• Taylor’s formula uses a rule to decide
when to use discretionary decisions.
• According to John Taylor
– “The federal funds rate is increased or
decreased according to what is happening
to both real GDP and inflation.
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The Taylor Rule
– In particular, if real GDP rises 1 percent
above potential GDP the federal funds rate
should be raised, relative to the current
inflation rate, by .5 percent.
– And if inflation rises by 1 percent above its
target of 2 percent, the federal funds rate
should be raised by .5 percent relative to the
inflation rate.
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The Taylor Rule
– When real GDP is equal to potential GDP and
inflation is equal to its target of 2 percent, then
the federal funds rate should remain at about
4 percent, which would imply a real interest
rate of 2 percent on average.
– The policy rule was purposely chosen to be
simple.
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The Taylor Rule
– Clearly, the equal weights on inflation and
the GDP gap are an approximation
reflecting the finding that neither variable
should be given a negligible weight.”
• If the central bank used this rule,
market participants could easily predict
central bank behavior, creating greater
stability and certainty.
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The Taylor Rule
• Some economists believe that the Fed
should be concerned about asset pricing—
especially housing and stock market
prices.
• The period of 1999–2004 saw inflation at a
low rate of about 2.5 percent per year, yet
housing prices were rising 25 percent and
higher in some markets.
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The Taylor Rule
• In some countries, such as Australia and
Great Britain, the central banks are paying
closer attention to the growth in asset
prices even when consumer price inflation
is low.
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The Taylor Rule
• Others believe that the central bank
should not concern itself with the value
that consumers place on stocks and
housing, and if the bubble bursts, the Fed
can always use interest rates in an attempt
to bolster the economy.
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The Taylor Rule
• Of course, as we found out during the financial
crisis of 2007–2009, there are several questions
that must be answered.
• One of the most important is: Can you identify
housing or stock bubbles when they are
appearing? The extent of monetary policy
intervention may depend on the bubble. In the
recession of 2007–2009, the housing bubble
spread throughout the economy quickly and
violently, before interest rate policy could be
used to offset the damaging effects.
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Indexing and Reducing the
Costs of Inflation
INDEXING
use of payment contracts that
automatically adjust for changes in
inflation
• As you recall, inflation poses substantial
equity and distributional problems only
when it is unanticipated or unexpected.
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Indexing and Reducing the
Costs of Inflation
• One means of protecting parties against
unanticipated price increases is to write
contracts that automatically change the
prices of goods or services whenever the
overall price level changes, effectively
rewriting agreements in terms of dollars of
constant purchasing power.
169
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Indexing and Reducing the
Costs of Inflation
• Wages, loans, and mortgage payments—
everything possible—would be changed
every month or so by an amount equal to
the percentage change in some broadbased price index.
170
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Indexing and Reducing the
Costs of Inflation
• Thus, if prices rose by 1.2 percent this
month and your last month’s wage was
$1,000, your wage this month would be
$1,012.
• By making as many contracts as possible
payable in dollars of constant purchasing
power, those involved could protect
themselves against unanticipated
changes in inflation.
171
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Why Isn’t Indexing Used
More Extensively?
• Indexing seems to eliminate most of the
wealth transfers associated with
unexpected inflation.
• Why then is it not more commonly used?
• One main argument against indexing is
that it can worsen inflation.
172
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Why Isn’t Indexing Used
More Extensively?
• As prices go up, wages and certain
other contractual obligations (e.g.,
rents) also automatically increase.
• This immediate and comprehensive
reaction to price increases leads to
greater inflationary pressures.
• One price increase leads to a second,
leading to a third, and so on.
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Other Problems Associated
with Indexing
• We might ask, so what? If prices rise
rapidly, but wages, rents, and so forth,
move up with prices, real wages and rents
remain constant.
• However, if inflation gets bad enough, it
could become almost impossible
administratively to maintain the indexing
scheme.
174
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Other Problems Associated
with Indexing
• The index, to be effective, might have to
be changed every few days, but the
information to make such frequent
changes is not currently available.
175
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Other Problems Associated
with Indexing
• To get the necessary information quickly,
then, might be quite expensive, involving a
small army of price-checking bureaucrats
and a massive electronic communications
system.
176
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Other Problems Associated
with Indexing
• Other inefficiencies occur as well.
• During the German hyperinflation of the
early 1920s, prices at one point rose so
rapidly that workers demanded to be paid
twice a day, at noon and at the end of the
workday.
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Other Problems Associated
with Indexing
• During their lunch hour, workers would
rush money to their wives, who would then
run out and buy real goods before prices
increased further.
• Other big problems include the fact that
indexing reduces the ability for relative
price changes to allocate resources where
they are more valuable.
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Other Problems Associated
with Indexing
• Not everything can be indexed, so
indexing would cause wealth
redistribution.
• In addition, costs would necessarily be
incurred as a result of renegotiating costof-living (COLA) clauses.
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Other Problems Associated
with Indexing
• Excessive inflation, then, leads to great
inefficiency, as well as to a loss of
confidence in the issuer of money—
namely, the government.
• Furthermore, inflation influences world
trade patterns.
180
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Other Problems Associated
with Indexing
• Limited indexing, in fact, has already been
adopted, as some wage and pension
payments are changed with changes in
the cost-of-living index.
• Whether on balance those escalator
clauses are “good” or “bad” is a debatable
topic—a normative judgment that we will
leave to you to make.
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Section 3
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The Financial Crisis
of 2007–2009
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Section 4
SECTION 4 QUESTIONS
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The Financial Crisis of
2007–2009
• The best word to sum up the financial crisis of
2007-2009 is debt. In technical terms, it is
called excessive leverage.
• In short, too many homeowners and financial
firms had assumed too much debt and taken on
too much risk.
• Many economists believe the crisis started in
the housing market, with declining housing
prices, and risky mortgages.
185
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Low Interest Rates (2002–2004)
Led to Aggressive Borrowing
• After the 2001 recession, the Fed
pursued an expansionary monetary
policy that pushed interest rates down to
historically low levels.
• The federal funds rate was maintained at
2 percent or lower for almost three years.
• Critics of the Fed argue that it lowered
interest rates too much for too long in a
growing economy.
186
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Low Interest Rates (2002–2004)
Led to Aggressive Borrowing
• Whatever the reason for the low interest
rates, there is common agreement that
the low interest rates increased the
aggressive borrowing that encouraged
less-qualified buyers to purchase houses.
• The low interest rates set off a housing
boom, especially in California, Florida,
and the Northeast.
187
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Deregulation in the Housing
Market and Subprime Mortgages
• In the last several decades the federal
government encouraged the mortgage
industry, especially Fannie Mae and Freddy
Mac, to lower lending standards for lowincome families in an effort to increase home
ownership.
• Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac are the
government-sponsored enterprises that fund
or guarantee the majority of mortgage loans in
the United States.
188
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Deregulation in the Housing
Market and Subprime Mortgages
• Lenders devised innovative adjustable rate
mortgages (ARM) with extremely low “teaser”
rates, making it possible for many new higher
risk buyers to purchase houses, often with little
or no money as a down payment.
• These loans were called subprime loans
because the borrower had less than a prime
credit rating and many would not have qualified
for a conventional loan.
189
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Deregulation in the Housing
Market and Subprime Mortgages
• In 2006, almost 70 percent of the subprime loans
were in the form of a new innovative product
called a hybrid.
• These loans started at a very low fixed rate for
the initial period, say three to seven years, and
then reset to a much higher rate for the
remainder of the loan.
• Many subprime borrowers just expected to
refinance later—thinking their property would
continue to appreciate and interest rates would
remain low.
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Deregulation in the Housing
Market and Subprime Mortgages
• Borrowers and lenders focused too much on
the borrower’s ability to cover the low initial
payment and not enough on risk.
• Subprime mortgages jumped from 8 percent
of the total in 2001 to 13.5 percent in 2005,
as shown in Exhibit 17.9. These new buyers
pushed housing prices higher. The increase
in the lending to “subprime” borrowers
helped inflate the housing bubble.
191
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SOURCE: Reprinted from James R. Barth et al., The Rise and Fall of the U.S. Mortgage and Credit Markets, Milken Institute,
2009, fi. 2, p. 2. Used by permission.
Exhibit 17.9: The Subprime Share of Home
Mortgages Grows Rapidly before the Big
Decline (1995–Q2 2008)
192
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Deregulation in the Housing
Market and Subprime Mortgages
• The rising housing prices then led to
overly optimistic expectations, with both
borrowers and lenders thinking that with
housing prices increasing, the risks were
minimal. (After all, housing prices jumped
almost 10 percent a year nationally from
2000–2006, as shown in Exhibit 17.10.)
193
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NOTE: The annualized growth rate is the geometric mean.
SOURCE: Reprinted from James R. Barth et al., The Rise and Fall of the U.S. Mortgage and Credit Markets, Milken Institute, 2009,
fi. 5, p. 9. Used by permission.
Exhibit 17.10: The Recent Run-Up of Nominal
Home Prices Was Extraordinary (1890–Q2 2008)
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Who Bought These Risky
Subprime Mortgages?
• Many of these risky subprime mortgages
were sold to investors such as Bear
Stearns and Merrill Lynch. They pooled
them with other securities into packages
and sold them all over the world.
• Part of the impetus for them was the
great demand for mortgage-backed
securities in the global market.
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Who Bought These Risky
Subprime Mortgages?
• A mortgage-backed security (MBS) is a
package of mortgages bundled together and
then sold to an investor, like a bond.
• Security rating agencies gave their highest
ratings to these securities.
• High ratings encouraged investors to buy
securities backed by subprime mortgages,
helping finance the housing boom.
• The rating agencies clearly underestimated the
risk of these securities.
196
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Consumers Borrowing
against Their Equity
• To complicate matters further, consumers
borrowed hundreds of billions of dollars
against the equity from the appreciation in
their homes, fueling consumption
spending and an increase in household
debt, combined with a fall in personal
saving.
• The low interest rates subsidized massive
borrowing, and credit market debt soared
as well.
197
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The Fed Raises Interest
Rates and the Housing Bust
• The low interest rates of the 2002–2004
period and other factors led to the Fed
becoming concerned about rising prices.
• In 2005–2006, therefore, the Fed
reversed course and pushed short-term
interest rates up.
198
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The Fed Raises Interest
Rates and the Housing Bust
• For those holding new adjustable rate
mortgages (ARMs), it meant their monthly
payments rose. Higher interest rates and
falling housing prices were a recipe for
disaster.
• Consequently, many homes went into default
and foreclosure—both subprime borrowers
and prime borrowers lost their homes. (The
default rate was much lower on those holding
fixed mortgage rates.)
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The Fed Raises Interest
Rates and the Housing Bust
• As housing prices fell and interest rates
rose, foreclosures jumped. Once home
prices fell below loan values, borrowers
could not qualify to refinance and many
were forced into foreclosure.
• When houses turn “upside down”—
people owe more on their loan than the
house is worth—many walk away from
their houses.
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The Fed Raises Interest
Rates and the Housing Bust
• When housing prices fell and mortgage
delinquencies soared, the securitiesbacked subprime mortgages lost most of
their value.
• When subprime borrowers defaulted, the
investors that took the hit started
demanding their money back by
surrendering these securities to the banks.
201
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The Fed Raises Interest
Rates and the Housing Bust
• Banks ended up receiving a double hit.
Their securities investors started
demanding money and their borrowers
were failing to pay their loans.
• Troubled banks were not able to raise
more money, because other banks and
investors sensed that they were in trouble
and refused to lend to them.
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The Fed Raises Interest
Rates and the Housing Bust
• Financial markets depend on lenders making
funds available to borrowers. However, when
lenders become reluctant to make loans, it
becomes difficult to assess credit risk.
• This happened in 2008, which led the
Federal Reserve and other central banks
around the world to pour hundreds of billions
of dollars (euros, pounds, etc.) into credit
markets to ease the pain of the financial
crisis.
203
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Section 4
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