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Civil Conflict PUBLG 080
External Factors & Civil Conflict
Lecturer M. Rodwan Abouharb Ph.D.
Dept. of Political Science
Contribution
• Joint Impact of Human Rights Consequences of World
Bank & IMF Conditionality Programs on Civil Conflict
• Conditionality Programs Worsen Violence Through
– Negotiations Effects
– Short Term Implementation Effects
– Longer Term Cumulative Effects
• Importance of Selection Effects
• Higher levels of civil conflict one of the major predictors of
human rights violations as government respond to antigovernment violence with repression.
• Part of a Larger Research Project
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The Question
• Do World Bank & IMF Conditionality Programs increase or
reduce levels of civil conflict?
In Particular:
• Anti government protest
• Riots and
• Rebellion
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Negotiation Effects of World Bank & IMF
Conditionality Programs on Civil Conflict
• The act of going to the World Bank or IMF in need of a
programme is a mark of particular government weakness
• Governments in economic difficulty more likely to seek
programme.
• Opposition groups will use this signal of weakness as an
opportune time to engage in politically motivated rebellion.
• Example: Nigeria, going to the IMF was viewed by the public
with ‘vehement popular antipathy’ (Callagy 1990: 269) resulting
in a military coup when the government entered into a
conditionality programme with the IMF.
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Implementation of Conditionality Programmes
on Civil Conflict
• Short Term
– Policy Changes mandated by the Bank & Fund increase
peoples uncertainty about economic future
– leading to more protest and low levels of violence as
opposition parties utilize widespread opposition for their own
political gain.
• Longer Term
– Cumulative failure of these programmes to promote broad
based economic growth generate feelings of relative
deprivation and grievance towards government increasing
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likelihood of civil conflict.
The Need for a Selection Model in
Implementation Arguments
• Systemic Relationship:
– World Bank & IMF Conditionality Programmes are NonRandom.
– The Determinants and Consequences of Conditionality
Programmes are Linked.
– May be that the underlying factors that increase the
likelihood of receiving an Conditionality Programmes
such as poverty economic difficulty also change
likelihood of civil conflict
Hypotheses
• Negotiations Effects
– H1: The successful negotiation of an Conditionality
Programmes increases the probability of rebellion
onset.
• Implementation Effects
– H2: Short Term implementation effects of Conditionality
Programmes increases the likelihood of Civil Conflict
– H3: The cumulative implementation effects of
Conditionality Programmes have a ‘u’ shaped impact on
the likelihood of Civil Conflict
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Results: Negotiation Effects of Conditionality
Programmes on Civil Conflict
Table 4 The Effects of Entering into Structural Adjustment Agreements on the Probability of Rebellion i & the
Short-term Implementation Effects on the Prevalence of Anti-government Demonstrations and Riots ii 1981-2003,
All Developing Countries
Negotiation Effects
Short-term Implementation Effects
Column I
Column II
Column III
Column IV
Column V
Rebellion,
Demonstration,
Rebellion
Selection Not
Demonstrations
Selection Not
Riots
Accounted
Accounted
Entering/Short-term
0.361^
0.393*
0.322**
0.277*
0.368*
Implementation of SAA
(0.249)
(0.236)
(0.136)
(0.144)
(0.194)
World Bank & IMF Selection
1.134^
0.183
0.827^
—
—
Effects
(0.835)
(0.477)
(0.554)
-0.363***
-0.325***
-0.119***
-0.144***
-0.104**
Physical Integrity Rights Index
(0.084)
(0.080)
(0.035)
(0.036)
(0.043)
-0.023*
-0.007
0.032***
0.033***
0.021**
Physical Quality of Life Index
(0.011)
(0.01)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.009)
-2.84E-7
-8.37E-5^
-4.31E-5
-2.48E-5^
-1.32E-4*
GDP per capita
(9.29E-5)
(6.03E-5)
(3.94E-5)
(1.66E-5)
(7.96E-5)
-1.41E-8
-1.08E-7
6.20E-7*
4.56E-7**
4.88E-7**
Population Density
(5.32E-7)
(4.84E-7)
(2.70E-7)
(1.75E-7)
(1.95E-7)
0.388
0.460^
0.368*
0.466*
0.180
Anocracy
(0.428)
(0.304)
(0.218)
(0.202)
(0.245)
0.011*
0.011**
-0.0004
0.001
0.001
Ethnic Heterogeneity
(0.005)
(0.004)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
0.004
-0.002
-0.008^
0.0006
-0.001
Regime Durability
(0.010)
(0.0085)
(0.005)
(0.003)
(0.005)
0.007*
0.003
-0.007**
-0.008***
-0.004^
Trade
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.003)
(0.002)
(0.003)
Log of Primary Commodity
-0.449*
-0.423*
-0.366***
—
—
Exports
(0.211)
(0.186)
(0.117)
0.016***
0.014***
-0.001
-0.006*
0.013***
Log of Fuel Exports
(0.005)
(0.004)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
0.041
0.004
Log of Mountainous States
—
—
—
(0.097)
(0.095)
—
0.250***
0.266***
0.262***
Lagged Dependent Variable
—
(0.030)
(0.031)
(0.059)
-3.488**
-3.370***
-5.311***
-5.294***
-6.591***
Constant
(1.216)
(1.039)
(0.537)
(0.519)
(0.621)
(Pseudo) R2
0.144
0.144
—
—
—
N
1644
2039
1461
2203
1453
Note: All significance tests are one-tailed: ^p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Estimated with robust standard errors
clustered on country.
Column VI
Riots, Selection
Not Accounted
0.307*
(0.180)
—
-0.156***
(0.049)
0.020**
(0.007)
-5.84E-5**
(2.23E-5)
6.33E-7*
(3.03E-7)
-0.014
(0.238)
0.003
(0.003)
0.008^
(0.005)
-0.004
(0.003)
-0.327*
(0.146)
0.008*
(0.004)
—
0.299***
(0.058)
-6.162***
(0.688)
—
2193
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Results: Cumulative Effects of Conditionality
Programmes on Civil Conflict
Table 5 The Cumulative Effect of Structural Adjustment Agreements on the Prevalence of Civil Conflict 1981-2003, All Developing Countriesi
Rebellion,
Demonstrations,
Riots
Selection
Rebellion
Demonstrations
Selection Not
Riots
Selection Not
Not
Accounted
Accounted
Accounted
Proportion of Time spent under a
-3.46E-5
-0.001*
-0.006
-0.004
-0.008*
-0.006*
World Bank or IMF SAA
(7.89E-4)
(0.0006)
(0.007)
(0.005)
(0.004)
(0.003)
Proportion of Time spent under a
2.15E-6
-1.44E-5*
7.87E-5
4.16E-5
0.0001*
7.46E-5*
World Bank or IMF SAA²
(9.57E-6
(7.85E-6)
(8.87E-5)
(6.54E-5)
(0.0001)
(4.49E-5)
Control Variables
0.012
0.428
0.187
World Bank & IMF Selection Effects
—
—
—
(0.032)
(0.376)
(0.182)
Respect for Physical Integrity Rights
-0.006*
-0.005*
-0.057*
-0.054**
0.010
-0.006
Index
(0.004)
(0.003)
(0.029)
(0.020)
(0.013)
(0.013)
-0.0003
-0.001**
0.007**
0.008***
-0.0008
-0.001
Physical Quality of Life Index
(0.0004)
(0.0003)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.001)
2.86E-6^
5.17E-6***
-5.85E-6
-1.28E-5**
5.00E-6
1.34E-8
GDP per capita
(2.19E-6)
(9.74E-7)
(1.81E-5)
(5.34E-6)
(7.99E-6)
(6.20E-6)
-1.33E-8
-1.48E-9
-1.42E-7
8.10E-8
-5.31E-8
-1.63E-7^
Population Density
(1.40E-8)
(1.32E-8)
(1.17E-7)
(7.57E-8)
(7.01E-8)
(1.11E-7)
-0.012
-0.005
0.165^
0.129
-0.035
0.025
Anocracy
(0.017)
(0.017)
(0.121)
(0.107)
(0.041)
(0.036)
4.55E-5
-0.0001
-0.002
0.0004
0.0003
-0.0006
Regime Durability
(2.67E-4)
(0.0001)
(0.003)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
9.44E-6
-9.47E-5
-0.001
-3.38E-5
-0.001*
-0.0006
Ethnic Heterogeneity
(1.21E-4)
(1.31E-4)
(0.001)
(8.19E-4)
(0.0005)
(0.0004)
0.0002
8.24E-5
-0.001
-0.002*
0.001^
0.0004
Trade
(0.0002)
(1.40E-4)
(0.001)
(0.0008)
(0.0006)
(0.0004)
-0.0025
0.005
-0.015
-0.003
Log of Primary Commodity Exports
—
—
(0.008)
(0.006)
(0.023)
(0.017)
0.0002
-4.29E-5
-0.001
-0.002*
0.0008
0.0003
Log of Fuel Exports
(0.0002)
(1.61E-4)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.0008)
(0.0006)
0.004
0.005^
Log of Mountainous States
—
—
—
—
(0.004)
(0.003)
-0.376***
-0.376***
-0.872***
-0.817***
-0.367***
-0.324***
Lagged Dependent Variable
(0.049)
(0.039)
(0.062)
(0.067)
(0.070)
(0.058)
-0.014
0.036
0.144
0.226^
-0.040
0.128
Constant
(0.040)
(0.031)
(0.211)
(0.163)
(0.105)
(0.119)
(Pseudo) R2
0.140
0.140
0.320
0.297
0.144
0.123
N
1583
2417
1398
2105
1390
2095
Note: All significance tests are one-tailed: ^p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Estimated with robust standard errors clustered on country.
i
Data availability limits the period examined to 2001 for Riots and Demonstrations.
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Results Summary
• Negotiation of a Conditionality Programmes
+ Rebellion
(Predicted Probabilities +44% Increase in likelihood of Rebellion
• Short Term Implementation Effects
+ Anti Government Demonstrations (+32% likelihood)
+ Riots (+45% likelihood)
• Cumulative Implementation Effects
+‘U’ shaped relationship between Conditionality Programmes
implementation and likelihood of rebellion
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Conclusions
• What do we know?
• World Bank & IMF Conditionality Programmes increase
likelihood of civil conflict in loan recipient countries.
• Links to human rights violations, civil conflict significant
predictor of human rights repression.
• International Financial Institutions domestic political effects
in developing countries beyond issues of economic growth
or decline.
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Table 3 Logit Equation: Which Governments Enter Into Structural Adjustment Agreements with the
World Bank & IMF 1981-2003, All Developing Countries
Entering into a Structural Adjustment
World Bank & IMF SAA
Agreement
Direction of Coefficient
Economic Factors
Debt as a Proportion of GNP
GDP Per Capita
Exchange Rate Value
Average Foreign Currency Reserves
Extent of International Trade
Change in GDP Per Capita
Human Rights
CIRI: Physical Integrity Rights Index
Level of Respect: Workers Rights
Physical Quality of Life Index
International Political Factors
Log of Population
Cold War
Alliance with United States¹
Domestic Political Factors
Level of Democracy
Conflict Proneness Factors
Rebellion
Interstate Conflict
International Financial Institutional Factors
Number of Countries under SAAs
Constant
N
Pseudo R2
0.081***
(0.013)
-2.53E-5
(4.01E-5)
2.71E-5^
(1.74E-5)
-0.048*
(0.024)
-0.009***
(0.003)
-0.025*
(0.012)
0.111***
(0.032)
-0.070
(0.085)
0.007
(0.006)
0.11*
(0.060)
-0.073
(0.131)
-0.811
(0.151)
-0.003
(0.018)
0.082
(0.073)
-0.069
(0.141)
0.035***
(0.005)
-3.879***
(1.116)
1914
0.143
P>|z .1^ .05*, .01**, .001*** ¹The model also included previous colonial or dependent relationship with France, Japan, the
United Kingdom or the United States. Countries with previously colonial or dependent relationships were more likely to
receive a program from either institution at the .01 level of confidence. Models are estimated with robust standard errors,
with one-tailed significant tests. Cubic splines were used to control for temporal dependence.
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