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Growth and Corruption: What are the stylized facts in ECA’s transition countries? Pradeep Mitra Chief Economist Europe and Central Asia Region Prepared for a Panel Discussion on “The Growth-Corruption Paradox”, in a Core Course on Public Sector Governance & Anti-Corruption, February 14-16, 2006 I thank Jim Anderson and Alexander Murevyev for helping put this presentation together. Views expressed are mine and do not necessarily represent those of the World Bank. Growth in GDP per capita from 1998 to 2003 owes more to productivity growth than improved labor utilization (Growth in GDP/POP) = (Growth in GDP/EMPL) + (Growth in EMPL/POP) 15% GDP/EMP EMP/POP GDP/POP 10% 5% 0% -5% Turkey Macedonia, FYR Czech Republic Poland Slovak Republic Slovenia Croatia Kyrgyz Republic Romania Moldova Hungary Bulgaria Lithuania Belarus Estonia Georgia Ukraine Albania Latvia Armenia Kazakhstan Azerbaijan -15% Russian Federation -10% 2 Firm entry and exit are comparatively more important for productivity growth in transition countries 3 While the business environment has been improving steadily in the transition countries, it is in general more difficult in 2005 than in the cohesion countries of Western Europe 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 Regulation Labour Taxation 1999 2002 Institutions 2005 Infrastructure Cohesion countries 2005 Note: 1 represents no obstacle; 4 represents a major obstacle Finance Macro instability 4 Unbundling by ownership category reveals that de novo firms find the business environment in 2005 to be more difficult than privatized and state firms in areas such as regulation, taxation and institutions and property rights . . . . . 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 de novo state & privatized de novo Regulation state & privatized de novo Taxation Cohesion countries New EU member states state & privatized Institutions SEE CIS 5 . . . . particularly with respect to regulatory constraints such as customs and trade regulations and business licensing and permits, but note this is true in the cohesion countries too 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 de novo state & privatized Customs and trade regulations Cohesion countries de novo state & privatized Business licensing and permits New EU member states SEE CIS 6 . . . . as well as institutional constraints such as the judiciary and corruption 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 de novo state & privatized de novo state & privatized Judiciary Cohesion countries Corruption New EU member states SEE CIS 7 Moving from entrant firms to potential exiters, while the fraction of firms with arrears and subsidies has been falling in the transition countries, indeed lower than the cohesion countries for subsidies . . . 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.00 1999 2002 2005 2002 2005 Subsidies Cohesion countries Arrears New EU member states SEE CIS 8 . . . . subsidies to a higher fraction of state and privatized firms retard their exit 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 Cohesion countries New EU member states state & privatized SEE de novo CIS 9 . . . . and arrears by state and privatized firms on utility payments and taxes as well as to employees and suppliers also retard exit 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 Cohesion countries New EU member states state & privatized SEE de novo CIS 10 Unsurprisingly, various measures of administrative corruption are related to changes in the business environment and show improvement, e.g. bribes as a proportion of sales, the more rapid the improvement where corruption was higher . . . . 1.0 LowIncome CIS Southeast Europe Bribe Tax (log) 0.5 MiddleIncome CIS 2002 2005 0.0 EU-8 -0.5 -1.0 EU Cohesion -1.5 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 GDP per capita (log) Source: BEEPS 2002, 2005. Notes: Low-Income CIS icnludes Arm, Aze, Geo, Kyr, Mol, Taj, Uzb; Middle-Income CIS includes Bel, Kaz, Rus, Ukr; Southeast Europe includes Alb, BiH, Bul, Mac, Rom, SAM; EU-8 includes Cze, Est, Hun, Lat, Lit, Pol, Slk, Sln; EU Cohesion includes Gre, Ire, Por, Esp. Income levels based on previous full year (2001, and 2004). Source for this and next two slides: Anticorruption in Transition 3 (forthcoming) 11 . . . . but progress is more mixed when corruption is 20% 15% Transition Countries: decrease between 2002 and 2005 Transition Countries: level in 2005 10% Transition Countries: increase between 2002 and 2005 5% Comparator Countries: level in 2005/2004 Source: BEEPS 2002, BEEPS 2005 Gov. Contracts Taxes Bus. Licenses Customs Courts Fire and Blg Insp. Occ. Health and Safety Insp. Env. Insp. Utilities 0% Influence Laws average percent of firms indicating type of bribery is frequent unbundled, although the deterioration for courts and public procurement is not statistically significant. 12 Frequency of bribes in dealing with courts is increasing in all sub-regions but not significantly so. But the gap is significant between EU-8 and cohesion countries Frequency of Bribery at Courts 2.3 2.0 2002 Southeast Europe 2005 1.8 LowIncome CIS 1.5 MiddleIncome CIS EU Cohesion EU-8 1.3 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 GDP per capita (log) Source: BEEPS 2002, 2005. Notes: Low-Income CIS icnludes Arm, Aze, Geo, Kyr, Mol, Taj, Uzb; Middle-Income CIS includes Bel, Kaz, Rus, Ukr; Southeast Europe includes Alb, BiH, Bul, Mac, Rom, SAM; EU-8 includes Cze, Est, Hun, Lat, Lit, Pol, Slk, Sln; EU Cohesion includes Gre, Ire, Por, Esp. Income levels based on previous full year (2001, and 2004). 13 Conclusions Rapid growth in the ECA transition countries since 1998 owes more to productivity growth than improved labor utilization. Firm entry and exit play a more important role in productivity growth in the transition countries compared to other emerging and OECD countries. Notwithstanding improvements in the business environment throughout the region, de novo firms in transition and cohesion countries confront a tilted playing field in areas such as regulation, taxation, the judiciary and corruption, while exit is retarded by softer budget constraints for state and privatized firms compared to de novo firms. 14 Conclusions While aggregate measures of corruption show improvement, unbundling confirms the same trend for most measures but no significant improvement in the frequency of bribery in government procurement and in dealing with courts. An operationally-oriented discussion of growth and corruption requires both to be unbundled, e.g. (i) what are the sources of productivity growth, and (ii) along which dimensions is corruption the most serious, so as to guide policy. 15