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Debt Relief, Grants and Free Riding: IDA’s proposed response Multilateral Development Bank Meeting on Debt Issues Washington, DC, June 21-22, 2006 Financial Resource Mobilization The World Bank Overview • IDA grants are linked to a country’s risk of debt distress. • MDRI debt relief and IDA grants create significant benefits for recipient countries in the form of strengthened debt sustainability prospects and resources for the MDGs. • However they also potentially add to the risk of “free riding” • This presentation will discuss the free-rider problem, and building blocks to limit the risk. Financial Resource Mobilization The World Bank What is free riding? • the indirect cross-subsidization, through IDA grants and debt relief, of other creditors offering non-concessional terms Higher risk of debt distress IDA Grants and debt relief Other creditors Non-concessional lending Lower risk of debt distress Financial Resource Mobilization The World Bank What are the Risks? • Grant-recipient countries with little access to financial markets – risk is limited. • Higher in resource-rich grant-recipient countries that could rely on non-concessional borrowing collateralized with future export receipts. • Risks of free riding may be magnified as a result of lower debt ratios resulting from the implementation of the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). Financial Resource Mobilization The World Bank The Impact of the MDRI MDRI brings debt ratios for eligible countries (at least initially) down to levels below those of many MiddleIncome Countries (see slide 9). But, static view leads to a risk that countries may accumulate excessive levels of debt that could threaten a return to unsustainability, and weaken IDA without the intended result. However risk of debt distress post-MDRI varies by country: Forward looking DSF points out continued fragility of most countries. See diagram on slide 10. Financial Resource Mobilization The World Bank Debt Burden Indicators-Post MDRI 400 350 NPV of debt-to-Exports 300 Peru 250 Syria Ecuador 200 Brazil Jordan 150 Bolivia 100 Guatemala Nicaragua Philippines Mauritania Honduras Guyana 50 China Thailand 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 NPV of debt-to-GDP Financial Resource Mobilization The World Bank 60 70 18 CP HIPCs 80 90 100 Lower Middle Income Countries Preliminary Risk Ratings post-MDRI Ghana Senegal Tanzania Mali Uganda Benin Mozambique Zambia Madagascar Burkina Faso Ethiopia Guyana Nicaragua Rwanda Niger Financial Resource Mobilization The World Bank Impact of Non-concessional borrowing Figure 2: NPV of debt-to-exports ratio - Nonconcessional vs. concessional borrowing 2006-15 300 4.0 4.0 Plus 3% of GDP concessional terms 3.0 250 200 Figure 3: Change in resource flows - Nonconcessional vs. concessional borrowing 2006-15 Plus 3% of GDP - nonconcessional terms Plus 3% of GDP concessional terms 150 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 100 2005 -1.0 50 Baseline (after MDRI relief) -2.0 0 2005 2015 Financial Resource Mobilization The World Bank 3.0 2025 -3.0 2015 2025 -1.0 Plus 3% of GDP non-concessional terms -2.0 -3.0 Key building blocks to an approach to free riding 1. 2. 3. 4. Agreement on a concessionality benchmark Creditor coordination Advanced reporting, increased monitoring. Disincentives aimed at borrower level Financial Resource Mobilization The World Bank 1. Concessionality benchmark for decisions • Concessional borrowing: multiples ways to measure it. • DAC ODA definition used for statistical purposes: 25% concessional using 10% discount rate. • Concessionality benchmark of at least 35% concessional using CIRR discount rates from IMF PRGF programs more realistic. • 35% is a proven benchmark in IMF programs for borrowing in LICs that does not endanger sustainability • 35% used by IDA in free-rider context: may be higher/lower if IMF program requires it. Financial Resource Mobilization The World Bank Country Albania Armenia Bangladesh Benin Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Chad Congo, Republic of Dominica Georgia Ghana Grenada Guyana Honduras Kenya Kyrgyz Republic Malawi Mali Moldova Mozambique Nepal Nicaragua Niger Rwanda Sao Tomé & Príncipe Sierra Leone Tanzania Zambia Date approved Expiration date Concessionality requirement 1/27/2006 5/25/2005 6/20/2003 8/5/2005 6/11/2003 1/23/2004 10/24/2005 2/16/2005 12/6/2004 12/29/2003 6/4/2004 5/9/2003 4/17/2006 9/20/2002 2/27/2004 11/21/2003 3/15/2005 8/5/2005 6/23/2004 5/5/2006 7/6/2004 11/19/2003 12/13/2002 1/31/2005 8/12/2002 8/1/2005 5/10/2006 8/16/2003 6/16/2004 1/26/2009 5/24/2008 12/31/2006 8/4/2008 9/30/2006 1/22/2007 10/23/2008 2/15/2008 12/5/2007 12/28/2006 6/3/2007 10/31/2006 4/16/2009 9/12/2006 2/26/2007 11/20/2006 3/14/2008 8/4/2008 6/22/2007 5/4/2009 7/5/2007 11/18/2006 12/12/2006 1/30/2008 6/11/2006 7/31/2008 5/9/2009 8/15/2006 6/15/2007 35 35 35 35 35 Financial Resource Mobilization The World Bank 35 (short-term), 50 (medium- and long-term debt) 35 35 50 35 35 35 35 n.a. 35 35 45 35 35 35 35 35 35 50 50 50 35 35 40 Source: IMF presentation ECA Meeting May 2006 2. Creditor coordination • Free riding is a major issue for IDA donors • Need a concerted international effort to prevent a repeat of the past • Requires Broadening Creditor Acceptance of the DSF as useful tool – ideally to underpin an informal arrangement. • We have presented free-rider issue in number of fora as it has been developed – to MDBs early on in Tunis, to OECD creditors more recently at meetings in Paris. • Consultations will continue – including with nonOECD and commercial creditors. Financial Resource Mobilization The World Bank Access to Information in DSFs • Country-specific DSAs are already available on IMF website - by country (www.imf.org) • About 40 DSF-style DSAs available - 23 joint DSF-style DSAs. • Every month 2-3 additional DSAs are released. • A stand-alone site should be available in the next 6-8 weeks on World Bank debt website. (www.worldbank.org and type in debt). • Access to interactive DSF template also to be made more readily available. Financial Resource Mobilization The World Bank Countries subject to IDA free-riding policy "Red Light" Countries 2/ Afghanistan Guinea Bhutan Guinea-Bissau Burundi Haiti Cambodia Kyrgyz Republic Central African Republic Lao People's Democratic Republic Chad Liberia Comoros Nepal Congo, Democratic Republic of Niger (MDRI) Congo, Republic of Rwanda (MDRI) Cote d'Ivoire Sao Tome and Principe Djibouti Sierra Leone Eritrea Solomon Islands Gambia, The Tonga "Yellow Light" Post-MDRI Countries "Green Light" Countries Angola Benin Ethiopia (MDRI) Burkina Faso Guyana (MDRI) Cameroon Lesotho Ghana Malawi Madagascar Mongolia Mali Nicaragua (MDRI) Mauritania Samoa Mozambique Tajikistan Senegal Tanzania Uganda Zambia 1/ This list is subject to change should other countries qualify for IDA grants and/or MDRI. It includes all countries currently elilgible for IDA grants on debt-sustainability grounds, as well as post-MDRI green light countries. It excludes "gap" and "blend" countries which are not eligible for IDA grants. 2/ Inactive countries including Myanmar, Somalia, Sudan and Togo are not listed, but would be subject to the free riding policy upon becoming active. Financial Resource Mobilization The World Bank 3. Reporting and Monitoring • Reporting and Monitoring of information flows is a weakness that may hamper a comprehensive approach to free-riding. • Close sharing of information and monitoring of flows will help to identify and prevent cases of unwarranted nonconcessional borrowing. • Monitoring is difficult – IDA is strengthening adherence to reporting requirements, working with other creditors to enhance reporting. • IDA requiring advanced reporting of planned new nonconcessional borrowing. Financial Resource Mobilization The World Bank 4. IDA disincentives at country level • Ultimately Borrower makes the final borrowing decisions. • Pragmatic approach to determining whether a non-concessional loan is a “breach” of the freerider policy. – accept that some potentially high return projects may warrant special exceptions – Some additional flexibility for post-MDRI countries with low risk of debt distress – Emphasizes importance of debt management Financial Resource Mobilization The World Bank Available instruments in IDA • For unwarranted breaches options available: – a reduction in volumes, – changing IDA financing terms However, there is a tradeoff: • volume cuts reduce resources that could be used to reach the MDGs • hardening of terms may exacerbate debt sustainability problems. Financial Resource Mobilization The World Bank Disincentives Grant-eligible countries: • Volume cuts would primarily be used in countries in which debt sustainability is a major concern • Initial 20% cut to grant allocations removes “subsidy”, but can be escalated for more serious or prolonged breaches. • lf disincentives are ineffective, a strong undertaking would be sought from borrower to abide by an agreed borrowing strategy. • Last resort measure: Management could consider disengaging from future support to the country. Financial Resource Mobilization The World Bank Risks to IDA incentive approach • Approach limited effectiveness if: – Countries can compensate through additional non-concessional borrowing (risk higher for post-MDRI) – Disincentives lead to a delay or reluctance to report, which has been particularly problematic outside of Fund arrangements. – Size of available non-concessional borrowing dwarfs IDA allocations (no leverage) Financial Resource Mobilization The World Bank Conclusion • No magic bullet to free rider problem • Requires concerted international effort by all actors. • Efforts to enhance creditor coordination will continue. • Ongoing efforts to improve debt management capacity should help. • Efforts to improve information on nonconcessional borrowing and adherence to reporting requirements need to continue. Financial Resource Mobilization The World Bank End Financial Resource Mobilization The World Bank