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Budgeting in Chile Santiago de Chile, 26 January 2005 Jón R. Blöndal Deputy Head of Division Budgeting and Management Division OECD Country Reviews  One of the core activities of the OECD  Chile is observer at the OECD  Review conducted by the Secretariat in 2003  Examined at the 2004 OECD meeting of budget directors Agenda Sound public finances  Tumultuous political history  Private provision of traditional public services  Structural budget surplus rule  Bidding fund  Role of Ministry of Finance  Role of Parliament  Transparency  Sound public finances Very low debt levels – circa 15% of GDP  Strong record of budget surpluses over time  Tumultuous political history  Economic malaise in the 1970’s used as a pretext by the military for overthrowing the democratic government  Unstable political situation following return to democracy  Experience of neighbouring countries Private provision of traditional public services   Headline expenditures ~ 20% of GDP Private provision of “traditional” expenditure ~ 11% of GDP  Mandatory pensions: 10% + 2-3% of pay Mandatory health contributions: 7% of pay Mandatory unemployment insurance: 1.6% of pay Significant use of PPP’s  Contingent liabilities    Structural Budget Surplus Rule    To formalize fiscal prudence To increase fiscal predictability To operate counter-cyclical fiscal policy  1% of GDP Independent panels In-year adjustments to maintain it  Calculations of structural balance not considered an issue   Bidding Fund  Mechanism for financing new initiatives – About 2½ percent of total spending – Financed from critical review of existing programs and from growth in economy  To improve quality of budget submissions – Spending ministries rank their own bids – Technical quality  Consistency with political priorities Role of Ministry of Finance  Centralised budget process – Strong Ministry of Finance – Line-ministries not pro-active – Risky ?  Attempt to change this are underway – Ministries and agencies Role of Parliament  Historically, a strong parliament – Civil war fought over its role in the budget process in the late 1800’s – Irresponsible fiscal behaviour  Today, a very weak parliament – Constitutional restrictions – No political will for stronger parliament Transparency  No budgetary information made available during military rule – A difficult legacy to overcome  Great progress has already been made and the government is committed to further improvements – Formal agreement between the executive and the Congress to implement the OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency Conclusion  “An innovative and sophisticated budget process that is focused on maintaining aggregate fiscal discipline.” For further information  www.oecd.org/gov/budget  OECD Journal on Budgeting  [email protected]