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Potential Output and Fiscal Challenges Philip Bagnoli, OECD FRB Workshop: L’impact de la crise sur la croissance de l’économie et les finances publiques : les réflexions et évaluations des économistes 27 October 2009 Outline OECD estimate of the impact on potential – production function and filter based – Includes capital and potential labour (with labour efficiency) Areas where some impact is historically evident – Capital – NAIRU Areas where impact is historically nuanced – Participation rates Areas where impact it is ambiguous – Total factor productivity Fiscal challenges OECD change in potential growth Estimated effects on potential OECD potential growth rate (% pa) 3.0% 2.5% 2.0% 1.5% 1.0% 0.5% 0.0% 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 “Level” effect from reduced capital intensity and labour input, see Chapter 4 of OECD Economic Outlook No 85. Growth effect not distinguishable. Estimated effects on potential … broadly consistent with evidence from previous severe downturns Potential output growth (% pa), 5 yrs following start of downturn compared to 5 yrs preceding it 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 -0.5 -1.0 -1.5 -2.0 FIN NOR ITA NLD CAN SWE BEL ESP ITA JPN CAN AUS DNK AUT USA FRA USA UK IRL 91 88 92 81 80 91 81 93 82 98 91 91 88 91 91 81 81 80 92 OECD change in potential through capital 2008-2011 Weighted average Unweighted average 0.00% -0.50% -1.00% Average % per annum Estimated effects via capital Non-housing investment growth -1.50% -2.00% -2.50% -3.00% -3.50% -4.00% -4.50% -5.00% “Level” effect from reduced capital intensity, see Chapter 4 of OECD Economic Outlook No 85. Growth in the capital stock falls, particularly following banking crises Estimated effects via capital Capital stock growth (% pa), 5 yrs following start of downturn compared to 5 yrs preceding it 1.0 0.5 0.0 -0.5 -1.0 -1.5 -2.0 -2.5 -3.0 -3.5 -4.0 FIN ESP NOR CAN SWE AUT ITA ESP ITA FRA UK JPN NLD AUS USA DNK BEL CAN USA IRL 91 79 88 91 91 91 92 93 82 81 80 98 81 91 91 88 81 80 81 92 For current projections, long-run decline in capital intensity is based on a static equilibrium calculation of the effect of higher capital costs, reflecting permanently higher risk aversion (see Box 4.2 in EO85). Much of this adjustment is projected to have already taken place by end 2010. Estimated effects via NAIRU Hysteresis effects on the NAIRU vary considerably across countries Increase in NAIRU varies according to: proportion of rise in unemployment that is translated into long-term unemployment relative effect of long-term unemployed on inflation Extent of recent institutional reforms (esp to EPL, unemployment benefits) 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 IRL ESP ITA TUR HUN CZE ISL BEL AUT NLD PRT GRC GBR FRA FIN DNK DEU AUS NOR LUX CAN NZL USA CHE SWE JPN MEX KOR -2 Change in NAIRU 2007-2010 Change in actual unemployment 2007-2010 OECD change in potential through labour Potential employment % chng in potential employment at peak Estimated effects via NAIRU Unweighted average Weighted average 0.00% -0.20% -0.40% -0.60% -0.80% -1.00% -1.20% -1.40% -1.60% “Level” effect mainly from increased NAIRU, see Chapter 4 of OECD Economic Outlook No 85. +0.02 pp annual weighted average improvement in NAIRU for 20122017. Likely effects via participation Trend labour force participation is typically reduced following severe downturns Trend labour force participation rate (%), average annual change 5 yrs following start of downturn compared to 5 yrs preceding it 1.0 0.5 0.0 -0.5 -1.0 -1.5 -2.0 NOR CAN SWE FIN AUT FRA CAN AUS DNK JPN BEL USA USA ITA 88 91 91 91 91 81 80 91 88 98 81 81 91 82 ITA 92 UK NLD ESP 80 81 93 IRL 92 Severe recessions have long-lasting effects on participation. Young often most affected (more education?). But also country-specific evidence of hysteresis–type effects. TFP effects are mixed, but more likely to be negative when regulation is anti-competitive Correlation coefficient = -0.35 (t-ratio = -1.6 ) 0.8 IRL 92 Excluding Ireland Correlation coefficient = -0.44 (t-ratio = -2.0) 0.6 Change in TFP growth (% pa) Tentative thoughts on tfp 1.0 AUS 91 0.4 CAN 91 SWE 91 0.2 FIN 91 0.0 -0.2 USA 91 2.0 USA 80 3.0 FRA 81 UK 80 4.0 5.0 ESP 79 AUT 91 JPN 98 DNK 88 6.0 ITA 92 CAN 80 -0.4 -0.6 ESP 93 BEL 81 NLD 81 -0.8 -1.0 ITA 82 NOR 88 Index of anti-competitive product market regulation … but there is wide variation across countries OECD estimates of hit to potential (unweighted average is 4%) JPN USA NZL CAN AUT AUS DNK PRT FRA FIN GBR SWE GRC BEL NLD DEU ITA POL ESP IRL 0.0 -2.0 -4.0 -6.0 Lower Potential employment Higher capital costs -8.0 -10.0 -12.0 Debts, deficits and stylised consolidation Fiscal challenge EO85 Fiscal trends in the stylised medium-term scenario As a percentage of nominal GDP Financial balances 2007 No consolidation Denmark Finland Hungary Korea Norway Sweden Switzerland 4.5 5.2 -4.9 4.7 17.7 3.8 1.3 2010 -4.1 -2.8 -4.2 -2.3 7.0 -4.5 -2.5 Net financial liabilities 2017 0.8 3.1 0.8 1.1 8.6 1.5 -0.3 2007 -4 -71 53 -36 -143 -20 12 2010 2 -47 61 -31 -138 -6 14 Gross financial liabilities 2017 3 -44 45 -21 -142 -8 18 2007 32 41 72 26 58 48 48 2010 51 52 87 39 72 57 48 2017 53 55 61 49 66 56 52 Debts, deficits and stylised consolidation EO85 Fiscal trends in the stylised medium-term scenario As a percentage of nominal GDP Financial balances Fiscal challenge 2007 Three years of consolidation Australia Austria Belgium Canada Czech Republic France Germany Greece Iceland Italy Japan Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Poland Portugal Slovak Republic 1.8 -0.7 -0.3 1.6 -0.6 -2.7 -0.2 -3.9 5.4 -1.5 -2.5 3.6 0.3 5.0 -1.9 -2.7 -1.9 2010 -5.0 -6.1 -6.1 -5.9 -4.9 -7.9 -6.2 -6.7 -7.2 -5.8 -8.7 -4.9 -7.0 -5.0 -7.6 -6.5 -6.3 Net financial liabilities 2017 1.4 -1.6 2.6 2.4 2.3 -1.7 1.4 0.0 -0.2 0.3 -3.2 2.7 3.3 3.6 -3.1 -1.0 1.4 2007 -7 31 73 23 -8 34 43 70 -1 87 80 -45 28 -13 17 44 -1 2010 0 43 86 33 3 57 57 83 37 102 107 -42 38 -8 33 63 7 Gross financial liabilities 2017 -1 48 61 18 -5 61 43 65 39 87 114 -30 24 -17 47 64 1 2007 15 62 88 64 38 70 65 103 54 112 167 10 51 26 52 71 32 2010 21 79 106 82 39 94 84 112 109 127 200 21 77 33 64 90 41 2017 21 84 81 67 18 99 71 94 110 112 208 8 63 24 78 91 21 Debts, deficits and stylised consolidation Fiscal trends in the stylised medium-term scenario As a percentage of nominal GDP Financial balances Fiscal challenge 2007 Seven years of consolidation Ireland Spain United Kingdom United States Euro area Total of above countries 2010 Net financial liabilities 2017 2007 2010 Gross financial liabilities 2017 2007 2010 2017 0.2 2.2 -2.7 -2.9 -0.7 -13.6 -9.6 -14.0 -11.2 -7.0 -5.0 2.7 -5.6 -0.5 0.7 0 19 29 43 44 38 43 61 69 58 82 40 97 74 53 28 42 47 63 71 80 68 89 98 89 125 66 125 103 85 -1.4 -8.8 -0.5 39 60 63 74 100 104 The impact on potential is a level effect – so growth recovers with financial hardship. Productivity impact through endogenous growth effect would be long-lasting growth effect. Co-ordinated consolidation Table 4. The effects of single-country and synchronised fiscal consolidation Fiscal consolidation equivalent to 1% of own-country GDP Fiscal challenge Impact of change on Source of change: United States Japan Euro area OECD Spillover as % of own-country effect United Japan Euro area States GDP effects, % diff from baseline first year -0.9 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.8 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.8 -1.2 -1.3 -1.1 26% 54% Total OECD -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 -1.1 Of which1 "own country" -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 32% 1. "Own country" effect corresponds to the own country multiplier weighted by is share in OECD GDP. The "spillover" is calculated as the effect of other OECD countries consolidation on own-country GDP as a share of the total GDP effect on that country when all OECD countries consolidate at the same time. Source: OECD Global Model Tentative conclusions and further questions • Current estimate is of a permanent fall in OECD-wide level of potential by 3% + Conclusions • Main identified effect via higher cost of capital=> capital intensity • Hysteresis effects on NAIRU, wide cross-county variation Policy dependent, different (better) this time? • Possibly large negative effects on participation Evidence from Nordics of hysteresis-type effects. Young most vulnerable (but less concern if more education?) But loss of pension wealth lead to retirement postponement? • Sign & size of TFP effects difficult to identify More likely to be positive if product market competition strong? R&D channel probably small? possibly large if endogenous growth considerations are important ???