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Comments on Anders Forslund: Den svenska jämviktsarbetslösheten – en översikt Bertil Holmlund Department of Economics Uppsala University 1 Outline Theory The Swedish development Recent Swedish reforms Unemployment insurance The income tax system Other tax reforms Conclusions 2 Equilibrium unemployment theory 3 Can fiscal policy affect the equilibrium unemployment rate (NAIRU)? Yes, in an open economy NAIRU depends in general on the real exchange rate Fiscal policy can influence the real exchange rate A fiscal expansion can reduce NAIRU through a real appreciation 4 Equilibrium unemployment in an open economy Real exch. rate AD WS/PS Employment 5 A fiscal expansion in an open economy Real exch. rate AD WS/PS Employment 6 Does the real exchange rate matter for unemployment? Direct evidence: Lindblad and Sellin (2003) Indirect evidence: taxes and unemployment The real exchange rate is part of the total wedge between real consumer and producer wages A real appreciation is analogous to a tax cut 7 Long run considerations Balanced trade? Relevant for the very long run 8 The Swedish development 9 10 Why did NAIRU double between 1990 and 1994? Institutional changes? Major tax reform 1991 (less progressive taxes) Benefit cuts 1993 Coordinated wage bargaining 1991 (Rehnbergavtalet) Hard to identify major changes in institutions that can explain a sharp rise in NAIRU in the early 1990s But NAIRU probably increased from the 1960s up to the early 1990s 11 Did NAIRU fall over the 1990s? Benefit cuts took place Imperfect wage-indexation of benefits Temporary work agencies (1993) Product market competition increased Coordinated bargaining (Industriavtalet 1997) So NAIRU probably fell over the 1990s 12 Recent reforms Less generous unemployment insurance In-work tax credits (Jobbskatteavdrag) 13 Compare benefit cuts and inwork tax credits (S) Income after tax when unemployed: B Income after tax when employed: W+S Standard model: Unemployment depends on the replacement rate, b Model with in-work tax credits, S : b=B/W is the replacement rate Unemployment depends on (b – s); s=S/W In-work tax credits and benefit cuts are approximately equivalent 14 Swedish reforms b B /W, s S /W bˆ b s (effective repl. rate) bˆ b s 0.10 0.05 0.15 The change in the effective replacement rate has been substantial Should reduce equilibrium unemployment 15 Effects on labor force participation Benefit cuts should reduce labor force participation In-work tax credits should increase labor force participation 16 Other tax reforms with implications for employment Property taxes: Effects on labor supply? Abolishment of the wealth tax Cuts in real estate taxes Reduced supply on the intensive margin In-work tax credits have income effects 17 In-work tax credit 2007: average tax rates by income 18 In-work tax credit 2007: marginal tax rates by income 19 Income and substitution effects H hours of work, W the wage, Y nonlabor income The last term is the marginal propensity to earn out of nonlabor income, mpe 20 Compute the hours response from exogenous tax cuts (income effects) H Y mpe H WH Y is the income increase associated with the tax reduction WH is annual earnings mpe = -0.10 (Imbens et al, AER Sept. 2001) 21 Hours responses to exogenous tax cuts (%) Tax cut (1000 SEK) Income (1000) 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 300 -0.5 -1.0 -1.4 -1.9 -2.4 -2.9 -3.3 500 -0.4 -0.9 -1.3 -1.8 -2.2 -2.7 -3.1 700 -0.3 -0.6 -1.0 -1.3 -1.6 -1.9 -2.2 22 Conclusions NAIRU in Sweden has increased gradually up to the early 1990s NAIRU has probably fallen over the 1990s Benefit cuts and in-work tax credits have probably reduced the NAIRU In-work tax credits in combination with other tax reforms have reduced work hours 23