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The GFC: Scale, Causes, Consequences Steve Keen University of Western Sydney Debunking Economics www.debtdeflation.com/blogs www.debunkingeconomics.com The Scale: Biggest Bubbles in History Deflating US Asset Prices 250 Lagging 10 Year Price-Earnings Ratio Shiller Lagging PE Ratio Case-Shiller Housing 40 200 30 150 20 100 10 0 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 50 2010 CPI Deflated Housing Index (Average 103) 50 The Scale: Greatest Debt Level in History US Debt to GDP Ratios 450 Household 400 Total Private Government 350 Total Percent of GDP 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 The Scale: Greatest Debt Level in History • But Australia’s different, right?... Australia's Private Debt to GDP Ratio 175 100 50 25 1930s Depression 75 1890s Depression Percent of GDP 125 Let’s zoom in here Our “Crisis? What Crisis?” 150 0 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 The Ponzi Economy • 72-74 & 84-92: debt-induced boom, bust, & recovery… Australia's Debt Ratio: What would have happened if?... 200 Actual Ratio (Peak=165%) Trend 64-08 Trend 72-74 (2009=10250%) Trend 84-91 (2009=372%) Unemployment (RHS) 150 100 30 • What odds on a third 20 upward trend? • Versus 1890/1930 10 style deleveraging? Sustained recoveries only when Debt/GDP ratio rose again 50 0 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 0 2010 Back in the USA… • Deleveraging-driven downturn… Private Deleveraging and Unemployment (USA) 30 0 20 3 10 6 0 9 10 20 1980 • Correlation 1980-Now: -61% • Correlation 1990-Now: -83% 1990 2000 12 2010 Unemployment (Inverted) Percent of Aggregate Demand Private Debt Contribution to Demand Unemployment (RHS) Why hasn’t it happened here? • Give it time… 20 0 15 2 10 4 5 6 0 8 5 10 1960 • Correlation 1980-Now: -84% • Correlation 1990-Now: -94% Debt-driven Demand Unemployment (RHS) 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 10 2010 Unemployment Rate (Inverted) Percent of Aggregate Demand Debt Contribution to Demand & Unemployment (Australia) Did neoclassical economists see this coming? • “the current economic situation is in many ways better than what we have experienced in years… • Our central forecast remains indeed quite benign: – a soft landing in the United States, – a strong and sustained recovery in Europe, – a solid trajectory in Japan – and buoyant activity in China and India. – In line with recent trends, sustained growth in OECD economies would be underpinned by strong job creation and falling unemployment.” (p. 9) • OECD Chief Economist Jean-Philippe Cotis – in OECD Economic Outlook June 2007 • Why so ignorant? – Static modelling (equilibrium-assuming “dynamics”) – Ignore role of credit & debt Better dynamic, credit-aware modelling needed… + • Click on the icon below to run this simulation after installing the Vissim Viewer Capital Output Plot Speculative to Productive Debt Output 6 5 Cyclical Growth 2000 Click here to download Vissim viewer program 4 1000 3 2 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 Time (Years) 60 70 1 0 WageShare Output 0 10 20 30 40 Time (Years) 50 60 70 Cyclical Growth Debt Ratios Wages share of output Employment Rate 1.0 .5 0 On DebtInModel On Off Ponzi InitialBoom Plot Debt to Output Ratios 0 10 20 30 40 50 Time (Years) 60 70 6 Total Debt Productive Speculative 5 Cyclical Growth 4 1.1 Employment • Minsky’s “Financial Instability Hypothesis” more realistic… Investment 3 .9 2 .7 1 .5 .3 .5 EmploymentRate + Profit + .7 .9 Wages * 1.1 Employment InterestRate TotalDebt 0 0 10 + + 20 30 40 Time (Years) Productive Debt Speculative Debt 50 60 Profit Investment RateOfGrowth 70 Better dynamic, credit-aware modelling needed… rl • Which gives more “bang for buck”— rescuing bankers or debtors? • Click on icons below to run this (after installing the Vissim Viewer) Bank Assets 1500 Bank Liabilities (Deposits) Loans Unlent Reserves 1250 1500 1000 1000 750 750 500 500 250 250 0 0 10 20 Firms Households Banks 1250 30 Time (Years) 40 50 60 URate 0 0 10 InfRate 20 B_D H_D Unemployment 25 40 50 60 40 50 60 F_D Inflation No Stimulus Bank Injection Borrowers Injection 20 30 Time (Years) 10.0 7.5 No Stimulus Bank Injection Borrowers Injection 5.0 2.5 15 0 10 -2.5 -5.0 5 -7.5 0 0 10 20 30 Time (Years) 40 50 Parameters & Initial Conditions Financial System NoStimulus Production System StimBank 0 60 -10.0 0 10 20 3 Debt to Output Ratio Magnitude of Crunch 25 30 Time (Years) 25 No Stimulus Bank Injection Borrowers Injection 20 C_size tCC 15 StimFirm StimFirm F_L Y l r / 100 10 1. 5 D:0 S:1 60. 0 0 10 20 30 40 Time (Years) 50 60 Prognosis & Remedies? • Deleveraging-induced downturn inevitable – Deleveraging outweighs government stimulus • E.g. 1st Rudd stimulus A$42bn (4% GDP) • Aggregate private debt A$2 trillion – 5% deleveraging—A$100 billion cut in demand – Can’t solve debt-induced crisis with more debt • Alternative policies… – Across-the-board debt reduction – Redefine capital assets to reduce Ponzi behaviour • Time-limited Shares (like bonds) • House valuation on imputed rent – Maximum secured mortgage debt say 10 times annual rental • Or we’ll be here again in 2070…