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SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference “Politics in Hard Times” - Stockholm, Sweden, 9-11 September 2010
SGIR 7th PAN-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
Politics in Hard Times: International Relations Responses to the
Financial Crisis
Stockholm, Sweden, September 9-11, 2010
Fulvio Drago
Ph.D. Candidate in History of International Relations
University of Florence
e-mail: [email protected]
- Draft: please, do not quote without the authorʼs written permission Brent Scowcroft: I would seek to reform it [the international system] rather than start over again.
Zbigniew Brzezinski: To start all over again, one would have to have a cataclysm first.
Brent Scowcroft: Iʼm afraid so 1.
Reshaping the Hegemony: The trilateralist approach of the Carter
administration 2
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyze the history of the Jimmy Carter administrationʼs
trilateralist approach stemmed from the crisis which the United States faced during the late
1960s and the 1970s. Trilateralism was formulated by a large group of experts then
implemented by Carterʼs administration for tackling the crisis of cold war liberalism,
characterized abroad by rigid anticommunist containment and domestically by the
unlimited expansion of welfare. In the long 1970s the political, economic, social and
1
Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, America and the World. Conversations on the Future of
American Foreign Policy, New York, Basic Book, 2008, p. 33.
2
This paper attempts to present a syntesis of my research activity from the last three years. Although, it goes
without saying, I carry the entire responsibility of the opinions and of the mistakes in it. I wish to thank
professor Leopoldo Nuti, University of Roma Tre and director of CIMA, my Ph. D. tutor who provided
important suggestions on many aspects of this paper, and professors of Department of Studies on the State
at University of Florence as well as CIMA scholars Duccio Basosi, Mauro Campus, Matteo Gerlini and
Angela Romano, for their very interesting suggestions during our conversations.
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SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference “Politics in Hard Times” - Stockholm, Sweden, 9-11 September 2010
cultural transformations forced the policymakers to carry out new political proposals in
order to restructuring the U.S. role on the international arena.
The Trilateral Commission, created between 1972 and 1973, sustained that an
interdependent and fragmented international system was no longer compatible with the
rigid bipolarism. A new internationalist approach, based on multilateralism, cooperation
and concerted decisions, had to consider the cornestone of the international relations not
the East-West relations, but the following goals: a new commitment of the advanced
countries in the North-South relations issues, economic cooperation among capitalist
nations, dealing with nuclear proliferation, pollution and global warming, promoting energy
independence, and a reorganization of international institutions.
That vision was implemented by President Jimmy Carter, who, during his term, tried to
define a postbipolar approach. Nonetheless, however some important successes, the
escalation of tension between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the late 1970s, the Iranian
revolution, the hostages crisis and stagflation damaged public confidence in the executive
branch, which in the 1980 presidential election was defeated by Ronald Reagan.
In conclusion, we consider the importance of Carter administrationʼs successes, which are
still relevant, and, above all, the unresolved issues, which arose during the 1970s and still
concern the international system: global warming, energy dependence, alternative fuels
issue, North-South relations and market economy dysfunctions. Finally, Jimmy Carter not
only began to undermine the agenda of containment, but tried to define a new U.S. global
hegemony, based no longer on the East-West competition, but on a concerted
management of new global issues.
The United States in the long 1970s: Reshaping the hegemony in an age of limits
and transformations
During 1971 and 1972 [...] I lost my feeling of awe about presidents3.
In 1972, shortly after the first meeting with President Nixon in Atlanta, Jimmy Carter, the
governor of Georgia from 1970 to 1974, decided to run for the 1976 election. It was not a
gamble, but a political project well detailed, formulated in a stage of the U.S. history, in
which many social, political and economic uncertainties were coming out. Between the late
1960s and early 1970s the American superpower was facing a phase of crisis and
3
Jimmy Carter, Why Not the Best? The First Fifty Years, Fayetteville, The University of Arkansas Press,
1975, p. 137.
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SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference “Politics in Hard Times” - Stockholm, Sweden, 9-11 September 2010
transformation, recognizing the limits of the cold war liberalism 4 to institutional and social
level. The idea of an unlimited growth, the belief of the market economy capacity to
implement influence, control and, if necessary, intervention abroad through the use of
alleged unlimited resources, the desire to join the mission of containment while an
assuring domestic social reform became gradually a chimera during the long decade 5.
The reasons behind the cold war liberalism’s decline stemmed from many factors - some
of them non-related to the policymaking - which involved not only the United States, but
the international system as a whole. Since the late 1960s and during the 1970s the market
economy was in deep transformation: fordism was gradually replacing by post-industrial
economy and most developed countries passed from being holders of the largest
industries to importers of goods and to services producers, inaugurating the beginning of
the post-fordist or post-industrial era. Furthermore, the development of small and medium
firms and the relocation of industries in countries, where labor was cheaper, became the
cornestone of the advanced economies. According to the Italian historian Mario Del Pero
During the Seventies initiated the gradual end of what historian Charles Maier called the 'empire of
production ", based on the centrality of the dollar and the primacy of the American industrial system. Hence
started a difficult and consequently opened transition to a new economic and international monetary system,
whose details would have been decisive for world and Western balance of world power. [...] The elements of
what Charles Maier has called the “empire of consumption” depended on (and depend) high levels of public
and private debt, allowed, in turn, by the willingness of foreign investors to support and finance them 6.
This transformation represented the fulcrum of the rising economic interdependence in the
1970s. Moreover, after more than two decades since the Second World War, global
economic balances were significantly changed: Western Europe and Japan, to whom
would soon be added the "Asian tigers", became competitive on the U.S. market, whose
imports gradually exceed exports. Dollar convertibility into gold and fixed exchange rates,
the cornestone of the Bretton Woods system, had fostered stability and prosperity of the
allies, creating a gradual overloading of the U.S. economy, which was no longer able to
4
For a definition of the Cold War Liberalism see Mario del Pero, The Eccentric Realist: Henry Kissinger and
the Shaping of American Foreign Policy, Cornell University Press, 2009. For the history of the Cold War
during the 1970s see Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier and others (edited by), The Shock of the Global: The
1970s in Perspective, Harvard University Press, 2010; Melvyn P. Leffler, Odd Arne Westad (edited by), The
Cambridge History of the Cold War, 3 voll., Cambridge University Press, 2010; Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul
of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War, New York, Hill & Wang, 2007.
5
See Riccardo Bellofiore, “I lunghi anni Settanta. Crisi sociale e integrazione economica internazionale”, in
Luca Baldissara (edited by), Le radici della crisi, Roma, Carocci, 2002, pp. 57-102. See also Robert
Solomon, The Transformation of the World Economy, St. Martinʼs Press, New York, 1999.
6
Mario Del Pero, Libertà e Impero. Gli Stati Uniti e il mondo, 1776-2006, Bari, Laterza 2008, p. 349 e p. 388,
see also Charles S. Maier, Among Empires. American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors, Cambridge,
Harvard University Press 2006.
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SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference “Politics in Hard Times” - Stockholm, Sweden, 9-11 September 2010
sustain agreements fundamentally based on the reconstruction of Europe and Japan,
hence on the U.S. economic supremacy7 . Since the early 1970s the U.S. economic
stagflation, characterized by high unemployment, low growth and rising inflation,
weakened public confidence in the American economy, which was no longer able to
guarantee an unlimited growth as in the previous decades, causing anxienties of
affluence 8. The post-fordist economic transition and the rise of European partners do not
explain the sudden crisis of the Cold War liberalism and the Bretton Woods system. The
war in Vietnam and the political and social crisis of the late 1960s and early 1970s did not
allow the United States a simple reshaping of their economy: it was a more sweeping
change 9. The tragic U.S. military involvement in Vietnam and the public indignation for the
executive’s mistakes and miscalculations had raised intense debates about the
foundations of American universalism, hitherto considered essentially right, and the
Watergate scandal, which added the decline of public confidence in the institutions of
government to the crisis of values 10. The major impact resulted from these changes
occurred on consensus, which suffered a substantial reduction and fragmentation process,
questioning the foundations of the cold war liberalism and paving the way for new
proposals with an alternative vision to the rigid containment and domestic social reforms.
The crisis of liberalism produced many schools of thought, some of which provided
concrete political proposals, while others did not overcome the intellectual debate’s stage
as too fragmented and radical 11. Even within the Congress, in which the consensus to cold
7
For the decline of Bretton Woods system see Francis Gavin, Gold, Dollars and Power: The Politics of
International Monetary Relations, 1958-1971, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press 2004, Duccio
Basosi, Il governo del dollaro. Interdipendenza economica e potere statunitense negli anni di Richard Nixon
(1969-1973), Firenze, Polistampa, 2006, Allen J. Matusow, Nixonʼs Economy: Booms, Busts, Dollars, and
Votes, University of Kansas Press, 1998.
8
For the consumer culture topic see Daniel Horowitz, The Anxienties of Affluence: Critiques of American
Consumer Culture, 1939-1979, Amherst and Boston, University of Massachussetts Press, 2004.
9
See also Edward D. Berkowitz, Something Happened: A Political and Cultural Overview of the Seventies,
Columbia University Press, 2006; Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies, The Great Shift in American Culture,
Society, and Politics, New York City, The Free Press, 2001; Stephanie Slocum-Schaffer, America in the
Seventies, Syracuse University Press, 2003.
10
For the influence of U.S. military defeat in Vietnam on American consensus decline see Steven Hurst, The
Carter administration and Vietnam, London, MacMillan Press, 1996; Richard A. Melanson, Reconstructing
Consensus: American Foregn Policy since the Vietnam War, New York City, St. Martinʼs Press, 1991.
11
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See also Mario Del Pero, The Eccentric Reealist...cit.
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SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference “Politics in Hard Times” - Stockholm, Sweden, 9-11 September 2010
war liberalism was stable since the late 1940s in the Republican and Democratic parties,
except for extreme fringes, raised deep splits 12.
An important school of thought was the Thirdworldism and the New Left, which influenced
more on a cultural and intellectual level than on a political one because of their extreme
internal fragmentation. The New Left acknowledged the executive’s mismanagement of
the Vietnam war, insisting on the U.S. troops withdrawal and focusing on a more
constructive approach to the North-South relations. The Thirdworldism, condemning the
neocolonialist approach of the developed countries, promoted a commitment to implement
the modernization of the South, without making developing countries another card to play
in the global ideological confrontation between the two superpowers 13.
Another proposal, better known as realpolitik or kissingerian pragmatism, stemmed from a
long and fruitful academic and political debate, whose most representative character was
Henry Kissinger, the National Security Advisor and Secretary of State in the Nixon and
Ford administrations. According to this view, the alternative to the cold war liberalism,
through which reconstruct the consensus and public confidence, would be based on the
following assumptions: the foreign and domestic U.S. policy were limited and within these
limits new priorities should be defined pragmatically, bipolarism should be managed as a
balance of power between great nations on the model of the Metternichian Restoration,
the strengthening of the alliance with partners should be functional to the bipolar system,
avoiding fragmentation and splits that could benefit the enemy in the delicate management
of the superpowers relations. The kissingerian approach, based on secrecy and naughty,
was gradually weakened by the systemic ideological competition between the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. in the Third World and the fundamental ambiguity of that approach, as Del Pero
points out:
Kissinger’s approach was both inside and outside the logic of the Cold War. Outside because he rejected the
ideological and discursive element of bipolarism, replacing it with a proud statement of principles realists and
relativists anti-universalistic. Inside because he resumed, and somewhat exasperated them by adopting a
perspective maniacally bipolar, which drastically reduced the capacity to understand the nuances of a
complex international system in which were radically transforming the same elements that defined the power
of a State. [...] U.S. and U.S.S.R. were still superior and unchallengeable. However imposing the bipolar
cage to the international system, in particular through the linkage, emphasized a series of problems instead
12
For the political fragmentation within the Congress during the 1970s see Robert David Johnson, Congress
and the Cold War, Cambridge University Press, 2006, Jim Wright, Balance of Power: Presidents and
Congress from the Era of McCarthy to the Age of Gingrich, Atlanta, Turner Publishing, 1996.
13
For Thirdworldism and New Left see Kevin Mattson, The Origins of the New Left and Radical Liberalism,
University Park, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003.
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SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference “Politics in Hard Times” - Stockholm, Sweden, 9-11 September 2010
of solving them. [...] Thereafter the kissingerian bipolarism tended to exacerbate local and regional tensions,
always bringing them all back to the bipolar competition, now de-ideological, with Moscow14 .
The contradictions of kissingerian pragmatism, constantly rising with the decline of
détente, favored a new approach, named neoconservatism, which since the mid-1970s
clearly influenced the public opinion and U.S. policy until the success in the presidential
elections of 1980 and 1984 carried out by Ronald Reagan. Neoconservatism, originated
from the fusion between the cold war liberals and the New Right conservatives, was able
to reconstruct the consensus, focusing on a renewed U.S. international activism against a
Soviet expansionism and domestic economic deregulation. The main goal was to exploit
the potential of the American superpower and gather public opinion behind the
anticommunist crusade, shifting the competition on the themes of the struggle for
democracy against totalitarianism and the need to promote the destabilization of the aging
and stagnant Soviet system. Moreover, in economic issues Reagan reduced drastically the
federal intervention, delegating the market management to the laissez faire approach 15.
The theme of the reconstructing consensus led to two central points of the long decade’s
history: on the one hand, the significance of domestic politics, on the other hand, the
precarious balance between the multilateralist objectives of the United States, a global
superpower in a deep crisis, and the rising of unilateralism in the U.S. policymaking.
The evolution of the U.S. hegemony in the Twentieth century: A brief survey
In the long 1970s rised different approaches aimed to create a new consensus: Reagan's
victory was the final stage that provided an adequate response to the public opinion in
search of revenge after the humiliations of the previous decade. That victory broke the
U.S. transformation process, which had took place since the early postwar years, in an
internationalist global world power, which gradually should have promoted a reorganization
of the international system, operated in concert with other major powers, and ensured
14
15
Ivi., pp. 148-149.
For Reagan and neconservatives see Kyle Longley, Jeremy D. Mayer, Michael Schaller, John W. Sloan,
Deconstructing Reagan: Conservative Mythology and Americaʼs Fortieth President, New York, M.E. Sharpe,
2007; W. Elliot Brownlee, Hugh Davis Graham (edited by), The Reagan Presidency: Pragmatic
Conservatism and Its Legacy, University Press of Kansas, 2003.
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SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference “Politics in Hard Times” - Stockholm, Sweden, 9-11 September 2010
peace and progressive expansion of welfare16. Since the 1980s, the United States boosted
its economic and geopolitical influence in order to regain an unchallenged world
leadership, but giving up the most ambitious project to use its strength to promote a global
concertation on new issues. Here we open a vital discussion on the evolution of the U.S.
hegemony in relation to the dynamics of the international system in the second half of the
Twentieth century17 . In the historiographical debate on the U.S. history in the Twentieth
century, there is a recurring theme of the rise of American power to global leadership,
accomplished by exerting dominance over the decades in the economic and geopolitical
fields and completed after World War II with a recognized status as hegemonic in the
capitalist bloc 18. However, this leadership changed profoundly throughout the rest of the
century.
Furthermore, the U.S. leadership, after the first world war, was characterized by a
strengthening of its leading economy and finance, during the 1930s by the implementation
of the New Deal, whose fordist core lasted until the late 1960s. The U.S. capacity to exert
global leadership was definitely harnessed by the public and isolationist tendencies within
the ruling class, which strongly conditioned the aim of Franklin D. Roosevelt, a supporter
of wilsonian internationalism, to involve the United States in European and Asian affairs.
Despite that commitment, the management of global issues was left to the European
powers or, at most, to the League of Nations 19.
During and after the Second World War the idea of exerting U.S. leadership in favor of
internationalism and cooperation became the dominant trend within the United States for
two reasons. Firstly, the need to cooperate with other regional powers was supported in
order to prevent future conflicts, to expand the market economy, to avoid protectionism
16
For the evolution of American internationalism see Michael J. Hogan, Thomas G. Paterson (edited by),
Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2004; Michael
H. Hunt, The American Ascendancy: How The United States Gained and Wielded Global Dominance,
Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2007; Frank Ninkovich, The Wilsonian Century. U. S. Foreign
Policy since 1900, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1999; Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U. S. Foreign
Policy, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2009; Michael H. Hunt, The Ambiguous Legacy: U. S. Foreign
Relations in the “American Century”, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1999.
17
For deepening the topic of hegemony in an international relationʼs perspective see Filippo Andreatta,
Marco Clementi, Alessandro Colombo, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Vittorio Emanuele Parsi, Relazioni
Internazionali, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2007.
18
Geir Lundestad, “Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe 1945-1952”, Journal of
Peace Research, XXIII (1986): pp. 236-277.
19
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For isolationism see Frank Ninkovich, The Wilsonian Century, cit.
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SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference “Politics in Hard Times” - Stockholm, Sweden, 9-11 September 2010
and new economic instability created by new strains 20. Secondly, the United States had to
face the Soviet threat, which on the one hand was the spring that boosted the United
States permanently toward internationalism, on the other hand, reduced the idea of global
cooperation in order to safeguard the Western bloc from the Soviet expansionism through
economic stability and military security both guaranteed by the American superpower21.
During the following two decades the U.S. economic leadership became the cornestone
for reconstruction and stability of capitalism and the strategy of containment. The
hegemony was exerted through the consensus and appropriate tools and forum, in which
the U.S. influence was predominant though not exclusive - the International Monetary
Fund, the OECD, the World Bank, the UN and regional military alliances like the NATO
and the SEATO. Despite the limitations created by the Soviet asymmetric antagonism to
the American globalist universalism, which aimed to sustain the free market economy and
economic interdependence around the globe, the United States exerted its hegemony
tackling promptly the needs of that time: economic reconstruction, stability and
containment of communism.
Since the late 1960s, the global balance and the capitalist world stability began to change
profoundly: decolonization, the trilateral economic competition with Europe and Japan, the
rise in the advanced societies of new values and new goals as environmentalism and the
development of the Third World countries, the energy issues, gradually questioned the
hegemonic status of the American superpower in the next decade through a phase of the
domestic crisis and transformation, decisive for a redefinition of its role on the global
arena.
The pragmatic approach of the Republican administrations during the first half of the
1970s recognized the limits of the American superpower in a completely changed global
context, where the indispensable accountability of each country, however, did not
correspond to the international political coordination, but a particularistic and ephemeral
accommodation in favor of preponderant interests. Hence, the kissingerian reshaping of
the U.S. hegemony in relation to new global problems fell in contradiction, as exploiting its
power only to solve the U.S. problems, disregarding an important part of the U.S. role until
that time, but not abandoning the role of great power and ensuring a world bipolar
20
21
See Niall Ferguson, The War of the World: Historyʼs Age of Hatred, London, Penguin Book, 2006.
For the rise of cold war liberalism and the end of interwar isolationism see Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of
Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954, New York, Cambridge
University Press, 1998.
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SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference “Politics in Hard Times” - Stockholm, Sweden, 9-11 September 2010
arrangement with the Soviet antagonist. Thereafter, the U.S. hegemony passed in the
1970s from geographical limits imposed by the cold war to unilateralism, which did not
tackled the international system needs, characterized by the interdependence and the
particularization of interest.
Finally, the victory of Ronald Reagan in the 1980 presidential election marked, as was
mentioned, a further reshaping of the idea of the U.S. global role: the leadership and the
potential of the American superpower were again carried out to strengthen the rule of the
United States, transforming the confrontation with the enemy not in a means for the
realization of internationalism, but in the goal and the legitimacy of the U.S. leadership. It
was aimed to strengthen the United States in order to defeat the enemy once for all, which
in the 1980s was naturally the Soviet communism and the spread of communism in the
Third World. The legimacy of hegemony, fighting the communist expansion anywhere,
represented the limit of the American internationalism as well, which no more supported
new goals in a changed international system, as it did in the mid and late 1940s. Del Pero
argues that
During the 1980s the United States forcefully reoccupied the international scene in a condition of absolute
superiority and its not comparable to the early years of the Cold War. [...] But this new hegemony is fragile,
contradictory and controversial, structurally weak and inconsistent. [...] The military buildup was combined
with a growing awareness of its futility. The exceptional national [...] stride with the recognition, implicit but
strong, of interdependence, which is indispensable also for the American leadership. [...] The world, global
and interdependent, is a world whose features have also been shaped by the United States and today
remains a world populated by actors deeply unequal, whose top there is the U.S. itself. However in the same
time is also a world that has come to erode many elements of sovereignty, by creating networks of mutual
dependencies and also the subject to which hegemonic and dominant actor must learn to obey as well,
otherwise it risks a profound destabilization of the system 22.
Between Two Ages: Interdependence and fragmentation in the international system
Today the most industrially advanced countries (in the first instance the United States) are beginning to
emerge from the industrial stage of their development. They are entering an age in which technology and
especially electronics - hence my neologism “technetronic” - are increasingly becoming the principal
determinants of social change, altering the mores, the social structure, the values, and the global outlook of
society23.
From the phase of the crisis and transformation that marked the history of the United
States and the international system in the long 1970s stemmed another approach
implemented by the Carter administration between 1977 and 1980: the internationalist or
22
23
Mario del Pero, Libertà e impero, cit., pp. 388 e 435.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages: Americaʼs Role in the Technetronic Era, Westport, Greeenwood
Press, 1970, p. XIV.
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SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference “Politics in Hard Times” - Stockholm, Sweden, 9-11 September 2010
trilateralist approach. The essay written by Zbigniew Brzezinski24 in 1970 Between Two
Ages: Americaʼs Role in the Technetronic Era represented the founding moment of
trilateralism. Indeed, David Rockefeller, inspired by this and other academic essays and
scientific articles, addressed three speeches in the spring of 1972 in order to support the
creation of a commission aimed to a new cooperation among the Most Advanced
Countries and the establishment of a new political agenda 25.
Between 1968 and the first half of the 1970s, Brzezinski and other experts reflected on
three key issues: technological progresses in the develpoded nations that shaped the
perception of global events and the international community, the relentless rise of the
interdependence as an indispensable factor of the world order and a coeval process of
fragmentation of both values and objectives within the United States, and in the
international relations. In Brzezinski’s thinking, the technetronic revolution, as progress in
electronics and advanced technology, allowed the public to have a different perception of
reality and events connected with it, profoundly altering the scope and the society’s
perceptions. Moreover, according to Brzezinski, the United States is the principal global
disseminator of the technetronic revolution. It is currently American society that is having
the greatest impact on all other societies, prompting to cumulative-reaching transformation
in their outlook and mores26 . With the massification of the media, images and meanings of
events reached the public in industrialized countries involving it in the world events as
never before. Simultaneously with the global sharing of a fact, and a versatile presentation
of it by the media in competition, was gradually emerging a subjective perspective that
exceeded the so-called "official" version as well. Brzezinski argues that
While our immediate reality is being fragmented, global reality increasingly absorbs the individual, involves
him, and even occasionally overwhelms him. Communications are the obvious, already much discussed,
immediate cause. The changes wrought by communications and computers make for an extraordinarily
interwoven society whose members are in continuous and close audio-visual contact-constantly interacting,
instantly sharing the most intense social experiences, and prompted to increased personal involvement in
24
Other articles by the same author: Zbigniew Brzezinski, The framework of East-West Reconciliation, in
Foreign Affairs (hereafter FA) gennaio 1968, Idem, How the Cold War Was Played, in FA, ottobre 1972,
Idem, America and Europe in FA, ottobre 1970, Idem, Japanʼs Global Engagement, in FA, gennaio 1972,
Idem, US Foreign Policy: The Search for Focus, in FA, luglio 1973, Idem, The Fragile Blossom: Crisis and
Change in Japan, New York, Harper & Row, 1972.
25
“Mr. Rockefeller opened the meeting by stating that he had proposed an International Commission for
Peace and Prosperity in three identical speeches which he had made to the Chase Manhattan International
Financial Forums in London, Brussels and Paris in March”, Meeting on Proposed Commission on Peace and
Prosperity, 9/5/1972, Trilateral Commission File, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Folder “Correspondence
File: 1/12/1973-31/12/1973”, Box 1, Jimmy Carter Library (da ora JCL).
26
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Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages, cit., p. 24.
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SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference “Politics in Hard Times” - Stockholm, Sweden, 9-11 September 2010
even the most distant problems. The new generation no longer defines the world exclusively on the basis of
reading, either of ideologically structured analysis or of extensive descriptions; it also experiences and
senses it vicariously through audio-visual communications. This form of communicating reality is growing
more rapidly - especially in the advanced countries 27.
Furthermore, the fragmentation of the public opinion was closely related to the expansion
of the media and, hence, to the development of technologies: the cumulative effect of the
technetronic revolution is contradictory. On the one hand, this revolution marks the
beginnings of a global community, on the other hand, it fragments humanity and detaches
it from its traditional moorings28 . That revolution gradually influenced economy: in
advanced countries began a process of industrial relocation and a progressive decline of
fordism, which contributed to a further fragmentation due to the shift in these countries
from keynesism to the primacy of consumption and services. According to Brzezinski, the
crisis of the Bretton Woods system and in the Middle East after the Yom Kippur War were
two fundamental aspects of the transition between the two eras. The first one officially
sanctioned the end of the reconstruction’s phase of market economies in Western Europe
and Japan, which entered a phase of competition with the U.S. superpower. The second
one blew off the cap on the energy supplying’s Pandora’s box for developed countries and
generally ended the idea of unlimited progress of capitalism. In an article, published in
1973 on the house organ of the Trilateral Commission, Brzezinski showed how the Middle
East crisis and the oil shock had imposed a harsh stop to the hitherto unlimited growth of
Western economies, influencing deeply the policymaking. In a arguable but effective
parallelism, Brzezinski compared the choice of the OPEC to raise prices and reduce an
output of oil to Russia's defeat in the war against Japan in 1904-05: in both cases the
European world, the industrialized West was defeated on vital issues by external forces 29.
The transformation and fragmentation of values in the advanced societies constituted
another important moment of the transition described by Brzezinski. Indeed, it stemmed
from the technetronic revolution, which gradually brought the public to events
geographically far apart. Wars, the desperate situation of some Third World countries,
decolonization, the environmental concerns, the waste of resources, were issues that
through the massification of the media captured the sensibility of the public opinion, which
27
Ivi., p. 18.
28
Ivi., p. 52.
29
Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Trilateral Relations in a Global Context (excerpt), in Trialogue n°7, 31/5/1975,
available on <http://www.trilateral.org/AnnMtgs/Trialog/library_annmtgs/stacks_annmtgs/
Global_Redistribution_Of_Power.pdf> last visit 10/07/2009.
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SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference “Politics in Hard Times” - Stockholm, Sweden, 9-11 September 2010
increasingly felt itself part of a global community. Moreover, the globalization of the issues
and the particularization or fragmentation of perspectives altered the traditional values,
considered, specially by the new generations, no longer appropriate. The higher level of
education provided to young people of the 1960s and the 1970s far exceeded both
qualitatively and quantitatively that of the previous generations. According to Brezinski
The age of volatile belief is intimately linked with the impact of the technetronic revolution on existing
ideologies and outlooks on life. What man thinks is closely related to what man experiences. The relationship
between the two is not casual but interacting: experience affects thought, and thought conditions the
interpretation of experience. Today the dominant pattern seems increasingly to be that of highly
individualistic, unstructured, changing perspectives. institutionalized beliefs, the result of the merger of ideas
and institutions, no longer appear to many as vital and relevant, while the skepticism that has contributed so
heavily to the undermining of institutionalized beliefs now clashes with the new emphasis on passion and
involvement. The result for many is an era of fads, of rapidly shifting beliefs, with emotions providing for
some the unifying cement previously supplied by institutions and with the faded revolutionary slogans of the
past providing the needed inspiration for facing and altogether different future.
[...] In our time the established ideologies are coming under attack because their institutionalized character,
which was once useful in mobilizing the relatively uneducated masses, has become an impediment to
intellectual adptation, while their concern with the external qualities of life is increasingly felt to ignore the
inner, more spiritual dimension, Commitment to individual action, based on moral indignation and stimulated
by a much higher level of general education, has become a substitute for highly organized activity, though it
avoids the passivity and indifference to external reality that was characteristic of the pre-ideological age 30.
The cultural and social fragmentation in the public perspective was in contrast with the
rigid cold war bipolarism, which characterized the relations between the two superpowers
since the late 1940s. This ideological perspective was increasingly flawed not only by new
needs and priorities arising from global public opinion, but by the emergence of centrifugal
forces within their spheres of influence: the conflict between the U.S.S.R. and China, the
Soviet military interventions in the Warsaw Pact, the Ostpolitik sponsored by the Federal
Republic's, the partial defection of France from the NATO and the creeping antiAmericanism in Western Europe, emerged from the criticism of the U.S. intervention in
Vietnam, undermined the idea of the existence of two compact blocks. Brzezinski argues
that
Tension is unavoidable as man strives to assimilate the new into the framework of the old. For a time the
established framework resiliently integrates the new by adapting it in a more familiar shape. But at some
point the old framework becomes overloaded. The new imput can no longer be redefined into traditional
forms, and eventually it asserts itself with compelling force. Today, though the old framework of international
politics - with their spheres of influence, military alliances between natio-states, the fiction of sovereignty,
doctrinal conflicts arising from nineteenth-century crises - is clearly no longer compatible with reality 31.
30
Ivi., pp. 61-62.
31
Ivi., p. 274.
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The bipolar antagonism was not perceived as a structural requirement, but as a dated
rigidism, which wasted enormous resources in arms race, hindering the resolution of
problems, which the two blocks shared: the energy issue, economic cooperation, support
for developing countries, the resolution of the Middle East crisis, the problem of nuclear
proliferation and so on.
Afterwards, in his essay Brzezinski considered the issue of the governability in the liberal
democracies, arguing that the global transition toward a new interdependent and
fragmented world altered the advanced nation’s domestic stability. The fragmentation of
political and economic interests led the policymakers to an uneasy compromise among
divergent tendencies for gaining voters’ consensus, and to a lack of competence because
of the increasing complexity of the issues. The need to gather the widest consensus as
possible urged the government to manage a large number of commitments, which are
difficult to fulfill during the mandate. Hence, an accentuated public perception of the
institutions’ incompetence and public distrust as well.
In Between two Ages and in subsequent articles published during his work as director of
the Trilateral Commission, Brzezinski analyzed the crisis in the antagonist block. As the
capitalist system, the Communist states faced a phase of uncertainty and profound
domestc transformation, compounded by the immobility of the Soviet system. On the one
hand, the thrust of the October Revolution was, according to Brzezinski, totally exhausted.
The final blow to the ideals of the world proletariat after the invasion of Hungary was
vibrated by the Soviet tanks, which had invaded Prague in 1968, confirming the rigidism
and the unreformability of "real socialism". On the other hand, the ideological and quasi
military split between the Chinese and Soviets, who since the mid-1950s diverged
significantly on the vision and practice of the tenets of socialism. Gradually the fog of
ideology thinned, showing the true nature of the communist superpower, which was
essentially conservative and imperialist. Moreover, despite the commitment and
destabilization initiated by the Soviets in support of the Marxist-Leninist movement struggle
for a national independence in the Third World, which had become the new cold war
battlefield during the 1960s and the 1970s, it was clear, according to Brzezinski, the
pragmatic reduction of the communist ideals to a mere tool in the hands of warring factions
to achieve Soviet aids 32. Moreover, since the 1960s the Soviet economy stagnated,
denouncing a fundamental problem that would have considerably complicated the stability
32
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Ivi., parte III.
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and development of the communist superpower: the lack of competition within the planned
economy, ignoring any progress in the consumer sector, the waste of huge resources for
increasing nuclear arsenal. The economic stagnation, the import dependency and
inefficiency of the aging Soviet nomenclature to set a profound reform of socialism were,
according to Brzezinski, the actual condition of the communist superpower in the 1970s.
Despite its considerable geopolitical influence in the Eurasian theater and its
unquestionable military power, the Soviet Union was unable to overcome a deep structural
crisis.
Finally, Brzezinski anticipated a fundamental concept of the trilateral process: a
reorganization of international institutions, which must be equipped with new tools and
rules in order to face and overcome the economic crisis and resolve local disputes:
The emerging community of developed nations would require some institutional expression. [...] Such a
council for global cooperation would be something more than OECD in that it would operate on a higher level
and would also be concerned with political strategy, but it would be more diffused than NATO in that it would
not seek to forge integrated military-political structures. Nevertheless, a council of this sort [...] would be
more effective in developing common programs than is the United Nations, whose efficacy is unavoidably
limited by the Cold War and by North-South divisions. [...] In appearance would therefore assist and perhaps
even accelerate the further development of present world bodies - such as the World Bank - which are in
any case de facto institutions of the developed world geared to assisting the Third World. A greater sense of
community within the developed world would help to strenghten these institutions by backing them with the
support of public opinion; it might also eventually lead to the possibility of something along the lines of a
global taxation system33.
The relevance of the international organizations consisted of ensuring broad participation,
which guaranteed the possibility of achieving a concerted decision on several issues
involving the entire international community as support for the modernization of developing
countries. Brzezinski's analysis implied a radical change in the future international role of
the United States, to whom he, despite the difficulties, looked with quite optimism: the U.S.
economic and geopolitical power should be used to promote new priorities to be
addressed in concert in international arena, but for achieving it was necessary a new
global consciousness of the public opinion, which through the establishment of new
priorities had the task of supporting a new ruling class capable of promoting new policies
for dealing with the global changes. Brzezinski concludes
the United States is the country that most urgently needs to reform its foreign service and policymaking
establishment, and it is best equipped to undertake such reform. It is the first society to become globally
oriented, and it is the one with the most extensive and intensive communications involvement34.
33
Ivi., p. 297 e p. 304.
34
Ivi., p. 292.
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The Trilateral Commission: Sharing a new project
The Aim of the Commission is to bring the best brains in the world to bear on the problems of the future 35.
An important test of the effectiveness of the commission would be whether it works to reduce the walls
dividing power and economic blocs from one another36.
In the spring of 1972, David Rockefeller addressed some speeches on the international
economic crisis and, adopting numerous suggestions offered by the writings of Brzezinski,
proposed to establish a non-governmental organization joined by academics and
representatives of finance, journalism, politics from the three poles of the industrialized
world - North America, Japan, Western Europe - through which encouraging greater
international cooperation and favoring a new concerted policy agenda. In a letter from
George Franklin to Gerard Smith, both members of the Commission, we can read
David Rockefeller in three speeches in London, Paris and Brussels specifically proposed a commission
made up of citizens from Europe, Japan and North America. [...] Three general purpose were: (a) to make
sure that leaders in the three regions came to a better understanding of each otherʼs problem and ways of
thinking (b) to issue reports on significant international topics -- with specific recommendations for action (c)
to try to inform citizens and influence governments37.
In 1972-1973, this proposal became an object of an intense brainstorming sessions, where
Rockefeller and his advisers confronted on the creation of the Commission, defining the
basic principles. David Rockefeller imagined a new Commission, similar to the Bilderberg
Group, of whom he was a major exponent: along with experts and academics debating on
the problems and failures of global capitalism represented a model in order to define and
propose new political solutions. Moreover, the main difference between the Bilderberg
Group 38, created in 1954, and the Trilateral Commission consisted in two key factors: on
the one hand, more transparency on the activities of the new organization, on the other
hand, the unprecedented involvement of Japan as an equal partner. The idea of a
commission built on a trilateral basis was an indispensable response to the changes
occurring in the 1960s and 1970s, when Japan joined definitively the club of the advanced
35
Statement by David Rockefeller in Trilateral Commissionʼs Program, Trilateral Commission File, Zbigniew
Brzezinski Collection, Gerard Smith [Chron File 1/3/73-31/3/73], Box 1, JCL.
36
Meeting on proposed Trilateral Commission, 23-24 luglio 1972, Council on Foreign Relations Records,
Folder 1, Box 49, Princeton University Library.
37
Letter from George Franklin to Gerard C. Smith, 3/6/1977, Trilateral Commission File, Zbigniew Brzezinski
Collection, Folder: Gerard Smith [File--Chron File: 1/1/76-3/6/77], Box 4, JCL.
38
For Bilderberg Group see Thomas W. Gijswijt, “Beyond NATO: transnational elite networks and the Atlantic
alliance, in Andreas Wenger, Christian Neunlist, and Anna Locher, Transforming NATO in the Cold War.
Challenges beyond deterrence in the 1960s, London, Routledge, 2007, pp. 50-64.
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nations, thanks to an extraordinary growth in exports. Furthermore, the credibility of the
organization lied, according to Rockefeller, in its capacity to bring to the public debate the
issues arised in the Commission’s meetings, in order to promote political actions, which
were analyzed and presented to the public through the support and cooperation of the
media. Indeed, from the outset, Rockefeller and his advisers decided to involve major
newspapers in the Commission’s internal debate, and to consider the media’s outlook on
the meetings 39.
The structure of the Commission reflected its tripartite nature, ensuring both preparatory
meetings in each region and equal representation within the executive committee, which
established the objectives, timing and issues. On the first stage, the founders proposed a
three-year commitment - 1974-1976 - after which dissolving the organization. Instead, after
the successes and the extensive participation, the executive committee decided to
continue without specifying a precise time limit, thereby establishing that the Commission
was not a simple tool to discuss the crisis and identify concerted motions, but a nongovernmental forum in which the best minds of the advanced world could discuss and
improve their perspectives on issues of collective interest as well 40. That was noticeable in
the substantial difference between the first three years and the period from 1977 onwards
of the Commission's activities. On the first stage, both the members’ appointing and the
choice of topics for discussion were extremely homogeneous, specially in relation to the
communiqué, in which trilateralists summarized the Commission's views on various topics.
On the second stage, from early 1977, when many trilateralists, who joined the Carter
administration were replaced, the Commission became a forum characterized by very
divergent opinions without eventually coming to a joint statement as in the previous years.
That condition stemmed not only from the increasing of the Commission’s members, but
mainly from the deep differences between them.
The Commission's work started from a topic selected by the executive committee, which
analysed it in relation to political, economic and social dynamics. That theme was
discussed and presented by three rapporteurs, experts on the subject, each one from
different trilateral pole. Following the submission of the report, called Triangle Paper, a
39
In the house organ of the Trilateral Commission, Trialogues, published every three months, was collected
partly or fully articles from important newspapers, which followed the Commissionʼs activities.
40
The Constitution of the Trilateral Commission was completed in the April 1973 and was divided in 7
sections: 1) name, objectives and structure 2) members 3) the Executive Committee 4) the President 5)
Director 6) task force 7) miscellaneous procedures, in Jimmy Carter Papers-Pre Presidential, 1976
Presidential Campaign, Issue Office- Noel Sterrett, Subject File, Trilateral Commission, Box 96, JCL.
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discussion took place within the Commission. Thereafter the various guidelines and
comments were reported briefly in Trialogue, which also included the joint statement of the
executive committee on individual topics and the reactions of the major newspapers on the
issue41.
The aim of the commission was to promote a broad debate in the public opinion, from
which could gradually arise concrete political proposals in order to develop the concerted
decisions and the resolution of disputes in the international system. In defining the
objectives during the brainstorming sessions trilateralists focused primarily on new tools to
be adopted for ensuring the implementation of a new political agenda of trilateralist
countries. The growing interdependence and fragmentation within the international system
pushed trilateralists to propose tools for the resolution of conflict and confrontation as an
alternative to unilateralism and protectionism, which produced a dangerous tightening of
relations among the capitalist countries, undermining the stability in the international
system. The panacea, according to trilateralists, was consultation and multilateralism
which ensured concerted decisions and cooperation, specially with regard to local
conflicts. The United States had to implement this approach, given their geopolitical and
economic influence, sustaining, after the crises in the early 1970s, a strong cooperation on
a new political agenda, using international organizations, above all the United Nations, as
suitable forum for a broad participation42.
Moreover, the new goals which developed countries and in particular the United States
had to pursue were, firstly, paying more attention to North-South relations issues.
Trilateralists identified three different groups within the Third World: developing countries,
underdeveloped ones and those in possession of huge fossil fuels, above all the OPEC
nations. On these complex issues, trilateralasts considered essential a concerted
approach between the developed countries, both on the development of poor countries,
and on the issue of "energy blackmail" moved from producing countries. The Trilateral
Commission proposed more investments by developed countries in poor areas and to put
these funds in partnership with them ensuring a large credit in order to allow the initiation
41
I Triangle Papers was the joint responsibility of the three rapporteurs. Although only them are responsible
for the analysis and recommendations, they were aided in their task by joint or individual consultation held
during the phase of preparation, which at various stages of the report included a number of other
trilateralists.
42
See Trialogue n° 11 available on <http://www.trilateral.org/AnnMtgs/Trialog/library_annmtgs/
stacks_annmtgs/Improper_Corporate_Payoffs_1976.pdf> last visit 10/07/2009.
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of large-scale industrial and economic activities as well43. Hence, trilateral countries should
agree on the distribution of responsibilities in different areas of the planet not for unilateral
or bilateral benefits, but in a concerted plan of economic development. Furthermore, on
the energy issue the commission proposed a gradual economic integration of the OPEC
countries through producers’ investments in the advanced world. Thereby, responding to
the process of interdependence and preventing new strains in the relations between
producers and consumers of oil. At the same time, the developed countries had to
establish a concerted approach in relations with the OPEC countries in order to avoid
unilateral actions which could weaken the position of consumers and undermine the
credibility of future cooperation with them 44. The focus of the Trilateral Commission for the
Middle East crisis derived mainly from October 1973 when it was obvious the lack of a
coordinated policy between consumers countries, causing friction and conflict within the
capitalist world. In addition to consultations between consumers, trilateralists considered
essential to move towards a policy of energy conservation, to develop alternative energy
sources and finding new oil fields using new technologies which allowed to exploit also
deposits marine45.
The crisis of the Bretton Woods system and the successive failures of the capitalist system
caused by the unilateralism of the U.S. and Europe were in the center of the activity of the
commission which intended to propose a solution that would avoid protectionism and
economic harm to a market economy. A decisive contribution, according to trilateralists,
had to come from organizations responsible for international economic coordination and
indispensable for intervention in case of crisis. Those bodies required a major
reorganization in relation to the greater complexity of capitalist economic dysfunctions. The
International Monetary Fund and World Bank, as well as contributing to the development
of the Third World countries, had to adopt new tools indispensable to create a new shared
accommodations in the market economy.
43
See also Trialogue n° 5 available on <http://www.trilateral.org/AnnMtgs/Trialog/library_annmtgs/
stacks_annmtgs/May_July_1974_North_American_European_Japanese_Affairs.pdf> last visit 10/07/2009.
44
See Harold Brown, “American Condition” in Trialogue n° 5 may-July 1974 available on <http://
www.trilateral.org/AnnMtgs/Trialog/library_annmtgs/stacks_annmtgs/
May_July_1974_North_American_European_Japanese_Affairs.pdf> last visit 10/07/2009.
45
For energy issues see Trialogue n°18 e n° 5 available on <http://www.trilateral.org/AnnMtgs/Trialog/
library_annmtgs/stacks_annmtgs/Energy_Industrial_Relations_1978.pdf> and on <http://www.trilateral.org/
A n n M t g s / T r i a l o g / l i b r a r y _ a n n m t g s / s t a c k s _ a n n m t g s /
May_July_1974_North_American_European_Japanese_Affairs.pdf> last visit 10/07/2009.
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Furthermore, the Trilateral Commission reconsidered the capitalist world’s relations with
communist countries, which during the 1970s cooperated with the adversary on economic,
and nuclear issues. Trilateralists proposed to carry out a multilateral cooperation to benefit
the entire international system. In conflicts as in the Middle East or in Subsaharian Africa,
cooperation and not competition between the superpowers, thanks to the geopolitical
influence of both, could contributed to the achievement of lasting agreements. The
regional approach had to prevail, therefore, over the traditional global and bipolar
approach of the two superpowers, which saw in local destabilization an opportunity to
reduce the enemy’s influence46.
Even détente should be carried out in a multilateral perspective and not simply for
regulating the competition between the two superpowers. According to trilateralists, a new
kind of cooperation should be occurred specially on arms negotiations and the issue of
nuclear proliferation. Negotiations had to promote not agreements on even higher nuclear
weapons ceilings, but cuts in the arsenals in order to reallocate resources from the military
industry to the development of the Third World countries. Moreover, the proliferation
identified another area, in which the two superpowers played a key role and where it was
essential to set a joint commitment to address any information and technological sharing
with other countries to peaceful energy use, not military47 . Cooperation with the Soviet
Union should have been functional to the problems of the international system and not a
pragmatic regulation of bipolarism. The process of normalization with China should be
carried out in order to guarantee to the United States a valuable partner for the Asian
issues, the progressive opening of a new market and geopolitical and economic
cooperation with Japan 48. Hence, according to trilateralists, the United States had to give
up the kissingerian triangular strategy, whereby the U.S.-China normalization should have
been used exclusively for building a cage around the Soviet Union and pressing on it
about arms negotiations.
46
See Trialogue n°14 “Managing Global Problems: Avenues for Trilateral-Communist Collaboration available
o n < h t t p : / / w w w. t r i l a t e r a l . o r g / A n n M t g s / Tr i a l o g / l i b r a r y _ a n n m t g s / s t a c k s _ a n n m t g s /
Managing_Global_Relations.pdf> last visit 10/07/2009.
47
See Gerard C. Smith, “Remarks on non Proliferation”, in Trialogue n° 15 available on <http://
www.trilateral.org/AnnMtgs/Trialog/library_annmtgs/stacks_annmtgs/
East_West_Relations_Strategies_Increase_Food_Production.pdf> last visit 10/07/2009.
48
For the US-China Normalization see Trialogue n° 20 available on <http://www.trilateral.org/AnnMtgs/
Trialog/library_annmtgs/stacks_annmtgs/Tokyo_1979.pdf> last visit 10/07/2009.
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In conclusion, the new internationalism, supported mainly by economic interests linked to
multinationals, and postindustrial economy, tried not only to avoid a new phase of
economic protectionism and international tension, but also to bring the potential of the
greatest exponents of the world capitalism toward new priorities and a renewed
cooperation. The Trilateral Commission summarized the internationalist approach, which in
a profoundly changed context considered the three poles of the industrialized world the
engine, which could tackle the crisis of the international system. Hence, the United States
had to play a key role thanks to its economic and geopolitical influence promoting
concerted multilateral actions of the advanced world. According to trilateralists, the
American superpower had to pursue a new hegemony, which finally responded to the
needs of the entire international community. A new U.S. hegemony consisted in the role of
a coordinator of global policies, a mediator in the local conflicts and a promoter of a new
political agenda on energy, environment and North-South relations. This role should be
directed to multilateralism in response to developments in the international system toward
interdependence and fragmentation.
An Outsider in Washington: The Jimmy Carter presidential campaign
In April 1973, Jimmy Carter was contacted by George Franklin about the possibility of his
candidacy as a member of the Trilateral Commission. The governor of Georgia, who
decided to compete in the presidential elections of 1976, accepted the proposal,
considered crucial to his political education, specially in economics and foreign policy, to
cooperate with experts and academics 49. During the following two years the contacts
between leading members of the Trilateral Commission and the election committee of
Jimmy Carter intensified considerably, up to conceive a closer collaboration for the election
debates with President Gerald Ford. The great contribution of trilateralists to the
preparation of the democratic candidate, particularly on foreign policy issues, were
fundamental to understand the new US approach in international affairs during the Jimmy
Carter presidency50 .
49
For Jimmy Carterʼs appointing as Trilateral Commission member in April 1973 see letter from George
Franklin to Peter Bourne, 27/1/1977, Trilateral Commission, Vertical File, Box 113, JCL.
50
Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski, Richard N. Gardner, Henry Owen, “Foreign priorities for the first
six months”, 3/11/1976, Cyrus R. & Grace Sloan Vance Papers, Folder 12, Box 8, Yale United States Library
Manuscripts Collection.
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However, it would be a mistake to present the collaboration between the commission and
Jimmy Carter as a mere influence of the first on the second: indeed, Carter had already in
mind a profound redefinition of the U.S. foreign policy agenda and a modus operandi that
favored transparency and cooperation between allies in order to deal with the complex
problems of the international system. It is more correct the term interaction between the
three conditions existing in the mid-1970s: the rise of the trilateralist internationalism, a
chance for an outsider to win the presidential election and the aspiration in the opinion
public for a political renovation and for a reconstruction of trust in institutions after the
Watergate scandals 51. Carter, as the trilateralists, was convinced of the need to restore the
U.S. leadership in the international system, specially to use the economic and geopolitical
influence of the United States for multilateral, not unilateral, goals. Thanks to his cultural
and religious background, Jimmy Carter believed in the messianic role and in the
American exceptionalism, whose universalism had been reduced to a pragmatic pursuit of
a ruthless supremacy within its sphere of influence and regulation of the bipolar relations
with communism by the previous republican administrations. Moreover, Jimmy Carter was
aware of the profound change occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s, so he did not
intend to constrain the U.S. politics in the classic cold war containment, but rather to
promote a new dynamism in foreign policy and particularly a new agenda of priorities 52.
The Trilateral Commission shared with the democratic candidate many concerns and
projects about the economic crisis, which, in the opinion of both, stemmed not only from
structural changes in capitalist economy, but also by lack of coordination between
advanced countries 53. The 1976 presidential campaign, in contrast to the previous one,
was not characterized by a predominant theme, but by issues concerning the conduct of
politics: the naughty, immorality, secrecy, corruption, inefficiency were the themes that led
the election debates during 1976, facilitating the rise of Carter in the polls. His outsider
status was more crucial than competence.
51
For election campaign see Patrick Anderson, Electing Jimmy Carter: The Campaign of 1976, Baton
Rouge, La., Louisiana State University Press, 1994 and Gregory Paul Domin, Jimmy Carter, Public Opinion,
and the Search for Values, 1977-1981, Macon, Mercer University Press, 2003.
52
For new world order and new foreign policy approach see Address by Governor Carter to the Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations, 15/3/1976, Jimmy Carter Papers - Pre-Presidential, 1976 Presidential
Campaign Issues Office - Stuart Eizenstat, Foreign Policy 1/27/76-3/76, Box 17, JCL.
53
For the information sharing between Carter and Brzezinski on foreign policy issue during the 1976
campaign see Memorandum Jimmy Carter allʼExComm della Commissione Trilaterale, 8/1/1975, Trilateral
Commission File, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Brzezinski Correspondence [1/1/75-31/3/75] Box 8, JCL.
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The uniqueness of the 1976 election campaign did not overshadow the profound
differences between the proposals of the two candidates: Ford, continuing the policy of
Nixon, counted on the Republican administration skills and experience; instead, Carter, as
well as promising an executive no more influenced by powerful groups in Washington,
proposed a domestic political reorganization, an economic recovery and a new
commitment to the Third World issues and, in general, an overcoming of the executive
opportunism in the relations with Communist superpower54.
Trilateralism and Decisionmaking: the trilateralist approach between cooperation
and regionalism
The trilateralist approach stemmed from the interaction between the proposed trilateral
background of the democratic presidential candidate and the historical circumstances of
the first half of the 1970s. Jimmy Carter, despite his inexperience in foreign policy and
international economics, compensated that deficiency appointing many trilateralist experts
in the executive branch not to delegate its decisionmaking, but to have a wide range of
outlooks for a most compelling vision 55 .
Jimmy Carter’s postbipolar approach did not consist of an rejection tout court of the
competition between the superpowers. The President was aware of the crucial importance
of continuing to have good relations with the Soviet Union, through reciprocity in bilateral
54
For the election debates see Sidney Kraus (edited by), The Great Debates: Carter vs. Ford, 1976, Indiana
University Press, 1979; The Presidential Campaign 1976, 3 voll., Washington DC, United States Government
Printing Office, 1978; Patrick Anderson, Electing Jimmy Carter: The Campaign of 1976, Baton Rouge, La.,
Louisiana State University Press, 1994.
55
Trilateralists appointed in the Carter administration: Lucy Wilson Benson, Undersecretary of State for
Security Assistance, C. Fred Bergsten, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, W.
Michael Blumenthal, Secretary of Treasury, Robert R. Bowie, Deputy to the Director of the Central
Intelligence for National Intelligence, Harold Brown, Secretary of Defence, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs, Jimmy Carter, President, Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretaty of
State, Richard N. Cooper, Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, Lloyd N. Cutler, White House
Counsel, Hedley Donovan, Senior Advisor Domestic and Foreign Policy and Media Relations, Richard N,
Gardner, Ambassador to Italy, Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Samuel P. Huntington, Coordinator on National Security, National Security Council, Sol Linowitz,
Special Middle East Negotiator; Director, Presidentʼs Commission on World Hunger; Co.Negotiator of
Panama Canal Treaties, Walter Mondale, Vice President, Henry Owen, U. S. Ambassador at Large, Special
Representative of President for Economic Summits, Elliot L. Richardson, U. S. Ambassador at Large with
Responsability for U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, John Sawhill, Deputy Secretary of Energy, Gerard C.
Smith, U. S. Ambassador at Large for Non-Proliferation Matters, Anthony M. Solomon, Undersecretary of the
Treasury for Monetary Affairs, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State, Paul C. Warnke, Director, U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, Chief Disarmament Negotiator, Leonard Woodcock, Ambassador to
Peking, Andrew Young, Ambassador to the United Nations, Paul A. Volcker, Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board.
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relations. Nevertheless, Carter did not reduce the perspective and action of the
administration to a simple management of relations with the Soviet Union, to contain it and
to react to possible destabilization, real or imagined, implemented by the Soviets. Instead,
Carter tried to define new foreign policy priorities and direct relations with the Soviet Union
toward cooperation, multilateral détente, from which the entire international community,
specially the Third World countries, could benefit. According to Jimmy Carter, an economic
and geopolitical leverage, which both superpowers exerted within their respective spheres
of influence, could be exploited to facilitate the resolution of local conflicts and promote the
development of poor areas with non-invasive and interventionist actions, but with a
collaboration functional to the needs of the country. Thus Carter altered the vision of a
systemic ideological competition in various theaters of the Third World and also opposed
to a preconceived perception that any political change or destabilization in these countries
was necessarily a sign of the Soviet interference.
Furthermore, the trilateralist approach was characterized by the need to cooperate with
allies on an equal basis seeking a concerted solution to reduce divergences among them
about political and military issues. Being a harsh critic of the unilateralism and
protectionism of previous administrations, the president sought to promote a shared
project with allies regarding common problems and goals. The accountability sought by
Carter on relations with allies differed greatly from which desired by Kissinger in the early
1970s. The former Secretary of State simply tried to implement an U.S. unilateral
approach aiming to reduce the U.S. responsibilities about the allies’ security and economic
stability. However, in Kissinger’s perspective, sharing responsabilites did not correspond a
concerted management of the world politics, specially regarding relations with the
countries of Eastern Europe. Kissinger openly contrasted the Ostpolitik and the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), strongly desired by the
Europeans, as complicated the complex regulatory process of bipolarism. The Ostpolitik
affected one of the cornestone of Nixon and Kissinger policy: the essential unity of the
Western bloc behind the policymaking of the American superpower. Carter, as well as
shared responsibilities, favored a multilateral management of relations with Communist
countries, using the CSCE as an instrument of pressure about the Soviet conduct in
Eastern bloc on human rights 56.
56
For Kissinger and CSCE see Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights,
and the Demise of Communism, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2001.
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The regionalism of the Carter administration was a new approach to manage local conflicts
and disputes by the superpowers. Carter considered to assess every single issue at the
local level through the lens of bipolar competition a dangerous limit. Carter administration’s
approach to a local conflict consisted on a super partes management using its influence to
reach an agreement between the parties without finalizing the U.S. efforts to an a priori
exclusion of the Soviet Union or to a simple support the anticommunist forces in the field.
The regionalist approach, in which the United Nations and the possible cooperation
between the superpowers played a crucial role opposed firmly to the global bipolar
approach, whereby any change or a regional turmoil was inscribed in a wider project of the
Soviet Union of weakening the influence of the adversary in the region 57.
During Jimmy Carter’s presidential term, relations with allies were characterized by several
differences in the economic and military sectors and were not facilitated by the gradual
escalation of tension between the two superpowers. The economic crisis and the decision
of deploying euromissiles on Western European soil were a arduous test for the trilateralist
approach of Carter’s administration. Since the first week in office, Carter worked with his
advisers, first of all Henry Owen, a former member of the Trilateral Commission, to
organize the first meeting with European allies 58. The occasion was the G7 summit in
London in 1977, where, after the clashes and differences caused by the unilateral and
protectionist policies of Nixon and Ford, Carter tried to build a new trust and renewed
cooperation between allies. During that meeting Carter proposed the adoption of the
locomotive approach 59 to overcome the stagflation of the Western economies through a
stimulus package of the three most advanced countries - the United States, Japan and the
Federal Republic of Germany - aimed to reduce unemployment and boosting economic
growth and productivity. Despite differences between main economic philosophies - the
antinflationist Germany and the United States against unemployment - the allies reached
an agreement, which provided stimulus to the locomotive economies. The final meeting
57
See Donna R. Jackson, Jimmy Carter and the Horn of Africa: Cold War Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia,
London, McFarland & Company Publishers, 2007.
58
Henry Owen, member of the Trilateral Commission U. S. Ambassador at Large, Special Representative of
President for Economic Summits in the Carter administration played a key role in the definition of the
locomotive approach during the G7 of Londra and Bonn in 1977 and 1978. See also Trialogue <http://
www.trilateral.org/AnnMtgs/Trialog/library_annmtgs/stacks_annmtgs/London_Summit_Revisited.pdf> last
visit 10/07/2009.
59
See Carl W. Biven, Jimmy Carterʼs Economy: Policy in an Age of Limits, Chapel Hill, University of North
Carolina Press, 2002.
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and the agreement, however, showed the first rifts in the relationship between Carter and
Chancellor Schmidt, who judged the U.S. president's economic policy adventurist, quite
excessive respect to monetary rigor promoted by Germans, specially for the gradual
weakening of the dollar that caused the decline of German exports to the U.S. market and
higher oil prices on the world market. Japan was asked to curb exports to the U.S. market
and reduce oil imports from the OPEC countries. Again the agreement was reached with
difficulty. In two subsequent meetings were evident the contradictions of the trilateralist
approach of Carter’s administration, as the continued devaluation of the dollar and the
substantial failure of the stimulus package did partially withdraw the allies from supporting
Carter’s proposal.
The issue of the production and installation of the ERW or neutron bomb in Western
Europe also strained relations between the American superpower and its European allies
in particular with West Germany. Everything was caused, as has been clearly described by
Robert Strong, by the ambiguity of the Western European position, which on the one hand
secretly supported a strong response to the deployment of Soviet SS-20 in Eastern
Europe, on the other hand, publicly did not intend to take responsibility for a decision so
unpopular. The neutron bomb issue was characterized in late 1977 and spring of 1978 by
a heated debate between allies, much emphasized by the media. The catastrophic fallout
caused by the explosion of the bomb would have caused an ecological disaster and an
impressive number of victims. Hence, the strong opposition from the European public
opinion about the installation of the ERW. European governments, facing a deep crisis in
the consensus on the issue of taxation aimed to the U.S. imposition, thus, playing a dual
role in private urged Americans to produce and install the bomb in Western Europe to
balance the difference between the continental theater Warsaw Pact and NATO, but
publicly they opposed to the installation of the ERW on the European soil60. Carter was not
going to impose unilaterally the neutron bomb and, after having suspended the ERW
production, asked the explicit consent by the European allies, so that the decision would
be multilateral and shared 61. The choice of the President, also opposed by the members of
60
For the US-European relations during Carterʼs years see Matthias Schultz e Thomas A. Schwartz (edited
by), The Strained Alliance: U. S. - European Relations From Nixon to Carter, New York, Cambridge
University Press, 2010.
61
For the ERW issue see Robert A. Strong, Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the Making of American
Foreign Policy, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 2000.
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the administration, was stigmatized as an act of weakness by the allies, who rejected the
option ERW, moving gradually to the idea of deploying Cruise and Pershing 2 missiles.
On the military issue, in the Far East there were also clashes between South Korea and
the United States, which from the first weeks of 1977, announced the withdrawal of the
U.S. troops from Korea, causing disappointment within the South Korean government that
felt abandoned to the mercy of the enemies, North Korea and China 62. Carter repeatedly
granted the military substantial coverage for South Korea through an implementation of air
defense, more flexible and less expensive. To this the President added a greater
accountability of Japan in the Far East63 .
The U.S. President intended to use the U.S. influence to encourage more equitable NorthSouth relations and the rise of democratic forces throught a functional support to those
political factions. The Panama Canal treaties represented a victory for the U.S. image in
relations with Latin America and the Third World after the Chilean crisis in 1973.
Domestically, however, the administration was accused of downsizing the U.S. leverage in
Latin America and the New Right led by Reagan was reinforced by exploiting the
dissatisfaction with the inconsistent foreign policy of the executive64. Moreover, the war
between Somalia and Ethiopia was an opportunity for implementing the regional approach
of Carter’s administration in local conflicts. The Soviet change during 1977 from the
Somali partnership, which invaded Ogaden in July, to the Ethiopian one could potentially
extend that conflict to the classic competition between the two superpowers. President
Carter during 1977-78 tried to involve other African countries for a cease-fire:
62
For US troops withdrawal from South Korea see also Trialogue available on <http://www.trilateral.org/
AnnMtgs/Trialog/library_annmtgs/stacks_annmtgs/Managing_Global_Relations.pdf> last visit 10/07/2009.
63
See memorandum from Cyrus Vance to the President, “Request for Approval of Coproduction of F-5
Fighter Aircraft in the Republic of Korea”,12/10/1979 National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Folder
Korea, Republic of: 10/1979, Box 44, JCL.
64
For Panama Canal Treaties see Adam Clymer, Drawing the Lineat the Big Ditch: The Panama Canal
Treaties and the Rise of the Right, University Press of Kansas, 2008; Michael J. Hogan, The Panama Canal
in the American Politics: Domestic Advocacy and the Evolution of Policy, Southern Illinois University Press,
1986; Jordan, William J. Panama Odyssey. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984, John Major, Prize
Possession: The United States and the Panama Canal, 1903-1979, Cambridge University Press, 1993,
George D. Moffett, The Limits of Victory: The Ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties, Cornell University
Press, 1985, Peter Michael Sanchez, Panama Lost? U. S. Hegemony, Gainesville, University Press of
Florida, 2007, Harvey G. Summ/Tom Kelly (edited by), The Good Neighbors: America, Panama, and the
1977 Canal Treaties, Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1988.
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we decided to explore means of getting as many African leaders as possible to partecipate in a call to all
outside powers to refrain from supplying arms to fuel the Ethiopian-Somali confrontation so that there can be
a cease-fire and an effort at mediation65.
Despite the pressures at the national level, both from the neoconservatives and from the
cold warriors within the administration, President Carter maintained a cautious and
equidistant approach to the conflict in the Horn of Africa, providing the humanitarian
support and refusing military aid to Siad Barre. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
changed the American perspective as the strategic position of Somalia respect to the
Middle East, forced the administration, after many failed mediations, to support Siad Barre
asking a permission to install the U.S. military bases in exchange for defensive weapons 66.
Meanwhile, in Southeast Asia Carter’s administration tried simultaneously with the
normalization with China an opening for Vietnam, which did not respond positively to the
US approach 67. Moreover, in July 1979, the Sandinistas took power in Nicaragua thanks to
Carter’s refusal to send military aid to dictator Somoza, to whom the American President
had proposed democratic reforms. During the riots, Carter committed himself for a
democratic transition, trying to prevent the rise of a marxist-leninist regime. Compared with
the global approach of Nixon and Kissinger, Carter aimed to mediate and to support for a
democratic change in Nicaragua without closing the door to the Sandinista revolution 68.
In the relations with Communist countries Carter intended, on the one hand, to overcome
the pragmatism of Nixon and Ford, on the other hand, to continue the dialogue with the
communist superpower proposing a cooperation based on reciprocity and multilateral
benefits. In the early 1977, Carter’s administration worked on reviving détente trying
simultaneously to define new shared goals. Firstly, an agreement on arms reduction in
each nuclear arsenal and not a new SALT based on ever raising ceilings of nuclear
65
Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski to the President, “PRC Review of Situation to Horn of Africa”,
26/8/1977, Subject File, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Folder: Meetings--PRC, Box 24, JCL.
66
See Donna R. Jackson, Jimmy Carter, cit.
67
For “Vietnam syndrome” see Steven Hurst, The Carter administration and Vietnam, cit.; Richard A.
Melanson, Reconstructing Consensus, cit.
68
For regionalist approach in Nicaragua see Robert Kagan, A Twilight Struggle: American Power and
Nicaragua 1977-1990, New York City, The Free Press, 1996, Morris H. Morley, Washington, Somoza, and
the Sandinistas: State and Regime in U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua, 1969-1981, Cambridge University
Press, 1999; Robert A. Pastor, Not Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua, London,
Westview Press, 2002.
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warheads and weapon systems 69. Secondly, a collaboration to exploit the geopolitical
influence of both to resolve local conflicts, specially in the Third World. Finally, the
possibility of cooperating on the issue of nuclear proliferation, for which, according to
Carter, was essential to define rules for the development of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes exclusively. The development of these plans ended in the first year of the
presidency, when a renewed bipolar tension, also caused by the insistence of Jimmy
Carter on human rights in Eastern Europe, damaged the new proposals in the SALT
negotiations. Furthermore, regarding the peace process in the Middle East, the lack of
Soviet influence from the first half of the 1970s and the lack of willingness to cooperate
with the United States closed another chapter in the bipolar cooperation project for
multilateral goals 70. Between the end of 1977 and the spring of 1978 was fought a conflict
in the Horn of Africa. In principle the United States, which intented to assume an impartial
role in the crisis, acknowledged the importance of collaboration with the Communist
superpower as closely linked at first to Somalia and, after the Somali attack to Ogaden, to
Mengistu’s Ethiopia. Furthermore, in that local conflict the U.S. and U.S.S.R.’s goals
differed significantly because of the Soviet willingness to impose to Ethiopia a marxistleninist economic development plan, which, inter alia, Mengistu strongly disapproved71.
The normalization with China brought to clearly different outcome, as both Jimmy Carter
and Chinese leaders after Mao's death aimed to conclude the process of sino-american
rapprochement, which began in 1969. The Kissingerian approach, aiming to exploit the
normalization with China to put pressure on the Soviet Union about the Vietnam War and
the SALT negotiations, to achieve a public consensus in the presidential elections of 1972
and 1976, and then to reconstruct a more favorable balance of power in Asia 72 was
sharply different from the normalization strategy conducted by Carter’s administration,
In cooperating with China in her modernization plans, we should avoid foolish talk of playing a “China card”,
that is to say, cooperating with the Chinese, whether economically, militarily or diplomatically, in order to
reduce Soviet pressures on Europe. Such talk is a myth: China is not a passive card to be played. Nor do we
69
For deep cuts proposal see cable from Cyrus Vance to the President, “SALT Discussions”, 23/3/1977,
Subject File, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Folder: SALT -- Chronology: [24/1/77-5/9/77: Tabs 11-19], Box
39, JCL.
70
For Jimmy Carter proposal of US-Soviet cooperation on peace process in Middle East see, Keeping Faith,
Memoirs of a President, The University of Arkansas Press, 1982, pp. 299-303.
71
72
See Donna R. Jackson, Jimmy Carter, cit.
For China Card issue see William Burr (edited by), The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with
Beijing and Moscow, New York, The New Press, 1999.
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SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference “Politics in Hard Times” - Stockholm, Sweden, 9-11 September 2010
wish to improve our relations with China at the expense of our relations with the Soviet Union. In order to
avoid the mistakes made on previous occasions when China has attempted to modernize, we should
cooperate in Chinaʼs modernization plans at her pace. We should also seek to reduce external pressures on
China73.
Carter, unlike the previous adiministrations did not consider the U.S.-China relations a card
to play in the ideological confrontation against the Soviets:
There are those who tend to view our relations with China through the prism of our relations with the USSR.
This is not wise. The U. S. has long had a deep interest in China and a high regard for the Chinese people.
Close U.S. - Chinese relations is a central U.S. goal. We feel that a strong, productive, and stable China can
play a great role in preserving peace in Asia and throughout the world over the next century and that
strengthening of U.S. - Chinese relations can contribute to this worthy aim. [...] We do not project US as
protector of PRC 74.
Jimmy Carterʼs aim was to integrate China in the market economy and cooperate with it for
managing a geopolitical balance in Asia:
The goals of our China policy: to partecipate constructively in Chinaʼs economic development, not just for
their benefit, but so that american businessman can secure a fair share of China market; to draw China into
the search fo solutions to the problems that confront all mankind (energy shortage, nuclear proliferation,
arms race, etc.); to advance our relations with China on their merits and not to allow our China relationship to
be held hostage to relations with others; no desire to provoke a Sino-Soviet conflict or to manipulate SinoSoviet tensions for tactical benefit75.
Carter’s administration faced a patient Chinese leadership, as was that of Mao, tackled the
question of Taiwan by finding a compromise between the demands of the Chinese and
U.S. commitment with the ally. Moreover, compared to the vague statement of 1972,
whose core was the counterhegemonic U.S.-China cooperation in Asia, in 1978-1979 was
the economic and cultural cooperation, which played a key role, along with the final
opening of the Chinese market, and the beginning of a partnership in Asia with the
Japan 76. Finally, as Kissinger, Carter also faced an internal opposition of the
neoconservatives, who accused Carter’s administration of abandoning a strategic ally in
the enemy’s hands 77.
73
Michael Oksenberg, “China and International Community” in Trialogue, disponibile su <http://
www.trilateral.org/AnnMtgs/Trialog/library_annmtgs/stacks_annmtgs/Tokyo_1979.pdf> last visit 10/07/2009.
74
Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski to the President, “Outline of Speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations”,
USSR, Country File, Brzezinski Material, National Security Affairs, Box 83, JCL.
75
Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski to the President, “Vance and Brown exchange on China Policy”,
14/12/1979, Peopleʼs Republic of China, Geographic File, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Box 9, JCL.
76
Sadako Ogata, Normalization with China: A Comparative Study of U.S. and Japanese Processes,
Berkeley, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988; Qingshan Tan, The Making of U.S.
China Policy: From Normalization to the Post-Cold War Era, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1992.
77
For neoconservatives reactions see Gong Li, William C. Kirby, Robert Ross (edited by), Normalization of
U.S.-China Relations: An International History, Cambridge, Harvard University Asia Center, 2005.
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SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference “Politics in Hard Times” - Stockholm, Sweden, 9-11 September 2010
Escalation of Tension: The decline of the trilateralist approach
The return of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran in February 1979 and the end of the reign of Shah
Reza Palhavi marked a profound change in the Middle East, the drastic reduction of the
U.S. influence and the outbreak of an era of transnational and unconventional conflicts
between the American superpower and the militant Islamic fundamentalism. The Middle
East crisis was characterized by several phases in which both the U.S. and the new Shiite
regime quickly changed their perception of events, specially after a new escalation of
tension in the relations between the superpowers. Between the late 1978 and the
departure of the Shah Reza Pahlavi in early 1979, Carter’s administration attempted a
difficult mediation between the revolutionary forces and the ally, trying to encourage a
process of domestic reforms to reduce the population’s discontent. The decennial crises
inevitably came to an end with the revolution that threw the country into chaos, during
which it was difficult for Americans to identify new referents with whom negotiating any
kind of agreement78 . The situation got worse with the departure of the Shah and the return
of Khomeini, who was determined to exploit a popular resentment against the American
superpower in order to strengthen the Shiite power. Despite the popularity and authority of
Ayatollah, the first months of revolution planted an uncontrollable disorder for the same
leaders of the country, and that condition created more confusion and concern in Carter’s
administration. Moreover, to the chaos caused by the revolution was added the issue of
the Shah’s admission in the U.S. hospital for specific cancer treatments. In April 1979, the
Shah, after some hesitation of the executive, was permitted to enter in the United States
for the treatment he needed further complicating relations with the Islamic regime in
Teheran.
Since early 1979, the Islamic government demanded not only that the United States
denied the asylum to the Shah, but also the American support for the return of Palhavi,
who, according to the Shiite regime, should be tried for his crimes against Islam. This
78
For Iranian crisis and the escalation of tension between superpowers see Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban
for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran, Oxford University Press, 1988; David Farber, Taken Hostages:
The Iran Hostage Crisis and the Americaʼs First Encounter with Radical Islam, Princeton University Press,
2005; David Patrick Houghton, US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis, Cambridge University Press,
2001; Russell Leigh Moses, Freeing the Hostages: Reexamining U.S.-Iranian Negotiations and Soviet
Policy, 1979-1981, University of Pittsburg Press, 1996; Kenneth Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict
between Iran and American, New York, Random House, 2004; Ofira Seliktar, Failing the Crystal Ball Test:
The Carter Administration and the Fundamentalist Revolution in Iran, Westport, Praeger, 2000.
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SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference “Politics in Hard Times” - Stockholm, Sweden, 9-11 September 2010
proposal was unacceptable for the U.S. executive, which would not betrayed a long time
ally. Once granted the asylum to the Shah, and relations with Iran worsened, until
November of that year the complex process of the normalization of relations with the new
regime stalled. The attack on the U.S. embassy in Tehran on November 4th 1979 and the
seizure of 52 American hostages marked a point of no return in the relations with the Shiite
government. The hostages were being held, provoking consternation and confusion in the
U.S. public opinion as in the executive, and President Carter and his advisers began to
plan a rescue operation to extricate the hostages 79. Since January 1980, simultaneously
with the difficult negotiations with the government in Teheran, Carter’s administration
prepared a rescue operation planned for the spring of the same year. Sided in favor of the
operation there were the first lady and the National Security Advisor Brzezinski, who
pushed strongly for a resolute choice against an arbitrary and aggressive Iranian action.
The executive, however, remained divided: the Secretary of State Cyrus Vance threatened
to resign if Carter approved the rescue operation, as strongly opposed to covert military
actions. Vance was convinced that the action could undermine relations with the new
regime and dissolve little hope of rescuing the hostages 80.
The pressure implemented by interventionists within the administration, combined with
those of the public opinion, which was expecting a firm action from the government and
the criticism of the Right of Reagan, urged the President to opt for intervention. From
President’s memoirs was evident a rough management of the operation, with little analysis
of the topography and climate, that provoking many problems to the U.S. helicopters’
landing81. The uncertainty of the moment and the danger of losing all the men engaged in
the operation finally led Carter to cancel the rescue throwing sharp criticism on the
administration regarding the preparation and impotence of the executive.
Meanwhile, the frustration that characterized the spring of 1979 did not vanish, but,
instead, was intensified in the same summer, on July 15th 1979, when Jimmy Carter with
the malaise speech to the nation spoke in tones of accusation and a deep distrust in the
Americans’ spirit of sacrifice. The speech was followed by the resignation of key members
of the administration, including The Secretary of Treasury Michael Blumenthal, who was
79
Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith, cit.
80
For Cyrus Vance resignation see Hard Choices: Critical Years in Americaʼs Foreign Policy, New York City,
Simon & Schuster, 1983.
81
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Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith, cit., pp. 525-528.
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SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference “Politics in Hard Times” - Stockholm, Sweden, 9-11 September 2010
charged with the failure of economic policies of the executive, entangled in a serious
stagflation, which had already deteriorated the stability of the US economy82 . The rising
unemployment, the weakening of the dollar due to the rising inflation, budget deficits,
rising oil prices deeply shattered the Carter administration’s economic reforms. As Carter
had feared since 1978, the economic stimulus package provoked a serious inflation and
partially overcame in the early 1980s 83.
The year of 1979 was a turning point for the trilateralist approach of Carter’s
administration. The President was convinced of the necessity of radical economic reforms
that would promote the efficiency, decentralization, preservation, and moderate
deregulation in the energy sector, in general, and the federal state. The malaise speech
showed a substantial proximity to trilateralist philosophy in the belief that the 1970s had
marked a profound turning point in the national and world history, specially in the
developed countries, which had the onerous task to set change, which would be coupled
by other countries. They also had to change the idea of welfare and development,
considering the economic transition to the post industrialism and the energy shortage as
an equivalent of war, remembering how during the Second World War the U.S. showed a
great spirit of sacrifice and adaptation84. The nation did not follow the President on this
path, on the contrary, the public opinion thought that the crisis, specially in the energy
sector, was artificially created by companies to raise prices and that the executive with his
weakness and indecision was not doing anything to resolve it. The first step towards the
decline of trilateralism was made during the hostage crisis, when, with the failure of
negotiations, the administration opted for a dangerous and unilateral action just to reach
the aim of extrication the hostages. The second step was the defeat of the proposal on
domestic front stemmed from the malaise speech, after which it became clear that the
public, under pressure from the crisis and distrust for the alleged incompetence and
impotence of the executive, did not intend to follow the President, favoring a deep fall in
the polls and Carter’s inevitable defeat in the 1980 election. The third step was the failure
82
Daniel Horowitz, Jimmy Carter and the Energy Crisis of the 1970's, the "Crisis of Conference" Speech July
15, 1979: A Brief History with Documents, Boston, Bedford/St. Martin's, 2005.
83
84
See Carl W. Biven, Jimmy Carterʼs Economy, cit.
There is a clear nexus between the malaise speech in July 15th 1979 and the Trilateral Commissionʼs
Report The Crisis of Democracy, published and discussed within the Commission in 1975, available on
<http://www.trilateral.org/library/crisis_of_democracy.pdf> last visit 10/07/2009. From both stems the
necessity to promote a new idea of affluence, whereby the economic growth doesnʼt mean a simple
increasing in consumption, but a delicate balance between resources and needs.
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SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference “Politics in Hard Times” - Stockholm, Sweden, 9-11 September 2010
of cooperation or, better coordination, between allies in responding to the Soviet invasion
in Afghanistan, first Soviet military operation outside the Warsaw Pact.
The U.S. government was warried not only by the Soviet intervention, but by the fact that
the invasion occurred at the moment of the profound instability in the Middle East and the
situation would have encouraged a revival of the Soviet influence in the region, on Iranian
oil, in particular. The response of President Carter was determined, as he tried to join an
aggressive and intransigent posture, favoring a collective response to the crisis. The
President decided both to stop ratification of the SALT II agreements, which would had
been definitely rejected by the Congress in a crisis situation, both to suspend the transfer
of grain and other goods to the Soviet Union, opting for a boycott of 1980 Moscow
Olympics 85. Carter in his intense correspondence with the European key allies sought
support and cooperation, but in that case, the allies did not go beyond the formal
condemnation of the Soviet Union. Carter’s administration in January 1980 confirmed its
commitment to intervene, even militarily if necessary, to defend the strategic balance in the
Persian Gulf in case of invasion by third parties. In Presidential Directive 59, Carter
approved the increase of military expenditures and the development of new weapon
systems, as a MX ICBM missile, to respond to the crisis 86. With these measures,
implemented in a state of emergency, the trilateralist approach and multilateralism of the
administration was overshadowed despite his efforts in promoting a concerted response to
the renewed Soviet expansionism.
Conclusion
The decline of the trilateralist approach originated from two factors, essential to fully
understand the changes of the 1970s: the first was a public consensus, the second
regarded the effectiveness of policymakers to implement a new polical agenda to deal with
domestic and international transformations.
The reconstruction of the consensus was the main objective on whom to base a new
approach in foreign and domestic policy in the long 1970s. It was the distrust in the
proposals of the Republicans that pushed much of the electorate to choose an outsider,
85
86
Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith, cit., p. 496.
For Presidential Directive 59 see Brian J. Auten, Carterʼs Conversion: The Hardening of American Defense
Policy, University of Missouri Press, 2008.
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unknown to powerful groups in Washington. The main advantage of Jimmy Carter, the
achievement of consensus, wisely used during the campaign, showed the other face of
Janus during his presidential term: the consensus became a tight control over executive
decisions, bringing the importance of the public perceptions to unprecedented levels.
Unfortunately, new projects of the Carter administration trilateralist agenda and the
complexity of their implementation damaged consensus. Pluralism within the executive
and the absence of a clear and direct message to the public compromised the support of
the electorate.
The status of the outsider from a favorable and determinant factor for victory became a
further complication in decisionmaking, in which the support of the Congress was
essential, as the question of the Panama Canal and the comprehensive energy plan had
showed 87. The leeway in economic and international issues outside the unilateralism and
the classic Cold War agenda narrowed gradually because of the events that profoundly
changed the political priorities of the executive and reduced to a minimum the alternatives
to containment. The hostage crisis in Iran, the Shiite revolution, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan further diminished the possibility of the trilateralist approach, difficult to
implement in a phase of a profound economic crisis and the lack of cooperation with allies.
Neverthelss, the trilateralism, unlike other policy proposals arising from the long decade,
did not reach the exhaustion of its innovative edge, but was gradually set aside as lacking
a sufficient base of support and favorable historical circumstances. Instead the realpolitik
of Nixon and Kissinger, which by the mid-1970s had demonstrated the ineffectiveness of
regulating competition between the United States and the Soviet Union and the bipolar
accomodation of the international system modeled on the great powers of the Nineteenth
century, as undermined by obsession of the credibility and global ideological conflict.
Similarly, after 1980 election, the new unilateralist and aggressive approach of Reagan, in
a few years, from 1981 to 1983, was exhausted, forcing the republican administration
since late 1983 to abandon its most radical features 88.
The aims of trilateralism - multilateralism and international cooperation, a new concept of
economic development, resolving the energy issue, a new focus on North-South relations,
87
For relations between Carter and the Congress see Jim Wright, Balance of Power, cit.; Robert David
Johnson, Congress and the Cold War, cit.; Charles O. Jones, The Trusteeship Presidency: Jimmy Carter and
the United States Congress, Louisiana State University Press, 1988.
88
Beth A. Fisher, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War, London, University of
Missouri Press, 1997.
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SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference “Politics in Hard Times” - Stockholm, Sweden, 9-11 September 2010
a new concerted management of interdependence, tackling fragmentation of the interests,
renovation of international institutions and dealing with environmental problems - are still
relevant. Emblematic is the dialogue between the journalist David Ignatius, Zbigniew
Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft in 2008 on current topics, which are very similar to
Carter’s administration objectives:
Ignatius: [...] A bipolar world like the one we had in the cold war with the Soviet Union was fairly stable, and
that a multipolar world, where you have many diffuse centers of power, would be fairly stable. But the
transition from the one to the other would not be stable and would be very difficult.
Scowcroft: [...] Itʼs no longer the old balance-of-power world of Herman Khan or the Henry Kissinger world
of multiple balances. Itʼs something different. Globalization is eroding national boundaries everywhere.
Importantly in information technology, but also in health and environment. Nation can no longer provide for
their citizens what they traditionally used to.
Brzezinski: [...] We have to face the fact that the global system as it now exists was shaped largely between
1945 and 1950, when there where entirely different power realities. So the first order of business is to adjust
the existing global institutions to these new realities, which involve the rise of power like China, India, Japan,
with Indonesia on the horizon. [...]
In that kind of world, the premium will have to be put on effective political management of the complex reality.
And that I think is going to be very difficult for a mass democracy like America to effectively pursue, in part
because our public is woefully uninformed about the implications of these new realities [...] And our
diplomacy and our leadership in recent years have not been inclined to engage in the kind of consensual
assumption of responsability that this new age requires. Look at the hesitations, the zig-zagging on climate
control and the global environment. Or on the issues of poverty and inequality. I think weʼre entering a period
in which complexity is going to be the biggest challenge89.
Proposing to achieve these new goals is, in the trilateralist perspective, the fulcrum of a
new U.S. hegemony, which, unlike other countries, thanks to its economic and geopolitical
leverage, might implement a new strategy of renovation of the international system
through a consistent commitment to concerted and multilateral resolution of global
problems, for which is ineffective and counterproductive an unilateral response. Brzezinski
concludes
Brzezinski: I think the American leadership is necessary - if by leadership we mean, first of all, not dictation,
but inspiration. If by leadership we mean an enlightened insight into the meaning of history and our time - a
leadership that understands what is truly new about the twenty-first century. [...] Then that kind of American
leadership - it can be a catalyst. Not for actions directed by the United States, but for actions that the global
community [...] is prepared collectively to embrace. That kind of leadership is needed. But for that kind of
leadership to emerge in America, we not only need wery special people as leaders [...] but we need a far
more enlightened society than we have 90.
89
Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, America and the World. cit., pp. 26-28.
90
Ivi. pp. 33-34.
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