Download CHANGING WORLD POLITICS

CHANGING WORLD POLITICS
Ass.Prof.Mesut Yalvaç
Introduction
Every society and state within the international system seeks to increase its presence and power in
order to become (or remain) both wealthy and dominant. An analysis and synthesis of this endeavour
could enable us to understand the politics of these states and of the world. The interaction between
economics and strategy within the process of this endeavour is of utmost importance. That is the
reason why, with due consideration to the venue where this meeting is held and within the bounds of
the main topic of the meeting, the related theses and conclusions will be based upon this interaction.
The aim is not to examine in detail the politics undergone by the world up to the present or the
changing world politics: that agenda would in any case not be fulfilled in 20 minutes. However, we
shall refer to some important events in world politics from 1500 onwards. These points will serve as
corroboration for the results to be achieved at the meeting.
One popular theory that is thought to influence state and world politics proffers that „in world affairs,
the existence and relative powers of states can never remain unchanged‟. „The unequal speed of
growth in various nations and scientific, technological, and structural enterprises that benefit some
states over others‟ are listed among the most important reasons for this.1 For example, the appearance
of better armed sailing ships and the increase in importance of trans-Atlantic trade after 1500 did not
benefit all European states equally. These developments aided some states more than others. In later
periods, steam energy, and the emergent importance of coal and metal sources upon which this energy
was dependent, increased the relative power of some nations, while it decreased that of others.2
When countries augmented their production capacities, it generally became easier to alleviate the
burden of wide-scaled armament in peace time, and of the maintenance and provision of large armies
and military equipment after warfare. It might not be pleasant to present this through the coarse
instructive language of economics, but „one needs wealth to support military strength, and often
military strength to achieve and preserve wealth‟. However, when a great portion of state resources
deviate from the aim of creating existence and is directed towards military ambitions, it is not
impossible that in the long run this condition will lead to a weakening of national strength.3
Since the development of Western Europe after the 16th Century, the line followed by the rise and
subsequent fall of the leading nations within the great power system shows the presence, in the long
run, of a significant interdependent relationship between their production and earning capacities, and
their military powers. 4
The Rise of the Western World
In 1500, in a world that included Ming Dynasty China, the Ottoman Empire, the Mogul Empire,
Muscovite Russia, Tokugawa Japan and the conglomerate of West-Central European states, who could
have foreseen that the three regions at the end of this list would become superior to the rest? Although
some of these Eastern empires seemed very effective and well-organized when compared to Europe,
they experienced the damages of being under the sway of a centralised and despotic authority which
insisted on retaining conservative positions not only in the matter of the official state religion, but also
in the fields of trading activities and knowledge, technology, and of course, in the development of
armament. In Europe, on the other hand, the fact that such authority did not exist, and the rivalries
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1
2
3
4
Full-time faculty member at the Istanbul University. E-mail: [email protected]
Paul M. Kennedy, TheRise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from
1500 to 2000. New York; Random House, 1987, pp. xv-xvi.
Ibid., p. xvi.
Ibid., p. xvi.
Ibid., p. xvi.
between certain city-states and kingdoms worked as a force sponsoring investigations into
developments in the military field. These investigations in turn led to a fruitful interaction with the
production of knowledge and new technological progress within a competitive and dynamic
environment. Embarking upon a lasting economic growth and increasing its military activities, Europe
was to gradually begin to lead the rest of the world. However, while this technological change and the
dynamics of military rivalry impelled Europe forward towards its customary egoistic competitiveness
and pluralistic frame of mind, there remained the possibility of one of the competing nations to
overcome the others by acquiring the necessary resources and to eventually dominate over the whole
continent.5
It is difficult to summarise the power struggles between 1660 and 1815 as a rivalry involving a great
alliance and its many competitors. While consequential powers of a bygone era, like Spain and the
Netherlands, were relegated to secondary importance, the constant emergence of the five great states
(France, Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia) occurred during this period. These five nations
were to be dominant in the diplomatic and military scene of 18th Century Europe, and to take part in a
long partnership war interspersed at times by rapid changes in alliances.6
Industrialization and Changing Global Equilibriums
Long coalition wars did not occur significantly after 1815, for the duration of a whole century. A
strategic equilibrium existed and this equilibrium was supported by all the nations taking part in the
Concert of Europe. Decades after 1815, the main concerns of states were national instabilities and, in
the case of Russia and the United States, expansion upon the continents they were located on. These
conditions of relative stability enabled the British Empire to reach its peak as a naval, colonialist, and
commercial global power, and also to develop favourably in the field of industrial production based on
steam energy, a commodity largely under the control of this country. However, in the second half of
the 19th Century, industrialisation spread to other regions and redirected international power balances
from leading nations of the past towards countries which had the resources and constitutions that
enabled them to utilise the new means of production and technology to the full. These circumstances
changed global economic equilibriums with an unaccustomed speed. This transformation was to
quickly show its effect on the power and internal-external politics of nations too. This is the period
when the Italian and German national alliances were established, but also the time when especially the
German Empire emerged as a power to be reckoned with.7 It is also the period when the West
(particularly Germany, Great Britain, and the USA which was to later catch up with these two
countries) began to interest itself in Ottoman oil resources, and when power and interest struggles
came to a head.8 After this period, oil was to become the main reason for starting wars.
The First World War: 1914-1918 – Crisis of Powers
As the 20th Century drew near, the speed of changes in science and technology, and the irregularity of
growth ratios caused the international system to become much more chaotic and unstable than it had
been fifty years ago. This became evident after 1880, when powers in Europe began a mad and selfcentred rivalry to gain additional colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific, motivated partly by
financial gain, and partly by a fear to be left behind by others. Underlying the colonialist struggles and
international crises of the period before 1914 lay the demise of a world system based on “Eurocentricism” Although they did the best they could, the traditional great powers of Europe, such as
France and Austria and Hungary, and the recently unified Italy were falling behind and eventually
5
6
7
8
Ibid,, p. xvi-xvii.; see also: Ibid., pp. 3-30.
Ibid., p. xvii.; see also: Ibid., pp. 73-139.
Ibid., p. xviii.; see also: Ibid., pp. 143-193.
See also: E.M.Earle, Turkey: The Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway: A study in Imperialism.
MacMillan, 1923.; S.H. Longrigg, Oil in the Middle East: Its Discovery and Development. Oxford Univ.,
1954.; B. Shwadran The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers. New York: 1955; İlber Ortaylı, Osmanlı
İmparatorluğu’nda Alman Nüfuzu (German Penetration in Ottoman Empire). İstanbul: Kaynak, 1983, p.47,
106.; Hikmet Uluğbay, Petropolitik: İmparatorluktan Cumhuriyete (Oil-politic: From Empire to Republic).
Ankara: Ayraç, 2003. p.96-214
2
retired from the race. Meanwhile, the United States and Russia, each as large as a continent, were in
the lead. Among the Western European nations, it was perhaps only Germany who seemed to have the
resolve and strength to forcefully take place in the elitist alliance to be formed in the future by world
powers. Japan, on the other hand, was determined to dominate in Eastern Asia, but had not made great
headway. These changes naturally led to immense, insurmountable problems for Britain who found it
increasingly difficult, when compared to fifty years earlier, to protect its global interests. 9
The First World War can be summarised as the impasse reached between the two sides, the fact of
Italy joining the war, which afforded no solution, the gradual exhaustion of Russia, the decisiveness of
American military and financial aid to the Allies, and the final collapse of the Central Powers. The
horrific losses of the First World War, the pain and destruction experienced, seem to be a fatal blow
dealt to itself by European civilisation. Table 1 correlates the forces effectively deployed at different
times during the war and the economic and industrial production available to both sides, and reflects
the lack of balance in forces set up and in terms of production.10
British Empire
France
Russia
Italy
United States of
America
Other Allies*
Total Allies
Germany
Austria-Hungary
Bulgaria, Ottoman
Empire
Total Central Powers
War Expenditure at
1913 Prices
Total Mobilized
(billions of dollars) Forces (millions)
23.0
9.5
9.3
8.2
5.4
13.0
3.2
5.6
17.1
3.8
-0.3
57.7
2.6
40.7
19.9
4.7
0.1
13.25
9.00
2.85
24.7
25.10
*Belgium, Rumania, Portugal,
Greece, Serbia
Table 1. War Expenditure and Total Mobilized Forces: 1914-191911
In conclusion, the First World War was detrimental to all primary factions:
 Austria-Hungary disappeared,
 Russia underwent a revolution,
 Germany and the Ottoman Empire were crushed,
 The Ottoman territory was divided into areas of profit and its rich natural resources (oil above
all) were shared.
 In reality, even France, Italy, and Britain experienced losses in spite of their victory.
The only exceptions were Japan who consolidated its presence in the Pacific, and, of course, the
United States of America who, in 1918, had become the great power of the world.12
 In the meanwhile, a new republic which would defend national interests to the end was
emerging from a collapsing empire. This was the Turkish Republic of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.
9
Kennedy, The rise and fall..., p. xviii-xix.; see also: Ibid., pp. 194-274.
Kennedy, The Rise and Fall..., p. 273-274.
11
Ibid., p. 274.; see also: G. Hardach, The First World War 1914-1918. London: 1977, p.153.; The Times Atlas
of World History. G. Barraclough (ed.). London: 1978.
12
Kennedy, The Rise and Fall..., p. xix.
10
3
After 1919, the international system emerging when the USA dissociated itself from foreign warfare
and Bolshevik Russia adopted a parallel isolation policy, still posited Britain and France at the centre
of the diplomatic stage, although both countries were now much weaker.13
The Role of the Gallipoli Battle at the First World War and Its Function in the World Politics:
It can be stated that the Gallipoli Battle had three different functions, which are political, economic,
and military:14
1. To oust the Ottoman State from the war (and to share its land) and thus to cut off the
Ottomans from Europe and Asia and benefit from its consequences,
2. To gain control of the straits from the Czar‟s Russia, and occupy and control Istanbul and thus
keep Russia at war,
3. To convert the already-neutral Balkan States (Greece, Rumania, Bulgaria in particular) into
„Allied forces‟; to relieve the Italians from hesitation and suspicion and to end the reluctancy
of the Arab countries.
In addition to these three main political reasons, if the naval battle had been a success, “the Allied
Forces” would have had significant economic and military benefits.
Besides these, the fact that the Ottoman army was defeated at the Balkan War made Churchill
believe that it was impossible to defeat an efficient military state and this view also played a
significant role in having Gallipoli as a new front.
About 800.000 people fought and the number of casualties was 500.000 in „the Gallipoli Battle‟15,
which had the following basic effects on the world and the world politics:16
1. The First World War continued two more years.
2. The fact that the Allied Western countries could not reach Russia led to the dissolution of the
confined great Czar‟s Russia and made Russia collapse internally; the policy of “reaching the
warm seas” pursued by Czar‟s Russia failed.
3. This battle not only contributed to the dissolution of Czar‟s Empire, but also inflicted the first
blow on the British Empire where the Sun never sets, and shook the foundations of
imperialism.
4. In history, the world was going to witness the fights for independence since then.
As a result, all of these effects caused more troubles for the European countries in defending the global
interests and accelerated the collapse of a “Europe-centered” world order.
The Second World War: 1939-1945 – The Continuing Crisis of Powers
In the 1930‟s, the positions of France and Britain were threatened by the militarised, revisionist states
of Italy, Japan, and Germany:
 Germany was more purposefully decided than in 1918 to attempt hegemony over Europe.
 The USA, however, stood in the background as much the strongest producer state of the
world.
 Stalin‟s Russia was fast becoming an industrial super state.
13
Ibid., p. xix.
Şükrü Erkal, “Birinci Dünya Savaşı‟nda Çanakkale cephesi deniz harekatı (boğazın zorlanması)” (Gallipoli
Side Naval Operations in The First World War (Being Forced of the Strait), Çanakkale Muharebeleri 75.Yıl
Armağanı (Gallipoli Battles 75th yearPresent). Ankara: Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı, 1990, pp. 40-43.
15
Fehmi Yılmaz, “Sunuş” (Presentation), Çanakkale Muharebeleri 75.Yıl Armağanı (Gallipoli Battles 75th
yearPresent). Ankara: Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı, 1990, p. Vi..
16
Erkal, “Birinci Dünya Savaşı‟nda Çanakkale cephesi deniz harekatı (boğazın zorlanması)” (Gallipoli Side
Naval Operations in The First World War (Being Forced of the Strait)... pp. 66-67.
14
4
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And, as was the case in the First World War, colonialist policies were among the main reasons
for the start of the Second World War. The main difference of this war was that some actors
were new, and some had changed sides.
As a result, the impasse in which the revisionist powers found themselves consisted of the fact that, if
they did not wish to remain under the shadow of the two continent-sized giants, they needed to expand
rapidly. The deadlock for the powers preferring the status quo, on the other hand, was that they would
very possibly weaken themselves while fighting off the threat formed by the Germans and the
Japanese. The Second World War, in spite of its ups and downs, fundamentally served to prove how
right of these fears of retrogression were. For all their initial spectacular victories, the revisionist
powers were vanquished in spite of the great imbalance in abundant resources.17
After the Second World War: The Cold War and After- The (New) World Order
In 1943, the prophecy of a bipolar world had come true, and military equilibriums had once again
determined the global distribution of economic resources.18 What followed was a period of cold war
that was to last until 1991 between the “Western Bloc” under the leadership of the USA, and the
“Eastern Bloc” under the leadership of the Soviet Union.
According to Mackinder, one of the founders of the neo-mercantilist and geopolitical philosophy, “the
great wars of history… are the outcome, direct or indirect, of the unequal growth of nations.”19 In view
of this statement, could this trend have stopped in 1945? Could we say that, with the development of
nuclear weapons, the tendency of world powers to react by having recourse to military armaments is
now under control? Whatever the likelihood of nuclear or conventional wars between states, it is clear
that there are great changes taking place in the balance of power, and it seems probable that these
changes will continue at a greater rate than before.20 What is more, these changes are occurring more
chaotically than ever, on a variety of independent but interactive levels, on platforms as diverse as
religion/belief, language, ethnicity, politics, society, culture, education, law, morality, energy, science,
technology, economics, and strategic power. Some of these are:
 The dissolution, at the end of the 20th Century, of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
of the Eastern Bloc.
 The changes in Eastern European countries,
 Nationalist divisions,
 The union of the two Germanies,
 Changes in the Caucasus and Central Asia ,
 USA strategies in Eurasia,
 Strategies of the European Union in Eurasia,
 Russian strategies in Eurasia,
 ...
 The importance of water resources (especially for the Middle-East),
 The importance of areas holding energy resources and the “Great Game” being played over
them (The Middle-East: 65.19 % of world oil reserves, and 36.43 % of natural gas reserves are
in this region),
 The incessant troubles in the Middle-East, the problem of balance and plans for changes (on
the subjects of political, social, economic, religious changes and about the problem of energy
resources),
 The “Great Middle-East Project” of the USA and Israel (a project initiated decades
ago),
 The Middle-East Strategy of the European Union (at this point in time it seems to
involve two separate cliques),
 The Middle-East Strategy of Russia (very secretive and covert),
 ...
17
18
19
20
Kennedy, The rise and fall..., p. xix-xx.; see also: Ibid., pp. 275-343.
Ibid., p. xx
Ibid., p. 537.; see also: R. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: 1981, p. 93.
Kennedy, The Rise and Fall..., p. 537-538.
5
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Discussions about the future of NATO,
Projects of cooperation between the USA and the European Union,
The changes in South Africa,
The perpetuation of Imperialist policies,
Poverty and Unemployment (a great danger that is still being underestimated),
Ethnic disorders,
Radical religious movements,
Terrorism, (Despite much suffering experienced throughout the world),
 Terrorism still being used in international rivalries,
 The fact that terrorism is still an important tool for imperialism,
Asia which is full of surprises,
The advance of Japan, China, and India,
The tendency of the Shanghai five under the leadership of China to promote military power,
Collective Security and the future of the United Nations,
The increasing pace of scientific and technological development and change,
The concept and formation of an Information Society / Information Technology,
The global economy,
Globalisation and discussions about globalisation,
 A world open to competition,
 Erosion in the shares of nations within the markets,
 A widening of the gap between the rich and the poor,
Economic protectionism, economic factions,
The development of the EU: „A Greater Europe‟ (Picture-1, 2)
...
of these have emerged as the reasons for, and some as the results of, the changes mentioned

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Some
above.
EU POLITICS AND FRAMEWORK PROGRAMMES
International
Economic
Difference
Social
Difference
Regional
Difference
Region
Citizen
EU
USA
Japan
China
...
..
.
Picture-1. Main Targets of EU Politics and Framework Programmes
6
SIXTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME 2002-2006
Participation by legal entities from third countries
- Integrating European Research
(1)
-
Data valid: 1.11.2002
European Union/
Associated States (3)/
Overseas Countries & Territories
Target countries of specific measures in
support of international cooperation:
eligible for participation and funding
(within limits of budget)
Other third countries: eligible for
participation; funding if provision under
RTD activity or essential for carrying out
indirect action
Currently no cooperation
1EC
Framework (non-nuclear)
(2) Some agreements are not yet into force
The European Commission does not guarantee the accuracy of data included in this map and accepts no responsibility
whatsoever for any consequence of its use. The boundaries shown do not imply on the part of the European
Commission any judgment on the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
1
European Commission, DG RTD-06
Picture-2. EU 6th Framework Programme 2002-2006: The Dimensions of (Integrating) European
Research Area21
The question “How right is it to call this chaos a „new order‟?” divides experts into two groups, some
asserting that this is “a new order”, and some maintaining that it is “a continuation of the old order”;
Those upholding the second view support their thesis by averring that “in world political economics,
no change has occurred in relationships based on hegemony and the hierarchy of „center, semiperiphery, periphery‟, that the order presented as „new‟ today is an extension of the old, unequal
relations, that colonialism survives, in some places in much the same guise as in the past, but in many
places in a disguised form.
Whether it is new or an extension of the old, many experts agree that the present order of the world
consists of 5 economic poles, while it exhibits a monopole militarily.
Some experts conceive of world politics roughly as follows:
1. There will be a slide from the five great centres of power (the USA, the EU, Russia, Japan, and
China) towards many other nations, both in terms of total world revenue and shares in total military
expenditure. This, however is a progressive process and will not be rapid.
2. The balance of profits between these five countries is already tending towards certain directions:
from the USA, EU, and Russia towards Japan and China. In other words, Japan and China are growing
faster than the others.22
3. The determination of Third World Countries to have a say in their future is going to be greater than
ever; they will reveal their strength when they succeed in increasing cooperation.
4. In the future, geo-politics, eco-politics, and most significantly oil-politics (the politics of oil –
energy) will still be of great importance. In other words, the control of economic resources (of all
natural and other resources, and especially of energy and water) and of production methods, and of the
regions and the people of the regions where these are found will be more important than ever.
Conclusion
It is thought that „when we look at it from the point of view of the international system, wealth and
power, or economic and military strength are always relative and should be seen as such.‟ „Since they
are relative and since all societies are inexorably open to the tendency to change, then international
21
22
“Marie Curie schemes new framework programme-FP6” [Online] Electronic address:
http://may.ie/research/news_content/mcf1.ppt [4.3.2004]
Ibid., p. 538.
7
equilibriums will never remain as they are.‟23 When we examine the 500 year long history of world
powers, we see that nations and the international system are constantly changing and that these
changes not only depend on the daily activities of politicians and on the ebb and flow of political and
military events, but also on deeper transformations that occur in the foundations of world power and
that sometimes find their way to the surface. „Keeping in mind the disorderly and competitive nature
of international rivalries, the history of international affairs during the last five centuries has mostly
been a history of war, or at least the history of preparation for war.‟ This state of things depletes
resources. According to some scholars, it consists of consuming resources in order to acquire more.
Whatever the level of economic and scientific development, the question of the amount of national
revenue to be spent for military purposes has always been an issue of contention. The discussion on
how to increase and protect national wealth has always existed alongside this issue. These arguments
are held, not only because increased affluence brings with it personal advantages, but also because it is
realised that economic growth, productivity, and an improved financial status will affect the chances
of success and power in case of international strife.24
Societies and states existing within the current international system have to contend with two great
challenges that were also faced by those who preceded them:25
1. Unequal economic resources and economic growth methods (the vital prerequisite of modern
economies, energy -especially oil and natural gas- plays an important role here) that lead/will
lead to some becoming wealthier (and generally more powerful as well) than others,
2. In external conditions (which sometimes can become dangerous) based on competition, being
forced into a choice between military security to be gained on a short time basis and a more
long term economic security.
Hence, the societies and states of our day will have to contend in future with both the age-old
dilemmas of rise and fall (the rich and powerful or the poor and weak) and, to a mounting degree,
with changing needs in economic resources and changing production increase rates, with scientific
and technological innovations, with transformations in international conditions, rising costs in
defence expenditures, and fluctuations in power equilibriums. These are probably developments
that a single society, state or person will be unable to control. The future depends upon the
sagacity (knowledge, talent, and experience) of all the members of the international community.
To conclude, to govern a state means, alongside other duties, to be equipped with the responsibility
and provision for raising that nation‟s affluence. The fundamental tools needed to successfully reach
that goal consist of using economic resources with the most contemporary techniques in national
economics and, within or outside national frontiers, to keep natural resources at the command and
under the control of the national economy. Within this framework, the basis of international
relationships consists of which state will have power over economic resources and strategic
geography, and how and with which methods it will implement this power. This is also the source that
forms (or changes) world politics (that also explains the basic reason of the First World War and the
Gallipoli Battle during the First World War, and the other wars). What remains unaffected despite
changing balances and changing world politics, on the other hand, is that “however many unknowns
there exists in the equation of international relationships, the solution is to ever protect national and
international interests.”
23
Ibid., p. 536
Ibid., p. 536-537
25
Ibid., p. 539-540
24
8
References
Earle, E.M. (1923). Turkey: The Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway: A study in Imperialism.
MacMillan.
Erkal, Şükrü (1990) “Birinci Dünya Savaşı‟nda Çanakkale Cephesi Deniz Harekatı (Boğazın
Zorlanması)” (Gallipoli Side Naval Operations in The First World War (Being Forced of the
Strait), Çanakkale Muharebeleri 75.Yıl Armağanı (Gallipoli Battles 75th Year Present).
Ankara: Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı, pp. 35-71
Gilpin, R. (1981). War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge.
Hardach, G. (1977). The First World War 1914-1918. London.
Kennedy, Paul M. (1987). TheRise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military
Conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York; Random House.
Longrigg, S.H. (1954). Oil in the Middle East: Its Discovery and Development. Oxford Univ.
“Marie Curie Schemes New Framework Programme-FP6”
http://may.ie/research/news_content/mcf1.ppt [4.3.2004]
[Online]
Electronic
address:
Ortaylı, İlber (1983). Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Alman Nüfuzu (German Penetration in Ottoman
Empire). İstanbul: Kaynak.
Shwadran, B. (1955). The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers. New York.
The Times Atlas of World History (1978). G. Barraclough (ed.). London.
Uluğbay, Hikmet (2003). Petropolitik: İmparatorluktan Cumhuriyete (Oil-politic: From Empire to
Republic). Ankara: Ayraç.
Yılmaz, Fehmi (1990). “Sunuş” (Presentation), Çanakkale Muharebeleri 75.Yıl Armağanı
(Gallipoli Battles 75th yearPresent). Ankara: Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı, pp. v-vii..
9