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Foundation, structure, work and decline of the League
of Nations
Search for Collective Security, alliances and treaties,
e.g. Rapallo and Locarno
Collective Security v. Alliances
CS would deter war by making a much larger, more effective alliance. Aggressors would
have to fight the whole world and would have few, in any, friends
Alliances could come into competition with other alliances to make a larger war and were
a force for instability. Alliances could also be used aggressively.
How both work
CS was so powerful that it would force nations to work out problems since war was out
of the question. This would allow for international arbitration as well as international
courts to solve conflicts. Over time, international law would further develop and war
would become a thing of the past. War would now be obsolete as well as illegal.
Locarno Undermines CS
The Locarno Treaty officially ended the Anglo-US-French alliance from WWI. France
now had to rely on CS for security. However, CS had worked well due to the alliance.
Now, Britain and the US became more isolationist, and more hostile to French
aggressiveness toward Germany. France knew that she could not take on Germany alone.
However, Germany had promised to be good and to only question borders to their south
and east.
Rapallo undermines CS
The treaty of Rapallo between Russia and Germany was a first major step toward
destroying the Paris System. Two states of such tremendous power in an alliance might
fend off the entire League. The very fact that they made their deal to end WWI between
them created anxiety in Rome, London and Paris. However, Locarno seemed to show that
Germany was willing to work within the League.
French v. British attitudes toward CS
The French never really embraced CS, preferring to keep alliances with Britain, Italy and
the US. However, the very negative reaction to the 1923 French occupation of the Ruhr
by the British and US put the alliance in jeopardy. Both allies were already insisting that
France use CS instead and to work a deal with Germany. Thus, the welcome given to the
Locarno Treaty in Washington and London. It was hoped that this new, “Spirit of
Locarno” had finally brought Germany into the League and into the CS system.
Britain mostly embraced the CS and held to her old tradition of staying out of alliances.
Even at Versailles, the British were already viewing France as a future enemy as she now
dominated Europe. Allying with a power that could dominate Europe had never been in
the interests of Britain. With the Locarno Treaty, Britain was now free of her alliance
with France as now any future war between Germany and France would be a League
matter. Britain, however, was unwilling to use her sparse forces to enforce CS. In fact,
Britain practically never used her forces to such effect. In this, they were like the US,
which refused to ever use US forces to enforce League mandates, though the Americans
cooperated with the League in a member-like manner on disarmament issues.
Italy, Germany views of CS
Italy greatly like being part of the League and, in that, part of CS. As a Permanent
Member Italy was in the front rank of nations. However, Italy was still very frustrated
with how little she got out of WWI’s settlements. Italy was very worried about the Tyrol
region with its heavy German population as well as greatly feared Austrian union with
Germany. Italy also planned on defeating Ethiopia in the future to avenge the humiliating
defeat at Adowa in the late 1800s. So, while the League could protect Italy from
Germany on its north, the League also posed an obstacle to Italian designs on East Africa.
Germany had little choice after WWI but to embrace CS as it was primarily directed
against any German resurgence. Gustav Stressemann, the great German chancellor of the
mid-1920s bowed down to this reality by signing the Locarno Treaty. This meant
Germany would never try to regain either Alsace-Lorraine from France, nor the ScheeEiffel in Belgium. However, Locarno also gave Germany the future right to change
borders with Poland, Czechoslovakia and, perhaps, even Austria. At the same time,
Stressemann made the Rapallo deal with Russia to get around the Versailles restrictions.
Weimar Germany, the Third Republic in France, Great
Britain
Germany
Strife,Illegitimacy
The Weimar Republic never got a fair start in Germany. It was modeled on the French
Third Republic and was imposed on Germany in defeat. In addition, it was this
government that signed the Versailles Treaty as one of its first acts.
Such a government never really had any legitimacy and was almost immediately set upon
by Communists and anti-democratic rightists. Four significant attempts to overthrow
Weimer happened between 1918 and 1923. Communists briefly seized power in 1918
and 1919 in Germany, while former soldiers failed in 1920 and finally the National
Socialist attempt in 1923.
Throughout the Weimar Republic, the government had difficulty maintaining order in the
streets as assassinations, riots, and violence between armed gangs associated with
political parties became common.
Finally came the humiliation of 1923 as Belgian and French soldiers occupied the mines
and factories of the Ruhr. The response was to order the Germans there to strike while the
government would pay the workers to stay home. This was paid for by simply printing
money. By 1924, the German economy was destroyed by inflation and the financial
system collapsed.
Golden Age
Economic and budgetary problems solved
1924 saw the German economy overhauled with a new, gold-backed paper money and an
easier reparations payment schedule put into place. These economic reforms were heavily
backed with US loans to help Germany back on her feet and to meet her reparations
payments to get the French out of the Ruhr. From 1924 to 1929, Germany had excellent
economic performance as they followed the US model of the 1920s to prosperity.
Stresemann and German renaissance
The architect of this German renaissance was Gustav Stresemann. His policies and his
ability to get the Americans on board saved Germany. Following this success he
negotiated the Locarno Treaty which not only led to a great sense of peace with France,
but also resulted in Germany taking the US place as a Permanent member of the League.
Germany was not only back in the family of nations, but at the front rank for the first
time since 1914.
During this time period, the Socialist Democratic Party (SPD) and Catholic Center Party
dominated Germany with their soft socialism and emphasis on Democracy. However,
their success did not create the feeling that Weimar was legititmate, only effective—for
now.
Depression and Crisis
The Great Depression hit Germany first along with the US. Both nations had followed
similar policies with great success in the 1920s. Now they both followed the same
disastrous policies of monetary restriction, massive new taxes and choking off foreign
trade. Both nations crashed the hardest and almost simultaneously. Those who had
criticized the 1920s as “Amerikanizing” Germany now capitalized on the opportunity.
The SPD and the Center rapidly lost membership as the Communists (KPD) and right
wing parties benefited. Event the laughable National Socialists (NSDAP, or, “Nazi”)
suddenly became more popular as their rallies soon even drew German Jews as paying
attendees. With the collapse of the ruling coalition, Germany soon could no longer put
together any ruling coalition as the NSDAP and KPD would not join any coalition.
Without those two major parties, there was not enough left to form any majorities.
Parliamentary rule was dying.
Bruning and the end of Parliamentary Rule
In 1931, President von Hindenberg appointed Ernst Bruning, the Center Party chief, as
the Chancellor. Bruning led no coalition and could get nothing passed as a result.
However, Hindenberg game Bruning the right to “rule by decree” on certain matters. This
was legal under the German constitution, however, it made a joke of parliamentary
government. For many, this was the end of the Weimar Republic.
The near-dictatorial powers of Bruning greatly undermined those Germans committed to
democracy. The KPD benefited somewhat from this phenomenon, but most Germans
viewed the Communists as little more than Germans who wanted to make Germany a
new Soviet province. However, the NSDAP benefited most, with its democracy-mocking
rhetoric, its awe-inspiring rallies, its fantastic use of radio and film, and its never-
compromising attitude toward destroying the Versailles Treaty. As the SPD and Center
collapsed and as the lethargic old right wing parties bled support, the NSDAP seemed to
be the only answer with any promise.
What to do with Hitler?
The NSDAP was the largest political party in Germany by 1932—yet their leader Adolph
Hitler, was never offered the job of Chancellor. The more Hitler was denied the
opportunity, the more popular his party became. When only his SA were outlawed, but
the other political party “soldiers” were not, it again played to Hitler’s benefit.
However, there was something very creepy about the Nazis that made von Hindenburg
shrink from offering Hitler the job. Hitler’s people were not standard God-fearing
German conservatives, but were usually radicals who preferred the occult, paganism and
had obviously lax standards regarding sexuality (the leader of the SA was a homosexual
who had a thing for teenaged boys and was put in charge of the Hitler Youth). Hitler’s
own sexual behavior was deemed by many to be homosexual at best or perverted in such
a grotesque way that every woman with whom the man had been intimate committed, or
at least attempted, suicide.
Hitler’s hostility to Christianity (due to its “Jewish” nature) hardly helped a Throne and
Altar Conservative like Hindenburg feel comfortable with the man. As a result,
Hindenburg three times declined the obvious choice of Hitler as Chancellor, preferring to
give near-dictatorial powers to first Bruning, then von Papen and finally to von
Schleicher before giving way to the inevitable and placing Hitler as Chancellor in
January 1933 (but NOT letting the NSDAP be a majority of the Ministers). Even as von
Hindenburg gave Hitler his chance, he tried to “control” the man he felt was bad for
Germany.
France
Post-War Glow
After WWI, France stood basking in the glow of perhaps the greatest victory in the
history of the nation. Hated Germany had been humbled and forced to sign a humiliating
treaty in the Palace of Versailles. The Third Republic had finally gained a large measure
of legitimacy. The Left was happy that one of their own, Georges Clemenceau, had led
the nation to victory from the dark days of 1917. The Right was actually thankful to the
Republic for beating Germany. In fact, the French Army was referred to as the Greatest
Army in the World (and not just in France). France was, at least for awhile, one big
happy family
The franc, budgetary problems, and Poincare to the rescue
However, soon the afterglow died down and some of the old problems of the Third
Republic reappeared. Paying for war damage, taking care of veterans, and paying off war
debts, all clashed with the desire to reduce the very high taxes imposed during the war as
well as demands by the French Left for greater social spending. As such, the French
government essentially tried to do it all at once—but it did so by printing the missing
money, rather than borrowing any more. This led to an inflation that began to destroy the
value of the French currency—the franc.
The Right wanted to cut government spending to make up for the gap and to cut taxes in
the future. The French Left wanted to raise taxes even more to pay for the programs.
However, neither side had enough political power to carry through their plans. As such,
coalition after coalition collapsed and new cabinets were re-formed. While the indecision
continued, the franc declined—and the decline alarmed most Frenchmen since France
had a very high percentage of its population who had significant savings.
Into this crisis rode and oddity in France—a strong President who commanded respect—
Raymond Poincare. Poincare was an older man would rather have retired than taken over
such a nightmare. However, he demanded, and received, near-dictatorial powers over the
French economy. This meant he could simply dictate what policies would be used to
solve the crisis. He moved quickly by slashing social spending of all types and outraging
the Left. However, he had enormous powers to do so and the Left could do nothing.
Within a couple of months, his tough medicine had saved the franc and Frenchmen could
again feel confident in their savings.
Troops in the Rhineland, Locarno, and Appeasement
Poincare also raised money by moving French troops into the Rhineland to force German
reparations payments. With France in such a crisis, he was unwilling to give the Germans
any slack. The Rhineland occupation outraged Germany and much of the world for sure,
but nevertheless, he got enough German money to take up the slack in French finances.
The man left office old and known for saving France twice: once for the franc and for
saving France in WWI.
After Poincare left the scene, France negotiated the Locarno Treat with Germany. Most
Frenchmen were overjoyed that the Germans had formally agreed to give up claim to
Alsace-Lorraine. However, also part of the treaty was the clause that officially put France
in the Collective Security regime of the League as well as formally ending their alliance
with Britain and the US.
In 1933 the France-hating Adolf Hitler assumed the Chancellorship in Germany. Some
French Rightists wanted to attack and remove the National Socialists before Germany
could be resurrected. However, French pacifism was far too powerful event to go after a
man as dangerous to France as Hitler. In addition, Hitler was mainly asking only for
territory that already was majority-German to begin with. Most Frenchmen were
unwilling to fight to keep the Germans dis-unified. They hoped that Hitler would be
satisfied once he had all his Germans in Germany. Thus, the French went along with the
British policy of appeasement.
Political instability and legitimacy issues
The 1930s were unkind to France. A severe scandal involving a man named Stavisky
seemed to implicate most of the ardent Republicans in the Parliament. Soon, chiefs of
police, Republican newspapers and even some conservative papers were involved.
However, after days of seeking Stavisky, the police finally found him. While in custody,
Stavisky killed himself—or at least shot himself while the policemen played cards until
the man bled to death. This outrageous end to and outrageous scandal destroyed much of
the legitimacy of the Republic. The cry of “government of robbers” again rose from the
French Right. It also did not help the Republic that Stavisky was (of course, this is
France) a Jew. This was a new Dreyfus Affaire, except this time the Republicans were on
the losing end. This scandal led to the Feb 6, 1933 Riots which nearly overthrew the
Republic. With rioters right outside the French Parliament, the deputies tried to decide
what to do, but a near-riot broke out inside as Republicans and Communists shouted each
other down, sang the Marseillaise and Internationale to drown out opposing speeches and
even saw the Premier, Daladier, dragged from the podium by opponents while giving a
speech. Meanwhile, a sign was put up after the deputies fled that read, “To the Rioters:
No Deputies in Here.” The crowd had been chanting “hang the deputies!” as French
police tried to ward off the crowd. Finally, late at night, the French police launched a
charge and dispersed the crowd. However, this incoherent and cowardly response to the
Stavisky scandal helped destroy French unity in the face of the anti-French unity
displayed in Germany under Hitler. The French Right began to hope for Mussolini or
Hitler to defeat France in war to rid them of the Republic. Communists also saw the
Republic as doomed and pushed for pacifism at every turn and opposed Republicans
almost constantly. All that was left was a demoralized Republican center to face Hitler
and Mussolini.
Paralysis in the face of Hitler and Mussolini
France had desperately fought to keep Italy on board with Britain to keep the peace.
However, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 created a crisis that France could not
escape. Most of the French establishment was suspicious of the League and of Collective
Security. The recognized that Mussolini was mostly worried about Germany moving into
Austria and threatening Tyrol and its heavily German population in the north of Italy.
However, Mussolini also had to avenge the defeat at Adowa by Ethiopian forces in 1896.
Italians had clamored for decades for revenge at Ethiopia. Ethiopia was at least a partial
ally of France, and France was heavily responsible for getting the Ethiopians to nearmodern military status. That status is what surprised the Italians at Adowa. In the
Ethiopian War, French officials patiently waited for Italy to win and then to “do
something” much too late. No point in offending Mussolini when France as not going to
fight anyway. Soon the Hoare-Laval Pact became known to the world. This deal
essentially gave Mussolini a free pass in order to keep the alliance between Italy and
France intact. However, the publicity enraged world opinion at France’s power
politicking. Soon, France had to retract the offer and later went along with League
sanctions that outraged Mussolini. These sanctions were very weak, but they showed
Mussolini that the League was toothless and that Germany was the leading power in
Europe. Thus, Italy withdrew from the League and became an ally of Germany. French
foreign policy now had to rely even more on Collective Security—and French officials
had little faith in that policy.
With regard to Germany, the French were guided by one policy after Italy bailed on them
in 1936—British help was essential in any conflict with Germany. Under no
circumstance would France “go it alone” against Germany. As a result, when Germany
moved into the Rhineland in 1935 France was willing to act but could not contact British
officials to get a green light. Failing in this, French observers simply packed up their
items and fled to France, In 1936, Hitler moved into Austria and, again, France could not
contact British officials in time to do anything. In both occasions, Hitler had correctly
guessed that France would not act without Britain, and therefore made his moves on
Saturdays when British officials went to their country homes and were incommunicado.
By the time of the Munich Conference of 1938, the French felt somewhat doomed.
Shackled to the British corpse, they had lost all freedom of action. Ready to fight
alongside the Czechs over the Sudeten Germans issue, the British made clear they would
not fight over the Czechs. The French Premier, Daladier, meekly had to go along with a
policy he thought fatal. The French Right was outraged that France had been humiliated
once again and that it was totally dependent on a startlingly weak Britain. Many, even in
the army, began to talk of a “cleansing” effect of a defeat by Germany or Italy to rid them
of the incompetent Third Republic. The Communists, now warlike, were angry that
France had not fought and urged a powerful anti-Hitler line. However, even that all
changed on the eve of WWII when Stalin and Hitler made their deal in order to hit
Poland—France’s ally. Overnight, Communist began to sing the praises of peace as well
as of not being warlike to the suddenly “good” Hitler. Poland was easily crushed and the
French army now had to face Hitler’s Wehrmacht with a defeatist Communist Left and a
Right that sometimes wanted a defeat as well. No wonder France only lasted six weeks
when Hitler finally came.