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P_S Journal of Phillpplne Developmen t Number Thirty*Two, Volume XVIII, No. 1,19g 1 P_ S ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEFENSE SPENDING: EVIDENCE ON CAUSALITY FOR SELECTED ASIAN COUNTRIES* P. C.Frederiksen* * 1. INTRODUCTION In the lastdecadeincreasingattentionhasbeenfocusedonthe role of militaryexpendituresindevelopingcountries.Onereasonfor this isthat worldmilitaryexpendituresin 1987 exceededonetrillionUSdollarsfor the veryfirsttime;developingcountriesaccountedforapproximately17percent ofthistotal.Despitethesteadygrowthindefensespending,scholars,forthe most part, know little aboutthe effects of militaryspendingon the local economy. As Saadat Deger(1986: 3) recentlynoted: "The numbersare mind-boggling;...Butwhat isclearisthatitisessentialto study,analytically, theeconomicdimensionsof militaryexpenditureinlessdevelopedcountries (LDCs) and carefullyevaluate the costs and benefits involved.... the economicsof militarizationarecrucial." Anotherreasonforthe increasedawarenessof militaryexpenditures isthat developingcountrieshavehadto recentlyscrutinizethesizeofoverall budgets, especiallythe defensecomponent.In manycasesthe resource base has declinedbut the needsfrom othersectorsof the economy have concomitantlyincreased.In manyinstances,defenseexpenditureshave replacedhighprioritydevelopmentprojectswith littleknowledgeonthepart of governmentsasto the impactof sucha decision. Much ofthecurrentresearchin thefieldof defenseeconomicscanbe attributedto the early work of EmileBenoit(1978) who concludedthat, contraryto popularopinion,developingcountrieswhichhadhigherdefense burdens (defense spendingas a percentageof Gross National Product (GNP)) usually had higher rates of economic growth. This result was diametricallyoppositeto the usually-heldbeliefthat increasesin defense spendingmeantlowergrowth;scarceresourceswere siphonedaway from moreproductiyeuseselsewhereinthe economy. *An eadier version of this paper was presented in 1989 at the Institute for Strategic and InternaldonalStudies, Kuala Lumpur. I wish to thank two anonymous referees formaking valuable sugge_tJor_. "° Professor of Economi_s, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, USA. 132 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT In the last decade, other aspects of defense spending in developing countries have received closer attention. Some of these areas are: - howmilitaryspendingaffectsratesofsavingsandinvestment, and consequently prospects for future growth; the economic and noneconomic determinants of defense spending; the determinants of arms industries; the production of major weapons systems by only certain developing countries; the discernibleeffects (both economic and noneconomic) of civilian versus military regimes; and human capital formation and development in the military. 1 In a recent paper, Looney and Frederiksen (1990) examined the determinants of defense spending in six Asian countries: the Philippines, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. Their research suggested that economic variables and resource availability were the main determinants of military expenditures inthese six countries. The purpose of this paper isto test, for the same set of countries, the widely-held hypothesis that the direction of causality is from military expenditures to economic growth, i.e., that defense spending can in fact "cause" economic growth. The alternative hypotheses are that (a) economic growth precedes defense spending, thereby allowing countries to increase defense outlays; (b) no relationship exists; or (c) a feedback loop exists whereby defense leads to growth which, in turn, leads to more defense, etc. The working hypothesis for this paper is that, aprior/, one cannot specify the direction of causality for any individual country. In addition to testing the usually assumed hypothesis of defense to growth, this paper goes on to (a) extend the preliminary results obtained by Frederiksenand LaCivita (1987) on causality in the Philippines which originally appeared in this Journal; (b) extend the results obtained in LaCivita and Frederiksen (1991 ) from 1982 to 1988 for the Philippines and Thailand; and (c) include comparative research results for Indonesia, 2 Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea. THE CAUSALITY ISSUE Most studies to date have assumed that defense spending is an exogenous variable and, thus, "causes" economic growth. In other words, the models which have been tested have specified economic growth as the 1. For an excellent review see Deger (1986) and Lindgren (1988). 2. The results for Indonesia converting the period 1864-85 ere reported in Frederiksen (1989). The results for Indonesia in this paper cover the period 1961-88. FREDERIKSEN:GROWTH AND DEFENSE SPENDING 133 dependent variable. Governments undertake military expenditure programs; and, presumablyat some (unspecified)time in the future, the economywould eitherbenefitorsufferasa resultofthis spending.Most of the studiesinthe1980s focusedonwhethertheeffectwas positive,neutral, or negative(seeDeger1986). Thewidely-heldbeliefregardingtheexogeneity of defense spending originated with Benoit. In his seminal paper, he recognizedthat the directionof causalitycouldbe eitherfrom defenseto growth orfrom growthto defense.As Benoitnoted: A questionarose,however,aboutthedirection ofthisinteraction. Mightnot the correlation be explainedby the influenceof growthrateson defense expenditures ratherthanviceversa?Countries withrapidgrowthmightfeel better able to indulgethemselvesin the luxuryof elaboratedefense programs .... Theseplausible hypotheses didnotappeartobesupported by theevidence .... Thusgrowthappearedto exertonlya weakinfluenceon defenseburdens.(Benoit1978:275-76) The assumedexogeneityof defensehasrecentlybeenchallengedby Joerding (1986) who examineddata for 57 countriesandconcludedthat defenseexpenditureswere notstronglyexogenous.Whetherornotdefense spendingpromoteseconomicgrowth is importantfor those developing countriessearchingforwaysto improveeconomicperformance-orat least to spendsoasnotto retardeconomicgrowth.Joerding'sworkis undoubtedlyan importantcontributionto the literature.Butas was pointedout in FrederiksenandLaCivita(1987)andLaCivitaand Frederiksen(1991 ), there are two major criticismsof Joerding's work. First, Joerding lumps all countriesintoonesample.Thissuggeststhat ifa causalrelationshipexists it iscommonto allcountries.Itisquitelikelythat in somecountriesdefense causes growth, in others growth causes defense, and yet in others a feedbackrelationshiporevennorelationshipexists.The secondpointisthat Joerdingassumeda commonand arbitrary four-year lag structureonthe defenseand growth variablesin hispooledset. It isreasonableto assume thatthelagstructuremightdifferfromonecountryto anotherdependingon the structureof the economy,thetype of defensespending,and the like. In Frederiksenand LaCivita'sstudy (1987) of the Philippinesduring 1956 and1982they usedJoerding'sprocedure(explainedmorefullybelow) totestforcausality.Nostatisticallysignificantrelationship was foundto exist betweendefenseandgrowthwhenthelaggedvaluesforthevariableswere arbitrarilychosento befour years.Whenthe modelwas re-estimatedwith anarbitrarylagvalueoftwo, itwasfoundthatgrowthcausesdefense.These initialresultssuggestthat, sincebothof thelagstructurestested (two and four years) were chosenarbitrarily, one cannot say which isthe correct specification. 134 DATA JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT SOURCES The primary data sourceSon Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and on the rate of growth of realG DP (except for Malaysia between 1961 and 1970) was the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) internationalFinancialStatistics Yearbook, The Yearbook: 1984 was used for data up to 1959, the Yearbook: 1990fordata between 1960 and 1980, and the Yearbook: 1991 for the period 1981-88. Defense expenditures were drawn from the United Nation's Statistical Yearbook (annual issues through to 1983/84). The rate of growth of real GDP was not reported by the IMF for Malaysia between 1961 and 1970. A series was constructed using the nominal GDP adjusted for inflation/deflation by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The defense burden through to 1983 (for all countries except Singapore and Indonesia) was calculated as the percentage of GDP allocated to defense expenditures. The defense burden data for the remaining years (1984-88) were reported by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (annual issues). A comparison of several overlapping years (Appendix A) indicated similar ratios for the military burden whatever the source used .4Defense expenditures for Malaysia between 1969 and 1985 were taken from the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies' Defense Spending in Southeast Asia, (1987). The defense burden for Singapore was derived exclusively from ACDA data. The defense burden for Indonesia for the period 1961-66 was reported by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's (SIPRI), S/PRI Yearbooks on Wor/d Armaments and Disarmament. The remaining years were drawn from USACDA. The following sections describe, respectively, the methodology by which the optimal lag length and correct direction of causality were calculated andthe empirical results for the Philippines(1956-88), Thailand (195688), South Korea (1955-88), Malaysia (1961-88), Singapore (1967-88), and Indonesia (1961-88). METHODOLOGY Hsiao (1981 ) has developed a systematic method for choosing lag lengths to avoid the problems associated with arbitrary lag lengths. His method combines Granger causality and Akaike's final prediction error (FPE). Initially a series of regression equations is estimated on the depend- 3. The data used in the study appears as Appendix A, Tables A 1-A6. 4. Sinoe the tests aremore robust with longerperiods, we feel more than justified in using ACDA data on the military burden for the later years especially given the similarity to the ratio computed (using UN and IMF data) for aadier years. A data sheet for each country, together with a copy of the computer output, is appended to this paper. FREDERIKSEN: GROWTH AND DEFENSE SPENDING 135 ent variable. In the first regressionequation, the dependentvariable is laggedoneyear, andin succeedingregressions,anadditionallagisadded. That is, M regressionequationsareestimated in theform: m Gt = (x,+_, _t-, Gt-1+ st i=-1 where Giseconomicgrowthand whereM, the maximumlaglength,takes on thevaluefrom 1 to M.s Foreachregression,thefinalpredictionerror(FPE)iscomputedin the followingmanner: T+m+ FPE(m) = T-m-1 1 ESS(m)/T, where Tis the samplesize, andFPE(m)andESS(m) arethe finalprediction errorandthesumofsquares,respectively.Theoptimallaglength,m*, isthe laglengthwhichproducesthesmallestfinalpredictionerror,i.e., themost accurateforecast.Oncem* hasbeencalculated,anothersetof regressions isestimatedwithlaggedvaluesofD, thedefensevariable,addedsequentially inthesame mannerwhich was usedto determinem ° . Thus, six additional regressionsareestimatedin theform: rrf n Gt = oc+___PI-1Gt-1 + _._'Yt-lDt-I+ i=1 F_t, i=1 with n takingon the valuesfrom one to six. We then compute the FPEfor each of these regressionequationsas: T+m* +n+ l FPE(m* ,n ) - T-m* -n - 1 _ESS(m*, n)/ 7", and we choosetheoptimallag lengthfor D, n *, asthe regressionequation withthelowestpredictionerror. In thesame manner,anothersetof equationsisestimated, with D as the dependent variable,and laggedvaluesof D are includedto find m*. Then, laggedvaluesof G areincludedto findn*. 5. Although the ohoioe of Mis arbitranh it should be as large as possible, consiatent with the sample size and the u nderlying process. Becau so of the relative shortness of time series data for mostdevsioping oountdes, M was limited to six years. 136 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE OEVELOPMENT The final procedure is to test for causality, and this consists of three steps: STEP 1: The final prediction error for the model G = f(GL) iscompared to the FPEfor the model G = f(GL, DL). If the FPEdecreases (i.e., the model's predic'dvepower increases as we add lagged values of D), we conclude that defense Granger causes growth. If, on the other hand, the FPEincreases then we conclude that defense does not Granger cause growth. STEP 2: The FPEfor the model D = f(DL) is compared to the FPEfor the model D = f(DL, GL). If the FPE declines, we conclude that growth Granger causes defense. If the FPE increases, we conclude that growth does not Granger cause defense. STEP 3: We compare the FPEs under Step 1 and Step 2. If the FPE increased in both cases, we conclude no relationship between D and G. If the FPEdeclines in both cases, we conclude a feedback relationship exists. If the FPEdeclined under Step 1 but increased under Step 2, we find that defense Granger causes growth. If the FPE increased under Step 1 but declined under Step 2, we find that growth Granger causes defense. EMPIRICAL RESULTS Lag Lengths The optimal lag lengths using I-Isiao's method on each country appear as Table 1 .eThe paired numbers in the first column indicate the optimum lag lengths, m* and n*, respectively, when economic growth is the dependent variable and lagged values of G and lagged values of the defense variable are the independent variables. The paired numbers in the second column indicate optimum lag lengths, m ° and n °, when defense is the dependent variable. As hypothesized, the estimated optimal lag lengths differ slightly among the countries. While we are unable at this aggregate data level to sPecify reasons for individual lag length differences among the countries, it is comforting to see that most of the lag lengths are either one or two years. These results support the findings of Looney and Frederiksen (! 990) who looked at the determinants of defense spending in these countries. Past growth of GDP has an immediate impact (one year) on current GDP in four of the countries. The one anomaly is a six-year lag rate for Malaysia, However, this result must be looked at with caution since Hsiao's model, while relatively consistent, tends to overestimate lag lengths. The 6. The final predlotion orrors havo not been reported in the paper. As noted pre_Aously, the results oan be obtained directly from the author. FREDERIKSEN: GROWTHAND DEFENSESPENDING 137 Table I OPTIMAL LAG LENGTHS (Years) • It Country G = f (GL , DL) D : f (D, , G_ Philippines (1, 1) (1, 1) Thailand (1, 1) (1, 2) South Korea (1, 5) (1, 3) Malaysia (6, 1) (2, 3) Singapore (2, 2) (2, 1) Indonesia (1, 1) (1, 1) result for Malaysia, while not spurious, is probably less than the computed six-year computed lag. In other words, earlier rates of growth of the GDP have a more recent effect on current GDP growth than indicated by the estimated results. In addition, the six-year lag isan average over a twentyeight year period and is most likely considerably shorter if examined using only recent data. Importantly, the data indicate an almost immediate effect of the defense burden on growth: a one-year lag for all countries except Singapore which experiences a two-year lag (see Column 1 ) and South Korea (fiveyear lag). In addition, the impact of past defense spending on current defense spending is immediate (one year) in four of the countries, and two years for Thailand and Singapore. This result also supports earlier research findings on the determinants of defense spending. It appears as if the "jumping off point" for the current military budget iseither the military burden or the growth rate in G DP of the preceding year. Past GDP growth rates have a one-year lagged impact on defense for the Philippines, Singapore and Indonesia. Past GDP from two years ago impacts the current defense budget in Thailand, and the impact is three years for South Korea and Malaysia. DEFENSE/GROWTH RELATIONSHIPS The final step in the procedure isto compare the final prediction error for the regression equations to determine causality, if any. The relationships appear in Table 2. For a half of the sample, the data suggest a clear direction of causality: from economic growth to defense for Malaysia and from defense to growth for Singapore and Indonesia. For the remaining three countries there is either no relationship between growth and defense (Philippines and South 138 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT Table2 DEFENSEAND GROWTHRELATIONSHIPS Country Relationship Philippines Thailand No relationship Feedback SouthKorea Malaysia Singapore Indonesia No relationship Growthto Defense DefenseGrangercausesGrowth DefenseGrangercausesGrowth Korea) or a feedback loop (Thailand). As noted above, the aggregative natureofthedataprohibitsusfromidentifyingthespecificdefenseexpenditure whichcausestheeconomicgrowthoreventhetimingof theeconomic growthwhichinducesthefollow-ondefensespending.Thisisprimarilydue to the examinationof data for a thirty-yearperiod.Presumably,for SingaporeandIndonesia,theexistenceofa largearmsindustry(especiallyinthe case of Singapore)or of growth-inducingtypes of military spending(on infrastructure,education,housing,andthelike)hashadpositiveeffectson theeconomy.These aretheeffectsthat Benoitsuggestedmighttake place in developingeconomies.ForMalaysiathefinal predictionerrorsuggests that economicgrowth is an important determinantof defensespending, whichisoppositetothe patternsuggestedby Benoit.ForThailand,thefinal predictionerror declinedwhen G and D were the respectivedependent variables.Thissuggestsa "feedback" relationshipwherebygrowthhasled to moredefensewhich, inturn, hascreatedmoregrowth, and soon. This was the predominantcasein the largerstudy conductedby LaCivitaand Frederiksen(199i ). Fortwo of the countries,the Philippines'and South Korea,theresultsindicatenorelationshipbetweendefenseandgrowth. For Koreathis issomewhatpuzzlinggiventheoftenperceivedimportanceofthe defensesectorineconomicdevelopment.However,thisresultmightbedue to the inclusionof relativelyrecentdata (throughto 1988) in the model; Korea's growth in the last decade or so may no longerdepend on the defense sector (as much as it did earlier), and other factors (such as technological advances and economic diversity) have been the main enginesofgrowth. Forthe Philippines,asinthecaseof Korea,theinclusion of the defenseburdenasanindependentvariable(with Gasthe dependent variable)ortheinclusionof G asan independentvariablewhen D was the dependentvariableled to increasesin the final predictionerror; defense expendituresinthePhilippinesapparentlyhavenoGrangercausalityeffect FREDERIKSEN:GROWTH AND DEFENSE SPENDING 139 on economic growth, and growth doesnot"cause" defense. Presumably either pattern couldhave happened(or is happening)if we were to take shorterperiodswithin thethirty-yearperiod.Unfortunatelythe shorter the time periodexamined,the weaker isthestatisticaltest. Froma policypoint of view, plannersin South Koreaand the Philippinesshouldthereforenot rely ondefenseexpendituresasa majorpolicy toolforeconomicgrowth intheir respectiveeconomies.The implicationof theseresultsisthat anyeffort to imposearbitrarylaglengthsalongthelines of Joerdingon modelswhichtry to uncovercausalitywilllikelyhidethetrue relationship.The appropriaterelationshipcanonlybedetectedby a proper specificationofthe model,andthe appropriaterelationshipWillmorethan likelydifferfrom one countryto another-an assumptionnot felt likelyby earlierauthorssuchas Benoit. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS This paperhasexaminedthe defense/growthcausality issuefor six Asian countries. The purposewas (a) to extend an earlierpaper in this Jouma/dealing with lag lengths in the Philippines;(b) to update prior causalitystudiesonthe PhilippinesandThailandthrough 1988; and (c)to includecomparativestudies on Indonesia,South Korea, Singapore,and Malaysia. Most past studieshaveassumedthat defensespendingprecedesor "causes" economicgrowth-i.e., thatcorrelationimpliescausation.Joerding suggestedthat defensespendingisnotexogenous.The two criticismsofthe Joerdingpaperwere that (a)he useda pooledsample,and (b) he chosean arbitrarylagstructure. Thissix-countrystudy determinedona country-by-countrybasisthe optimallagstructurefor thedefenseandgrowth variables,ontheone hand, and the appropriatedirectionof causalityfor each country, on the other hand. The results indicate that the lag structure differs from country to countryashypothesized.However,whenbroadlyexamined,thelaglengths areprimarilyone ortwo years. The similarityisfurther strengthenedwhen oneconsidersthat the modelusedin this papertends to overestimatethe lagperiod.Pastgrowth andpastdefensehavean almostimmediateimpact oncurrentgrowth, andsimilarly,pastdefenseandpastgrowth havea very quickimpacton currentdefense. The results alsoconfirmedthat the causalrelationshipdiffers from country to country. ForSingaporeand Indonesiathe resultsindicatethat defense Granger causes defense-the presumed directionaccording to Benoit.Onlyin Malaysiadideconomicgrowth appearto be a determinant of defensespending.In the caseofThailandourresultssuggesta feedback 140 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT relationship; for the remaining two countries-Philippines and South Korea-no discernible relationship between defense and growth was uncovered. The Irnpllcatlon forfurther researchisthatneither defenseor growth can be consideredas exogenously determined.Furthermore, we do not expectone model tofit allcountries oreven a group ofcountries Inthesame region. The laglengthsarelikely to differ from countryto country,as does thecausalrelationship between thedefenseburdenand economic growth. Given thecomplexityoftheinteraction ofthedefenseand growthvariables, a fruitful areaforfuturereseamh mightbe to uncoverexactlyhow defense affectsgrowth on a count_/-by-country and year-by-year basis-a task made difficult due to the aggregativenatureof the reporteddata.Given further breakdowns as to thetypesof military spending{on,forexample, capital equipmentor R&D), more completeinsights mightbe uncoveredas to theroleofmilitary expenditures on theeconomy. APPENDIX A Table A1 DATA, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Year Gross Domestic Product= Defense expenditureb 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 10 11 12 13 14 15 17 20 21 23 26 29 32 35 42 50 56 72 1O0 115 166 157 181 181 190 197 206 209 230 225 249 290 345 326 458 543 602 855 1941 3982 Defense USACDA Growth rate burden defense of real GDP (pement) burden (percent) (percent) 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.9 3.5 6.9 5,3 3.5 6.7 1.5 5.6 4.8 7.0 3.5 5.2 4.4 6.1 5.6 4.8 4.6 4.9 4.8 9.2 5.0 6.4 FREDERIKSEN: GROWTHANDDEFENSESPENDING 141 Table A1 (continued) Year 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 t988 Gross Domestic Producta Defense expenditureb 135 ,154 178 218 265 305 341 384 4118 4325 3552 4995 5115 5526 5552 6106 Defense USACDA Growth rate burden defense of real GDP (percent) burden(percent) (percent) 3,1 2.8 2.0 2.3 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.6 2.0 2.3 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.2 1.3 1.9 1.8 1.7 8.0 6.1 5.5 6.3 5.2 3.2 3.6 1.9 -7.6 -7.4 3.4 4.8 6.3 a. Billions ofpesos. b,Millions ofpesos, Sources:GDPand GrowthRateof RealGDP:IMF,InternationalFinancialStatistics Yearbook:1984(1956-1959), Yeadoook: 1990(1960-1980), Yea_ook:1991(1981-1988). 19561983DefenseExpenditures fromUnitedNations, StatisticalYearbook,Annual Issues.Defense Burden(1978-1988) fromUSACDA, WorldMilitaryExpenditures andArmsTransfens:1989. Table A2 DATA, THAILAND Year Gross Domestic Producta Defense expenditureb 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 43 44 45 48 54 5g 63 68 75 84 101 108 817 1567 1390 1421 1378 1080 1570 1609 1745 1877 2055 2437 Defense USACDA Growth rate burden defense of real GDP (percent) burden(percent) (percent) 1.9 3.6 3.1 3.0 2.6 1.8 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.0 2.3 6 -1.6 3.4 6.9 10.0 5.3 8.1 8.4 6.6 7,9 12.2 7.8 142 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT Table A2 (continued) Year 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Gross Domestic Product, 117 129 147 153 170 222 279 303 347 403 488 559 659 760 820 910 Defense expenditursb 2990 3638 4898 5383 5721 5950 7104 7870 9987 12566 17367 22978 27019 29143 33652 34944 Defense USACDA Growth rate burden defense of real GDP (percent) burden (percent) (percent) 2.6 2.8 3.3 3.5 3.4 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.9 3.1 3.6 4.1 4.1 3.8 4.1 3.8 3.6 4.2 4.1 3.9 4.2 3.9 3.9 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.1 8,5 7,9 10,5 5.0 4.1 9.9 4.4 4.8 9.4 9.9 10.4 5.3 4.8 6.3 4.1 7.3 7.1 3.5 4.9 9.5 13.2 a. Billions of baht. b. Millionsof baht, Sources:GDPandGrowthRateofRealGDP:IMF,InternationalFinancialStatistics Yearbooks: 1984(1956-1959),Yearbook:1990(1960-1980),Yearbook: 1991(1981-1988). 1956-1983DefenseExpenditures fromUnitedNations,StatisticelYearbook,AnnualIssues. DefenseBurden1978-1988fromUSACDA,WorldMilitaryExpenditures andArrnsTransfers, 198_ FREDERIKSEN: GROWTHAND DEFENSESPENDING 143 Table A3 DATA, SOUTH KOREA Year 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 t 987 1988 J/ Gross Domestic Producta Defense expenditurea 113 150 196 203 216 243 291 352 500 711 798 1024 1259 1630 2130 2724 3379 4170 5416 7569 10224 1_996 18074 24327 31323 38041 47482 54443 63833 6 11 11 13 14 15 17 21 20 25 30 41 50 65 84 101 136 171 181 254 194 771 1008 1438 1597 2252 2831 3163 3405 Defense USACDA Growthrate burden defense of real GDP (percent) burden(percent) (percent) 5.3 7.3 5.6 6.4 6.6 6.2 5.8 6.0 4.0 3.5 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.7 4.0 4.1 3.3 3.4 1.9 5.5 5,6 5.9 5.1 5.9 6.0 5.8 5.3 5.1 5.1 4.8 4.4 4.3 _. l_, 4,5 -1.3 7.6 5.5 3.9 1.2 5.8 2.1 9.1 9.7 5,7 t 2.2 5.9 11.3 13.8 8.8 9.2 5.9 14.4 7.9 6.5 13.2 10.9 9.7 7.4 -2.0 6.7 7.3 11.8 9.4 6.9 12.4 12.0 11.5 ,, a.Billionsof won Sources: GDPend GrowthRatsof RealGDP:IMF,InternationalFinancialStatistics Yearbooks:1984 (1955-1959),Yearbook:1990 (1960-1980)Yearbook:1991 (1981.1988). DefenseExpenditures from UnitedNations,StatisticalYearbook,AnnualIssues.Defense Burden(1984-1988) fromUSACDA, WorldMllita_/Expenditures and ArmsTransfers:1989. 144 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT Table A4 DATA, MALAYSIA ,,A/Ill Year 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 196g 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Gross Domestic Product a Defense expenditurea 6696 7056 7515 8056 8837 9394 9774 10160 11629 12155 12955 14220 18723 22858 22332 28085 32340 37886 46424 53308 57613 62579 69941 79550 77547 108.8 127.4 154.9 216.5 303.1 379.5 366.6 379.3 329.6 436.7 546.0 707.6 725.3 954.7 1053.8 1117.2 1324.0 1406.0 1704.0 2253.0 3332.0 3694.0 3489.0 2626.4 1850.2 Defense burden (percent) USACDA defense burden (percent) 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.7 3.4 4.0 3.8 3.7 2.8 3.6 4.2 5.0 3.9 4.2 4.7 4.0 4.1 3.7 3.7 4.2 5.8 5.9 5.0 3.3 2.4 4.2 4.5 2.8 Growth rate of real GDP (percent) -2.1 5.4 3.3 7.2 8.6 6.3 6.1 3.9 15.6 2.4 7.1 9.4 11.7 6.3 0.8 11.6 7.8 6.7 9.3 7.4 6.9 5.9 6.3 7.8 -1.0 1.0 5.4 -0.1 Consumer Price Index 97 97 100 100 101 101 99 99 98 100 102 a. Millionsofringgit Note:Only 1960-88data used. RealGDPfor earlieryearsunavailable, Sources:GDP (1960-1970)and ConsumerPrice Index (1961-1970)from IMF, InfematlonalFinancialStatistics Yearbook: 1990.DefenseExpenditures1961*68fromUnitedNations, Statistical Yearbook,Annualissues.DefenseExpenditures1969-1985fromDefence Spending in Southeast Asia, ed. ChinKin Wah (Singapore:Instituteof SoutheastAsianStudies, 1987), p.174. Defense Burden 1986-1988 from USACDA,World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1989.GrowthRateofRealGDPfor 1961-1970computedbytakingcurrentGDPand adjustingusingConsumer PriceIndex;for 1971-1988from International Financial Statistics Yearbook: 1990. GROWTHAND DEFENSESPENDING 145 Table A5 DATA, SINGAPORE Year 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 USACDA defense burden (percent) 2._1 2.8 6:0 8.8 7.8 6.0 5.2 4.7 5.0 5.5 6.2 5.3 4.9 5.2 5.3 5.1 4.2 5.2 5.9 5.5 5.1 5.3 Growth rate of real GDP (percent) i 1.8 13.9 13.7 13.7 12.5 13.4 1.5 6.3 4.1 7.5 7.8 8.6 9.3 9.7 9.6 6.9 8.2 8.3 -1.7 2.0 9.4 11.1 "" DefenseBurdenfromUSACDA, WorldMilitaryExpenditures and ArmsTransissues.GrowthRateof RealGDP,1967-1980fromIMF,InternationalFinancial Yearbooks:1984;1981-1988 fromYearbook:1991. 146 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT Table A6 DATA, INDONESIA Year Defense burden (percent) Growthrate of real GDP (percent) 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 6.3 4.6 2.9 2.0 2.2 1.2 2.6 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.4 2,9 2.9 3.8 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.1 3.2 3.2 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.1 1.8 5.1 2.4 -2.4 5.5 0.0 2.3 2.3 11.1 6.0 7.5 7.0 9.4 11.3 7.6 5.0 6.9 8.8 7.8 6.3 9.9 7.9 2_2 4.2 7.0 2.5 5.9 4.1 6.5 Souroes: DefenseBurden(1961-1966): Stockholm International PeaceResearch Institute,SIRPIYearbook1990,WorldArmamentsand Disarmaments,(OxfordUniversity Press, 1990)Table5A.3.1967-1988fromUSACDA, WorldMilitaryExpenditurss andArmsTransfers, annualssues,GrowthRateofRealGDP(1961-1980) fromIMF,IntemationalFinancialStatistics Yearbooks:1984;1981-1988fromYearbook:1991. 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