Download Sofia Bauducco - Department of Economics and Business Economics

Sofia Bauducco
November 2008
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Department of Economics and Business
C/ Ramón Trias Fargas 25-27
08005 Barcelona - Spain
Thesis Advisor: Albert Marcet
Placement Director: Jaume Ventura
E-mail:
Webpage:
Office phone:
Mobile:
[email protected]
www.econ.upf.edu/∼bauducco
(+34) 93 5421 621
(+34) 67 7211 782
[email protected]
[email protected]
Education
Expected: 2009
PhD in Economics. Universitat Pompeu Fabra
2004
MSc in Economics. Universitat Pompeu Fabra. With honours
2002
BA in Economics. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Argentina
Fields of Interest
Macroeconomics, Optimal fiscal and monetary policy, Quantitative macroeconomics, Heterogeneous- agent models
Research Papers
“Seigniorage and distortionary taxation in a model with heterogeneous agents
and idiosyncratic uncertainty” (Job Market Paper)
“Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy with Limited Commitment” (Joint with Francesco Caprioli)
“Taylor Rules Under Financial Instability” (Joint with Ales Bulir and Martin
Cihak). IMF Working Paper 08/18
Profesional Experience
Winter 2007
Winter Intern. International Monetary Fund
2001-2003
Research Assistant. Institute of Economics and Finance.
Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Argentina
Teaching Experience
Instructor - Universitat Pompeu Fabra
2008
Economic Theory IV, Econometrics I
Teaching Assistant - Universitat Pompeu Fabra
2007
Econometrics I, Applied Economics II
2006
Introduction to Economics, Mathematics II, Economic Theory III, Applied Economics II
2005
Economic Theory III, Applied Economics II, Public Economics, Real Analysis and Measure Theory (Graduate course)
2004
Economic Theory III, Applied Economics II
2003
Microeconomics I
Teaching Assistant - Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Argentina
2002
Economics II, Economics III
2001
Economics II, Economics III, Mathematics I
2000
Economics III, Mathematics I
Seminar and Conference Presentations
2008
La Pietra-Mondragone Workshop, CREI Macro Breakfast,
CREI Macro Break, CEMFI Lunchtime Seminar
2007
32ž Simposio de Análisis Económico, XII Spring Meeting
of Young Economists, CREI Macro Break, IMF Institute
Seminar
2006
CREI Macro Break
2005
CREI International Breakfast
Scholarships and Awards
2003-2008
Teaching Fellowship. Universitat Pompeu Fabra
2003–2004
Research Grant. Secretarı́a de Extensión Universitaria. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Argentina
July 2002
Beca LIDER of Directive and International Immersion. Fundación Carolina
2002
Scholarship on Banking Administration and Techniques. Banco
Roela
2001
Abanderada (best GPA in my year) of the School of Economics. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Agentina
2000
Student Award. Government from the Province of Córdoba,
Argentina
Languages
Spanish (Native), English (Fluent), Italian (Fluent), German (Intermediate)
Computer Skills
Matlab, Fortran, Stata, Gauss, E-Views, SPSS, Latex, MS Office
References
Albert Marcet
Instituto de Análisis Económico
Campus UAB
08193 - Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain.
E-mail: [email protected]
Phone: (+34) 93 580 6612
Michael Reiter
Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
Department of Economics and Finance
Stumpergasse 56
A-1060 Vienna.
E-mail: [email protected]
Phone: (+43) 1 59991 149
Josep Pijoan-Mas
CEMFI
Casado del Alisal 5
28014 - Madrid, Spain
E-mail: [email protected]
Phone: (+34) 91 429 1056
Abstracts
Seigniorage and distortionary taxation in a model with heterogeneous agents and idiosyncratic uncertainty (Job Market Paper)
In this paper we study the optimal monetary and fiscal policy mix in a model
in which agents are subject to idiosyncratic uninsurable shocks to their labor
productivity. We identify two main effects of anticipated inflation absent in
representative agent frameworks. First, inflation stimulates savings for precautionary reasons. Hence, a higher level of anticipated inflation implies a higher
capital stock in steady state, which translates into higher wages and lower taxes
on labor income. This benefits poor, less productive agents. Second, inflation
acts as a regressive consumption tax, which favors rich and productive agents.
We calibrate our model economy to the U.S. economy and compute the optimal
policy mix. We find that, for a utilitarian government, the Friedman rule is
optimal even when we allow for the presence of heterogeneity and uninsurable
idiosyncratic risk. Although the aggregate welfare costs of inflation are small,
individual costs and benefits are large. Net winners from inflation are poor, less
productive agents, while middle-class and rich households are always net losers.
Optimal fiscal policy in a small open economy with limited commitment (joint with Francesco Caprioli)
In this paper we analyze how the tax-smoothing result obtained in models
of optimal fiscal policy is altered in a context of international risk sharing with
limited commitment. We consider the problem of a benevolent government that
has to choose optimally distortionary taxes on labor income and transfers from
the rest of the world. The contract between the government and the rest of the
world is designed so that at any point in time, neither agent has incentives to
exit the contract and there is no net transfer of wealth between them. Our analytical results suggest that the presence of limited commitment alters substantially the dynamics of the fiscal variables with respect to the full commitment
case. In particular, the volatility of the tax rate is higher than the volatility
of the government expenditure shock since the former responds strongly to the
incentives to default of both agents. Moreover, optimal taxes are procyclical.
Our findings are in line with the evidence of fiscal policy in developing countries.
Taylor rule under financial instability (joint with Ales Bulir and Martin
Cihak) IMF Working Paper WP/08/18
To provide a rigorous analysis of monetary policy in the face of financial instability, we extend the standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
to include a financial system. Our simulations suggest that if financial instability affects output and inflation with a lag, and if the central bank has privileged
information about credit risk, monetary policy responding instantly to increased
credit risk can trade off more output and inflation instability today for a faster
return to the trend than a policy that follows the simple Taylor rule. However,
the long run consumption impact of the augmented rule appears negligible.