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VENEZUELA COUNTRY REPORT VENEZUELA Economic Research and Public Affairs Valentina Cariani [email protected] Capital city: Caracas Population (2010): 29 million Nominal GDP (PPP, 2010): USD 291 billion EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Political risk. President Chavez has gradually adopted a more rigid stance since the opposition took up seats in the Venezuelan parliament in early 2011. The President is pursuing his policy of centralising power and implementing radical measures (expropriation). President’s health status poses some concerns on his candidacy for the December 2012 presidential election. Economic risk. The economy depends heavily on the hydrocarbons sector, which accounts for 80% of all exports and more than 50% of fiscal revenues. Reduced oil production, the fall in foreign investments and the government’s handling of public finances are causing the country’s economic performance to deteriorate. Financial and operational risk. Cumbersome bureaucracy and widespread corruption continue to hamper investments in Venezuela. The government exerts heavy control over the banking system, undermining profit margins. Real GDP (% change) Consumer prices (% change. average) Central government balance/GDP (%) Balance of payments Exports ($ bln) Imports ($ bln) Trade balance ($ bln) Current account balance ($ bln) Current account balance/GDP (%) Total external debt ($ bln) Total external debt/GDP (%) Debt service ratio (%) Reserves ($ bln) Reserves (months of imports) Exchange rate VEB/USD (average) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 4.8 30.4 -1.1 -5.0 30.3 -5.3 -5.4 32.6 -5.7 -2.6 41.8 -6.1 -1.7 36.7 -6.9 93.5 -48.1 45.4 39.2 12.3 47.3 14.8 6.8 33.1 9.0 2.1 58 -41 17 9.0 2.6 50 15.6 15.2 26 9.2 2.5 62 32 30 21 7.6 51 24 11.6 30.0 7.9 4.3 59 33 26 17 7.7 57 25.7 12.9 29.1 9.0 5.3 63 34 29 20 6.5 63 21.0 8 30.0 8.8 5.4 Source: EIU, 2010 SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS RATING Standard and Poor’s BBMoody’s B Fitch B+ Agreements and Treaties Convention of Washington Convention of New York Bilateral agreement on the promotion and protection of investments SACE TERMS OF COVER OECD Category: 7/7 Sovereign risk Bank risk: Private risk: 1 SACE Current 172/183 174/183 162/178 Business Climate Indicators Doing Business 2011 Index of Economic Freedom 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index 2009 without conditions without conditions without conditions Previous 170/183 148/183 158/180 In force In force In force SACE GUARANTEES 31 MARCH 2011 Venezuela Committed (€ mln) Outstanding (€ mln) - of which issued (€ mln) 171 140 118 VENEZUELA POLITICAL RISK Domestic affairs. The Socialist Party, which supports President Hugo Chavez, won the general election in September. Despite this, the President’s party fell short of the majority it would need to pass laws immediately, as was the case after the last election (which the opposition boycotted). President Chavez continues to pursue his radical policies, despite the opposition’s presence in parliament. However news about his cancer treatment in Cuba and powers’ delegation to vice president in July raised some concerns o n C h a v e z candidacy for the December 2012 presidential election. Political risk remains high, particularly as regards the expropriation and nationalisation of assets. International relations. Relations with the US worsened recently after Congress imposed sanctions against the PDVSA oil company due to its business relations with Iran. However, Venezuela continues to be one of the main suppliers of oil to the US. Venezuela and the main Latin American countries (especially Brazil and Argentina) have moderately unstrained relations. Chavez’s attempt to create an alternative axis of power that does not include America, by financing certain countries (Cuba, Bolivia), has fuelled tensions. ECONOMIC RISK Economic activities. The economy is highly dependent on the country’s hydrocarbon industry. While offering good potential for growth, production and quality are heavily regulated and the operational problems involved discourage many foreign investors. Various sectors, such as construction, services and infrastructure, are sustained by state investments. Others, such as household appliances, cars and textiles, which reflect household spending, are in sharp decline. Public finances and inflation. Prior to the crisis, high oil revenues (which account for almost 50% of public finance income) enabled the government to adopt a highly expansionary fiscal policy, marked by a substantial increase in public spending and a relatively limited deficit. However, these measures, which lack transparency and were introduced for purely political reasons, are not deemed sustainable in the long term given the structural constraints of the hydrocarbons sector. Inflation has gradually risen since 2006 despite controls on prices of consumer staples. Balance of payments. Substantial oil exports have generated a trade balance surplus which is, however, forecast to narrow in the short term. The positive balance on the current account is expected to follow a similar trend, reflecting a gradual decline in FDIs. Foreign debt and international reserves. Venezuela has a low level of foreign debt (less than 25% of GDP), albeit rising slightly in terms of absolute value. Currency reserves are falling due to the need for hard currency by the national oil company (PDVSA) and the national development fund (FONDEN). The shortage of hard currencies is gradually leading to the introduction of restrictions on circulation of capital and conversion of currencies. Exchange rate. Venezuela introduced a two-tier exchange rate between the bolivar and the US dollar in 2010 to curb mounting pressure on the currency and reduce tensions on the exchange market. The exchange rate for priority transactions is VEB 2.60 per US$, whereas for non-essential goods (such as profits and repatriated capital) it is 4.30. The medium-term forecast is for gradual devaluation. The CADIVI, the government body which administers currency exchange, has accumulated a huge backlog of permit requests resulting in long delays. 2 SACE VENEZUELA GDP growth and inflation Foreign debt 70 30 50 60 25 40 20 30 15 20 50 % 30 % mld US$ 40 10 10 10 5 0 0 0 -10 20 2008 2009 Gross foreign debt 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2012 Gross foreign debt / GDP Real GDP growth Inflation FINANCIAL RISK System structure. The Venezuelan banking system consists of 55 banks, 10 of which are state owned. The five biggest banks are: Banco Mercantil, Banesco, Banco de Venezuela, Banco Provincial and Banco Occidental del Descuento. These manage more than 50% of assets in the sector and some 60% of the total credit portfolio. According to data provided by Venezuela’s central bank, non-performing loans account for less than 2% of the total. Despite developments in recent years, the number of banks operating in the sector appears to far exceed the country’s actual credit brokerage requirements: many banks have tiny market shares (frequently less than 1%) and are not competitive. Performance. The system as a whole is characterised by lack of efficiency and a high degree of government interference. Some banks, including giants like Santander and BBVA, have faced expropriation and been threatened with nationalisation in attempts by the government to control the mortgage market. Stock market. Performance on the Venezuelan stock market depends directly on the policies of President Chavez. After two years of growth, the stock market index slumped in 2007. Stocks of a number of nationalised companies were repeatedly suspended after losing up to 20-30% of their value. The nationalisation campaign has also accentuated investors’ risk perception and CDS spreads have widened considerably. OPERATIONAL RISK Legal system. The system is hampered by cumbersome bureaucracy, corruption and government interference. The legal system is highly politicised and regarded as biased. Attitude towards foreign investors. In recent years the government has taken an aggressive stance towards foreign investors. As companies have been nationalised many foreign operators have found themselves ousted from the country. Infrastructure, safety and natural disasters. Much of Venezuela’s infrastructure is inadequate and the government has approved an ambitious plan to expand the rail network. The country has one of the highest crime rates in Latin America. 3 SACE VENEZUELA RELATIONS WITH IFIs International Monetary Fund. Venezuela has no loan agreements with the IMF. Relations between the two parties are limited to periodical consultations. World Bank. At the moment there are 3 World Bank projects in the country, worth a total of US$ 30 million. These regard the health sector and environmental protection. BUSINESS RELATIONS WITH ITALY Trade. The United States is Venezuela’s biggest trade partner. In 2010 Italian exports to Venezuela amounted to € 616 million, slightly less than in 2009. The main sectors are mechanical engineering, which accounts for 43% of the total, electronics (10%) and metals (11%). Italy imported Venezuelan goods worth € 253, which was also slightly less than the previous year. Mined and quarried products and refined energy products make up the majority of imports. Italian exports to Venezuela (2010, %) other means of transport 3% furniture and other manufacturing 2% Italy - Venezuela trade balance (2001-2010, mln €) other 11% 900 800 700 600 food 5% 500 400 automotive 5% 300 mechanical engineering 43% chemicals 10% 200 100 0 -100 electronics 10% 4 SACE metals 11% 2001 2002 2003 export 2004 2005 2006 import 2007 2008 2009 2010 balance Last update: April 2011