Download Guidelines for the Papers on Economic And Social

CONFERENCE ON DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION
Working Group 8: Economic and Social Conditions
Coordinator: Jose Maria Maravall
Guidelines for the Papers on Economic And Social Conditions
José María Maravall
Session 1
Blueprints for economic reforms.
If we assume that the management of the economy in transitions to democracy must reinforce
democracy and promote growth, to what extent is there an internally coherent and universally valid
program of economic reforms for new democracies?
Blueprints for economic reforms have generally included tight fiscal discipline, new public
expenditure priorities, trade liberalization, the promotion of exports, the removal of restrictions on direct
foreign capital investment, the privatization of publicly-owned companies, the deregulation of economic
activities, the protection of property rights, the market determination of exchange and interest rates.
a) Is this a universally valid blueprint?
b) Are these policies necessarily connected?
c) To what extent do they correspond to the policies of economically developed, well-established
democracies?
d) If new democracies often inherit states that over-regulate and over-protect the economy, what
should be changed in state activities in order to promote democratic rights and economic
development?
CONFERENCE ON DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION
Working Group 8: Economic and Social Conditions
Coordinator: Jose Maria Maravall
Session 2
Aggregate and distributive consequences of economic reforms
If new democracies launch reforms that will open the economies to international trade and capital
flows, there will be domestic winners and losers. How can governments survive (and thus, anticipating
this possibility of survival, be ready to launch and implement economic reforms)?
a) Can intertemporal arguments by politicians about the future aggregate well-being be convincing?
In particular, to what extent can the poor, or the losers, make intertemporal calculations?
b) If economic reforms hurt some groups, does that mean that economic inequality must also
increase? If so, to what extent?
c) In what ways are democracies (and not just governments) vulnerable if economic conditions
deteriorate? What would be the temporal or material thresholds?
d) Even if democracies can survive under poor economic conditions and great income inequality,
how do these affect the way democracies work? That is, in what ways do they have consequences
on political equality, the operation of the legal system, the respect of contracts, the incidence of
corruption?
Session 3
Fiscal reforms and the role of the state
If democracies recognize and protect rights, such rights are costly. Yet in most of the transitions to
democracy the revenue-collecting systems are weak. What can be done?
a) To what extent are fiscal reforms necessary for the consolidation of democracy?
b) Are they politically feasible?
CONFERENCE ON DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION
Working Group 8: Economic and Social Conditions
Coordinator: Jose Maria Maravall
c) What design of the tax system would be more appropriate for the economic and political
conditions of new democracies?
Session 4
Variations in welfare regimes
If democracy is generally perceived as consisting of social, and not just political, rights, demands
for equality and social protection will put pressure on the governments. Under what conditions can these
demands create an incompatibility between economic reforms and democracy?
a) If the welfare state made markets and democracies compatible, in what ways is it possible to
think of the existing welfare regimes as applicable in the new democracies?
b)Does the difference between universal versus targeted benefits make sense in such countries?
c) How can one design social policies to protect from need and poverty, while avoiding social
discrimination?
Session 5
The politics of economic reforms.
It is often stated that the introduction and implementation of economic reforms in new democracies
depend only on the "political will" of the governments. What underlies this argument is the assumption
that reforms can, and perhaps must, be imposed. Is that the case?
a) In what ways are the negotiation and concentration of reforms an impediment to their success?
That is, do they lead to their emasculation or procrastination?
b) On the contrary, are there ways that negotiation and concentration generate useful information,
either technical or political, to decision-makers?
CONFERENCE ON DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION
Working Group 8: Economic and Social Conditions
Coordinator: Jose Maria Maravall
c) Can they facilitate intertemporal transactions regarding the costs of reforms?
d) Are strategies related to the type of economic decision to be adopted?
e) To what extent are they dependent on temporal considerations--for instance, the age of the
government, the lag until the effects of the decisions become visible?