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Response Framework
Looking Forward: Assessing the Regional
Response Framework for Arctic
Emergencies
Arctic Emergencies: Assessing the Regional
Response Framework (include short title)
Developed by EPPR
The Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response
Working Group
of the Arctic Council
2010
26Oct2010
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INTRODUCTION: EMERGENCY PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS, AND
RESPONSE WORKING GROUP (EPPRWG)
The Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group of the Arctic
Council was established pursuant to the provisions of the Rovaniemi Declaration of the Arctic
Council, to provide a framework for future cooperation in responding to the threat of
environmental emergencies.
The mandate of the EPPR Working Group (EPPRWG) is to deal with the prevention,
preparedness and response to environmental emergencies in the Arctic. Members of the
Working Group exchange information on best practices and conduct projects (e.g.
development of guidance and risk assessment methodologies, response exercises, training
etc.). EPPR is not a response agency. The work has focused mainly on oil and gas
transportation and extraction, and on radiological and other hazards. In 2004, EPPR was
directed by the Arctic Ministers to expand its mandate to include natural disasters. Looking
forward as globalization and changing environmental conditions open the Arctic seas to
increased marine traffic and activity, the EPPR recognizes the need to address the challenges
created by the changing nature of potential Arctic environmental emergencies.
A. BACKGROUND
In 1996, pursuant to the Inuvik Declaration of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy
(AEPS)1 ministerial meeting the minister requested that the EPPRWG analyze the
effectiveness of existing international agreements and other arrangements in the Arctic within
EPPR’s area of expertise in order to determine whether existing international, bilateral, and
regional agreements provided a legal framework for mutual assistance to protect the
environment in the event of pollution emergencies in Arctic waters. Thus EPPR embarked on
an analysis and resulting report which:
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
reviewed existing bi-lateral and multi-lateral arrangements in order to evaluate the
adequacy of the geographical coverage of the Arctic regions by cooperative
arrangements; and
considered and recommended the necessary system of cooperation within the EPPR
mandate.
That study, referred to as “The Gap Analysis,” indicated that there were no significant gaps,
(the 2000 Gap Analysis). EPPR also conducted an assessment of the risks that human
activities posed to the Arctic environment2 (referred to as “the Risk Analysis”).
Since the original objectives and mandate of the EPPR and the aforementioned Gap Analysis,
the Arctic Council has released three major assessments that have influenced EPPR’s conduct
of the 2011Response Framework: The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (2004), the USGS
Arctic Oil and Gas Report (2008) and the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (2009). In 2009
PAME (Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment) also developed a revised set of Arctic
Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines for the Arctic Council (2009), which provides guidelines
intended to be of use to the Arctic nations for offshore oil and gas activities during planning,
1
2
The Arctic Council was established in 1996 to continue the work of the AEPS
Environmental Risk Analysis of Arctic Activities, Risk Analysis Report No. 2, (1998);
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exploration, development, production and decommissioning. The Arctic Council’s ongoing
Arctic Search and Rescue (SAR) Task Force is also addressing issues relevant to EPPR’s Gap
Analysis.
 The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) (2004) - An international project of
the Arctic Council and the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), to
evaluate and synthesize knowledge on climate variability, climate change, and
increased ultraviolet radiation and their consequences.
 USGS Arctic Oil and Gas Report (2008) - an assessment of undiscovered
conventional oil and gas resources in all areas north of the Arctic Circle, indicating
that 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion
barrels of natural gas liquids may remain to be found in the Arctic, of which
approximately 84 percent is expected to occur in offshore areas.
 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) (2009) – a document produced by the
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working group of the Arctic
Council that represents a four-year effort to consider and review all aspects of Arctic
shipping. It includes documentation of shipping activities from a baseline year (2004)
and future projections in key areas such as environmental protection, marine
infrastructure, human dimensions, and governance.
The AMSA report reinforced the observation that the Arctic is undergoing extraordinary
transformations early in the 21st century. Natural resource development, governance
challenges, climate change and marine infrastructure issues are influencing current and future
marine uses of the Arctic. In the executive summary of the AMSA report it was stated that the
Arctic states should continue to develop circumpolar environmental pollution response
capabilities that are critical to protecting the unique Arctic ecosystem. It was proposed that
this can be accomplished through circumpolar cooperation and agreement(s), as well as
regional bi-lateral capacity agreement. The same report identifies gaps in preparedness and
response. A multi-lateral oil spill contingency plan or an oil spill agreement was proposed to
address this issue. Based on this recommendation EPPR has been designated as the body
within the Arctic Council to consider this proposal.
AMSA recommendations include:
Oil Spill Prevention: That the Arctic states decide to enhance the mutual cooperation
in the field of oil spill prevention and, in collaboration with industry, support research
and technology transfer to prevent release of oil into Arctic waters.
Circumpolar Environmental Response Capacity: That the Arctic states decide to
continue to develop circumpolar environmental pollution response capabilities that are
critical to protecting the unique Arctic ecosystem. This can be accomplished, for
example, through circumpolar cooperation and agreement(s), as well as regional
bilateral capacity agreements. Primary responsibility is: the EPPR. PAME to consider
this recommendation in the AOR project.
The decision to conduct the AMSA followed the release of the ACIA report and the Arctic
Marine Strategic Plan (AMSP) (2004), developed under leadership by PAME. The Arctic
Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) reported on the rapid and severe climate change ongoing
in the Arctic. One of the key findings of the ACIA was that “reduced sea ice is very likely to
increase marine transport and access to resources”. The AMSP called for future application
of an ecosystem approach to the Arctic Ocean and for a comprehensive assessment of Arctic
marine shipping.
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The Protection of the Marine Environment (PAME) working group of the Arctic Coucil
produced and updated the 2002 Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines. These guidelines
recommend voluntary standards, technical and environmental best practices, management
policy and regulatory controls for Arctic offshore oil and gas operations.
These major initiatives as well as deliberations at the EPPR workshop in Vorkuta, Russia in
June 2010, influenced the EPPRWG’s decision to revise the Gap Analysis in many significant
ways. The AMSA Report is of particular import because of concern about whether the
existing legal framework for emergencies in the Arctic is sufficient to meet increased
activities in shipping and other anthropogenic activities.
The recent blow-out of the Deepwater Horizon3 oil rig deep in the waters of the Gulf
of Mexico provided additional impetus for updating the Gap Analysis because an
entirely new risk, not previously considered in any worst-case scenario became a
potential reality for Arctic waters: an oil spill of indefinite duration and of indefinite
quantity. Such a scenario occurring in Arctic waters would provide even greater
challenges than occurred in the Gulf of Mexico because of extremely harsh and
variable environmental conditions, including shifting and often unstable sea ice,
extreme cold temperatures, wind, high seas, storms, fog, and darkness. Lack of
infrastructure and safe access compound the potential problems associated with
preparedness and response. In spite of this, there are ongoing plans for increased oil
exploration and development throughout the Arctic.
As sea ice decreases for longer periods in the Arctic, shipping activity and its
associated risks also increase. A key AMSA workshop, Opening the Arctic Seas:
Envisioning Disasters and Framing Solutions, was held in March 2008 at the Coastal
Response Research Center of the University of New Hampshire. The goal of the
workshop was to identify key strategies, action items and resource needs for
preparedness and response to potential Arctic marine incidents. International
participation in the workshop included the U.S., Canada, Denmark, Russian
Federation, Norway and Finland and South Africa. The workshop focused on the
qualitative risk factors for five plausible incidents developed by the organizing
committee which bore some significance to incidents that have already occurred in
polar waters. The incidents were designed to explore spill response, search and rescue,
firefighting and salvage, communications, governance and jurisdiction, and legal
issues. The questions were designed to answer the question, if this incident happened
today in the Arctic how would we respond. The five incidents were:
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3
Cruise ship grounding near the west coast of Greenland
Bulk carrier trapped in ice in the central Arctic Ocean
Fire and collision in offshore operations in the Beaufort Sea
Oil tanker and fishing vessel collision in the Beaufort Sea
Tug and barge grounding on St. Lawrence Island in the Bering Sea
An oil well blow-out in the deep water of the Gulf of Mexico (~5,000ft/1,500m) which flowed for 3 months in
the summer of 2010. The impact of the spill and mitigation efforts, including record release of dispersants,
continues since the well was killed in September 2010. It is the largest accidental marine oil spill in the history of
the petroleum industry.
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The workshop identified three key areas of data and research needs:
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The updating of weather data and updating of navigational charts for Arctic
regional seas, ports and waterways
Studies on the behavior of oil in cold water and technologies for spill response
(including the detection of oil under ice as well as cleanup measures for oil in
ice)
Improving the baseline information for Arctic resources (biological/ecological
resources and areas important for human use and cultural significance) that
could be affected by potential marine incidents.
An overarching result of the conference was that the Arctic states need to foster and
enhance their cooperation to improve joint contingence plans and multinational
agreements, as well as to agree to develop mandatory safety regulations for Arctic
marine operations.
Sea ice in the Arctic is melting at an unprecedented rate providing longer seasons of
navigation and increased access to Arctic regions and resources. The pace of development and
shipping activity is accelerating at a speed much greater than was anticipated when the last
Gap Analysis was conducted in the year 2000. Thus, it has become more important than ever
to conduct an update of the original Gap analysis, hereinafter referred to as the Response
Framework, that takes into account, not just where we have been, but where we will be in the
near future.
As used in this document, an environmental emergency refers to natural and anthropogenic
activities including those resulting in the release of pollutants, and environmental impacts
resulting from natural events (storms, floods, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, etc.).
B. APPROACH
The overall approach for evaluating the sufficiency of the legal framework for addressing
emergencies is the Arctic includes:
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
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identifying activities posing increased risk in the Arctic (Environmental Risk Analysis
of Arctic Activities; EPPR Report No.2 ,1998);
determining which existing arrangements and agreements relate to the activities that
pose increased risk;
identifying coverage each agreement provides and any gaps via communication with
the Arctic states, and
identifying activities posing increased risk not covered by existing arrangements and
agreements.
New activities have been identified in the three major Arctic Council assessments. In light of
the environmental impacts associated with the 2010 Deep Water Horizon rig explosion and oil
spill incident in the Gulf of Mexico and the deliberations of the New Hampshire workshop
(see above), additional risk activities are envisioned. The particular challenges of operating in
an Arctic environment compound the difficulties associated with preparedness of response.
The study will also focus on the impact of new risks in international waters, discuss potential
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risks that may develop as a result of new activities or accelerating pace of activities taking
place in the Arctic in the next 20 years, and consider mitigation strategies which may need to
be developed to respond effectively.
C. IDENTIFIED RISKS
TaskThe Response Framework is an examination of the legal framework for oil spill
and hazardous noxious substances (HNS) spills in Arctic. It includes the legal
framework for international cooperation in preparing for and responding to accidental
and intentional release/discharge of oil or HNS (including radiological substances). It
addresses both bi-lateral and multilateral or international arrangements for sharing of
information, resources and personnel in response to an event.
Increased and Changing Risk
Simultaneously with the globalization of the Arctic, marine access in the Arctic Ocean
has been changing in unprecedented ways, driven by global climate change. Arctic sea
ice is undergoing an historic transformation which includes thinning, extent reduction
in all seasons, and substantial reductions in multi-year ice in the central Arctic Ocean.
This has significant implications for longer seasons of navigation and new access to
previously difficult to reach coastal regions. These changes present increased demands
on the existing legal and regulatory structures needed for enhanced marine safety and
environmental protection associated with increasing Arctic marine activity. Such
challenges will require unprecedented levels of cooperation among the 8 Arctic states
and broad engagement with many non-Arctic stakeholders within the global maritime
industry.4
Both the USGS Arctic Oil and Gas Report and the AMSA Report point to significantly
increased development and marine activity including but not limited to oil and gas
development, tourism, fishing, marine transport related to oil/gas and hard minerals,
marine support of Arctic communities, and nuclear activities. The activities vary in
type and extent from country to country. The accidental release or illegal discharge of
oil into the Arctic environment is the most significant environmental threat to the
region (from the AMSA 2009 Report). Although the impacts from oil spills are
generally local, they can potentially have widespread and trans-boundary effects.
Many countries are planning offshore development. The USGS has suggested that
about 20 percent of the world’s oil and gas resources could be located in the Arctic.
Increased shipping activity related to tourism, fisheries and marine transport present
risks with respect to groundings, collisions, foundering and release of hazardous
substances. In 2010 there have been numerous incidents including transport of iron ore
through Arctic waters, the grounding of a cruise ship, the collision of two tankers, and
the evacuation of a scientific research station. As marine activity increases, so too will
potentially dangerous incidents.
From the point of view of responders, the Arctic environment presents difficult
challenges. A strategic approach must include management and operational measures
to deal with the extreme environmental conditions of the Arctic such as light and
temperature variations, short summers, extreme weather (including fog, high winds,
storms, extreme cold), extensive snow and ice cover, transitional ice, and large areas
of permafrost as well as remoteness. Response needs to be timely to mitigate effects
4
AMSA 2009
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on a fragile Arctic biological community. In most areas of the Arctic the infrastructure
needed for preparedness and response is insufficient. This includes both access to sites
(eg. roads, ports, airfields, launch points) and other infrastructure such as charts,
communications, places of refuge, salvage capabilities, and adequate and effective
response equipment and facilities. The ability to access infrastructure among nations
depends on adequate international agreements. While there are some regional and
local agreements, there are no comprehensive agreements related to circumpolar
environmental response. The processes for planning and responding to an
environmental emergency in Arctic conditions are evolving as plans for new
development and industry (including travel and tourism) increase in response to
globalization and decreasing sea ice. There are complexities associated with
coordinating any international response and uncertainties about whether measures
would be effective and sufficient. EPPR concluded in its initial risk analysis that,
despite the coverage by domestic, regional, and international instruments, the ability to
prevent, prepare for, and respond to pollution incidents can vary considerably among
the Arctic states due to technical, social and economic factors.
There are hazardous materials waste sites, several nuclear sites and radioactive waste
sites in the Arctic. Nuclear sites, although assessed as less of a threat overall, pose the
potential of circumpolar impact. A major release of radioactive contaminants would
require emergency response by all the Arctic states to address human health and
environmental impacts.
Identifying Needs:
Conventions
Cooperation
AMSA (2009) made several recommendations with respect to international
cooperation, including identifying areas of common interest and developing
unified positions and approaches with respect to international organizations such
as the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the International Hydrographic
Organization (IHO), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and the
International Maritime Satellite Organization (IMSO) to advance the safety of
Arctic marine shipping. In addition AMSA recommended that the Arctic states
develop and implement a comprehensive multi-national Arctic SAR instrument
including aeronautical and maritime SAR. This agreement is currently being
finalized. An analogous instrument might be advisable for response to
environmental emergencies that provides for sharing of resources, information, or
incident management responsibilities.
Infrastructure
AMSA (2009) identified four main areas relating to marine infrastructure
1. Infrastructure Deficit: critical improvements are needed in ice navigation
training, charts, communications systems, port services, accurate and timely
ice information, places of refuge and icebreakers. Other infrastructure deficits
not specifically noted by AMSA include roads, airfields, launch points, salvage
capabilities, and adequate and effective response equipment and facilities,
particularly with respect to oil spill response.
2. Comprehensive Arctic Marine Traffic Awareness System: to improve
monitoring and tracking of marine activity, to enhance data sharing in near
real-time, and to augment vessel management service.
3. Circumpolar Environmental Response Capacity: continue to develop
circumpolar environmental pollution response capabilities that are critical to
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protecting the unique Arctic ecosystem. This can be accomplished, for
example, through circumpolar cooperation and agreements as well as regional
bilateral capacity agreements.
4. Investing in Hydrographic, Meteorological and Oceanographic Data: improve
level of access to data and information in support of safe navigation and
operations (eg. oil spill response in ice), including increased efforts for:
hydrographic surveys to improve navigation charts and systems to support realtime acquisition, analysis and transfer of meteorological, oceanographic, sea
ice and iceberg information.
Mitigation Strategies:
The EPPRWG developed a risk analysis as a means of systematically analyzing the
level of protection afforded to the Arctic from trans-boundary pollution incidents. To
assess the level of protection for each activity occurring in the Arctic, the EPPRWG
categorized and then inventoried the activities, and the potential threats and impacts of
discharges from the activities which might have a trans-boundary impact. Each Arctic
nation then determined the level of risk for each activity in their respective country.
This Risk Assessment Matrix is currently being updated.
At the 2009 EPPRWG meeting in Copenhagen in November 2009, several
presentations concerning efforts to improve/assess mitigation strategies were
discussed. Examples include discussion of needs related to natural disasters presented
by Norway, the Barents Project 2009 exercises conducted in cooperation with the
Russian Federation, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, and improvements in contingency
planning by various countries including Iceland and Canada. The BoHASA Joint
Industry Project (JIP) reported on efforts to gather and synthesize knowledge and
expertise on the behavior of hazardous substances in Arctic waters in order to promote
the development and use of technologies and working methods for responding to
accidents involving such substances.
It was pointed out that while some bilateral and multilateral agreements exist (eg. the
Bonn Agreement for the North Sea, HELCOM for the Baltic Sea, and the Copenhagen
Agreement between Nordic States), there is not a common understanding of the
geographic, functional, and administrative boundaries of each agreement as they relate
to each other. Canada presented information on several bi-lateral agreements between
itself and the US, Denmark, and Russia. The arrangements facilitate cooperation and
have similarities in terms of notification process, but differ greatly on the legal
structure, operational command and control, and funding/reimbursement. It was noted
that as the risks in the Arctic have changed, it is not known whether existing
agreements effectively cover the entire Arctic
Through its SAR task force, the Arctic Council has developed its first pan-Arctic,
multi-lateral binding instrument to provide for cooperation in aeronautical and
maritime Arctic SAR. Other ongoing activities include the IMO attention to the
recommendation by The Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) for the development of the
monitoring of ships by Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Long Range
Identification & Tracking systems (LRIT). The AMSA recommendation (2009) calls
for contined development of a comprehensive Arctic marine traffic awareness system
to improve monitoring and tracking of marine activity. In addition. AAMVERnet is a
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volunteer system to provide the US Coast Guard with information on ship position that
has been in effect for decades and works to provide information for SAR.
Further mitigation should focus on multi-national comprehensive cooperation toward
resource and communications sharing agreements for responding to environmental
emergencies.
D. EXISTING AGREEMENTS
EPPR identified agreements and arrangements that relate to activities posing increased risk in
the Arctic. These agreements are: in force; cover at least part of the Arctic; pertain to
emergency prevention, preparedness or response; and address at least one of the risks
identified in the Risk Analysis5, which is currently being updated. International, multi-lateral,
bi-lateral and regional agreements are included and in some cases, described, in the EPPR
Arctic Guide (under ‘Resources: Products’, updated 2009)6. In addition AMSA (2009)
summarizes all key marine shipping agreements in the chapter Governance of Arctic
Shipping, pages pp. 50-63, including charts that indicate which agreements have been ratified.
The lists of agreements and arrangements identified by EPPR are provided as separate
attachements to this document: D-1: International Conventions and Agreements and D-2:
Multi-Lateral and Bi-Lateral Agreements and Arrangements among Arctic states.
E. POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF RECENT AND FUTURE ARCTIC DEVELOPMENTS
During 1996, the Arctic states responded to a questionnaire addressing risk assessments in
their Arctic regions. The results of this effort were used to create a Risk Assessment Matrix
(year?). Identified in this effort were three major gaps:



management of hazardous substances;
control of vessel traffic in the Arctic seas; and
abandoned ships and wreck removal
Subsequently, two recent Arctic Council reports (AMSA 2009 and USGS Arctic Oil & Gas
2007) highlighted a number of new Arctic activities relevant to EPPR (eg. increased ship
traffic associated with natural resource exploration/ development and maritime trade; coastal
erosion and other effects of melting and thinning ice; plans for new oil and gas exploration
and drilling in the Arctic; and especially insufficient infrastructure for responding to
emergencies in most of the Arctic). The Risk Assessment Matrix was updated on the basis of
this information in July 2010. During this process it became apparent that there were
additional categories that should be included. A recommendation was made to circulate a new
draft matrix among the Arctic states that included these additional categories and a request
that each state fill in missing data. These data will be used to create an updated 2010 Risk
Assessment Matrix to identify the current and future needs for legal agreements.
5
Types if risks included are: accidental discharge or release of oil and/or hazardous noxious substances,
including tailings; release of contained materials avaialble for trans-boundary transport; volcanic ash, with
respect to health effects and interaction with aircraft; destruction of infrastructure, disruption of activities and
loss of life as a result of earthquakes, tsunamis, storm surge and other natural disasters; spills and accidental
discharges release of stored materials from abandoned vessels
6
Arctic Guide, EPPR working group publication. The Arctic Guide was presented at the Alta Ministerial
Conference 1997 and updated in 2009 Can be found at the EPPR website: http://eppr.arctic-council.org
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Most predictions foresee a substantial increase in sea-based activity in the Arctic region in the
next twenty years. Several countries have expressed the intention of future oil and gas
development in the Arctic. The decreasing extent of Arctic sea ice and lengthening of the icefree season opens up the potential for increased shipping traffic related to a number of
industries and activities, including marine transport of hazardous materials, support of
industry and Arctic communities, and significant increases in traffic related to travel and
tourism. The BoHASA Joint Industry Project has determined that the greatest risk to the
Arctic comes not from traffic originating or ending in the Arctic region, but from shipments
that are simply passing through Arctic waters. The latter is particularly problematic because
ships that are simply passing through are not obligated to report the nature of their cargo to
any of the countries where they do not make a stop.
The coming years will see a need for Arctic states to adjust to the risks associated with
increased activity in the Arctic. These adjustments will likely include attempts to improve
both the scope and effectiveness of contingency plans, improve the infrastructure necessary
for effective prevention, preparedness and response, and development of both regional and
comprehensive international cooperative agreements that address gaps in current
arrangements. At the EPPRWG meeting in Vorkuta, Russia in June 2010, representatives
from Indigenous communities, including the Indigenous People’s Secretariat, emphasized the
need to include local communities in planning and training and to address issues from an
Indigenous perspective.
F. INTERNATIONAL WATERS
The governance of all activities in the Arctic is complicated. The 1982 Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) sets out the legal framework for regulation of shipping according to maritime
zones of jurisdiction and has struck a balance among the powers of coastal states. A wide
range of factors affect the law, policy and practice applicable to shipping in the Arctic. The
International Maritime Organization (IMO) addresses a broad range of issues pertaining to
international shipping, including maritime safety. The jurisdictional status of some Arctic
waters, particularly internal waters and straits, could give rise to future disputes related to
national jurisdiction over international navigation through those waters. Similarly, spills
related to exploration and development of offshore oil and gas prospects might also affect the
waters of neighboring states. The Arctic Council's EPPR working group has noted the need to
increase communication and the sharing of information with the IMO in such areas as
dispersant application, waste removal and treatment, in-situ burning and spill response in ice
and snow conditions. With increasing activity in the Arctic there will be a continuing need to
assess trans-boundary agreements as relates to EPPR.
While regional agreements are important mechanisms for allowing neighboring states to
cooperate effectively with respect to EPPR issues, there are scenarios that will require a
comprehensive Arctic-wide international agreement instead of relying solely on a patchwork
of multi-lateral and bi-lateral agreements. Examples of these types of scenarios include:


Incident in international waters where there is the potential for jurisdictional dispute
Incident which occurs under the legal responsibility of a specific Arctic state but that
has impacts on other states and requires logistical cooperation among states and
permission for territorial access and use of infrastructure not already provided by
regional agreements.

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Incident which does not directly impact a particular Arctic state but for which the state
might be able to render aid (eg. through infrastructure support) but where no multilateral agreement exists to facilitate such aid.
The Arctic Council SAR task force has created a pan-arctic multi-lateral binding instrument
to provide for cooperation in aeronautical and maritime Arctic SAR. A similar instrument
should be developed to provide for improved cooperation with respect to pollution incidents
in the Arctic.
G. AMSA 2009 & AOG 2007 RECOMMENDATIONS RELEVENT TO EPPR
This section presents recommendations from the above documents.
AMSA 2009 That the Arctic states:
 3C - decide to continue to develop circumpolar . . . pollution response capabilities that
are critical to protecting the unique Arctic ecosystem…
 3A - should recognize that improvements in Arctic marine infrastructure are needed to
enhance safety and environmental protection in support of sustainable development.
Examples of infrastructure where critical improvements are needed include: ice
navigation training; navigational charts; communications systems; port services,
including reception facilities for ship-generated waste; accurate and timely ice
information (ice centers); places of refuge; and icebreakers to assist in response.
 law.
 1A - identify areas of common interest and develop unified positions and approaches
with respect to international organizations…to advance the safety of Arctic marine
shipping [Policy Issue?]
 1B - in recognition of the unique environmental and navigational conditions in the
Arctic, decide to cooperatively support efforts at the International maritime
Organization…regularly update international standards for vessels operating in the
Arctic.[Policy Issue?]
 D - should…strongly encourage cruise ship operators to develop, implement and share
their own best practices for operating in such conditions…including consideration of
measures such as timing voyages so that other ships are within rescue distance in case
of emergency. [IMO? Individual governments?]
 [This text is same as 1E above]2B - decide to determine if effective communication
mechanisms exist to ensure engagement of their Arctic coastal communities and,
where there are none, to develop their own mechanisms to engage and coordinate with
the shipping industry…[Prevention strategy, but may beyond EPPR’s mandate unless
it is part of an agreement.]
 2F - …in collaboration with industry, support research and technology transfer to
prevent release of oil into Arctic waters …[Preparedness strategy, but technology
transfer may be beyond EPPR’s mandate unless it is part of an agreement.]
 3D - significantly improve …the level of access to data and information in support of
safe navigation and voyage planning in Arctic waters. This would entail increased
efforts for: hydrographic surveys to bring Arctic navigation charts up to a level
acceptable to support current and future safe navigation; and systems to support realtime acquisition, analysis and transfer of meteorological, oceanographic, sea ice and
iceberg information.[Prevention and preparedness strategies likely beyond EPPR’s
mandate unless part of regional agreement]
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AOG 2007
Referencing the AOG 2007 report, it is clear that extensive oil and gas activities have already
occurred in the Arctic with much more exploration and development likely to occur in the
next two decades and beyond. The unique characteristics of the Arctic mean that
development of oil and gas activities face a number of challenges or considerations that do not
apply elsewhere in the world. Risks from these activities cannot be eliminated because of the
Arctic’s harsh environment and are further complicated by the remoteness of the Arctic,
especially if response to an accident or a disaster is required. Tanker spills, pipeline leaks and
other accidents are likely to occur, even under the most stringent control conditions.
Transportation of oil and gas entails risks beyond production regions. Pollution can be
reduced by strict adherence to regulations and sound engineering practices. However,
physical impacts and disturbance are inevitable wherever industry operations occur. The
AOG report provided a number of recommendations that are applicable to EPPR activities.
These include:
Oil and gas activities and their consequences for the environment and humans should be
given increased priority in the future work of the Arctic Council, focussing in particular
on:
 research, assessment and guidelines to support prevention of oil spills and reducing
physical disturbances and pollution;
 Governments and industry should be encouraged to provide better information on
infrastructure related to oil and gas activities, marine shipping and tourism
 Governments and industry should provide the Arctic Council with improved access to
relevant and appropriate data to enable the Arctic Council to establish an inventory of
facilities and infrastructure with potential for release of spills associated with oil and
gas and compile and maintain an updated inventory of accidental release from oil and
gas activities in the Arctic as a basis for conducting periodic risk assessments. [Tie in
to discussion of mitigation measures – EPPR response resource project currently in
development ?]
 Undertake new research and continue existing research to provide better information
on the behaviour and fate of oil in ice-covered water. [Related to EPPR, but an issue
for National Governments - Discuss in context of Deep Water horizon – new research
efforts being planned by national governments i.e., Canada & U.S., others??]
 Continue existing research necessary for developing effective techniques for dealing
with oil spills in areas of sea ice, and with large spills on land.[National governments –
see comment above]
 Continue existing research and where necessary conduct more studies using oil spill
trajectory models to determine areas most at risk from oil spills and set priorities for
response strategies, in particular in sensitive areas.[National governments – see
comment above]
 Continue existing research and where necessary, conduct new research and monitoring
to better understand short-and longer-term effects on the ecosystem, focusing and risk
associated with oil spills, including prevention, clean-up, and response.[National
governments – see comments above]
H. RISK MITIGATION MEASURES
This section identifies steps that countries have taken to reduce or mitigate risk. This
section also highlights best practices that are innovative or particularly interesting
examples of mitigation.
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Both Russia and Canada have procedures in place in their respective Arctic regions for
mandatory reporting on Arctic ships, mandatory regulations for polar class ships, and
mandatory routing if required.
The Barents Rescue 2009 Project: the first large-scale international exercise that has
been implemented in the Arctic under existing cooperation between Arctic states in
the Barents region, including the Russian Federation, Finland, Norway and Sweden.
The objective was to check the functional use of existing cooperation, improve
information exchange, the level of coordination of activities, and gain practical insight
into coordination and rescue services in the Barents region. It covered 5 stages,
including the case of radioactive emission due to destruction of a waste container, the
case of an emergency at sea, the case of a large traffic accident with the threat of
radioactive contamination, the case of a large forest fire in a bordering area, and the
case of fire onboard and oil spill in the sea. The results of the exercise are being
analysed and recommendations will be developed for further improvement in real
emergency situation conditions. This is intended to be a biennial exercise, scheduled
to occur next in 2011.
Canada has bi-lateral agreements in place with the US and Denmark that will allow
parties to cooperate to respond expeditiously to a pollution incident.
Canada Coast Guard is working on improving contigency plans including a strategy to
train local communities to be first responders, and the distribution of community-sized
kits with equipment to improve community response capacity to more frequent,
smaller-scale spills
Canada has instituted a moratorium to prevent drilling in the Beaufort Sea region until
2014 and is starting a comprehensive review of offshore drilling safety procedures.
Canada has also begun aerial surveillance using Dash-7 Arctic Surveillance airplanes
that have been used for near-time reporting which has helped reduce the number of
spills.
The Russian Federation is developing 10 new rescue center locations based on
infrastructure and risk assessments. Some of the items they are working on include
emergency forecast and notification to the public, and firefighting without water using
non-aqueous solutions.
USGS Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines (approved April 2009): relevant to
EPPR include the following operating practices: waste management, use and discharge
of chemicals, emissions to air, design and operations, human health and safety,
transportation of supplies, transportation infrastructure, and training; also included are
specific guidance on emergency preparedness and response (best practices for
contingency planning and requirements for emergency response plans; specific
elements of the plans are outlined in the Guidelines)
The United States’ North Slope Science Initiative (NSSI), a consortium of federal,
state and local governments, is working to identify and implement science based
recommendations, including a response database, for use by EPPR and other entities.
Norway is working to identify areas and possible threats caused by natural disasters
liable to harm human life, infrastructure, biodiversity and nature in the Arctic. They
have suggested a simple typology for categorizing what can be conceived to be a
natural disaster in the Arctic. They have propsed the establishment of a resource centre
for risk, vulnerability and preparedness for monitoring the Arctic region. The centre
would carry out risk and vulnerability assessments and maintain an overview of
emergency preparedness capacity to be carried out in cooperation with research and
educational establishments.
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Norway has implemented regulations concerning the use of heavy fuel oil (HFO) in
the protected areas of Svalbard. These regulations became effective as of January 1,
2010. The recent events surrounding the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico have driven
Norway to consider a Norwegian Management Plan for the Barents Sea.
Iceland has identified risks associated with rapidly increasing oil tanker traffic and
cruise ships (not designed for ice and travel in uncharted areas). They have improved
contingency plans for responding to pollution incidents.
Several Arctic states have developed industry/government consortia to facilitate rapid
oil spill response and to improve effectiveness of oil spill response (eg. Joint Industry
Program on Oil Spill Contingency for Arctic and Ice-Covered Waters - SINTEF)
The BoHASA Joint Industry Project is gathering and synthesizing current knowledge
and expertise on the behavior of hazardous substances in Arctic waters to promote the
development and use of technologies and working methods that improve the ability to
respond to accidents involving such substances. It has determined that the greatest risk
to the Arctic comes not from traffic originating or ending in the Arctic region, but
from shipments that are simply passing through Arctic waters. The latter is particularly
problematic because ships that are simply passing through are not obligated to report
the nature of their cargo to any of the countries where they do not make a stop.
SAR Task force has developed the Arctic Council’s first pan-Arctic, multi-lateral
binding instrument to provide for cooperation in aeronautical and maritime Arctic
SAR
IAEA Response and Assistance Network
The IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), at its eighty-sixth session, agreed to
include an item on development of a mandatory code for ships operating in polar
waters (Polar Code) in the work program of the Sub-Committee Design & Equipment
(DE). The work is planned to be completed in 2012.
The IMO is considering action on the recommendation by the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) for the development of the monitoring of ships by Automatic Identification
System (AIS) and Long Range Identification & Tracking systems (LRIT). The AMSA
recommendation (2009) calls for continued development of a comprehensive Arctic
marine traffic awareness system to improve monitoring and tracking of marine
activity.
AAMVERnet is a volunteer system to provide the US Coast Guard with information
on ship position that has been in effect for decades and works to provide information
for SAR.
I. SUMMARY OF KEY POINTS
As a result of globalization and sea ice changes associated with climate change, the future of
the Arctic will include significant increases in development and marine traffic. These changes
will not just involve volume of activity, but also increased diversity in the type of activities.
Many countries have imminent plans for both near-shore and off-shore oil and gas
development. The Arctic is already experiencing escalating marine traffic associated with
marine transport of hazardous materials, support of industry and Arctic communities, and
significant increases in traffic related to travel and tourism. This trend is expected to intensify.
With the increased volume and diversity of marine activity will come additional risk of
accidents and incidents involving release of hazardous materials and threat to the environment
and human health/life. Arctic states, already active in creating mitigation strategies, are faced
with a need for more effective contingency plans and cooperative agreements for an ever
increasing suite of risks.
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The analyses of AMSA and USGS AOG both point to serious deficiencies in infrastructure
and data related to the infrastructure inventories necessary for effective response to incidents
in the Arctic. Inadequate infrastructure coupled with the unique environmental difficulties
present in a polar environment provide real challenges to risk assessment and mitigation. A
specific AMSA finding is “Without further investment and development in infrastructure,
only a targeted fraction of the potential risk scenarios can be addressed”. Although it is
beyond the scope of the original intent of this document, the EPPR should consider the issues
surrounding the lack of sufficient marine infrastructure in the Arctic.
Although all 8 Arctic states participate in international emergency cooperation as members of
the United Nations and its specialized organizations such as the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), it is important for the
Arctic states to consider comprehensive pan-arctic agreements as a means to address critical
infrastructure or policy objectives for the Arctic, especially those not effectively addressed by
regional agreements. Nevertheless, regional agreements are equally important and need to be
assessed in light of expectations of future Arctic activities and risks. Local communities are
often the first affected and may be among the first responders to emergencies in the Arctic –
there is a need to address EPPR issues from the perspective of Indigenous communities. The
Arctic states have been active in developing mitigation strategies based on improved
contingency plans and cooperative agreements. Whether it is more appropriate for agreements
to be local, regional or international will be driven by the interests of the Arctic states as they
look forward toward the challenges they will face in future decades.
FINAL STATEMENT
In light of expectations for the next 20 years and the daunting challenges that remain, it is not
clear if existing agreements will be adequate. EPPR endorses the process of reviewing bilateral and multi-lateral agreements by the countries involved and recommends the creation of
a comprehensive pan-arctic instrument that will address circumstances that cannot be dealt
with effectively with regional agreements. EPPR will continue to facilitate information
sharing on mitigation strategies and cooperative agreements and will continue to emphasize
the critical relationships among prevention, preparedness and response when considering
effective strategies for cooperation and mitigation.
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RESOURCES
AMSA Correspondence Group, Meeting Minutes, February 24, 2010
AMSA Correspondence Group, Meeting Minutes, March 11, 2010
AMSA Correspondence Group, Meeting Minutes, April 8 and May 6, 2010
ANNEX 4, CONUSNORTH, Beaufort Sea Operational Supplement to the Joint Marine
Pollution Contingency Plan, December 6, 2007
Arctic Oil and Gas 2007, Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Oslo 2007
Arctic Council EPPR Risk Analysis for Canadian Arctic Region NCR #3024887
Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response, July 21 2010-08-10
Emergency Scenarios to Facilitate EPPR’s Future Directions, EPPR Panel Meeting, July 2123, 2010
EPPR Working Group Meeting, Vorkuta, Russian Federation, Agenda Item 4.0, Revised
Draft June 3, 2010
EPPR Working Group Meeting, Vorkuta, Russia, June 16-18, 2010 Draft Report
EPPR Agenda Item 4.3, June 24, 2010, Analysis of Existing Aarrangements, Revision
Comments
EPPR Agenda Item 4.4, Risk Matrix, Norway
Opening the Arctic Seas, Envisioning Disasters and Framing Solutions, Durham, New
Hampshire, March 18-20, 2008
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REVIEWER BACKGROUND
David L. Barnes received a B.S. and M.S. in Civil Engineering from New Mexico State
University and a Ph.D. in Chemical and Bioresource Engineering from Colorado State
University. He is a professor in the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering and
the Water and Environmental Research Center as well as the Department Chair of Civil and
Environmental Engineering at the University of Alaska Fairbanks. Dr. Barnes teaches and
performs research in the area of environmental engineering. He has served as principal
investigator on multiple projects focused on protection of human health and environmental
quality primarily in cold regions. Dr. Barnes has over 75 refereed journal publication, book
chapters, and conference proceedings on these topics. email:[email protected]
Lawson Brigham is Distinguished Professor of Geography & Arctic Policy at the University
of Alaska Fairbanks, and a Senior Fellow at the Institute of the North in Anchorage. He has
lived in Eagle River, Alaska since 2003. During 2005-2009 he was chair and co-lead of the
Arctic Council’s Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) and Vice Chair of the
Council’s working group on Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME). Dr.
Brigham was a career U.S. Coast Guard officer serving from 1970-95 and retiring with the
rank of Captain. He served at sea in command of four Coast Guard cutters including a patrol
boat, Great Lakes icebreaker, offshore law enforcement cutter, and the polar icebreaker Polar
Sea sailing in Alaskan, Arctic & Antarctic waters; he also served as Chief of Strategic
Planning at Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington, DC. He has participated in more than
15 Arctic and Antarctic expeditions, and during July & August 1994 Polar Sea crossed the
Arctic Ocean (from Bering Strait to the North Pole) in company with the Canadian Coast
Guard icebreaker Louis S. St-Laurent. Dr. Brigham has been a research fellow at Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institution, a faculty member of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy and the Naval
Postgraduate School, and Deputy Director & Alaska Office Director of the U.S. Arctic
Research Commission. He is a 1970 graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy (BS) and a
distinguished graduate of the U.S. Naval War College, and holds graduate degrees from
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (MS) and the University of Cambridge (MPhil & PhD). He
has had articles published in the U.S., Canada, United Kingdom, Russia and Norway and his
research interests for more than three decades have focused on the Soviet/Russian maritime
Arctic, Arctic climate change, marine transportation, remote sensing of sea ice, Arctic
environmental protection, and polar geopolitics. Captain Brigham was a 2008 signer of the
American Geographical Society’s Flier’s and Explorer’s Globe, the Society’s historic globe
that has been signed by more than 75 explorers of the 20th century. This signing was in
recognition of Polar Sea’s voyages in 1994 becoming the first ship in history to reach the
extreme ends of the global ocean (at the North Pole and in the Ross Sea, Antarctica at the
closest navigable position to the South Pole). email: [email protected]
J. Margaret Castellini works as a research professional at the School of Fisheries and Ocean
Sciences at the University of Alaska Fairbanks. She has studied marine mammal physiology
including diving and nutritional physiology. For the past 3 years she has also worked in the
Wildlife Toxicology Laboratory at UAF with particular interest in heavy metal contamination
in wildlife and subsistence species. She has worked as rappoteur and technical editor for the
North Slope Borough Science Advisory Committee. email: [email protected]
Douglas Dasher has a Masters in Sanitary Engineering, and is a registered Professional
Engineer. He has worked in Alaska, first with the U.S. Forest Service in Southeast Alaska in
1980-81, and then has worked for the State of Alaska Department of Environmental
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Conservation (DEC) as an environmental engineer in Northern Alaska since 1981. For the
past 5 years he has been leading DEC’s effort to characterize Alaska’s aquatic fresh and
marine resources by conducting region wide survey sampling assessing conditions using an
approach using biological, physical and chemical indicators. In relation to impacts from oil
and gas production in the marine environment the AKMAP efforts have focused on a
modified sediment quality triad analysis approach. This approach assesses aquatic health
based on conditions observed in sediments, biological, chemical and physical; demersal fish
trawl biodiversity, contaminants and histopathology and physical and chemical water column
properties. email: [email protected]
John J. Kelley is Professor of Marine Science at the Institute of Marine Science, School of
Fisheries and Ocean Sciences, University of Alaska Fairbanks. Dr. Kelley’s research in the
Arctic and Antarctic over 40 years includes studies on trace gases in the atmosphere and
ocean, trace metals and contaminants, environmental radioactivity and marine acoustics. He
has served as director of the Naval Arctic Research Laboratory, Barrow, and director of the
National Science Foundation’s Polar Ice Coring Office, Fairbanks. He has chaired the North
Slope Borough Science Advisory Committee (SAC) since 1981. email: [email protected]
Bruce Molnia is a research geologist with the U.S. Geological Survey. He has conducted
marine, coastal, glacial, and remote sensing research for more than 4 decades, with most in
Alaska. Molnia has lead many expeditions and surveys to understand the impacts of offshore
oil and gas activities on the marine environment and to document pollution in the Arctic and
sub-Arctic. Molnia has authored, coauthored, Alaska's Glaciers, Glaciers of Alaska and the
Alaska chapter of the Satellite Image Atlas of the Glaciers of the World. From 1999-2003,
Molnia was a Senior Legislative Fellow for Congressman Curt Weldon (R-PA), organizing
and operating the House Oceans Caucus. Molnia previously served as USGS Chief of
International Polar Programs and Chief of the Eastern Gulf of Alaska and Bristol Bay
OCSEAP Studies. Molnia holds Affiliate Professorships at the University of Alaska Fairbanks
and Duke University. email: [email protected]
Sathy Naidu has been a Professor Emeritus at the Institute of Marine Science, University of
Alaska Fairbanks since 2004 after serving the UAF for 35 years as Professor. His current
research interests and expertise cover a variety of subjects in the Alaskan subarctic and
Arctic, such as marine sedimentology, monitoring of trace metals contaminants in sediments
and mercury in salmon, sediment-benthos interactions, and application of clay mineralogy and
isotopes of carbon and nitrogen to understand sources of sediments, and paleoceanography.
Dr. Naidu has published over 80 peer-reviewed articles, including chapters in 36 books, and
has led several interdisciplinary research.
email: [email protected]
John F. Payne is the NSSI Executive Director. The North Slope Science Initiative (NSSI)
was established by Congress pursuant to Section 348 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005
(Public Law 109-58). Congress directed that the purpose of the NSSI is to implement efforts
to coordinate collection of scientific data that will provide for a better understanding of
terrestrial, aquatic and marine ecosystems of the North Slope of Alaska and to identify and
prioritize information needs to address individual and cumulative effects of development
activities and environmental change. Collectively, the NSSI has 13-representatives from
federal, state and local governments that have administrative and management responsibilities
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on the North Slope of Alaska and the adjacent marine environments and provides scientific
recommendations through an interdisciplinary 15-member science panel. email:
[email protected] or [email protected]. Activities of the NSSI can be reviewed at
www.northslope.org
Patricia Rivera has a M.S. Marine Biology from UAF - Rapporteur for the EPPR Policy
Review Workshop at the School of Fisheries and Ocean Sciences, UAF; 21-23 July 2010. For
the past 24 years, Patricia has performed research over a broad range of topics in the fields of
marine science and physiology in Alaska and in Florida. She currently manages the Alaska
Monitoring and Assessment Program Laboratory at the School of Fisheries and Ocean
Sciences. email: [email protected]