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Ottoman military
organization (up to 1800)
GÁBOR ÁGOSTON
The Ottoman Turks, who emerged in
western Asia Minor in the late thirteenth
century, built one of the longest-lived
empires in history, a multi-ethnic state that
influenced the lives of millions in Europe
and Asia for six centuries until the empire’s
demise in World War I. In addition to its
pragmatic policies and flexible governance,
the Ottoman military played a crucial role
in the expansion of Ottoman realms. The
Ottomans were among the first to create a
standing military force, the Janissary corps,
which was established as early as the late
fourteenth century. Until the late seventeenth century, the army and logistical system proved superior to those of their
European and Asian rivals. However, economic and social upheavals in the empire
in the seventeenth century, together with
the growing military threat of the Ottomans’
foes, Austria and especially Russia from the
mid-eighteenth century onward, resulted in
major changes in the Ottoman military
forces and their financing.
THE EARLY OTTOMAN MILITARY
In the early years of the Ottoman state, the
bulk of the Ottoman army consisted of the
ruler’s military entourage, the cavalry
troops of Turkoman tribes that had joined
forces with the Ottomans, and those
peasants who had been called up as soldiers
for military campaigns. The members of the
military entourage, known as kul (“slave”)
and nöker (“companion, client, retainer”),
were the forerunners of the sultans’ salaried
troops. The Turkoman cavalrymen received
a share of military spoils and were granted
the right to settle on conquered lands.
In return, they had to provide men-atarms in proportion to the amount of benefice in their possession. Later they became
the fief-based provincial cavalry, or timarholding sipahis, whose remuneration was
secured through military fiefs (timar). The
bulk of the early Ottoman forces under
Osman (?–1324?), the founder of the
dynasty, consisted of mounted archers and
excelled in raids and ambushes rather than
formal battles and sieges. However, by the
reign of Orhan (1324–1362) and Murad I
(1362–1389), the Ottoman military had
been transformed from the ruler’s raiding
forces into a disciplined army, and was capable of conducting campaigns and sieges.
In the fourteenth century, young volunteer peasants were recruited for the infantry
yaya (footman) and cavalry müsellem
(exemptee) corps. Paid by the ruler during
campaigns, they returned to their villages
after campaigns and were exempted from
certain taxes in lieu of their military service.
Under Murad I the salaried palace horsemen, known as sipahis, gradually replaced
the müsellems, whereas the azab infantry
archers and the more famous Janissaries
took the yayas’ place in the army. As a consequence, the yayas and müsellems became
auxiliary forces, transporting weapons and
ammunition and building and repairing
roads and bridges during campaigns.
The azabs were a kind of peasant militia
composed originally of unmarried young
men fit for war, who were levied from the
taxpaying subjects. In the late fifteenth and
early sixteenth centuries, some twenty to
thirty reaya households were responsible
for equipping and sending one fighting
azab soldier to campaigns. Armed with
bows and swords, infantry azabs were
expendable conscripts who fought in the
first rows of the Ottoman battle formation,
in front of the cannons and Janissaries.
While their number was significant in the
fifteenth century (20,000 at the conquest of
The Encyclopedia of War, First Edition. Edited by Gordon Martel.
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2012 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Constantinople in 1453, and 40,000 in the
1473 campaign against the Akkoyunlu
Turkoman Confederation in eastern
Anatolia), the Janissaries gradually overtook their role, relegating them to garrison
service. Azabs also served as archers and
later musketeers on ships; they guarded
the coastline and ports and worked in the
imperial naval arsenal and the many shipyards throughout the empire. Paid from the
imperial treasury, the number of marine
azabs decreased from 2,279 in the midsixteenth century to 239 in 1694.
THE STANDING ARMY
Established in the 1370s, the Janissaries, or
“new troops” (Turkish yeni çeri), served
initially as the sultan’s elite guard and comprised only a few hundred men. At first the
sultan used prisoners of war to create his
own independent military guard. Later, in
the 1380s, the child levy or “collection”
(devshirme) was introduced to recruit new
soldiers. Under this system, Christian boys
between 8 and 20 years old, and preferably
between 12 and 14 years of age, were periodically taken at varying rates, usually one
boy from forty households.
A group of 100–200 boys, called “the
flock,” was collected and a detailed register
was compiled, containing each boy’s name
and physical description. The “flock” then
traveled on foot to the capital. Those who
did not escape or perish during the long
journey were inspected on arrival, circumcised, and converted to Islam. The smartest
were singled out for education in the
empire’s elite Palace School. The rest were
hired out to Turkish farmers for seven to
eight years, learning the rudiments of the
Turkish language and Islamic customs.
After these years the boys joined the ranks
of Janissary novices. They lived in their own
barracks under strict military discipline,
and in addition to their military training
they served as a cheap workforce for public
building projects or worked in the sultan’s
gardens, the imperial dockyards in Istanbul
and Gallipoli, or in the imperial cannon
foundry. After several years of such service
they became Janissaries or joined the corps
of gunners, gun carriage drivers, bombardiers, and armorers. The levies occurred
haphazardly in the fifteenth century, and
more regularly in the sixteenth century,
when the frequent wars often decimated
the ranks of the Janissaries. By the end
of that century, however, the ranks of
the Janissaries were filled with sons of Janissaries and thus the child levy became
unnecessary.
With the broadening of the pool of
recruitment, the initial guard was soon
transformed into the ruler’s elite household
infantry, numbering about 2,000 men by the
Battle of Kosovo (1389), 5,000 men in the
mid-fifteenth century, and about 10,000 men
by the end of Mehmed II’s reign in 1481. The
Janissaries remained about 10,000–12,000
strong until the end of the sixteenth century.
The bulk of the Ottoman army, however,
remained cavalry. Until the beginning of the
sixteenth century the freelance light cavalry
akıncı raiders remained militarily significant. In 1475, Mehmed II mobilized 6,000
such raiders, whereas Suleiman I
(r. 1520–1566) brought 20,000 of them to
his 1521 campaign against Hungary. Along
with the standing infantry forces, the
sultans also paid six cavalry units whose
number doubled between 1527 and 1567,
from 5,088 men to 11,251.
An even larger cavalry force was
maintained through the timar military
fiefs. In return for the right to collect revenues from his assigned villages, the Ottoman provincial cavalryman had to provide
for his arms (short sword, bows), armor
(helmet and chain mail), and horse, and
to report for military service along with
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his armed retainers when called upon by the
sultan. The number of armed retainers that
the provincial cavalryman had to keep, arm,
and bring with him on campaigns increased
proportionately with the income from his
fief; the more income he had, the more
soldiers he was obliged to provide. In
order to keep track of the number of fiefholding cavalrymen and their obligations,
the Ottomans introduced various survey
registers, perhaps as early as the reign of
Bayezid I. During campaigns, muster rolls
were checked against these registers in order
to determine whether all the cavalrymen
reported for military duty and brought the
required number of retainers and equipment. If the cavalryman did not report for
service or failed to bring with him the
required number of retainers, he lost his
military fief, which was then assigned to
someone else.
The timar fiefs and the related bureaucratic surveillance system provided the Ottoman sultans in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries with a standing provincial cavalry
army of 50,000–80,000 strong, while relieving the central Ottoman bureaucracy of the
burden of revenue-raising and paying military salaries. The system also proved instrumental in administering the provinces,
maintaining law and order, and protecting
the taxpaying subjects from abuses on the
part of their “landlords.” Provincial and district governors, also remunerated through
these military fiefs, served as military commanders of the cavalry forces of their respective provinces and districts, as well as heads
of the provincial administration, which was
charged, among other duties, with collecting
taxes and maintaining law and order. The
frequent rotation of governors and their surveillance by Muslim judges, sent by the central government, prevented the emergence of
independent local strong men in the provinces and proved an efficient way to maintain
and mobilize large forces until the end of the
sixteenth century. For major sultan-led campaigns, Mehmed II, Selim I (r. 1512–1520),
and Suleiman I could and did mobilize
70,000– 80,000 men or more, including the
standing units, the provincial cavalry paid
through military fiefs and vassals, thus
greatly outnumbering their opponents.
Based on Ottoman treasury accounts, the
paper numbers of the Ottoman salaried
troops are summarized in Table 1.
As we shall see later, the paper figures in
Table 1 are often inflated, especially from
the late seventeenth century onward, and
the size of deployable and deployed central
troops was considerably smaller. However,
they reflected one important trend, the
increase of salaried troops, which took
place in the Ottoman military as a response
to the new challenges that the Ottomans
faced when fighting against their Habsburg
and Romanov enemies.
WEAPONRY, ARMS INDUSTRY,
AND LOGISTICS
The bulk of the Ottoman army (infantry
azabs, cavalry timariots, and akıncıs) used
swords and bows. The Ottomans adopted
firearms in the latter part of the fourteenth
century, and established a separate artillery
corps as part of the sultan’s standing
army in the early fifteenth century, well
before their European opponents. Initially,
the Janissaries were equipped with their
formidable recurved bow, saber, shield,
and light coat of mail, while other units
used crossbows, javelins, and war-axes.
Under Murad II (r. 1421–1444, 1446–
1451), they began to use matchlock arquebuses, called tüfek in Ottoman sources. The
fact that fortress inventories of the midfifteenth century listed tüfeks alongside cannons (top) suggests that by this time the
tüfek had evolved into hand-held firearms
of the arquebus type. By the mid-sixteenth
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Table 1 The paper number of central salaried troops
Date
1514–1515
1527–1528
1567–1568
1574
1609
1652
1654
1660–1661
1661–1662
1665–1666
1666–1667
1669–1670
1694–1695
1696–1697
1698–1699
1700–1701
1701–1702
1702–1703
1704–1705
1710–1711
1712
1723–1724
1727–1728
1728–1729
1729–1730
1761–1762
1775–1776
Janissary
Artillery
Cavalry
Total
10,156
7,886
12,798
13,599
37,627
55,151
51,047
55,151
54,222
20,467
47,233
39,470
78,798
69,620
67,729
42,119
39,925
40,139
52,642
43,562
36,383
24,403
24,733
24,803
98,723
49,708
61,239
1,171
2,163
2,671
2,034
7,966
7,246
6,905
7,246
6,497
?
?
8,014
21,824
14,726
15,470
11,485
10,893
10,010
11,851
5,510
5,316
5,088
11,044
6,047
14,869
20,479
19,844
?
15,248
?
?
14,070
13,395
15,217
13,447
13,043
12,999
12,976
17,133
15,625
16,643
15,137
26,513
21,680
60,462
82,876
77,796
?
75,967
?
?
61,554
114,017
99,563
96,646
66,647
63,817
63,125
81,626
64,697
Source: Genç and Özvar (2006), vol. 1: 237–238; Ágoston (2010): 116, 128–129.
century most Janissaries carried firearms.
Murad III (r. 1574–1595) equipped his
Janissaries with the more advanced matchlock musket, although flintlock muskets
with the Spanish miquelet-lock were also
manufactured in the empire from the late
sixteenth century. The Janissaries were firing their weapons row-by-row from the
early sixteenth century, but it seems that
they started to use volley fire of the West
European type only in the 1590s.
The Ottomans also established cannon
foundries and gunpowder works throughout
their empire. Major foundries operated
along the Adriatic (Avlonya and Prevesa),
in Hungary (Buda and Temesvár), the
Balkans (Rudnik, Semendire, İskenderiye,
Novaberda, Pravişte, and Belgrade), Anatolia
(Diyarbekir, Erzurum, Birecik, Mardin, and
Van), Iraq (Baghdad and Basra), and Egypt
(Cairo). The center of cannon casting, however, was the Imperial Cannon Foundry
in Istanbul, which was established by
Mehmed II after the capture of the city. It
was one of the first arsenals in late medieval
Europe that was built, operated, and
financed by a central government, at a time
when most of Europe’s monarchs acquired
their cannons from smaller artisan workshops. The Istanbul foundry could easily
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multiply its capacity before and during
major wars, casting several hundreds of
cannon before the campaign season.
In addition to the Istanbul gunpowder
works, the Ottomans produced gunpowder
in their provincial centers, including Cairo,
Baghdad, Aleppo, and Yemen in the
Arab provinces; Buda, Esztergom, Pécs,
Temesvár, Belgrade, Salonica, and Gallipoli
in the European provinces; as well as Izmir,
Bor, Erzurum, Diyarbekir, Oltu, and Van in
Asia Minor. These works met the demand
of the army, navy, and garrisons well into
the eighteenth century. However, in
the 1770s diminishing production forced
Istanbul to import substantial quantities of
powder from Europe. At the end of the
eighteenth century, the new Azadlı gunpowder works in Istanbul, modernized
with French assistance, were again able to
manufacture sufficient quantities of
gunpowder of a much better quality.
Despite allegations to the contrary in
the literature, the Ottomans managed to
keep pace with Europe regarding weapons
technology. More importantly, their military-industrial complex in the capital,
supplemented by smaller provincial cannon
foundries and gunpowder workshops,
enabled the Ottomans to establish longlasting firepower superiority in eastern and
central Europe, the Mediterranean, and the
Middle East. While factors such as numerical
superiority, cavalry charge, and better
logistics and tactics were important in
the Ottoman victories at Chaldiran (1514),
Marj-i Dabiq (1516), Raydaniyya (1517),
and Mohács (1526) against the Safavids,
Mamluks, and Hungarians respectively,
Ottoman firepower superiority played a crucial role in all these field battles. In siege
warfare, Ottoman firepower superiority
remained the Ottomans’ strength throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
The Ottomans also had a well-oiled financial and bureaucratic apparatus, as well as
advanced provisioning, supply, and logistical
systems. The Ottoman treasury closed most
years with surplus up until the 1590s. They
had a sophisticated road network, partly
inherited from Roman and Byzantine
times, and elaborate and well-functioning
courier and relay systems, the stations of
which were also used as grain-storage depots.
Roads, mountain passes, and bridges were
repaired before the campaigns, and substantial quantities of wheat, barley, flour, and
biscuit were stored in the depots along the
campaign routes. The mobilization, storage,
and distribution of food supplies to the fighting army remained the strength of the
Ottomans until about the mid eighteenth
century, positively affecting discipline and
moral. Owing to their supply and logistical
system, Ottoman soldiers were usually better
fed than their opponents. However, during
the Russo-Ottoman Wars of 1768–1774, the
Ottoman supply system seems to have
collapsed, contributing to the Ottomans’
disastrous defeat.
Ottoman firepower superiority, combined
with numerical and logistical superiority,
proved to be crucial in mounting a continuous pressure on Europe. Attempts to match
Ottoman firepower prompted a series of
European countermeasures. These included
modernization of fortress systems (the introduction of the star fort or trace italienne into
central and eastern Europe); changing the
cavalry–infantry ratio; improving the training and tactics of field armies; increasing the
quality and production output of armaments industries; and modernizing state
administration and finances. While all
these were part of a larger phenomenon,
often referred to as the “European military
revolution,” and were undoubtedly fostered
by the frequency of interstate violence
within Europe, in eastern and central
Europe it was Ottoman military superiority
that constituted the greatest challenge and
required adequate countermeasures.
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THE NAVY
Under Mehmed II and Bayezid II
(r. 1481–1512), the Ottomans acquired the
common naval technology of the Mediterranean, adopting the oared galley as their principal vessel. The usual Ottoman galley
carried a single mast with a lateen sail and
had 24–26 banks of oars on both sides, with
three oarsmen to a bench, all pulling separate
oars until the mid sixteenth century. From
the 1560s, following their Mediterranean
rivals, the Ottomans too adopted the al
scaloccio system, by which all oarsmen on
the same bench pulled a single oar. This
arrangement helped to increase the number
of oarsmen. Ottoman galleys usually carried
a center-line cannon and two smaller
flanking culverins. However, impressed by
the Venetian galeasses, which played an
important role in the Christians’ victory at
the Battle of Lepanto, the Ottomans were
quick to imitate these large and heavily
armed galleys that could fire broadsides, as
opposed to the traditional galleys, which
had guns only on the prow. During the
rebuilding of their fleet, destroyed at
Lepanto, the Ottoman shipyards in Sinop
and Istanbul constructed some four or five
galeasses. These vessels could carry as many
as 24 guns and fire them from the stern, bow,
and sides. Although the Ottomans’ allies in
the Barbary states started to use warships of
the Atlantic type from the early seventeenth
century and the Algerine war vessels carried
as many as 30 to 50 guns and 250–350 men
by the last third of the century, the Ottomans
were slow to adapt to the shipbuilding revolution. Recognizing the superiority of the
Venetian sailing galleons during their attack
on Crete in 1645, the Ottomans tried to
imitate the Venetians. However, due to the
inexperience of their crew, several of these
new galleons were either captured or
destroyed by the Venetians in the mid1650s. In 1662, Istanbul temporarily
suspended the building of galleons and
returned to the production of galleys. It was
only after 1682 that the galleons became
standard warships in the Ottoman navy. Of
the ten galleons built in 1682, four carried
60 bronze guns, and six 80 guns. From the
beginning of the eighteenth century some of
the three-decker and larger galleons
carried as many as 112 and 130 guns. In
1735–1740 the Ottoman navy consisted of
33 ships, of which 27 were three- and twodecker ships of the line and six smaller vessels
of the fifth rank. The next phase of the
modernization of the Ottoman navy took
place under Selim III, as part of the sultan’s
military reforms.
The size of the Ottoman navy was already
impressive under Mehmed II, who employed
380 galleys in his naval expeditions against
the Genoese-administered Crimean port
town of Caffa in 1475. During the 1499–
1503 Ottoman–Venetian War, Bayezid II
considerably strengthened the navy, ordering the construction of no fewer than 250
galleys in late 1500 alone. The reorganization of the Ottoman navy under Bayezid II
transformed the originally land-based
empire into a formidable naval power.
The navy was instrumental in halting
Portuguese expansion in the Red Sea and
the Persian Gulf and in the Ottoman conquest of Mamluk Egypt in 1516–1517.
Appointing the famed corsair Hayreddin
Barbarossa grand admiral of the Ottoman
navy (1533) and co-opting the corsairs of
the Barbary states of Algiers and Tunis was
a smart and economically efficient way to
further strengthen the Ottoman navy and
to project Ottoman military and political
power as far as Algiers and Tunis.
The Mediterranean fleet under the command of the grand admiral was the core of
the Ottoman navy. Operating independently of this main fleet were smaller squadrons under the command of the captain of
Kavala, who patrolled the northern Aegean;
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the district governors of Lesbos and Rhodes,
the latter commanding the sea routes
between Egypt and Istanbul; the admiral of
Egypt, who controlled both the Egyptian
fleet based in Alexandria and the Suez
fleet; and the captain of Yemen, who
guarded the entry to the Red Sea. In addition, smaller flotillas operated on the
Danube, Tigris, and Euphrates. The fighting
power of such flotillas was impressive.
On the Shatt al-Arab in 1698–1699, there
were 60 frigates with 70 soldiers aboard
each ship, which meant a fighting force of
4,200 troops.
Gelibolu, the first naval arsenal,
remained an important shipyard for the
construction and repair of Ottoman ships.
Nevertheless, by the beginning of the
sixteenth century the Istanbul Naval Arsenal
on the shore of the Golden Horn, inherited
from the Genoese of Galata and expanded
under Selim I, had become the principal
center of Ottoman shipbuilding and maintenance. In the 1550s, 250 ships could be
constructed and/or repaired there at a time.
In addition to Gelibolu and Istanbul, there
were shipyards at Izmit on the Sea of
Marmara, at Sinop and Samsun on the
Black Sea, at Suez in the Red Sea, and at
Birecik and Basra on the Euphrates and the
Shatt al-Arab, respectively. If one includes
the smaller shipyards, the number of
sixteenth-century Ottoman shipbuilding
sites is close to 70.
IMPERIAL OVERSTRETCH, MILITARY
TRANSFORMATION, AND REFORM
By the late sixteenth century the Ottoman
army reached the limits of its operational
capabilities. Power relations on all fronts
were more balanced, wars lasted longer, and
they required commitments in fighting men,
weaponry, supplies, and money at scales
previously unseen. Moreover, during the
Hungarian wars of 1593–1606, the Ottomans
faced increased firepower from the musketbearing Habsburg infantry, whose ratio to
the cavalry in certain units reached 75 percent. The Ottomans strove to counterbalance
this in two ways: by substantially increasing
the number of musket-bearing Janissaries
(see Table 1), and by recruiting musketeers
from the subject population. The latter were
disbanded after the campaign seasons in
order to ease the burden on the treasury.
These disbanded soldiers often turned
into bandits and contributed to the late
sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century
uprisings.
The swelling of the ranks of the Janissaries
also had several negative consequences. The
child levy system lapsed, and with it the old
methods of training and drill also weakened,
resulting in deteriorating discipline and
skills. Prebends were turned into crown
lands so that the treasury could pay the growing number of salaried troops. However,
with the decline of the timar system, Istanbul lost its control over the provinces and its
ability to maintain law and order through
their provincial cavalry commanded by the
sultan’s governors and other officers. These
functions were increasingly fulfilled by
semi-independent local strongmen, who
were then appointed as governors, for the
state needed their private armies against
Austria and Russia. For instance, traditional
timariot cavalry forces comprised less than
12 percent of the 86,884 troops mobilized
for the 1697–1698 Hungarian campaign. At
the same time, the household troops of
governors and non-timariot provincial
troops together accounted for more than
32 percent of the mobilized army. It was
only with the help of such private and provincial troops that the Ottomans could
still mobilize an army whose infantry-tocavalry ratio (57:43) was comparable to
that of Istanbul’s Habsburg and Romanov
rivals.
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Since the state still lacked the funds to
pay its swelling troops, the Janissaries were
allowed to engage in trade and craftsmanship. It is hardly surprising, thus, that in the
mid seventeenth century some 30 percent of
the Janissaries were pensioners or guards,
not fit for active military service. Some 30 to
60 percent of the Janissaries performed garrison duties. Thus only a fraction of the
Janissaries (17 to 30 percent at the turn of
the seventeenth century) participated in
campaigns.
By the end of the seventeenth century,
the Ottomans’ European opponents had
established their own standing armies that
were comparable in size to that of the
Ottomans. While revenues of the European
fiscal-military states increased sharply in
the seventeenth and especially in the eighteenth centuries, the Ottoman central government’s share of the redistribution of
revenues shrank from 58 percent in the
1520s to 24 percent in the 1660s, and the
Ottoman state’s revenues increased by only
10 percent in the eighteenth century.
Whereas in the middle of the century the
revenues of Russia and the Ottoman
Empire measured in tons of silver were still
comparable, by 1796 St. Petersburg’s revenues were almost ten times greater than
those of Istanbul. In addition to such fiscal
imbalance of power between the two
empires, Russia also had a conscription system, which resulted in much larger armies.
European troops in general were of higher
quality, enjoyed an efficient supply system,
better command, and professional military
bureaucracy.
The eighteenth century thus witnessed
experimentation with other forms of recruitments and military systems ranging from
militias to state-contracted formations, leading to the “New Order” (Nizam-i Cedid)
Army of Sultan Selim III (r. 1789–1807).
Launched in the aftermath of the RussoOttoman War of 1787–1792, the military
and associated financial and administrative
reforms of Selim III resulted in a new, disciplined, European-style army equipped
with up-to-date weaponry and dressed in
modern uniforms. Financed from an independent treasury, the new army was 23,000
strong by 1807, when opposition –mounted
by an alliance of the Janissaries and the
religious establishment – forced Selim III
to disband it and abdicate.
SEE
ALSO:
Austro-Ottoman
War
(1736–1739); Janissaries; Lepanto, Battle of
(1571); Military Revolution, the (1560–1660);
Muscovy, military rise of (1460–1730); Ottoman conquests; Ottoman military organization
(1800–1918); Peter I of Russia (“the Great”)
(1672–1725); Russo-Turkish Wars (pre-1878);
Selim I (“the Grim”) (1465–1520); Suleiman I
(“the Magnificent”) (1494–1566).
REFERENCES
Ágoston, G. (2010) “Empires and Warfare in EastCentral Europe, 1550–1750: The Ottoman–
Habsburg Rivalry and Military Transformation.”
In Frank Tallett and D. J. B. Trim (Eds.), European
Warfare, 1350–1750. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 110–134.
Genç, M. and Özvar, E. (Eds.) (2006) Osmanlı
Maliyesi: Kurumlar ve Bütçeler, 2 vols. İstanbul:
Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi.
FURTHER READING
Ágoston, G. (2005) Guns for the Sultan: Military
Power and the Weapons Industry in the
Ottoman Empire. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Aksan, V. H. (2007) Ottoman Wars 1700–
1870: An Empire Besieged. Harlow: Longman/
Pearson.
Börekçi, G. (2006) “A Contribution to the Military
Revolution Debate: The Janissaries’ Use of Volley
Fire during the Long Ottoman–Habsburg War
9
of 1593–1606 and the Problem of Origins,” Acta
Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae,
59 (4): 407–438.
Bostan, İ. (2005) Kürekli ve Yelkenli Osmanlı
Gemileri. Üsküdar, İstanbul: Bilge.
Heywood, C. (2002) Writing Ottoman History:
Documents and Interpretations. Aldershot:
Ashgate.
Heywood, C. (2006) “What’s in a Name? Some Algerine Fleet Lists (1686–1714) from British Libraries
and Archives,” Maghreb Review, 31 (1–2):
103–128.
Imber, C. (1996) “The Navy of Suleyman the
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