Download A2 China Trade War - UMKC Summer Debate Institute

Alt Causes to Trade Disputes
Chicken
Chicken large friction point in trade war
5/10/16, William Mauldin (Reporter for the Wall Street Journal), “U.S. Challenges
China Over Chicken as Trade Friction Rises”, The Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2016,
Accessed: 6/25/16
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-challenges-china-over-chicken-as-trade-friction-rises1462881223
The Obama administration filed a trade complaint against China on Tuesday over access to the Asian giant’s
market for U.S. chicken, the latest friction point in an election year that is casting a harsh light on U.S.
economic ties with China. Washington is demanding China open its market to U.S. chicken,
especially the chicken feet enjoyed in Asia, or face potential trade sanctions. The latest filing with the World Trade
Organization accuses China of not removing chicken tariffs that the Geneva-based trade body previously
ruled were improperly applied. “Based on our review, it’s clear to us that China is ignoring the
rules, and that’s unacceptable,” said Mike Froman, the U.S. trade representative, at a news conference
Tuesday on Capitol Hill. “By breaking those commitments, China’s actions tilt the playing field further against hardworking Americans.” “China
respects and has implemented the ruling of WTO on this case,” said Zhu Haiquan, a spokesman for Beijing’s embassy in Washington. “China
expresses regret over the United States’ request for consultations again.” The Chinese Commerce Ministry echoed that message on
Wednesday. The skirmish over chicken exports comes as the Obama administration steps up enforcement of trade rules against Beijing and
other countries in hopes to winning more congressional support for its signature Pacific trade agreement. The
administration has
brought 21 challenges since 2009 to the WTO, 12 of them targeting Beijing’s practices.
China violation of chicken guidelines creates tension with US
Charles Riley, May 13, 2016, “The Latest US-China trade splat is over chicken,” CNN Money,
http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/11/news/economy/china-us-trade-wto-chicken/ Accessed 6/25/16 BE
The latest trade flame-up between China and the U.S. is over chicken. Yes, chicken. The
Obama administration has accused China of
unfairly blocking U.S. poultry imports, the latest in a series of election-year trade disputes between Washington and Beijing. The U.S. Trade
Representative's office filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization on Tuesday, arguing that China has failed to remove tariffs on U.S. chicken in violation of
an earlier ruling by the trade body. "These unfair
and unjustified taxes are in direct violation of China's international
commitments and tilt the playing field further against America's poultry farmers," said U.S. Trade
Representative Michael Froman. The WTO ruled in 2013 that China's duties of more than 50% on
chicken imports violated its guidelines. The new U.S. complaint -- the 12th against China since 2009 -- argues that Beijing is still
breaching key parts of the ruling. In a statement, a spokesperson for China's Ministry of Commerce said that "China regrets that the U.S. has
requested further consultation" on the matter. Trade tensions between the U.S. and China have risen considerably this year.
Last month, U.S. Steel accused dozens of Chinese steel producers of breaking trade rules and asked the U.S. International Trade Commission to investigate.
Meanwhile,
Beijing has continued to support key exporters as China's economy has slowed down. Critics argue that
state support allows Chinese producers to flood foreign markets with cheap goods and undercut local rivals. Trade with China has also become a key issue in the
U.S. presidential election. Donald Trump, the presumptive Republican nominee, has repeatedly used bombastic language to accuse Beijing of manipulating its
currency and flouting trade rules in order to gain an unfair advantage over the U.S. " We
country, and that's what they're doing," Trump said last week at a rally.
can't continue to allow China to rape our
US/Chinese food trade disputes still active- US has filed multiple complaints.
Worstall in 2016[Tim; well-rounded author featuring publications in The Times, WSJ, and The
Guardian; “US Takes China To WTO Again Over Chicken Trade: Rightly So”; Forbes; American business
magazine featuring finance and industry; 5/11/16;
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2016/05/11/us-takes-china-to-wto-again-over-chicken-traderightly-so/#34f733977898]
The Obama administration
on Tuesday brought a fresh challenge to China’s anti-dumping duties on U.S.
broiler chicken products at the World Trade Organization in an effort to bring the long-running trade dispute to a close.
The U.S. Trade Representative’s office said it is making claims that China’s anti-dumping and
countervailing duties violate WTO rules, partly because China failed to properly calculate U.S. poultry
production costs. This is not the reason it’s all so bizarre: “American [poultry] farmers deserve a fair shot to
compete and win in the global economy, and this administration will continue to hold China responsible when they attempt to
disadvantage our farmers, businesses and workers,” he said. We do not and should not run either the global or domestic
economies in the interests of producers. It should always be about the interests of consumers. The
complaint is the second US WTO objection to China’s 2010 imposition of anti-dumping duties of up to 105.4%, and
anti-subsidy duties of up to 30.3%, on US broiler chicken products. In a statement posted on its official website on Wednesday, China’s Ministry
of Commerce said it regretted the action the US had taken but would resolve the dispute in accordance with WTO processes.
Steel
Steel is one of the main contributions to US/China trade tensions
5/18/16, Charles Riley, Huizhong Wu, and Sophia Yan (Reporters for CNNMoney @
New Delhi), “U.S. hikes duties on Chinese steel to more than 500%”, CNNMONEY, May
18, 2016, Accessed: 6/25/16
http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/18/news/us-steel-china-trade/
A trade spat between the U.S. and China boiled over on Wednesday, with Beijing demanding the
removal of a new 500% duty on some of its steel products. The escalation follows a ruling by the U.S.
Department of Commerce on Tuesday that dramatically increases duties on Chinese cold-rolled steel,
which is used to make appliances, cars and electric motors. "China is extremely dissatisfied with
this decision," the Ministry of Commerce said in a statement. "China urges the U.S. to strictly
abide by World Trade Organization guidelines and correct its mistake as quickly as possible."
Trade tensions between the U.S. and China have risen considerably this year -- especially over
steel. Last month, U.S. Steel accused dozens of Chinese producers of breaking trade rules, and
asked the U.S. International Trade Commission to investigate. China produces half of the world's
steel, more than the U.S., European Union, Russia and Japan combined.
Unfair subsidizing by China leads to ICT ruling that sparks tension
Lisa Murray, June 23, 2016, “Trade war looms as China lashes US over 500pc steel tariffs,”
Australian Financial Review, http://www.afr.com/news/world/trade-war-looms-as-china-lashes-us-over500pc-steel-tariffs-20160623-gpq76z Accessed 6/25/16 BE
China has accused the United States of protectionism after Washington approved plans to hit Chinese
steelmakers with tariffs of more than 500 per cent, raising the prospect of a global trade war. The
prospect of a steel trade war is bad news for troubled South Australian steelmaker Arrium, which has had to go cap in hand to the state and
federal governments for a bailout. Cheap Chinese steel kept out of the US could be diverted to the Australian market
and the Australian government could come under similar diplomatic pressure to the US if it tries to keep
it out. Australia already has penalties tariffs on many Chinese steel imports of over 50 percent. China's Ministry of Commerce said on
Thursday it was "deeply concerned" about trade practices in the US steel sector, claiming that by the end of April the US had
already imposed as many as 161 protective tariffs on Chinese steel products. "Increasing trade protection will only escalate tension and conflict," the ministry said in
a statement on its website. "It will not help to solve the problem." The
comments followed a ruling out of the US on Wednesday by
the International Trade Commission, an independent government agency, which found that imports of some steel products from
China and Japan were unfairly subsidised and sold for less than fair value. As a result, the US Commerce
Department will be allowed to slap Chinese steelmakers with tariffs as high as 522 per cent on cold-rolled flat
steel that is used to make cars and appliances. Japanese producers will also be hit with additional duties of more than 70 per cent. Waning demand at home The
anti-dumping case was just one of three being considered by the US government, which says China has
flooded the global steel market with cheap products in an attempt to gain market share and as demand at home wanes. Other
governments, including those from Britain and Australia which are under pressure from their own steel sectors, have also raised the issue with Beijing, urging the
Chinese government to address its overcapacity problem. Arrium was put into administration in April, and both the state Labor government and Prime Minister
Malcolm Turnbull have pledged public money to keep the plant going. Indian giant Tata Steel has threatened to shut down its UK operations because of steel's
woes. Production cut Beijing
insists China, which makes more than half the world's steel, is pushing ahead with plans to cut
annual production by 100 million to 150 million tonnes over the next five years. "The current difficulties faced by the global steel sector are
the result of a decline in demand caused by the global financial crisis," the commerce ministry said. Xu Xiangchun, chief information officer at Mysteel, said China
had recently accelerated its efforts to reduce steel capacity. Earlier this week, Baosteel Group announced it was shutting down a furnace at one of its mills in
Shanghai. The Communist Party newspaper, the People's Daily, reported the government had warned local officials in the steelmaking province of Hebei that they
would be sacked if they approved additional capacity. These
efforts followed an increase in steel production at the start of
the year after the government began pumping more credit into the economy to boost growth and directed state-owned
companies to increase investment. This led to higher steel prices and prompted some mothballed mills to reopen.
Trade war with China coming now – steel and protectionism
Bob Stokes, May 31, 2016, “U.S. Vs. China: Has the Trade War Only Begun?” Elliott Wave,
http://www.elliottwave.com/Economy/US-Vs-China-Has-the-Trade-War-Only-Begun Accessed 6/25/16 BE
But, today, the psychology of governments is quite different. Consider two global titans, China and the U.S.: China
has charged the U.S. with
unfair trade policies after imposing a new wave of penalties on low-priced steel imports. After the Commerce
Department on [May 25] announced anti-dumping duties on Chinese corrosion-resistant steel products of up to 210%, that country's Ministry of
Commerce accused the U.S. of hampering trade. Last week, the U.S. announced duties of up to 522% on
cold-rolled steel used in automobiles and other manufacturing. USA Today, May 27 And the president of the European
Commission also just warned about new anti-dumping tariffs. As you probably know, trade protectionism has been frequently
discussed during this U.S. presidential-election cycle. Presumptive Republican nominee Donald Trump has pointed out
the nation's trade imbalance with not only China, but also Mexico. A trend toward trade protectionism has
emerged. We see it as part of the psychology that was described in Robert Prechter's Conquer the Crash: One example of action impelled by defensive
psychology is governments' recurring drive toward protectionism during deflationary periods. Protectionism is correctly recognized among
economists of all stripes as destructive, yet there is always a call for it when people's mental state
changes to a defensive psychology. ... You will be reading about tariff wars in the newspapers before this
cycle is over. As we've seen, this is already occurring. Our analysis suggests that the current cycle has only begun.
US/China steel disputes still occurring. Plan is not inclusive of these trade practices.
Talley in 2016[Ian; international finance from the Wall Street Journal; “Why the U.S. Steel Industry Is
Molten Hot Over China’s Trade Practices”; Wall Street Journal; business focused newspaper based in NY;
6/6/2016; http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2016/06/06/why-the-u-s-steel-industry-is-molten-hot-overchinas-trade-practices/]
John Ferriola, chief executive of U.S. steel giant Nucor Corp., is skeptical China will soon fix what he calls
the biggest problem facing his industry: excess production capacity. “The Chinese government
is…engaged in economic warfare against the U.S. and sadly, they are winning,” Mr. Ferriola said in an interview
ahead of high-level U.S.-China talks kicking off in Beijing Monday The trouble, he says, is China’s “illegal, unfair”
subsidizing of an industry the U.S. government recently accused of dumping, or selling products below
production cost to improperly gain market share. From outright government ownership to an array of
illegal subsidies, Chinese steel companies are being propped up at the expense of U.S. and other producers,
American officials and firms complain. When U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew presses Beijing on the matter, Chinese
officials will likely reiterate recent promises to gradually cut annual production by 100 million to 150 million tons
over the next five years. But Nucor is taking a “seeing is believing” approach. China two months ago set a new production
record after spending two years promising to cut production, the Charlotte, N.C., company contends.
Solar Panels
Solar panels have contributed to trade war for years and recently creating more
tensions.
6/19/14, Ucilia Wang (Contributor to Forbes on renewable energy, electric cars, water technology,
and other ideas to lower carbon footprint.), “Report: U.S. Trade Dispute Will Inflict Pains On Chinese
Solar Manufacturers”, Forbes, JUN 19, 2014, Accessed: 6/25/16
http://www.forbes.com/sites/uciliawang/2014/06/19/report-u-s-trade-dispute-will-inflict-pains-onchinese-solar-manufacturers/#7e54d68f6377
The latest round of a trade war that started nearly three years ago over Chinese silicon solar
panels imported in the United States will likely have a far more financial impact than before. In fact,
prices for Chinese solar panels could go up 14% on average, said a report released Thursday. That price
hike will be hard to avoid and cause Chinese companies to lose much of the advantage they
have enjoyed for years: the ability to make and sell solar panels at costs far lower than their
competitors elsewhere in the world, according to an analysis by GTM Research. The report is taking
stock of the ongoing trade case undertaken by the U.S. Department of Commerce, which issued a preliminary decision on June 3 that
set tariffs at 19% to 35%. It plans to make a final decision in August. China is the solar manufacturing hub of the world.
It supplied 31% of the solar panels installed in the United States last year , GTM said. The vast majority of
the solar panels made in China use silicon solar cells. The commerce department pegged the value of the Chinese silicon solar panels that
entered the U.S. market at around $1.5 billion.
Aircrafts
Trade disputes with aircrafts is a fight large aviation manufacturers are willing to join
12/8/15, Alan Tovey,(Industry Editor at The Daily Telegraph), “US launches trade dispute with
China over tax on imported aircraft”, The Daily Telegraph, Dec 8, 2015, Accessed: 6/25/16
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/12040119/US-launches-trade-disputewith-China-over-tax-on-imported-aircraft.html
The US has launched a trade dispute against China, claiming that American aircraft and components are
put at a disadvantage because of a tax break Beijing offers locally made small aircraft. The US Trade
Department has asked the World Trade Organisaton (WTO) to intervene, saying Chinese-produced escape a 17pc value added tax
that is levied on imported aircraft and parts. Michael Forman,
US Trade representative, called the tax –
generally imposed on aircraft weighing under 25 tons – is “discriminatory,
unfair and harmful to US workers and
business of all sizes in the critical aviation industry”. “The Chinese government is undermining fair
competition and playing by their own set of rules. Punishing American small and medium-sized aircraft
and aircraft component manufacturers is a direct violation of WTO commitments,” said Congressman Pat
Tiberi, former chairman of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade. China had also broken the commitments it gave
on transparency to the WTO when it joined, the US claimed, saying Beijing had not published details of tax exemptions offer to
domestic aircraft companies. Until recently China had only a very small aerospace industry meaning that the levy had little impact
on foreign manufacturers as the country’s airlines were forced to look overseas to buy aircraft. However, as the country
industrialises, its aviation sector is expanding and opening up new options. Combined
with growing demand for air
travel as the Chinese population gentrifies, such an import duty is a point that countries with large
aviation industries are willing to fight. The complaint opens up a new front in aerospace-related trade
wars. The US and Europe have been engaged in a dispute for almost of a decade over what each claims
are unfair state subsidies to Boeing and Airbus to develop or produce new airliners, with no clear
resolution in sight.
Seafood
Threesome tensions arise between US, Russia, and China over seafood regulations
Sputnik International, June 24, 2016, “China Urges US to Avoid Trade Barriers Amid New Seafood
Import Rules,” Sputnik News, http://sputniknews.com/business/20160624/1041852605/us-chinaseafood-rules.html, Accessed 6/26/16 BE
The US authorities should not create unnecessary barriers for seafood trade with China given the big volume of
deals and complexity of seafood supply chain, Chinese Bureau of Fisheries Deputy Director General Lifeng Cui said in a letter
obtained by Sputnik on Thursday. WASHINGTON (Sputnik) — In 2014, US President Barack Obama introduced new seafood import
regulations in an effort to combat illegal fishing. According to the new rules, each supplier must present extensive information on the
origins of the catch. “We would be highly appreciated if US could take a little more prudent approaches to avoid unnecessary trade barriers when you are to
formulate the related new rules and start to implement based on the WTO [World Trade organization] rules,” Cui stated. In the letter addressed to US Deputy
Assistant Secretary for International Fisheries Russell Smith, Cui
argued that Chinese fish farmers have not been involved in
illegal fishing. “Thus we require the removal of farmed species from the trace list to avoid increasing unnecessary burden on the supply chain,” Cui stated.
Earlier in June, a representative of Russia's Federal Agency for Fishery (Rosrybolovstvo) Oleg Rykov told RIA
Novosti that Moscow has also been concerned with the consequences of the new regulations. The official said
the Russian Economy Ministry has notified the United States of Russia's concerns over the issue within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Internet
China’s lack of internet freedom leads to complications for foreign businesses who
need the internet – China views the authoritarian internet as a part of its regime’s
control
Sarah Logan, April 28, 2016, “Online censorship: A new flank in the US-China trade wars?” The
Interpreter, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/04/28/Online-censorship-A-new-flank-in-theUS-China-trade-wars.aspx Accessed 6/26/16 BE
However, last week the
issue of internet freedom emerged once more, again in the context of China, but this time
from the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR). Two paragraphs in the 2016 Trade Estimate Report for the first time
added China's Great Firewall to an annual list of trade impediments. The report argues that over the
past decade this firewall has 'posed a significant burden to foreign suppliers, hurting both Internet sites
themselves and users who often depend on them for business.' These two paragraphs mark an
important turning point in US policy on internet freedom, framing the issue outside the stirring rhetoric
of human rights and instead in the dry technicalities of international trade. So why the shift? The answer highlights the
power of the US tech lobby; Google, for example, is the third largest corporate lobbyist in America. Although it championed the US tech industry, Clinton-era
internet freedom policy was not an unmitigated gift to the US-based digital giants of the online world. The policy hamstrung internet companies by shaping their
entry into the largest emerging internet market in the world in the context of US human rights discourses, putting them in a difficult position given that it
is
impossible to do business in China's online sphere without interacting with a government with scant
regard for such discourses. As early as 2007 the First Amendment Coalition, a non-profit advocacy group with significant tech representation on its
board, had requested the USTR treat internet freedom as a trade issue. These calls only intensified after Google left China in 2010. Indeed, in 2010, the Executive
Director of the First Amendment Coalition published an op-ed arguing for almost exactly the approach taken in the 2016 report. The issue has gained currency as
Chinese tech giants continue to expand outside China, including into the US. As of May 2015, four Chinese companies were ranked in the top 15 global internet
companies by market capitalisation. Adding salt to the wound, this expansion uses American finance and expertise. For example, Alibaba's 2014 initial public offer
was the largest in NYSE history, underwritten by four major US banks, including Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase. Now the third most valuable internet
company in the world, ahead of Amazon and Yahoo! Alibaba has also announced plans to expand into the US and European markets. Other Chinese tech giants
such as Baidu and Sina Weibo are also expanding outside Chinese borders, directly challenging US dominance. This takes place in a cloud of accusations of Chinese
cyberespionage and IP theft against US companies. Meanwhile,
Google cannot operate in China, the Government just this
month suddenly and substantially reduced Apple's Chinese operations and in 2015 banned a range of US
tech firms from accessing Government procurement contracts. The appointment of a Robert Holleyman as the US Trade
Representative in 2014 underscores the shift in the US approach to internet freedom. Holleyman spent 13 years as the head of the Business Software Alliance,
which represents technology heavyweights such as Apple, Intel and Microsoft. In his nomination testimony to the Senate Finance Committee in August 2014,
Holleyman stated that alongside mounting a robust response to China's ever-growing presence in global
trade, he would ensure that the US would lead the establishment of the rules of digital trade globally,
not just in the Chinese context. He told the committee he would fight for rules to guarantee the free
flow of data across borders and to stop discrimination against goods and services traded online rather
than physically. The success of this new approach to Chinese censorship is not guaranteed. It will depend firstly of course on favourable rulings at the WTO.
Outside of the fact that any such case will be breaking new ground, GATT and GATS were designed in the 1990s, before the internet's force as an economic
multiplier was fully understood. This means the definitions of both goods and services are unclear as they apply to internet services and associated technology
goods. The arcane workings of the WTO are difficult to fathom and the outcomes of deliberations which hinge on these definitions are not a given, however the US
appears to be betting that this will soon change. But
outside of any positive outcome from WTO deliberations, China will
still have to agree to and implement any decisions. Here, the likely outcome is clearer. China has long
failed to liberalise many sectors of its economy as fully as its trading partners may wish, and the internet
sector is no exception because of both its security implications and its size. Even more so than its
predecessors, the current regime sees the internet sector as underwriting its political legitimacy:
censorship has increased apace in recent years, and even recent months. But the internet sector is also one of the
country's most profitable: the three biggest Chinese internet companies — Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent — have become the largest private sector companies in
China by capitalisation and revenue. This means they are not only powerful in terms of the politics of information but also as private economic actors, meaning the
Government is likely to tighten its hold on the the sector.
China’s internet policy suppresses the voice of their lower class – nations justly oppose
these and want to bring it to trading negotiations
Paul Mozur, April 7, 2016, “U.S. Adds China’s Internet Controls to List of Trade Barriers,” New York
Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/08/business/international/china-internet-controls-us.html
Accessed 6/26/16 BE
HONG KONG — China’s
notorious online controls have long been criticized as censorship by human rights
groups, businesses, Chinese Internet users and others. Now they have earned a new label from the
American government: trade barrier. United States trade officials have for the first time added China’s
system of Internet filters and blocks — broadly known as the Great Firewall — to an annual list of trade
impediments. The entry says that over the last decade, the limits have “posed a significant burden to
foreign suppliers, hurting both Internet sites themselves and users who often depend on them for
business.” The move, which isn’t likely to have immediate repercussions, speaks to the American
government’s growing concern over Chinese Internet regulations and could foreshadow more
aggressive actions. It also underscores the opposing visions the world’s two largest economies have on how the Internet should work and be managed.
The United States argues against overt censorship and policies that block the flow of data across
borders. China has been pushing its agenda that each state should have the right to closely control what websites are available within its borders. The report
from the Office of the United States Trade Representative said that over the last year, the “outright blocking of websites appears to have worsened,” noting that
eight of the
top 25 most popular global sites are blocked in China. “Much of the blocking appears arbitrary; for example, a major
home improvement site in the United States, which would appear wholly innocuous, is typical of sites likely swept up by the Great Firewall,” the report said.
China blocks some of the biggest corporate names on the Internet, including services offered by Google,
Facebook and Twitter. That can hobble the ability of foreign companies to do business in China, whether through blocked websites or workplaces that
cannot reach Gmail, Google’s email service. China also blocks a growing number of foreign news outlets, including the
website of The New York Times. Officials at China’s commerce and foreign affairs ministries, as well as at its top Internet regulatory agency, did
not respond to requests for comment. In recent years, China and the United States have clashed over trade in the technology industry. Last year, the Obama
administration responded to lobbying from American companies against a number of Chinese laws that the companies said were devised to push them out of China.
Beijing toned down language in an antiterrorism law, and it scrapped a regulation restricting what foreign hardware could be sold to Chinese banks. Still,
any
effort by the United States to persuade China to reduce its Internet censorship would most likely be a
nonstarter. The Chinese government considers the close control of online discourse a matter of national
security, largely out of concerns about the Internet’s power to aid the organization of protests and the
spread of dissent. As a result, Beijing has shown little flexibility on issues of censorship, and it tends to block
any Internet media it feels it does not have complete control over. Scott Kennedy, deputy director of the Freeman Chair in
China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the move by the United States trade office illustrated the gulf between the attitude
represented by China’s heavy regulation of the Internet and the one put forward by the United States through trade agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
“China is far less willing to separate commercial and national security concerns,” he wrote in an email. “This
difference in approach is unlikely
to disappear anytime soon, no matter how much the U.S. highlights the issue.” China cites the threat of
online espionage, pointing to disclosures by Edward J. Snowden, the former National Security Agency
contractor, that showed American intelligence efforts to use American hardware abroad to gather
information. Online filters in China create an Internet largely walled off from the rest of the world,
violating the fundamental idea of the web as an open channel of communication among people across
the globe. Detractors say that the practice is anticompetitive, prohibits freedom of expression and ultimately damages Chinese economic growth by limiting
access to information. Supporters of China’s policies say that the rules have allowed the country to foster a thriving set of domestic Internet companies. The United
States trade office added China’s Internet censorship policies to its annual National Trade Estimate Report, released on March 31. The insertion was reported on
April 1 by Inside U.S. Trade, a trade publication. American
trade officials have scrutinized the Great Firewall in the past. In
2011, the United States trade office said that China’s filters were a commercial barrier that hurt
American small businesses. The statement was among the formal questions submitted through the World Trade Organization to China about what
laws and regulations dictated the availability of commercial websites in the country. Some of the largest American Internet companies
and foreign trade groups have long lobbied the United States to treat censorship as a trade matter. For
instance, in 2008, Google’s deputy general counsel testified before a Senate subcommittee that the United States government should make the matter a central
issue in trade talks.
China continuously violates WTO standards for imported publications- another major
trade dispute not focused on by affirmative.
Hufbauer in 2007[Gary; former deputy assistant secretary for international trade and investment
policy of the US Treasury; “Three US-China Trade Disputes”; PIIE; 5/2/2007;
https://piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/three-us-china-trade-disputes]
In April 2007, the USTR(US trade rep) announced the filing of two WTO
cases against China (consultations are the initial step; see the description of the Subsidies case for the WTO timeline).6 The first case involves Chinese
restrictions on market access for publications and audio/video products. These restrictions are claimed
to violate China's Accession Protocol to the WTO, and its national treatment obligation. The United States argues that China's
continued reservation of the right to import publications and audio/video products to state trading enterprises is at
odds with China's WTO Accession Protocol. The United States also claims that China restricts the right of
foreign companies to distribute these products within China, through measures that favor state-owned enterprises, in violation
of the national treatment principle under GATS. The second case centers on alleged deficiencies in
China's IPR regime. While the underlying complaint is weak enforcement of IPR, the US claims are expressed in terms of shortcomings in China's legal regime. The United
States asserts that, in its details, the Chinese regime does not meet the obligations of the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The United States argues that the quantitative threshold
which must be met in order to initiate criminal prosecutions of IPR infringement allows large scale piracy and
WTO Intellectual Property Rights Cases Description.
counterfeiting by street vendors. The United States argues that Chinese rules allow the disposal of infringing goods through normal market channels, to the detriment of the IPR holder. The
The United States
claims that Chinese law in certain cases does not prosecute unauthorized reproduction of copyrighted
works unless reproduction is accompanied by unauthorized distribution.
United States claims that China denies copyright protection to imported works awaiting censorship review, and that these are often pirated during the waiting period.
ZTE
Chinese phone supplier ZTE found guilty of dealing with US enemies – China urges US
to drop the issue
Alan Burkitt-Gray, March 8, 2016, “US threatens trade war on ZTE over Iran,” Global Telecoms
Business,
http://proxy.library.umkc.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.umkc.edu/docview/1
779803272?accountid=14589 Accessed 6/26/16 BE
ZTE and shadow companies 'acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the US',
says US Department of Commerce A trade war between China and the US is on the verge of breaking
out over the US Department of Commerce's new rules that could cripple ZTE's exports to many - if not
all - parts of the world. The DoC has unearthed alleged ZTE documents that date back to 2011 in which
the Chinese telecoms vendor apparently describes how to set up a series of shell companies in order to
evade restrictions on exporting equipment containing US hardware and software to Iran. The Chinese
Foreign Ministry hit back sharply, with official spokesperson Hong Lei criticising the US in his daily press conference in Beijing. "The
Chinese side is firmly opposed to the US using domestic laws to place sanctions on Chinese companies," said Hong. "The Chinese side urges the
US side to call off the wrong action lest it should jeopardise economic cooperation and relationship
between China and the US." The DoC is saying that ZTE included components from US companies including chipmakers Qualcomm and Intel in the
equipment it supplies to TIC, the Iranian Ministry of ICT's Telecommunications Infrastructure Company. An Intel spokesperson said: "I can
confirm that ZTE is an Intel customer but other than that we have nothing to add." Qualcomm has not yet responded
to a request for comment. Senior executives of ZTE and TIC have been contacted and said they would comment, but have not yet done so. Other companies that
face being affected include Broadcom and IBM. ZTE
suspended trading of its shares on the Hong Kong and Shenzhen
exchanges on Monday in response to the reports. They are still suspended. The DoC lists ZTE and three other
related entities as being subject to its sanctions: Beijing 8 Star International Co, based in the Chinese
capital, Shenzhen-based ZTE Kangxun Telecommunications, and Tehran-based ZTE Parsian. All four are
covered by the US Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and the DoC says there is a "presumption of denial" of any request for
an export licence from the US authorities. The DoC says: "The US Government has determined that the four entities are
acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States." Its statement adds:
"The EAR imposes additional licensing requirements on, and limits the availability of most licence
exceptions for, exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) to those listed." That seems to imply that all use of US
hardware and software by ZTE is now covered by the DoC's regulations - and not just in kit destined for Iran. That could severely hurt ZTE's
export business, at least until it is able to source hardware and software from other sources, including
Chinese industry. Two documents from 2011 leaked to Reuters in Hong Kong immediately before the DoC's new restrictions seem to show that ZTE set up
a structure of shadow companies. One document states: "As our overseas businesses have grown rapidly in recent years, so have US export control risks. Following
director Tian and director Qiu's instructions, our company should immediately form a company-level export control project team to study, handle, and respond to
our company's current export control risks." Tian Wenguo, identified as a signatory of the document, is executive vice president of ZTE; the other signatory is Guo
Xiaoming, chief legal officer of the company. Shi Lirong, the CEO, is identified as having approved the document on 2 September 2011. The
other
document explicitly warns that if ZTE violates US restrictions, the US government "might carry out civil
and criminal punishments against US suppliers, which will lead to increased difficulty for our company to
obtain the relevant US technologies and components". It is not immediately clear whether the English versions of the documents which are also available in Chinese - are officially from ZTE. The 2011 document explains that the DoC classifies countries into
a number of categories, including group Z which are said to be "state sponsors of terrorism". The ZTE
document says: "Our company is conducting large amount of business in Z group countries such as YL
and GB" - believed to be codes for Iran and Cuba.
General
US accuses China of currency manipulation – China won’t let failing industries fail and
will cheat to prevent unemployment, complaints of lack of transparency, investment
imbalance
WSJ, 6-2-2016, Ian Talley and Mark Magnier, “U.S.-China Trade Troubles Grow,” Wall Street Journal,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-china-trade-troubles-grow-1464887897 Accessed 6/8/16 BE
The U.S. and China, facing mounting political pressures at home, are seeing economic tensions flare to
their worst point in years over currency and trade practices. China has pushed the yuan to a five-year
low against the dollar, reviving charges from American firms of currency manipulation to gain a competitive
advantage for Chinese goods. The Obama administration has fired off a series of trade complaints and
levied duties on several Chinese industries, from chicken feet to cold-rolled steel used in appliances and auto parts. The friction
between the world’s two largest economies could worsen as domestic politics collide with already weak
growth. The U.S., seeing heightened anti-China rhetoric in the presidential election, wants China to press ahead with promised
policies to open up its markets and allow greater international investment. Chinese leaders, worried about a
deeper economic slowdown, are trying to keep factories humming and prevent the kind of market unrest that
gripped global investors over the past year. U.S. Treasury and State Department officials fly to Beijing early next week for two days of talks
to try to calm some of the trade irritants and address ongoing geopolitical tensions, particularly over the South China Sea, where their militaries are operating in
sometimes dangerous proximity. The
U.S., which moved on Wednesday to cut off North Korea from the banking system,
wants Beijing to help rein in its increasingly belligerent ally. U.S. officials also will seek reassurance from
Chinese officials about moving ahead with promised reforms, such as restructuring state-owned enterprises and reducing
industrial overcapacity, and try to advance talks on an investment treaty. “Implementing this reform agenda—and resisting the urge to
hang on to an outdated growth model—offers the best formula for China to achieve an orderly transition and put its economy on a more sustainable footing,” said
Nathan Sheets, U.S. Treasury’s undersecretary for international affairs. China’s
Vice Finance Minister Zhu Guangyao, while acknowledging at a
media briefing Thursday major challenges for China’s economy, insisted Beijing would adhere to its reform agenda and
commitments made by the Group of 20 against competitive currency devaluation. Some analysts think President Xi
Jinping, wanting to consolidate power in the Communist Party ahead of a leadership transition next year, has paused reform efforts and instead is revving up the old
playbook of credit-fueled growth and infrastructure spending. His aim: Ensure economic stability and mollify rivals, they say. An attempt last year by Beijing to allow
markets to play a role in setting its exchange rate was mismanaged, adding to a summertime of woe for China’s financial markets and sparking global jitters. The
reaction surprised Chinese officials and created a headache for reformers. The
Chinese government is keeping steel mills, coal
plants and a host of manufacturing industries afloat despite dwindling demand and a tumble in
commodity prices that should have closed many. The U.S. recently slapped Chinese cold-rolled steel
imports with duties worth 267%, accusing the country of selling products below production cost. By
supporting excess production capacity, the Chinese government is “engaged in economic warfare
against the U.S.,” said John Ferriola, chief executive of North Carolina steel giant Nucor Corp. “Thousands of hardworking
Americans have lost their jobs because of these illegal, unfair trade practices.” The Chinese economy has
decelerated after decades of double-digit expansion. Growth is clocking in at 6.7%, its slowest pace since
the global financial crisis amid rising debt, growing labor unrest and factory output well above demand.
China acknowledges it has an excess-capacity problem. “But we have to prevent massive
unemployment,” Premier Li Keqiang said in March. When President Bill Clinton persuaded Congress to in 2000 to back China’s entry into the
World Trade Organization, the U.S. counted on expanded trade as the catalyst for political change in the Communist state. U.S. firms hoped to capitalize on the
industrialization of the world’s most populous nation. A decade and a half later, U.S. firms and voters are growing increasingly frustrated despite China’s promises to
open up the country. Cheaper
wages and costs pulled production out of the U.S., Chinese imports surged and
American manufacturing declined as a share of the economy. The U.S. trade deficit with China has
swollen to $365 billion, now about 2% of U.S. economic output. U.S. presidential contenders are
leveraging anger at China over lost jobs into potential votes. Many of the areas hit hardest by China’s rise have shown some of the
strongest support for Republican candidate Donald Trump, who has threatened to slap a 45% tariff on China as a
way to force a change in Beijing’s trade policies. The Obama administration points to the yuan’s broader
appreciation since 2005, renewed talks for a bilateral investment treaty and Beijing’s vows to allow
markets to play a greater role in the economy as proof that its diplomacy has yielded gains. But the
yuan's recent depreciation and continued obstacles to U.S. corporate access threaten to erode those
advances. “There’s a growing risk that if China remains closed, we’re going to see more and more concern about a
growing investment imbalance,” said Jeremie Waterman, a U.S. Chamber of Commerce executive overseeing China. China
says it also faces access problems in the U.S. Its firms complain of a complicated web of U.S. state and
federal laws and rules that are “not transparent enough” and of restrictions on Chinese investment in
areas deemed strategic, said Zhang Xiaoqiang, executive vice president of the China Center for International Economic Exchanges. Chinese
officials also are eyeing the U.S. political scene warily, concerned about making commitments the next
administration could backtrack on. Recent articles in China’s controlled media have raised questions
about who is in control of U.S. economic policy. “President Obama’s ability to implement has always been a bit weak,
and on the Chinese side now it may be the same,” said Jing Huang, a professor of U.S.-China relations at the National University
of Singapore.
Space
The structure of China’s space program means China says no. And even if China says
yes, their advancing military tech proves they don’t intend for interstellar bilateral
relations with the US
Inkster 13
(Nigel, Director of Transnational Threats and Political Risk at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and former director of operations and intelligence for
the British Secret Intelligence Service, Oct.-Nov. 2013, “Conflict Foretold: America and China,” Survival vol. 55 no. 5 Pgs. 12-13) Accessed 6/27/16 BE
China's space programme has a dynamic which is to some extent independent of the United States. The
rapid growth of Chinese ICT has driven an expansion of satellite capabilities, including efforts to establish the
Beidou system as a competitor to the United States' GPS. China also sees space research as critical to promoting
scientific and engineering breakthroughs that will have an impact on economic development. The same
economic development rationale, which is imposing severe sf rains on earth-based natural resources, is likely to
drive Chinese ambitions to begin the exploitation of space-based minerals. And the importance of national prestige
as a driver for China's space programme cannot be overlooked. Beijing has repeatedly emphasised the
peaceful nature of this programme and has long campaigned for an international treaty banning the development of weapons in
space.'^ But the dynamics of the security dilemma make it hard for the United States to take such
protestations at face value, as evidenced by statements such as that contained in the 2003 US Department of Defense's annual report
to Congress: Publicly, China opposes the militarization of space and seeks to prevent or slow the development of anti-satellite (ASAT) systems
and space-based ballistic missile defences. Privately, however, China's leaders probably view ASATS - and offensive counterspace systems in
general - as well as space-based missile defences as inevitabilities."" More recently, a
report by Project 2049 ^or the US-China
Economic and Security Review Commission stated: • China's space ambitions are in part peaceful in
nature. Yet technologies can also be used with ill-intent, and military applications of dual-use space
technology are a principal concern: space technology increases the capacity of the PLA [People's Liberation
Army] to project power vertically into space and horizontally beyond its immediate periphery.''
US-China Relations
Low Now
US and China tensions increase because of South China Sea conflict
Benner 16
Tom Benner (journalist with experience in mass communication), 6/5/16, "Tensions
escalate over South China Sea claims," Aljazeera,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/tensions-escalate-south-china-sea-claims160605065515637.html
Singapore - Asia's largest defence summit concluded on Sunday amid growing fears of a legal and military
showdown in the South China Sea over China's rapid construction of artificial islands with ports, airstrips and helipads in one of the
world's most bitterly contested waterways. At the weekend-long Shangri-La Dialogue , Chinese military officials vowed to ignore
a legal ruling expected in the next few weeks by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague on a Philippines' challenge to
China's growing assertiveness in the key sea route between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. "We do not make trouble, but we
have no fear of trouble," said Admiral Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army,
who led the Chinese delegation at the summit. Sun added: "China will not bear with the arbitration
award, nor will it allow any infringement of its sovereignty." The Hague court is expected to rule on the legality of the socalled "nine-dash line", China's cartographic marker that it uses to claim territorial rights over most of the resource-rich sea. China's claimed
sovereignty stretches hundreds of kilometres to the south and east of its most southerly province of Hainan, covering hundreds of disputed
islands and reefs. The nine-dash line, first shown on a 1947 Chinese map, carves out an area that runs deep into the maritime heart of
Southeast Asia, and overlaps claims from Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. China has boycotted The Hague tribunal's
proceedings and instead wants bilateral talks with rival claimants, all of which lack China's economic and military prowess. Meanwhile, the
US has stepped up military patrols and exercises in the South China Sea, and pledges to ensure freedom
of navigation and flight - acts that China considers provocative and targeted at its sovereignty and
security interests. The increased patrols of US littoral combat ships, jet fighters, and surveillance planes near Chinese-held islands come
as China is reportedly close to imposing an Air Defence Identification Zone, which would require civilian aircraft to identify themselves to
military controllers in the region. Beijing made a similar declaration two years ago in the East China Sea over several islands contested by Japan.
On Saturday, US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter told the summit that China's
militarisation of the South China Sea is
destabilising the region, and urged it to abide by the pending international tribunal legal ruling. Asia Pacific defence ministers gather
for annual summit "Countries across the region have been taking action and voicing concerns publicly and
privately, at the highest levels, in regional meetings, and global fora," Carter said. "As a result, China's
actions in the South China Sea are isolating it at a time when the entire region is coming together and
networking. Unfortunately, if these actions continue, China could end up erecting a Great Wall of selfisolation." While calling for diplomatic and legal solutions to the territorial disputes, Carter warned that the US will continue to
"fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows". Carter also warned that Chinese construction on a South China
Sea islet claimed by the Philippines would lead to "actions being taken" by the US and other nations, but he did not elaborate. Major-
General Yao Yunzhu, of the People's Liberation Army, speaking at the summit on Saturday, said the US military's presence in
the disputed waters are unwarranted and could be interpreted as "battlefield preparations". "China has
said many times that freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is not in trouble at all," said Yao, who is
also a senior researcher at the PLA's Academy of Military Science. She added, "I don't think any state has the right to impose
its own understanding of freedom of navigation as a universal rule and label those who do not agree as
a default violator of freedom of navigation or even a violator of the rule-based international maritime
order." Duterte vows to settle South China Sea dispute Yao also defended China's nine-dash line, which critics say is legally ambiguous. She
said it allows "China and other claimants to have more room to manoeuvre and to have more room to compromise." The US and China traded
harsh accusations in May after what the Pentagon said was an "unsafe" encounter between two Chinese fighter jets and a US military
reconnaissance aircraft flying over the South China Sea. While territorial disputes in the waters date back in some cases for centuries, China has
created islands and installed military hardware at a rapid pace and now asserts sovereignty over most of the 3.5 million-square-kilometre
waterway. Last month, a Pentagon report claimed China has added more than 1,300 hectares of land over two years in the Spratly Islands
archipelago. "China often uses a progression of small, incremental steps to increase its effective control over disputed territories and avoid
escalation to military conflict," the report stated. Chinese Defence Ministry spokesman Yang Yujun, quoted by the Associated Press following
the report's release, called it "hyped up" and expressed "strong dissatisfaction" with its findings. Tensions
in the South China Sea
are expected to drive up Asia-Pacific defence spending by nearly 25 percent from 2015 to $533bn in 2020, according security
think-tank IHS Jane's. "By 2020, the centre of gravity of the global defence spending landscape is expected to
have continued its gradual shift away from the developed economies of Western Europe and North
America, and towards emerging markets, particularly in Asia," said Paul Burton, director of IHS Jane's.
High Now
US and China working to ensure cooperation and avoid conformation with South
China Sea conflict
Yuting 16
6/6/16, Su Yuting (Reporter for China Central Television), “Xi Jinping: China, US to
further cooperation”, China Central Television, June 6, 2016, Accessed: 6/25/16
http://english.cctv.com/2016/06/06/VIDETuSZdIa9okuXuh9Vv9jU160606.shtml
President Xi Jinping has given a speech at the Joint Opening Ceremony of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue and the High-level Consultation
Both China and the US have showed the will to strengthen
cooperation and address differences. Enhancing cooperation and avoiding
confrontation. That notion has been reaffirmed during the dialogue. In a speech at the Joint Opening
Ceremony, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of consultation and
communication to expand mutual trust and consensus. "Thanks to our concerted efforts, our two countries
on People-to-People Exchange.
have cooperated at bilateral, regional and global levels in a wide range of areas, and registering new programmes in our relations. We
witnessed record highs in trade and two-way investments, enjoyed closer people-to-people and sub-national exchanges, and made new
headway in cooperation in cyberspace, law enforcement and military exchanges. We issued three joint statements on climate change and
worked together with other countries for the conclusion of the historic Paris agreement," Xi said. US Secretary of State John Kerry said the
progress made on climate change is a very clear example of a benefit that arose from dialogue between China and the US. He also added that
it's vital to use this meeting to constructively deal with contentious issues, ranging from cyber security to the territorial disputes over the South
The US will make it clear that we are looking for a peaceful resolution to the
disputes of the South China Sea. We urged all nations to find a diplomatic solution... in
rule of law," said John Kerry, US Secretary of State. US Treasury Secretary Jack Lew said he supports China's
China Sea. "
efforts to reduce excess industrial capacity, improve data and regulatory transparency, and lower barriers to trade and investment. "Together,
. Our countries have an
enormous stake in each other's economic success. And, as the world's two largest
economies, our policies and economic management will not only shape the prosperity
of the our own peoples,, they will structurally shape the health and development of the
global economy as well," said Jack Lew, US Treasury Secretary. Strategic mutual trust,
economic and trade cooperation, and people-to-people exchanges are crucial to the
development of China-US ties. The world's two largest economies seek a relationship
that is not defined by confrontation, but by practical cooperation on common
challenges, and the constructive management of differences. And that will not only
benefit both countries, but the entire world as well.
the US and China account for a third of global GDP and nearly 40 percent of recent global growth
US and China working to maintain stability and increase cooperation
Xinhua, Liping 16
6/6/616, Xinhua News Agency (official press agency of the People's Republic of China),
Gu Liping (Editor at ECNS), “President Xi urges China, U.S. to deepen mutual trust,
cooperation”, Official English-language website of China News Service, June 6, 2016,
Accessed: 6/25/16
http://www.ecns.cn/2016/06-06/213389.shtml
President Xi Jinping on Monday urged China and the United States to properly manage
differences and sensitive issues and deepen strategic mutual trust and cooperation at a highlevel bilateral dialogue. The differences between China and the United States are normal, Xi said at the joint opening ceremony of
the eighth round of China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogues (S&ED) and the seventh round of China-U.S. High-Level Consultation on
People-to-People Exchange (CPE) in Beijing. As
long as the two sides tackle differences and sensitive issues in
the principle of mutual respect and equality, major disturbances in bilateral relations can be
avoided, Xi said, adding that China and the United States should strengthen communication and
cooperation on Asia-Pacific affairs. The broad Pacific Ocean, Xi said, should not become an
arena for rivalry, but a big platform for inclusive cooperation. China and the United States have
extensive common interests in the region and should maintain frequent dialogues, cooperate more, tackle
challenges, jointly maintain prosperity and stability in the region, and "cultivate common circles
of friends" rather than "cultivate exclusive circles of friends," Xi said. He reaffirmed that China pursues
neighborhood diplomacy featuring amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness, and has always been committed to bolstering peace,
stability and development of the Asia-Pacific region. He
said all countries share intertwined interests amid multipolarization, economic globalization and social informatization. China and the United States
should strengthen their mutual trust through regular communication in order to avoid strategic
misjudgment, he said. The Chinese president also called on the two sides to expand mutually beneficial cooperation, uphold the win-win
principle, and raise the level of bilateral cooperation. He urged both countries to strengthen coordination on their macroeconomic polices,
jointly work toward positive outcomes at the G20 Hangzhou summit, and reach a reciprocal bilateral investment treaty at an early date.
China and the United States should also deepen cooperation in the areas of climate change,
development, Internet, nonproliferation, military and law enforcement, and enhance
communication and coordination on major global and regional issues, Xi added. The president stressed that
China will unswervingly pursue the path of peaceful development and promote the building of
a new model of international relations with win-win cooperation at its core. China stands ready
to strengthen cooperation with all countries to safeguard the international order and global
system built on the UN Charter, and make the international order more just and reasonable, he
said. China is confident about meeting its fixed goals for economic and social development, Xi said, adding that the country will provide more
opportunities to the world and cooperate more closely with all countries, including the United States. On people-to-people exchanges, Xi called
on both sides to deepen the friendship between the two peoples and facilitate bilateral interactions in various sectors. The S&ED is co-chaired
by Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang and State Councilor Yang Jiechi, with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew
on Monday and Tuesday, while Chinese Vice Premier Liu Yandong co-chairs the CPE with Kerry.
China’s president wants to continue working with the US because of the value seen in
collaboration
Rudd 15
(Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister of Australia with a Bachelor of Arts in Asian Studies from
the Australian National University in Canberra), “U.S.-China 21: The Future of U.S.-China
Relations Under Xi Jinping,” Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
April 2015, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf
For Xi, China must seize the moment of “extended strategic opportunity,” following ten wasted years when necessary reforms were postponed,
and corruption allowed to run rampant. China’s domestic policy needs are now integrally bound up with the country’s foreign policy direction.
In Xi’s worldview, an increasingly “rich and powerful” China must now start playing a much bigger role in
the world. No longer will China “hide its strength, bide its time, and never take the lead” (taoguang yanghui, juebu dangtou 韬光 养晦 决不
当头), Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy mantra for decades. China must now pursue an “activist” (fenfa youwei 奋发有为)
foreign policy that maximizes China’s economic and security interests, and one that begins to engage in
the longer-term reform of the global order. Xi speaks for the first time of China’s “grand strategy”
needing to embrace “a new great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics” (you zhongguo tese de xinxing
daguo waijiao 有中国特色的新型大国外交), in order to craft a “new type of great power relations” (xinxing daguo guanxi
新型大国关系) with the United States.2 Xi, in short, is not a status quo politician. He is the exact reverse. And in pursuing his sense of
national mission and personal destiny, he is prepared to take calculated risks in a traditionally risk-averse Communist Party culture. Xi Jinping’s
sense of personal and national urgency is animated by a formidable, Confucian work ethic, which he also expects of his Party colleagues and
policy advisors. He is results-driven. He is frustrated by the interminable processes of the Chinese bureaucracy, and its predisposition for
formulaic responses to real policy challenges. He is very much a man in a hurry. For these several reasons, Xi, unlike his predecessor, has the
personal authority and policy flexibility to be a potentially dynamic interlocutor with the United States, albeit always within the framework of
his nationalist vision for China’s future, and his definitive conclusions concerning the continuing role of China’s one-party state. When,
therefore, Xi
uses the term “win-win” (shuangying 双赢) to describe his desired relationship with the U.S., it
should not be simply discarded as a piece of Chinese propaganda. Xi does see potential value in strategic
and political collaboration with the United States. In short, there is still reasonable foreign and security
policy space for the U.S. administration to work within in its dealings with Xi Jinping, although it is an open
question how long it will be before policy directions are set in stone, and the window of opportunity begins to close. I argue that Xi is capable of
bold policy moves, even including the possibility of grand strategic bargains on intractable questions such as the denuclearization and peaceful
re-unification of the Korean Peninsula. It is up to America to use this space as creatively as it can while it still lasts.
Cyber issues won’t spill over – Both countries working to resolve
Joshua Kurlantzick, 16, 4-27-2016, Can the United States and China De-conflict in Cyberspace?, Council on Foreign Relations, Accessed
form http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/can-united-states-china-de-conflict-cyberspace/p37827 on 6-26-2016 -O'Brien
In spite of significant differences in views, Beijing
and Washington appear committed to not letting cyber issues
derail the U.S.-China relationship or interfere with cooperation on other high-profile issues. Among the wide
range of issues raised at their recent meeting on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit, Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping
reiterated their commitment to last September’s breakthrough cybersecurity agreement. The agreement included important
cybersecurity measures, including a pledge to refrain from stealing intellectual property or trade secrets
to give domestic companies a competitive advantage. Both sides also agreed to identify and endorse
norms of behavior in cyberspace and to establish two high-level working groups and a hotline for crisis
response. The success and ultimate implications of which have yet to be determined and the two sides work cautiously to build greater
collaboration in cyberspace.
US china relations will remain strong – climate talks prove
Schell 15, How China and the U.S. became unlikely climate allies, Greenbiz, October 20, 2015.Orville Schell is Arthur Ross Director of the
Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia Society and former dean of the University of California, Berkeley’s Graduate School of Journalism.
Accessed 10/30/15 from http://www.greenbiz.com/article/how-china-and-us-became-unlikely-climate-allies -O’Brien
Both leaders
promised "to move ahead decisively to implement domestic climate policies, to strengthen bilateral
coordination and cooperation, and to promote sustainable development and the transition to green,
low-carbon and climate-resilient economies.Ӧ China agreed to match the U.S. by pledging $3.1 billion
to help developing countries meet the climate change challenge and then went the U.S. one better: It promised
to expand its seven experimental carbon markets into a nationwide cap-and-trade carbon emissions trading
system.¶ The U.S.-China relationship turned out to be an unexpected vessel into which despairing
climate change activists could place their hopes. But climate change also proved to be an unexpected
providence for the increasingly fraught U.S.-China relationship.
US relations with China are increasing in strength, despite what many think
Fingar, Jishe 13
Thomas Fingar and Fan Jishe (Thomas Fingar is the Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow at
Stanford University’s Institute for International Studies and former Chairman of the National
Intelligence Council (NIC). Fan Jishe is a Senior Fellow in the Institute of American Studies at the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)), 2013, “Ties that Bind: Strategic Stability in the
U.S.–China Relationship”, The Washington Quarterly
Conviction is widespread and increasing in both the United States and China—as well as many other countries—
that the U.S.–China relationship is becoming less stable and more dangerous.1 We do not agree.
Relations between Beijing and Washington in 2013 are more extensive, more varied, more
interdependent, and more important to one another as well as to the global system than at any time in
the past. But suspicion and mutual distrust persist and may have intensified. Yet, despite dramatic changes in the
international system and the need to manage fleeting as well as persistent problems, the United States
and China have maintained strategic stability for four decades. The relationship is less fragile and volatile
than many assert, with strategic stability the result of multiple factors that reinforce one another and limit the deleterious effects of
developments threatening specific “pillars” that undergird the relationship.2 Complacency and failure to address misperceptions and mistrust,
however, will have unfortunate consequences for both sides.
Bilateral relations between the US and China are growing- which means more
cooperation
Zhu 07
Zhiqun Zhu (assistant professor and chair of international political economy and
diplomacy at the University of Bridgeport, Connecticut.), 2-1-2007, "China and the
United States: Learning to Live Together.: EBSCOhost," Global Dialogue, pg.28
Just as marriages need to be nurtured, so do state-to-state relationships.
With nearly monthly contacts among senior US
and Chinese officials and regular strategic dialogues, Beijing and Washington are institutionalising their
interactions. Bilateral contact is much deeper, wider, and more systematic than it has ever been. China
and the United States need to focus on broad, long-term goals rather than politically sensitive shortterm issues. Chinese leaders should be encouraged and prodded, not pressured and lectured. China's thirst for energy is a development
problem shared by a growing number of countries. Even without China, energy demands from India and other emerging markets are expected
to jump drastically in the next few decades. So for the United States and the international community, how to help developing countries reduce
the cost of modernisation and improve energy efficiency has become a serious challenge.
China's rise does not imply America's
decline. For the foreseeable future, the two powers will coexist in the world. China, with its proclaimed
harmonious diplomacy, is not seeking to challenge America's supremacy in world affairs. The most critical
issue in their bilateral ties in the new century will probably not be Taiwan or trade, but determining and abiding by their respective roles in the
international political economy.
They must form a long-term vision for the future of their relations. The SinoAmerican relationship is no longer just of bilateral significance. It now has deep regional and global
implications. Good relations between the world's only superpower and the largest rising power are
absolutely essential for maintaining global peace and prosperity in the twenty-first century. China and
the United States have no alternative but to co-operate towards this end.
Resilient
Despite differences, US and China overcome disputes peacefully
Shaohui 16
Tian Shaohui (Editor at Xinhua), 6-7-2016, "Xi pledges to promote China, U.S. relations,
expand cooperation," Xinhua, Accessed: 6/26/16
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-06/07/c_135420097.htm
BEIJING, June 7 (Xinhua) -- President
Xi Jinping on Tuesday called on his country and the United States to
promote the healthy and stable development of ties through increased exchanges and
cooperation. Xi made the remarks here while meeting with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew, who
attended the eighth round of China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogues and the seventh round of China-U.S. High-Level Consultation on
People-to-People Exchange. Xi stressed that three
years ago, he and U.S. President Barack Obama agreed to
work together to build a new model of major-country relations between the two sides. The
development of bilateral ties over the following three years indicates that the path is in line
with the fundamental interests of the two peoples and the world, he said. The president called
on both sides to focus on cooperation, manage their differences properly and promote the
healthy and stable development of China-U.S. relations. On macro-economic policies, Xi suggested the two
countries strengthen policy coordination, strive for more positive outcomes at the G20 Hangzhou summit, and inject new impetus into the
world economy. He suggested that both countries make the most of cooperation potential in the areas of trade and investment, clean energy,
and environmental protection, adding that they should strengthen communication and coordination on major global and regional issues.
Referring to divergence, Xi
said the two countries should respect each other's core interests and major
concerns, and settle problems through dialogue and consultation. Kerry and Lew said the
United States would like to work with China to ensure the G20 Hangzhou summit is a success, adding that
Obama welcomes a stable and prosperous China. Effective cooperation between the two
nations on major issues such as climate change indicated the significance of the U.S.-China
relationship, they said. The two U.S. officials agreed the United States and China have extensive
cooperation potential, and could solve differences properly
US China relations keep proving resilient – policy understanding, communication
Cui Tiankai, Ambassador of the PRC to the US, May 8, 2016, “Making the Right Choices China-U.S.
Relations at a Critical Point,” Brookings Institute,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/speeches/2015/05/china-us-relations-at-a-criticalpoint.pdf Accessed 6/25/16 BE
It is a real pleasure to come to Sunnylands again. There is no better place in America to host this forum. Three
years ago next month, our leaders,
President Xi and President Obama, had their first presidential meeting here. It was the beginning of a new model of
presidential dialogue, one with less formality and fewer aides but greater candor and a clearer focus on issues of strategic importance. Such top-level
communication has now become a prominent feature of our relationship, from Sunnylands to Yingtai, from the Blair
House to the recent Nuclear Security Summit. It has enabled our leaders to build up a good mutual understanding not only
of priorities and policies, but also of each other as people. Thanks to the strong guidance of our two presidents and the joint efforts
of both sides, the
China-U.S. relationship in the last three years has withstood one test after another and
has by and large moved forward on a positive and stable track. Today, our bilateral cooperation is more extensive
and comprehensive than what is usually reported in the media. The relationship is stronger and more
resilient than many people have realized.
US China relations positive and resilient – peaceful resolution to conflicts
Shannon Tiezzi, 4-1-2016, "Obama, Xi Put Positive Spin on US-China Relations," The Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/obama-xi-put-positive-spin-on-us-china-relations/
On Thursday, Obama and Xi had their first bilateral meeting this year, the latest face-to-face since talks on the sidelines of the UN Climate Change Conference in
Paris four months ago. Obama
began his remarks with Xi by repeating the long-standing position that “the United States
welcomes the rise of a peaceful, stable, and prosperous China.” Xi, meanwhile, reiterated that “it is a priority for
China’s foreign policy to work with the United States to build a new model of major country relations,
and to realize no conflicts or confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation.” Both those oft-repeated
statements have worn rather thin, thanks in part to increasingly assertive moves in the disputed waters of the South China Sea from Beijing, and increasingly barbed
verbal responses from U.S. military officials. Still, the two sides could — and did — point to some positive progress on nuclear security. In a joint statement on
nuclear security cooperation, the
U.S. and China pledged to deepen cooperation and coordination to prevent
nuclear smuggling and increase the security of nuclear materials. At a press briefing, Laura Holgate, added that Washington was
“really quite encouraged by the leadership that China is beginning to show in the nuclear security realm.” In another positive step, a new nuclear security Center of
Excellence opened in China earlier this month, at a ceremony attended by U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz. Moniz described the new center, the result of
close U.S.-China collaboration, as “a world-class facility for Chinese, regional, and international nuclear security training and technical exchanges.” Meanwhile,
White House officials were also quick to note China’s cooperation over the North Korean nuclear issue.
Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes pointed out that the recent UN Security Council sanctions – “the toughest
sanctions that have ever been imposed on North Korea” – would not have been possible “without
China’s cooperation and support.” “So we’ve seen China step up in many ways in terms of applying pressure,” Rhodes told reporters in a press
briefing on Wednesday. “The fact is, it has to over time affect the calculus of the North Korean leadership.” Despite the upbeat tone, questions remain about just
how coordinated China and the United States are in their approach toward North Korea. Beijing
strongly favors negotiations – including
peace treaty negotiations on a separate track from denuclearization talks – over sanctions, while the United States continues to emphasize the use of
pressure to eventually bring North Korea to the table. Daniel Kritenbrink, the senior director for Asia on the National
Security Council, called the North Korea question “one of the most important issues that President
Obama and President Xi [will] discuss.” During his remarks with Xi, Obama noted that “President Xi and I are both committed to the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the full implementation of UN sanctions.” He said the bilateral meeting would include discussions on how to
discourage provocations like missile tests. In another symbol of U.S.-China cooperation on global issues, Obama and Xi will also gather together Thursday, along
with the other leaders of the P5+1, to review progress on implementing the nuclear deal reached with Iran last year. Meanwhile, climate
change
continues to provide a bright spot for U.S.-China cooperation. In a joint statement, Obama and Xi announced
that the United States and China will both sign the Paris climate change agreement on April 22, and committed to
completing the domestic processes to join the agreement “as early as possible this year.” The statement also proclaimed that “climate
change has become a pillar of the U.S.-China bilateral relationship” and called cooperation in this field
“an enduring legacy of the partnership between our two countries.” The feel-good vibes on climate change might help to
somewhat mitigate what Obama predicted would be a “candid exchange” with Xi over human rights, cyber, and maritime issues. However, White House officials
appeared to be trying to downplay the South China Sea issue after weeks of sharp exchanges between the U.S. and China. Obama didn’t mention the South China
Sea in his brief remarks with Xi; he did not even repeat standard U.S. nods to the importance of freedom of navigation and peaceful settlement of disputes. In a
press briefing prior to the Obama-Xi meeting, Rhodes tried to emphasize that U.S. insistence on principles such as non-militarization and resolving disputes in
accordance with international law was “not to single out China.” Rhodes explained that non-militarization of the South China Sea, in particular, is “a principle that
we would support as it relates to any country.” U.S.-China
bilateral meetings generally try to stay positive – thus the issuance of a joint
statement on climate change, and more optimistic evaluations than usual on thorny issues like North Korea. Still, while handshakes and sunny joint statements can’t
paper over growing tensions, holding the meeting at all was a small victory. After all, Xi could have chosen to follow the example of Russian President Vladimir Putin
and skip the summit altogether.
The US and China hold vested interests in respectful relations- disputes are minor in
big picture.
White House Press Secretary in 2015[the Press secretary has immediate access to the POTUS
increasing knowledge and awareness on foreign policy; White House; 9/25/2015;
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-us-china-economic-relations]
The United States and China recognize their shared interest in promoting a strong and open global
economy, inclusive growth and sustainable development, and a stable international financial system, supported by the
multilateral economic institutions founded at the end of World War II that have benefited the peoples of both nations. Both countries recognize
and value the substantial contributions that the international financial institutions have made to global growth, higher incomes, the alleviation
of poverty, and the maintenance of financial stability since their establishment. The
rules-based international economic
system has helped to propel China’s unprecedented economic growth over the past 35 years, lifting
hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. The United States has also benefited from the emergence of a global middle
class that, by 2030, is projected to include more than 3 billion consumers in Asia alone. U.S. exports of goods and services supported
approximately 12 million jobs in the United States in 2014.
China has a strong stake in the maintenance and further
strengthening and modernization of global financial institutions, and the United States welcomes China's
growing contributions to financing development and infrastructure in Asia and beyond. The international
financial architecture has evolved over time to meet the changing scale, scope, and diversity of challenges and to include new institutions as
they incorporate its core principles of high standards and good governance. Both countries are committed to supporting this international
architecture and welcome the greater role of the G-20 in global economic governance to ensure an inclusive, resilient, and constantly improving
international economic architecture to meet challenges now and in the future.
In light of China’s increased share of global
economic activity and increased capacity, the United States welcomes China playing a more active role
in and taking on due responsibility for the international financial architecture, as well as expanded
bilateral cooperation to address global economic challenges.
US/China relations have become resilient through years of cooperation
Russel 14
Daniel R. Russel (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs), 6-252014, "The Future of U.S.-China Relations," U.S. Department of State, Accessed: 6/26/16
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/06/228415.htm
Overall Bilateral Relations This year marks the 35th anniversary of the establishment of official
diplomatic relations between the United States and China. We have made remarkable progress since the
era of back-channel messaging and secret trips. The scope of today’s U.S.-China relationship was
unimaginable when President Nixon made his historic visit in 1972 to China. Yet there is still enormous
potential for progress in the U.S.-China relationship. Progress that will yield benefits to the citizens of
both countries, our neighbors, and the world. To realize this progress and these benefits, we seek to
ensure that the relationship is not defined by strategic rivalry, but by fair and healthy competition, by
practical cooperation on priority issues, and by constructive management of our differences and
disagreements. Where interests overlap, we will seek to expand cooperation with China. These areas
include economic prosperity, a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, peaceful resolution of the Iranian
nuclear issue, and a reduction in the emission of greenhouse gases. Where they diverge – and we have
significant and well-known areas of disagreement – we will work to ensure that our differences are
constructively managed. Mr. Chairman, there are those who argue that cold war-like rivalry is inevitable
and that the United States and China are condemned to a zero-sum struggle for supremacy, if not
conflict. I reject such mechanistic thinking. As anyone who has served in government can tell you, this
deterministic analysis overlooks the role of leaders who have the ability to set policy and to shape
relationships. It gives short shrift to the fact that our two economies are becoming increasingly
intertwined, which increases each side’s stake in the success of the other. It undervalues the fact that
leaders in Washington and Beijing are fully cognizant of the risk of unintended strategic rivalry between
an emerging power and an established power and have agreed to take deliberate actions to prevent
such an outcome. And it ignores the reality of the past 35 years – that, in spite of our differences, U.S.China relations have steadily grown deeper and stronger – and in doing so, we have built a very resilient
relationship.
Cold War No Sim
Disagreements between China and the US will not spiral into another Cold War- arms
race and land control are no longer factors.
Crowley in 2014[Michael; writer for the Foreign Policy Association; “Why China Isn't the Next Soviet
Union”; US News; 6/20/2014; http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2014/06/20/auschina-cold-war-wont-happen]
What that more robust foreign policy means for Asia and the U.S. is the key question. Some in the U.S. advocate preparing for a great power
showdown along the lines of the Cold War. There
are, however, more differences than similarities between the current
state of Sino-U.S. relations and the Cold War model. First, relations between the two countries are not
built on struggles for territory stemming from a prior conflict, as the U.S. and Soviet Union struggled over postWorld War II Europe. Where China is catching up with the U.S. and no longer keen to “accede to U.S. hyper
power” (in the words of he report’s authors), the U.S. and Soviet Union were strategic rivals and peers from the
latter days of World War II. Second, while China is fast developing conventional military capabilities of a great power – for
example, a blue water navy – there is no razor’s-edge “arms race” or mutually-assured destruction dynamic
comparable to U.S.-Soviet competition over nuclear missile capability. Instead, China is looking, over time,
to marginalize U.S. influence in Asia.
No China War
General
No US-China war, Containment fails, Interdependence
Thomas J. Christensen, June 8, 2015, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs and Professor at Princeton University, “The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a
Rising Power,” Pg. 290, Accessed 6/25/2016 BE
In part because they see Sino-American conflict as nearly inevitable, prominent pessimists, such as John Mearsheimer, prescribe a U.S. – led containment effort
against a rising China. As discussed in Chapter 3, the periods from which pessimists tend to draw their theoretical lessons, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
were very different from the twenty-first century; now
a thick web of economic interdependence in the form of
transnational production links us all. Regional and global institutions also help ameliorate tensions. In the
meantime, all the great powers in the world either have nuclear weapons or are allied with a nuclear power.
Great powers have no incentive and no credible threat to invade and occupy each other as they had in
the past. Even if we were to accept Mearsheimer’s outdated logic about a zero-sum Sino-American power competition, an active attempt by
Washington to harm the Chinese economy and isolate China diplomatically whenever possible, as the United States did
to the Soviet Union in the Cold War era, would be extremely ill advised. A straightforward containment effort toward
China today would almost certainly fail because the United States would be extremely hard-pressed to enlist any other country in such an
effort, and an attempt to do so would likely cause irreparable damage to the U.S. alliance system in the
region and around the world. In a net assessment of the two nations’ relative power, the United States has many advantages, but there is no area
where that advantage is greater than the U.S. network of alliances and security partnerships in Asia and beyond. Throwing that advantage away under the banner of
enhancing American power would be as ironic as it were tragic.
US and China have no interests of using armed conflict- mutually assured destruction
Rudd 15
(Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister of Australia with a Bachelor of Arts in Asian Studies from
the Australian National University in Canberra), “U.S.-China 21: The Future of U.S.-China
Relations Under Xi Jinping,” Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
April 2015, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf
Xi Jinping is a nationalist. And China, both the U.S. and China’s neighbors have concluded, is displaying newfound assertiveness in pursuing its
hard security interests in the region. But there
is, nonetheless, a very low risk of any form of direct conflict involving the
armed forces of China and the U.S. over the next decade. It is not in the national interests of either
country for any such conflict to occur; and it would be disastrous for both, not to mention for the rest of
the world. Despite the deep difficulties in the relationship, no Cold War standoff between them yet
exists, only a strategic chill. In fact, there is a high level of economic inter-dependency in the
relationship, which some international relations scholars think puts a fundamental brake on the possibility of any open hostilities. Although
it should be noted the U.S. is no longer as important to the Chinese economy as it once was.
No china war – the high cost, mutually assured destruction, and asymmetry of military
power all check
Leslie H. Gelb, 13, President Emeritus and Board Senior Fellow at counsil of foreign relations, 9-9-2013, Is a military conflict between China
and the United States possible in the future?, Council on Foreign Relations, Accessed form http://www.cfr.org/china/military-conflict-betweenchina-united-states-possible-future/p31361 on 6-26-2016 -O'Brien
The stakes are much too high for either Beijing or Washington to expect direct military confrontations.
Two-way trade and investment are quite high. China holds almost $1.2 trillion in American debt. By contrast,
during the Cold War, the United States had virtually no economic ties with the Soviet Union—and both
sides still went out of their way to avoid war because of the dangers of escalation into nuclear war. The
nightmare of nuclear war hangs over the Chinese-American relationship today. It is clear neither side wants
to come anywhere near this ultimate danger. None of this is to say that both sides will not continue to build up their military
capability. No country is adding to its military punch faster than China. But it is still far behind the United States [US] in
usable military capability, that is, force that can be applied effectively and decidedly in various situations. Chinese military
strength is limited almost entirely to lands and seas bordering its own territory. The United States [US] is
still the only global military power. And it is difficult to see what Beijing might calculate is worth a war or
even the risk of war. It has boundary disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines and others in the South China Sea, and with Japan up north.
Troubles should be expected there, and China will certainly be testing Washington's will in both places. Chinese leaders, however,
continue to focus on their nation's economic development, and war would certainly set that back.
No escalation of war -- Mutually assured destruction checks
Dowding, Keith, 11, Encyclopedia of Power, No Publication, Keith Martin Dowding, is Professor of Political Science in Research School of
Social Sciences at the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia arriving from the London School of Economics, UK in 2007.Accessed
from http://web.b.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.umkc.edu/ehost/ebookviewer/ebook/ZTAwMHhuYV9fNDc0MjkzX19BTg2?sid=9e54f4e0-898249d6-8e92-a3e3af857adc@sessionmgr106&vid=0&format=EB&rid=1 on 6-26-2016 -O'Brien
The term mutually assured
destruction (MAD) was used starting in the mid-1960s by American policy makers and strategists
to describe a situa-tion in which the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
each possessed the capacity to retaliate with a devastat-ing nuclear attack on the other, even in circumstances in which the retaliator had been struck first in a surprise nuclear attack. The term denoted a form of strategic stability
in which neither side would initiate a nuclear attack for fear of retribu-tion. The barely imaginable power
of nuclear weapons was stalemated by mutual capability. The concept guided how some American decisionmakers saw
the relationship between technology and strategy and in particular how ostensibly defensive measures, such as antiballistic missiles (ABMs),
were thought to weaken stability. The idea of assured destruction became associated with Robert McNamara, the highly influential secretary of
defense in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The acronym for Mutually Assured Destruction—MAD—became a focus for critics of
McNamara’s policies on both the Left and Right. Opponents of nuclear weapons, includ-ing those in Europe, took the acronym as an indi-cator
of the insanity of nuclear war.¶ The “father of the atomic bomb,” Robert
Oppenheimer, had previously likened the two
superpowers to two scorpions in a bottle, each capable of killing the other but only at risk to its own life.
Yet, for a decade or more after the Soviets first tested their atomic bomb in 1949, the United States possessed overwhelming numerical
superior-ity in nuclear weaponry over the Soviet Union. Indeed, until the early 1960s, the United States might well have been able to wreak
devastation on the USSR without suffering direct retaliation. With the development of long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
however, the Soviet abil-ity to attack the United States was increasingly apparent.
US and China won’t go to war because of nuclear weapons and geography.
Keck in 2013[Zachary; former intern for the Center for a New American Security and in the U.S.
Congress, where he worked on defense issues; “Why China and the US (Probably) Won’t Go to War”;
The Diplomat; international news source covering politics in the Asia-Pacific region; 7/12/2013;
http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/why-china-and-the-us-probably-wont-go-to-war/]
a U.S.-China war is virtually unthinkable because of two other factors: nuclear weapons
and geography. The fact that both the U.S. and China have nuclear weapons is the most obvious
reasons why they won’t clash, even if they remain fiercely competitive . This is because war is the continuation
of politics by other means, and nuclear weapons make war extremely bad politics. Put differently, war is
fought in pursuit of policy ends, which cannot be achieved through a total war between nuclear-armed states. This is not only because of nuclear weapons
destructive power. As Thomas Schelling outlined brilliantly, nuclear weapons have not actually increased humans destructive capabilities. In fact, there is evidence
to suggest that wars between nomads usually ended with the victors slaughtering all of the individuals on the losing side, because of the economics of holding
slaves in nomadic “societies.” What makes nuclear weapons different, then, is not just their destructive power but also the certainty and immediacy of it. While
extremely ambitious or desperate leaders can delude themselves into believing they can prevail in a conventional conflict with a stronger adversary because of any
With nuclear weapons,
countries don’t have to prevail on the battlefield or defeat an opposing army to destroy an entire
country, and since there are no adequate defenses for a large-scale nuclear attack, every leader can
be absolute certain that most of their country can be destroyed in short-order in the event of a total conflict. Since
no policy goal is worth this level of sacrifice, the only possible way for an all-out conflict to ensue is for a
miscalculation of some sort to occur. Most of these can and should be dealt by Chinese and the
U.S. leaders holding regularly senior level dialogues like the ones of the past month, in which frank and direct talk about
number of factors—superior will, superior doctrine, the weather etc.— none of this matters in nuclear war.
redlines are discussed. These can and should be supplemented with clear and open communication channels, which can be especially useful when unexpected
crises arise, like an exchange of fire between low-level naval officers in the increasingly crowded waters in the region. While this possibility is real and frightening,
it’s hard to imagine a plausible scenario where it leads to a nuclear exchange between China and the United States. After all, at each stage of the crisis leaders know
that if it is not properly contained, a nuclear war could ensue, and the complete destruction of a leader’s country is a more frightening possibility than losing
credibility among hawkish elements of society. In any case, measured means of retaliation would be available to the party wronged, and behind-the-scenes
Geography is the less appreciated
factor that will mitigate the chances of a U.S.-China war, but it could be nearly as
important as nuclear weapons. Indeed, geography has a history of allowing countries to avoid the Thucydides Trap, and works against a U.S.-China war in a
couple of ways. First, both the United States and China are immensely large countries —according to the Central
Intelligence Agency, the U.S. and China are the third and fourth largest countries in the world by area, at 9,826,675 and 9,596,961 square km respectively. They
also have difficult topographical features and complex populations. As such, they are
virtually unconquerable by another power. This is an important point and differentiates the current strategic environment
diplomacy could help facilitate the process of finding mutually acceptable retaliatory measures.
from historical cases where power transitions led to war. For example, in Europe where many of the historical cases derive from, each state genuinely had to worry
that the other side could increase their power capabilities to such a degree that they could credibly threaten the other side’s national survival. Neither China nor the
U.S. has to realistically entertain such fears, and this will lessen their insecurity and therefore the security dilemma they operate within. Besides being immensely
China and the U.S. are also separated by the Pacific Ocean, which will also
weaken their sense of insecurity and threat perception towards one another. In many of the violent power transitions of
the past, starting with Sparta and Athens but also including the European ones, the rival states were located in close proximity to one another. By contrast,
when great power conflict has been avoided, the states have often had considerable
distance between them, as was the case for the U.S. and British power transition and the peaceful end to the Cold War. The reason is simple
and similar to the one above: the difficulty of projecting power across large distances—particularly
bodies of waters— reduces each side’s concern that the other will threaten its national
survival and most important strategic interests.
large countries,
China’s rise will not lead to a major war with US- nuclear deterrence, global
unipolarity, and regional bipolarity stop escalation
Peou 14
Sorpong Peou (Chair of the Department of Politics and Public Administration at Ryerson
University in Canada. His research interests include Security and Democracy Studies.),
“Why China’s Rise May Not Cause Major Power-Transition War: A Review Essay”, Asian
Politics & Policy—Volume 6, Number 1 pg. 121-123, © 2014 Policy Studies Organization.
Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc, Accessed: 6/27/16
This article seeks to examine these theoretical debates in light of recent empirical evidence. The two publications are reviewed for two reasons.
First, China’s Ascent (Ross & Zhu, 2008) is a collection of contributions made by leading scholars in the field of international security and is
based on different optimistic perspectives on the question of China’s rise. Meanwhile the second publication, Southeast Asia and the Rise of
China (Storey, 2011), is less of a theoretical treatment of China’s rise and foreign-policy responses from states in Southeast Asia; it is a more
recent publication and provides empirical details that help shed light on the question raised in this article: will
the rise of China be
peaceful or unpeaceful? A close examination of China’s role in Southeast Asia helps us understand the
nature of China’s rise because this is the region in which China has the most immediate interest and
where Chinese leaders have concentrated much of their attention because of geographical proximity.
Based on some of the theoretical insights and empirical evidence presented by the authors in the two volumes, I
argue that the Asia-Pacific region is bound to remain stable and potentially more peaceful if and when
China becomes a liberal democracy. What is interesting about China’s Ascent is the fact that the volume contains the
contributions of scholars who belong to different theoretical traditions but share a sense of optimism about the future prospects of China’s rise.
There are various reasons why the growth of Chinese power will not destabilize the region. In Chapter 1 on
“Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China,” Jack Levy provides a powerful critique of Power Transition theory,
arguing that its proponents overlook the fact that major wars—such as World Wars I and II—break out
at the regional, rather than at the global, level and have regional causes. The dominant power within the
regional system is more likely to engage in preventive war for the defense of the status quo: the aim is
to prevent a rising power from overtaking the dominant power. Regional great-power wars in the
nuclear age are unlikely when states engaged in the struggle for dominance possess nuclear weapons
with deterrent effects. As nuclear powers, China and the United States are not expected to wage war
against each other. Another optimistic perspective, which is somewhat close to neoclassical realism, is that China has
been and will be constrained by the current international system characterized as unipolar—that is,
dominated by the United States. Operating within this hierarchical system, China is reluctant to
challenge the United States because of both systemic and domestic constraints that are interpreted to
reinforce Chinese strategic restraint. This is the thesis advanced by Zhu Feng in Chapter 2. The Asia-Pacific has become
stable because of regional bipolarity. Robert Ross and Zhu Feng see stability in the Asia-Pacific in terms of regional
bipolarity. Initially advanced by Ross (1999), the thesis is that the region has become stable because neither the
United States nor China is in a position to dominate the other. China has emerged as the dominant
player in the landmass of Southeast Asia, North Korea, and Asia’s interior regions. With its blue-water
naval superiority, the United States maintains its dominance over the maritime states of Southeast Asia
and Japan. Global unipolarity and regional bipolarity help “ease the likelihood of power transition war”
(p. 298). This reaffirms the thesis that China is reluctant to challenge the United States with the aim of
achieving world hegemonic status.
China won’t go to war with the US- “big history” cultural beliefs proves.
Yongian in 2012[Zheng; political scientist and political commentator on China; “Cultural Reasons
China Won’t Go To War With US”; Strait Times; 3/19/2012;
http://newshub.nus.edu.sg/news/1203/PDF/CULTURAL-st-19mar-pA20.pdf]
AFTER the United States' declaration of a "return" to Asia, Sino-American relations entered an unusually
tense period. Many have asked if the two big powers will go into conflict, and even a war. If one looks at the
essence of Chinese culture, the answer is no. Culture matters in international affairs and influences foreign policy as a way of
thinking. The mode of thinking is not a cause of conflicts, but the interactions between two different ways of thinking is likely to lead to conflict.
Culture can also be mobilized and utilized to influence foreign policy. Once mobilized, the impact of culture is
infinite. So why is war an impossibility between the two? One should distinguish between small-scale conflicts and
major wars. All kinds of conflicts such as trade disputes and ideology-oriented debates on human rights are inevitable and normal. But for
the China-US conflict to result in a major war is unlikely. Here is the cultural argument. A long undisrupted history of several
thousand years has bestowed China with a rare sense of "big history". China perceive long-term issues
with a long-term vision. China is slow in dealing with international issues, while the Americans sometime become
impatient. China's normal approach to problems is to find the best solutions before acting on them. China
sees many problems as inherent in the process of development and believes solutions will eventually
emerge with time. An analogy can be made here with Chinese medicine, which is slow in curing an illness but is considered better it
completely curing one. The American way is similar to Western medicine's delivering of quick fixes.
China will only attack the US in defense- Chinese culture is evident of a defensive
society.
Yongian in 2012[Zheng; political scientist and political commentator on China; “Cultural Reasons
China Won’t Go To War With US”; Strait Times; 3/19/2012;
http://newshub.nus.edu.sg/news/1203/PDF/CULTURAL-st-19mar-pA20.pdf]
The differences between cultures are also demonstrated in the different understanding of strategy. The
West views China's "Tao Guang Yang Hui" (translated literally as "hiding brightness and cherishing obscurity")
strategy as something temporary and believes China is waiting for better opportunities to emerge. This
strategy is apparent in China's reactive and defensive foreign policy of the last few centuries. Its
defensive foreign policy is best reflected in China's Great Wall, which was built for defending aggressive
invasions. Although such defensive strategies are not very successful in Chinese history, they are deeply rooted in
Chinese culture. This defensive culture also prevails in China's military development. The military philosophy of "zhi ge wei
wu" simply means that the purpose of developing weapons is to use them to stop their usage. For the West,
it is for deterrence while for the Chinese it is defence. China develops a certain kind of weapon or military plan only to
counteract weapons and military plans directed at it. China is rarely pre-emptive like the US. China has repeatedly
stressed its nuclear policy of maintaining a minimum deterrence with a no-first-use pledge. Chinese defence policy is very different from the
ones adopted by the Soviet Union, Germany and Japan before World War II, which all had a state will and plan to achieve hegemonv.
Big Money
No china war – big money controls politics
Jon Aziz, 14, 3-6-2014, Don't worry: World War III will almost certainly never happen, The week, John Aziz is a writer and analyst. His
interests include various topics in economics, finance, geopolitics and history including global trade dynamics, the flow of credit, moneyness
and currencies, unclearing markets, solar technology, ecology, civil libertarianism, drone warfare, market democracy, bubbles, Bayesian
statistics, subjectivism, evolutionary economics and a whole load of other stuff. Accessed form http://theweek.com/articles/449783/dontworry-world-war-iii-almost-certainly-never-happen on 6-26-2016 -O'Brien
It is easy to complain about the reality of big business influencing or controlling politicians. But big
business has just about the most to lose from breakdowns in global trade. A practical example: If Russian
oligarchs make their money from selling gas and natural resources to Western Europe, and send their
children to schools in Britain and Germany, and lend and borrow money from the West's financial
centers, are they going to be willing to tolerate Vladimir Putin starting a regional war in Eastern Europe (let
alone a world war)? Would the Chinese financial industry be happy to see their multi-trillion dollar
investments in dollars and U.S. treasury debt go up in smoke? Of course, world wars have been waged despite international
business interests, but the world today is far more globalized than ever before and well-connected domestic
interests are more dependent on access to global markets, components and resources, or the
repayment of foreign debts. These are huge disincentives to global war.∂ But what of the∂ military-industrial
complex∂ ? While other businesses might be hurt due to a breakdown in trade, surely military contractors and weapons manufacturers are
happy with war? Not necessarily. As
the last seventy years illustrates, it is perfectly possible for weapons
contractors to enjoy the profits from huge military spending without a global war. And the uncertainty of a
breakdown in global trade could hurt weapons contractors just as much as other industries in terms of
losing access to global markets. That means weapons manufacturers may be just as uneasy about the
prospects for large-scale war as other businesses.
Korean Peninsula
No war on Korean Peninsula-China checks
Michael Martina, April 28, 2016, “China won't allow chaos or war on Korean peninsula: Xi,” Reuters,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-northkorea-xi-idUSKCN0XP05P Accessed 6/26/16 BE
China will not allow chaos and war to break out on the Korean peninsula, which would be to no one's advantage, Chinese
President Xi Jinping told a group of Asian foreign ministers on Thursday. North Korea's drive to develop a nuclear weapons
capability, in defiance of U.N. resolutions, has angered China and raised tension in the region. " As a close neighbor of the peninsula, we will
absolutely not permit war or chaos on the peninsula. This situation would not benefit anyone," Xi said in a speech to a Conference
on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia. On Thursday, South Korea's defense ministry said North Korea had fired what appeared to have been an
intermediate range ballistic missile that crashed within seconds of the test launch. It was the second such failure in the run-up to next week's ruling party congress
in Pyongyang, and follows the isolated state's fourth nuclear test in January. North Korea is expected to conduct another nuclear test before the rare congress, set
to begin on May 6, at which young leader Kim Jong Un is expected to try to cement his leadership. China
is North Korea's sole major ally but
it disapproves of its development of nuclear weapons and backed harsh new U.N. sanctions imposed against North Korea last month.
China has long called for the Korean peninsula to be free of nuclear weapons. Nearly 30,000 U.S. troops are based in
South Korea and the two Koreas are still technically at war after the 1950-53 conflict ended in an armistice, not a treaty. Xi also told the meeting China
would safeguard peace and stability in the South China Sea, while at the same time maintaining its
sovereignty and rights there.
SCS Conflict/War
No south china sea war – neither side believes it’s worth the cost
Li and Yanzhou, 15 Xue Li and Xu Yanzhuo, The Diplomat, 15, 6-19-2015, The US and China Won't See Military Conflict Over the
South China Sea, Diplomat, Dr. Xue Li is Director of the Department of International Strategy at the Institute of World Economics and Politics,
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Xu Yanzhuo received her doctorate from Durham University (UK) in December 2014 and studies
international responsibility, South China Sea disputes, and Chinese foreign policy. Accessed from http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-us-andchina-wont-see-military-conflict-over-the-south-china-sea/ on 6-26-2016 -O'Brien
However, if we look at the practical significance of the remarks, there are several limiting factors. The
interests at stake in the
South China Sea are not core national interests for the United States. Meanwhile, the U.S.-Philippine
alliance is not as important as the U.S.-Japan alliance, and U.S. ties with other ASEAN countries are even
weaker. Given U.S.-China mutual economic dependence and China’s comprehensive national strength,
the United States is unlikely to go so far as having a military confrontation with China over the South
China Sea. Barack Obama, the ‘peace president’ who withdrew the U.S. military from Iraq and
Afghanistan, is even less likely to fight with China for the South China Sea. As for the U.S. interests in the region,
Washington is surely aware that China has not affected the freedom of commercial navigation in these waters so
far. And as I noted in my earlier piece, Beijing is developing its stance and could eventually recognize the legality of military activities in another
country’s EEZ (see, for example, the China-Russia joint military exercise in the Mediterranean). Yet when it comes to China’s large-scale land
reclamation in the Spratly Islands (and on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands), Washington worries that Beijing will conduct a series of
activities to strengthen its claims on the South China Sea, such as establishing an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) or advocating that
others respect a 200-nautical mile (370 km) EEZ from its islands. Meanwhile, the 2014 oil rig incident taught Washington that ASEAN claimants
and even ASEAN as a whole could hardly play any effective role in dealing with China’s land reclamation. Hence, the U.S. has no better choice
than to become directly involved in this issue. At the beginning, the United States tried to stop China through private diplomatic mediation, yet
it soon realized that this approach was not effective in persuading China. So Washington started to tackle the issue in a more aggressive way,
such as encouraging India, Japan, ASEAN, the G7, and the European Union to pressure Beijing internationally. Domestically, U.S. officials from
different departments and different levels have opposed China’s ‘changing the status quo’ in this area. Since 2015, Washington has increased
its pressure on China. It sent the USS Fort Worth, a littoral combat ship, to sail in waters near the Spratly area controlled by Vietnam in early
May. U.S. official are also considering sending naval and air patrols within 12 nautical miles of the Spratly Islands controlled by China.
Washington has recognized that it could hardly stop China’s construction in Spratly Islands. Therefore, it has opted to portray Beijing as a
challenger to the status quo, at the same time moving to prevent China from establishing a South China Sea ADIZ and an EEZ of 200 nautical
miles around its artificial islands. This was the logic behind the U.S. sending a P-8A surveillance plane with reporters on board to approach three
artificial island built by China. China issued eight warnings to the plane; the U.S. responded by saying the plane was flying through international
airspace. Afterwards, U.S. Defense Department spokesman, Army Col. Steve Warren, said there could be a potential “freedom of navigation”
exercise within 12 nautical miles of the artificial islands. If this approach were adopted, it would back China into a corner; hence it’s a unlikely
the Obama administration will make that move. As the U.S. involvement in the South China Sea becomes more aggressive and high-profile, the
dynamic relationship between China and the United States comes to affect other layers of the dispute (for example, relations between China
and ASEAN claimants or China and ASEAN in general). To some extent, the
South China Sea dispute has developed into a
balance of power tug-of-war between the U.S. and China, yet both sides will not take the risk of military
confrontation. As Foreign Minister Wang Yi put it in a recent meeting with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, “as for the
differences, our attitude is it is okay to have differences as long as we could avoid misunderstanding, and
even more importantly, avoid miscalculation.”
US and China wary about starting conflict- resolution of peaceful coexisting likely
outcome.
Thayer in 2013[Carlyle; Emeritus Professor at the University of New South Wales, Australian Defence
Force Academy, Canberra; “Why China and the US won’t go to war over the South China Sea”; East Asia
Forum; 5/13/2013; http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/05/13/why-china-and-the-us-wont-go-to-warover-the-south-china-sea/]
China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea is challenging US primacy in the Asia Pacific. Even
before Washington announced its official policy of rebalancing its force posture to the Asia Pacific, the
United States had undertaken steps to strengthen its military posture by deploying more nuclear attack
submarines to the region and negotiating arrangements with Australia to rotate Marines through
Darwin.Since then, the United States has deployed Combat Littoral Ships to Singapore and is negotiating new arrangements for greater
military access to the Philippines. But these developments do not presage armed conflict between China and the
United States. The People’s Liberation Army Navy has been circumspect in its involvement in South China Sea territorial
disputes, and the United States has been careful to avoid being entrapped by regional allies in their territorial
disputes with China. Armed conflict between China and the United States in the South China Sea appears unlikely.
Another, more probable, scenario is that both countries will find a modus vivendi enabling them to
collaborate to maintain security in the South China Sea. The Obama administration has repeatedly emphasised that its
policy of rebalancing to Asia is not directed at containing China. For example, Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, Commander of the US Pacific
Command, recently stated, ‘there has also been criticism that the Rebalance is a strategy of containment. This is not the case … it is a strategy
of collaboration and cooperation’.
No Asian war – Economy first policies discourage costly conflict
Stein, 15 Tønnesson, Stein Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden, and Peace Research Institute Oslo
(PRIO), Norway
. "Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace." International Area Studies Review, vol. 18, 2015..doi:10.1177/2233865915596660.
Accessed 6/27/16 -O’Brien
Steve Chan’s Enduring Rivalries in the Asia-Pacific (2013) is very optimistic: the
general trend∂ in East Asia, he says, is toward
abatement rather than exacerbation of rivalries. Territorial disputes∂ are less likely to escalate today
than during the Cold War since East Asian states have shifted to∂ policies emphasizing economic
development. This has created a ‘synergistic effect that restrains∂ interstate tension and rivalry’. Ties have
been multilateralized, with many third parties gaining a∂ vested stake in interstate stability. While China has
increased its military capabilities it has also∂ acquired an interest in preserving regional stability. On its side, the US
faces resource constraints∂ that make it wary of providing too strong support to its allies. This should
work against bipolarization∂ of regional relations. Chan’s optimism is not derived from recent events but from an assumption∂
that underlying long-range forces create interests securing the peace: ‘Economic∂ interdependence and political pluralism
promote stakeholders that have a vested interest in stabilizing∂ and expanding foreign ties, and these
stakeholders are, in turn, self-motivated to lobby their∂ government to undertake policies that abate rivalry’ (Chan,
2013: 20). Chan finds that the normal∂ mechanism behind the outbreak and escalation of large wars is that a smaller
state in an asymmetrical∂ relationship chooses a confrontational behaviour in the hope of gaining
support from a major∂ patron; those with little or no hope of receiving foreign support and those with a great deal of∂ confidence in
their ally’s commitment ‘are less likely to initiate such confrontation than those that∂ are in an intermediate position’ (Chan, 2013: 108, 114,
186). Given
the nature of Sino–US relations,∂ no provocation by a smaller state in East Asia is likely to
escalate. North Korea cannot count∂ on Chinese support against South Korea. South Korea, Japan, and
the Philippines are subjected to∂ US ‘escalation control’. From the perspective of power balance theory, says Chan, greater
power∂ parity between China and the US should have ‘a stabilizing rather than a destabilizing effect’. This∂
defies Mearsheimer’s reasoning but conforms to Yan’s analysis. Chan thinks China’s rise should∂ stabilize regional relations by
‘curtailing any US tendency toward assertive unilateralism … the∂ last thing Beijing wants to do is to
trigger a costly arms race or precipitate forces that will pressure∂ its neighbors to choose between it and
Washington’ (2013: 82, 102, 104). While this seems reasonable,∂ China’s behaviour in the last few years does not quite confirm Chan’s
argument. The ways∂ and the conditions under which cost concerns enter into Beijing’s decision-making need to be∂ gauged. Who calls for
caution? At which stage in a crisis?∂ According to Chan the
people and governments of East Asia have turned away from
being garrison∂ states to
a model of political economy emphasizing economic growth. This presents ‘the most∂
powerful firebreak against conflict contagion’. The region-wide transition to ‘economy first’ policies has
been successful, and ‘successful policies are likely to be continued … emulated and∂ replicated’. But can they
continue to be successful if Western markets are no longer able to absorb∂ huge quantities of Asian goods? Chan qualifies his argument:
‘…when states expect future economic∂ relations to be disrupted or curtailed, they are likely to stop cooperating and might even lash∂ out in
war’ (2013: 135, 140, 147, 149). This same argument forms the nucleus of Dale Copeland’s∂ ‘trade expectation theory’ (Copeland, 2015), which
builds on his ‘dynamic differentials theory’∂ (Copeland, 2000). Copeland does not include nuclear deterrence as a part of his theory (he treats∂
nuclear as no different from conventional deterrence), and has not studied Sino–US relations in∂ particular. What he has done is to develop a
comprehensive theory of major war, based on defensive∂ realism while including liberal elements, and paying particular emphasis to the
security–economy∂ nexus. His findings, which are based on a number of historical case studies, are of considerable∂ interest in the context of
this paper. Copeland includes three kinds of power in his theory: military;∂ economic; and ‘potential’. The latter includes several elements, such
as size, age and education of∂ the population, access to natural resources, and economic growth prospects. In Copeland’s most∂ recent books
he focuses more narrowly on just the economic aspect of potential power, namely∂ ‘trade expectations’. His The Origins of Major War (2000)
and Economic Interdependence and∂ War (2015) include a number of elements and findings from which interesting implications for∂ Sino–US
relations today may be seen.
No Nuke war general
No nuke war -- China has a no first use policy
Zhang, 13, Hui Zhang, The Diplomat, 13, 5-22-2013, China’s No-First-Use Policy Promotes Nuclear Disarmament, Diplomat, Hui Zhang, a
physicist, is leading a research initiative on China's nuclear policies for the Managing the Atom Project in Harvard Kennedy School' s Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs. Accessed form http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/chinas-no-first-use-policy-promotes-nucleardisarmament/ on 6-27-2016 -O'Brien
In fact, there is no evidence that China will change its long-standing no-first-use nuclear doctrine. Since its first nuclear explosion in 1964,
China has consistently adhered to a nuclear policy that features a minimum deterrent and a no-first-use
pledge, both aimed at avoiding a costly nuclear arms race. This policy has been based on Chinese
leaders’ perception of the nature and role of nuclear weapons and has been continuously embraced by
top Chinese leaders, from Mao Zedong until today. As Mao stated a few months after China’s first nuclear test: “We don’t
wish to have too many atomic bombs ourselves. What would we do with so many? To have a few is just
fine.”∂ China's nuclear policy has proven to be effective and smart, providing savings that can be used on
economic development. As its conventional capabilities grow, Beijing should have more confidence to pursue firmly and unshakably its
nuclear policy rather than follow the road of U.S. and Russia’s nuclear development. It is unthinkable that China would change
its policy to pursue extremely expensive weapons parity with the superpowers.
Cyber
No US China cyber warfare – tension between cyber espionage has potential to
escalate
Inkster 13
(Nigel, Director of Transnational Threats and Political Risk at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and former director of operations and intelligence for
the British Secret Intelligence Service, Oct.-Nov. 2013, “Conflict Foretold: America and China,” Survival vol. 55 no. 5 Pgs. 22-23) Accessed 6/27/16 BE
The reality is that for both China and the United States, cyber warfare in its more apocalyptic portrayal
seems far from an immediate prospect since such conflict would inevitably be a function of a more
general war between the two countries - something which, at present, clearly neither side wants. In
particular, media images of a testosterone-fuelled US Cyber Command belie the more sober reality of an entity that is still focused primarily on
protecting its own networks from attack in conditions of actual military conflict. The
real issue is how to manage a situation of
continuous cyber skirmishing in circumstances where the Law of Armed Conflict cannot reasonably be
said to apply - a manifestation of the new era of constant conflict and confrontation described by General Rupert Smith.'" This is a
situation in which no agreed ground rules currently apply. And there can be no doubt that the signalsintelligence agencies of the United States and China - not to mention those of many other states - are engaged in a
process of constant cyber contestation, although, in the short term, an asymmetry of vulnerabilities arising out of a disparity in
levels of technological sophistication may seem to be working to China's advantage. Perhaps more than any other issue, the two
countries have to manage the problems stemming from the fact that cyber exploitation - or cyber
espionage - has created a climate of suspicion and uncertainty which has begun to infect the entire SinoAmerican relationship, and which brings with it the potential for an escalatory dynamic about which
almost the only certainty is that it would not be confined to that one domain.
A2 China Trade War
China doesn’t want one
No chance of US-China trade war – China does not want a trade war and intends to
work cooperatively with the US
Xinhua, June 8, 2016, “Premier Li: No currency or trade war to stimulate exports,” China Daily,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016-06/08/content_25648795.htm
BEIJING - China
is willing to maintain high-level interaction with the United States to promote the
sustainable, healthy and stable development of bilateral ties, Premier Li Keqiang said on Tuesday. China
and the United States should jointly strive to deepen mutual trust and expand cooperation, Li said when
meeting with US Secretary of State John Kerry and Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew, who attended the eighth round
of China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogues and the seventh round of China-US High-Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchange in
Beijing. Noting
that the two sides' common interests "far outweigh" their differences, Li said the two
countries should manage differences in a constructive manner. Last year, two-way trade and investment
volumes both hit historic high, and China has for the first time become the biggest trade partner of the
United States. China is willing to deepen economic and trade cooperation with the United States, according to Li. Describing
frictions in bilateral cooperation as normal, the premier said the two sides should focus on the big
picture and mainstream. He expressed the hope that the United States will honor its commitment stipulated in the protocol on
China's accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Li also reiterated that China's currency renminbi has no
grounds to depreciate continuously, and China does not intend to stimulate exports via a "currency war"
or "trade war." China, he said, is capable of maintaining the renminbi exchange rate at a reasonable and balanced level. When asked
about industrial overcapacity, the premier said many countries face similar problems, and the fundamental reason lies in the feeble world
economy recovery, sluggish international trade growth and declining market demand. China
stands firm to address industrial
overcapacity according to the rules of the market economy, Li said. Kerry and Lew hailed the outcomes of the highlevel dialogues, saying the mechanism contributes to deeper US-China cooperation. As the world's two biggest economic entities, more
communication and cooperation between the United Stated and China will exert a major influence on the global economy, they said. The
two US officials also said their country is willing to speed up negotiations on a bilateral investment
treaty and closely cooperate with China under the G20 framework.
Yes China War
SCS
China not trying to achieve military dominance now but as South China Sea tensions
heighten, crises and war more likely
Swaine 15
(Michael D. Swaine, Senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies with a
Ph.D. from Harvard, “Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific: The Need
for a Stable U.S.-China Balance of Power,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
4/20/15, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyond-american-predominance-in-westernpacific-need-for-stable-u.s.-china-balance-of-power, )
The limits on U.S. maritime predominance do not mean that China will eventually grow into the position
of Asia’s next military hegemon, however. The above-mentioned Carnegie reports also concluded that American military power in
Asia will remain very strong under all but the most unlikely, worst-case scenarios involving a U.S.
withdrawal from the region. While China’s regional military capabilities will continue to grow
significantly in key areas such as submarines and surface warships, ballistic and cruise missiles, offensive aircraft, air defense, and joint warfare, they will
not provide an unambiguous level of superiority over U.S. forces in the Western Pacific, and certainly
not in any other region. Therefore, any eventual Chinese attempt to establish predominance in Asia
would almost inevitably fail, and not only because of U.S. capabilities and resolve, but also because such
an effort would drive regional states much closer to the United States. The result would be either a cold
or a hot war in Asia, with intensifying polarization, arms races, and an increased likelihood of crises and
conflicts. The Chinese leaders understand this and hence might only seek some form of predominance (as
opposed to acting opportunistically and in a more limited manner) if American words and actions were to convince them that even the minimal level of security
they seek were to require it. Such a belief could emerge if Washington insists on maintaining its own historical level of military superiority in Asia by attempting to
neutralize entirely Chinese military capabilities right up to China’s 12-nautical-mile territorial waters and airspace or to develop a force capable of blockading China
from a distance. Variants of operational concepts currently under consideration in U.S. policy circles, such as Air-Sea Battle or Offshore Control (the former designed
to defeat Beijing through preemptive, precision strikes deep into Chinese territory, and the latter to throttle China via a blockade along the first island chain
bordering the eastern and southern Chinese mainland), contain such features. Indeed, any effort to sustain U.S.
predominance in the face of a
growing relative decline in U.S. capabilities alongside steady increases in Chinese power and influence
will almost certainly intensify the U.S.-China security competition, deepen tensions between the two
powers, and greatly unsettle U.S. allies and friends. Fortunately, this zero-sum dynamic has yet to emerge,
but growing suspicions and beliefs in both capitals—founded on the above clashing assumptions held by each side regarding the
necessary conditions for long-term order and prosperity in Asia—are certainly moving events in this direction.
War will happen – china continues to test the US in the SCS. Leads to sudden breaking
point for direct confrontation
Jerry Hendrix, 16, 5-24-2016, Is War with China Now Inevitable?, National Review Online, Jerry Hendrix is a retired Navy Captain, a
former director of the Naval History and Heritage Command, and a senior fellow and director of the Defense Strategies and Assessments
program at the Center for a New American Security. from http://www.nationalreview.com/article/435749/us-china-war-obama-weakness-eastasia on 6-27-2016 -O'Brien
China’s actions are representative of a new phenomenon that is increasingly characterizing the foreign policies of
Korea, Iran, and Russia, China has recognized that America
is trapped by its doctrinal adherence to “phasing,” the method by which it goes to war as delineated in Joint
Publication 3-0, “Joint Operations,” first published in the early 1990s. As its name suggests, the method lays out six major phases
authoritarian states around the world. Like states such as North
of war: phase 0 (shaping the environment), phase I (deterring the enemy), phase II (seizing the initiative), phase III
(dominating the enemy), phase IV (stabilizing the environment), and phase V (enabling civil authority). It’s a stepby-step approach that has come to dominate American tactical and strategic thought. The problem is that
when you write the book on modern warfare, someone is going to read it, and those that seek to
challenge the United States most certainly have. They know that U.S. war planners are all focused on
phase III — the “Dominate the Enemy” phase — and treat the separation between phases as
impermeable barriers. America’s concentration on phase III has allowed rising competitors to expand
their influence through maneuvers that thwart U.S. interests in the preceding three phases, maneuvers
cumulatively grouped in a category known as “Hybrid” warfare. Authoritarian states have mastered the art of walking
right up to the border of phase III without penetrating it, slowly eroding American credibility without triggering
a kinetic response.¶ Nations work out their differences through consistent and credible interactions. Exercises and real-world operations
allow states to define their interests and then defend them. Competitor nations take these opportunities to test the will of
states they are challenging. The consistency of these activities allows tensions between states to be released at a constant rate, so
that pressures never rise to dangerous levels. But when a nation vacates the arena of competition for too long or fails to conduct credible
exercises, as the United States has done in the Western Pacific over the past five years, strains begin to warp the fabric of the international
order. China’s construction of artificial islands as a means of extending its claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea have left the United
States with few options.¶ The U.S. can continue its policy of sending mixed messages, dispatching individual warships on “innocent-passage”
profiles that come within twelve miles of the islands while avoiding normal military operations, but this
will only play into China’s
plan to slowly boil the frog as it continues arming the islands, establishing a new security status quo in the region.
China’s strategy mirrors Russia’s actions in Georgia, the Crimea, and Ukraine. There, Russian forces
operated below the U.S.’s radar, conducting phase I and II operations and standing pat in the face of
international sanctions, confident that neither the United States nor its NATO allies really wanted to risk war to re-institute the
regional order that had just been upended. China clearly feels that time is on its side so long as it only incrementally expands its influence,
avoiding direct confrontation with the United States.¶ Such
an approach will, of course, leave the United States no choice
but to suddenly and directly confront China at some critical point in the future. America’s adherence to
its founding principles of free navigation and free trade, not to mention its belief in a free sea, will not
allow it to tolerate a Chinese assertion of sovereignty over such a large swath of heretofore-open water.
Perhaps when the time comes the United States could simply land an international force of marines on one of the artificial islands as part of an
amphibious exercise. As the islands are not Chinese sovereign territory, there is no reason not to use them as the staging ground for an
international exercise. And such an exercise would force China’s hand, making it choose between resisting the assembled international marines
with armed force or acknowledging the illegitimacy of its own claims.
South china sea will go nuclear – Beijing is sending out nuclear submarines into SCS
and us will respond with more naval presence
Jonathan Broder, 16, 6-22-2016, The U.S. and China seem bound to clash over the South China Sea, Newsweek, Jonathan Broder writes
about defense and foreign policy for Newsweek from Washington. He's been covering national security issues for more than two decades,
including 12 years as a writer and senior editor at Congressional Quarterly. Before moving to Washington, Broder spent 20 years as an awardwinning foreign correspondent in the Middle East, South Asia, China and East Asia for the Chicago Tribune and the Associated Press. Broder’s
writing also has appeared in The New York Times Magazine, The Washington Post and Smithsonian magazine. He's a frequent commentator on
foreign affairs for NPR and Al Arabiya TV. Accessed form http://www.newsweek.com/south-china-sea-war-nuclear-submarines-china-unitedstates-barack-obama-xi-473428 on 6-27-2016 -O'Brien
The Obama administration is
bracing for trouble this summer when an international court in the Hague rules
on the Philippine challenge to China’s claim to the South China Sea. The ruling is expected to go against
Beijing, which has declared it won’t accept any decision from the court. China says it’s willing to talk one-on-one with the Philippines, as well
as with the other countries with rival claims—a position that would give Beijing a clear advantage over its smaller neighbors. The U.S. wants
China to negotiate with these claimants collectively, and Beijing has told Washington to butt out. “Our view is the U.S. is stoking the dispute and
using it to bring its forces back the Pacific,” said Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin during a meeting with a small group of visiting
American and British reporters in May.∂ For
U.S. officials, the big question is how China will react to an unfavorable
ruling. Some fear Beijing will step up its land reclamation operations. Others worry it will restrict the air
space over the South China Sea and begin intercepting unidentified aircraft—a policy that would force it
to confront the U.S.’s spy flights. Or they could do something even more provocative. “The [Chinese]
military is urging the leadership to put it in fifth gear, step on the gas and give the finger to the world,”
says a U.S. official, asking for anonymity under diplomatic protocol.∂ Obama has warned Xi that such measures would
prompt a substantial American response, including military action. Some regional experts say Beijing may counter an
unfavorable ruling with tough rhetoric to mollify people at home, but take no actions before September, when China hosts the G-20 summit. ∂
But once that gathering is over, the dispute could become much more volatile. U.S. officials
are particularly worried about a
Chinese plan to send submarines armed with nuclear missiles into the South China Sea for the first time.
Chinese military officials argue the submarine patrols are needed to respond to two major U.S. military moves: plans to
station a defense system in South Korea that can intercept missiles fired from both North Korea and China, and the Pentagon’s development of
ballistic missiles with new hypersonic warheads that can strike targets anywhere in the world in less than an hour. Taken together, Chinese
military officials say, these American weapons threaten to neutralize China’s land-based nuclear arsenal,
leaving Beijing no choice but to turn to its submarines to retaliate for any nuclear attack.∂ The implications
would be enormous. Until now, China’s nuclear deterrent has centered on its land-based missiles, which
are kept without fuel and remain separate from their nuclear warheads. That means the country’s political
leadership must give several orders before the missiles are fueled, armed and ready to launch, giving
everyone time to reconsider. Nuclear missiles on a submarine are always armed and ready.∂ U.S. and Chinese
warships operate in uncomfortably close proximity in the South China Sea. Add submarine operations to the
mix, and the chances of an accident multiply despite protocols meant to minimize the risk of collisions.
Submarines are stealthy vessels, and China is unlikely to provide their locations to the Americans. That means
the U.S. Navy will send more spy ships into the South China Sea in an effort to track the subs. “With the U.S. Navy
sailing more and more in the area, there’s a high possibility there will be an accident,” says a high-ranking
Chinese officer, who spoke anonymously to address sensitive security issues.
South China Sea will escalate pulling in all nations in the region, China committed to
their position
Chalmers and Macfie 15
(John and Nick, 5-21-15, “U.S. says South China Sea reclamations stoke instability,” Reuters,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-usa-idUSKBN0O50VC20150521) Accessed 6/27/16 BE
China's land reclamation around reefs in the disputed South China Sea is undermining freedom and
stability, and risks provoking tension that could even lead to conflict, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken
told a conference in Jakarta. China claims 90 percent of the South China Sea, which is believed to be rich in oil and gas, its claims overlapping
with those of Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan. Recent satellite images suggest China has made rapid progress in filling in
land in contested territory in the Spratly islands and in building an airstrip suitable for military use and that it may be planning another. "As
China seeks to make sovereign land out of sandcastles and redraw maritime boundaries, it is eroding regional trust and undermining investor
confidence," Blinken said on Wednesday. "Its
behavior threatens to set a new precedent whereby larger countries
are free to intimidate smaller ones, and that provokes tensions, instability and can even lead to conflict."
The United States and China clashed over the dispute on Saturday, when visiting U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry urged China to take action to
reduce tension. China said its determination to protect its interests was "as hard as a rock". Asked about Blinken's remarks, China's Foreign
Ministry demanded on Thursday that the United States abide by the principle of not taking sides on the South China Sea, and said his comments
damaged trust in the region. "The U.S. assumptions are groundless," ministry spokesman Hong Lei told a regular briefing. Blinken said the
previous day that competing claims had to be handled "diplomatically". "We don't take sides but we strongly oppose actions that aim to
advance a claim by force or coercion," he said. "We will continue to encourage all claimants to resolve their differences in accordance with
international norms." The territorial
dispute is seen by many as one of Asia's most dangerous hot spots, posing
risks that it could result in conflict as countries stake their claims.
South China Sea sparks conflict - treaties don’t prevent conflict
Press TV in 2015 (Press TV is a 24-hour English language news and documentary network, affiliated with
Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting; ‘US, China may come to blows over flaws in maritime laws’ Published: Sat
Oct 31, 2015 2:13PM; http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2015/10/31/435737/Maritime-flaws-may-spark-USChina-war)
A new report says loopholes
in maritime laws pose the risk of confrontation between the United States Navy and
Chinese military in disputed areas of the South China Sea. The CNBC report refers to close encounters between
the two navies in the disputed waters over the past years and counts certain gaps, discrepancies and different interpretations in maritime
laws as reason behind such risky behavior by the two countries. It says although there are specific codes of behavior in the form of agreements
adopted by the US and China, the protocols in place are mostly non-binding, contain exceptions, and at times are interpreted differently by the
two sides, highlighting the risk of an unwanted escalation of tensions. The report refers to a 2013 incident in which a US
guided-missile ship veered sharply to avoid a Chinese navy vessel that tried to block its path in the South China Sea. It added that the next year,
Washington said a Chinese fighter jet buzzed within 30 feet (9 meters) of one of its Navy planes. According to the media outlet, the US, China
and other Western Pacific nations signed an agreement called, the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) in 2014, which sets out rules
such as safe speeds and distances, the language to be used in communications, and actions in case a ship becomes disabled. In this March 12,
2015 US Navy handout photo, the guided-missile destroyer USS Lassen (DDG 82) is underway in formation with the Republic of Korea patrol
craft Sokcho (PCC 778) during exercise Foal Eagle 2015 in Southeast Asia. It noted, however, that CUES does not, for example, cover coast guard
or other civilian vessels that Beijing has increasingly used to back its vast territorial claims in the South China Sea. Another international accord
that also reportedly failed to fully close the legal gaps was the United Nations' Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS provides for
countries to set 12 nautical miles from their coasts to treat as sovereign territory and a further 200 miles as the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),
giving them claim to any fishing or minerals on the seabed, but full freedom of passage to international shipping. One key difference between
Washington and Beijing is the right of military vessels and planes to conduct surveillance in international waters seas, including an EEZ, the
report said. This file handout photo taken on April 2, 2015 by satellite imagery provider DigitalGlobe and released to AFP by the Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSSI) think tank shows a satellite image of a general
view of what is claimed to be an under-construction airstrip at the top end of Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands in the disputed South China
Sea. China
has repeatedly objected to US military operations off its coasts in the South China Sea, even if
they are outside what it claims as its territory. Washington insists normal military activities are allowed
in an EEZ under UNCLOS, including surveillance. Washington accuses Beijing of conducting a massive “land
reclamation” program through building artificial islands in the South China Sea, warning that China’s
projects could further militarize the region. China claims most of the South China Sea. Other claimants are Vietnam, the
Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan.
China is increasing its presence in South China Sea a spark for conflict is inevitable
Valerie May 8th 2016 (Precious Valerie has more than 11 years of professional writing and managing
experience. She has worked with different international organizations in Australia, New York, Philippines and
Singapore in delivering news and other related content. She has overseen teams of writers and publications to
produce high quality and highly relevant content to keep readers informed; “Cold War 2.0: China Can Bring US Into
Bankruptcy” Published: PUBLISHED: 12:36 AM, MAY 8, 2016 UPDATED: 12:36 AM, MAY 8, 2016;
http://www.morningnewsusa.com/cold-war-2-0-china-can-bring-us-bankruptcy-2376366.html)
China is being aggressive on all fronts and several scholars are predicting that such moves could bring the world to
a new cold war. More importantly, Beijing’s efforts to surpass the United States not only threaten the world over but also the country
itself as it may push itself on the brink of economic collapse. Several scholars have looked into China’s recent actions and concluded the
scary picture that China’s capabilities and goals are presenting. Not to mention the dangerous foreign policy moves that the nation
is creating and its implications to the world. On top of this, another expert also predicted that given China’s aggressive efforts to push its
economy to surpass the United States could endanger the nation to economic collapse – in just 18 months. “Building a world-class and then a
world-dominant military is at the core of Xi Jinping’s vision,” Sea Power Magazine quoted Richard Fisher who was talking about China’s
president, head of the Communist Party and chairman of the Central Military Commission. Fisher also noted China’s
efforts in the
South China Sea as a means to extend its power beyond its coastline. Joseph Bosco, a scholar at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, on the other hand, pointed out the risk of creating “Cold War 2.0” given China’s drive to take
over the Western Pacific and reduce America’s power and influence over other regions. If China pushes
for such efforts, it can eventually lead to a conflict with the United States, according to the scholar. China watcher
Gordon Chang added that China is at risk economically because of its unstable market. If it will not be addressed them
there could be decades of recession. “We need a wall of missiles in Asia to counter the wall of sand,” Chang added. As if to demonstrate what
the scholars are saying, China
has just started its military exercises in the disputed region. According to CNBC, naval
group of two destroyers, two frigates, and a supply ship departed Sanya, Hainain province for the said drills. China reportedly wants
to make sure its forces are combat ready thus the increased efforts in military exercises. “China’s best
warships will be deployed in the South Sea Fleet as a response to the US military -activities, although both
sides will carefully avoid any friction,” CNBC quoted Ni Lexiong, a Shanghai-based military commentator. “It is a demonstration of muscle.” The
commentator added.
Population
China war likely – aging population makes them desperate to cement sphere of
influence within next decade
Jerry Hendrix, 16, 5-24-2016, Is War with China Now Inevitable?, National Review Online, Jerry Hendrix is a retired Navy Captain, a
former director of the Naval History and Heritage Command, and a senior fellow and director of the Defense Strategies and Assessments
program at the Center for a New American Security. from http://www.nationalreview.com/article/435749/us-china-war-obama-weakness-eastasia on 6-27-2016 -O'Brien
China is acting like it wants a war. It probably doesn’t, but it doesn’t want the United States to know that. China’s communist leaders know
they must keep growing the economy and improving the lives of their citizens, or risk revolution and the
loss of power. They also know that they are on a clock: Within the next ten years, China’s recently
amended one-child policy will invert the country’s economy, forcing that one child to pay the medical and
retirement costs of his two parents and four grandparents. Under these circumstances, the state will need to
begin allocating additional resources toward the care of its citizens and away from its burgeoning nationalsecurity apparatus. China has to lock down its sphere of influence soon, becoming great before becoming
old. It’s time for Chinese leaders to go big or go home, and they’re slowly growing desperate. The United States, for its own part, has
not helped ward off the regional threat that desperation poses. Its policy of strategic patience and its prioritizing of
Chinese cooperation on nuclear issues to the exclusion of local security concerns have created an almost palpable sense of growing confidence
in the Chinese among nervous U.S. allies nearby. The
lack of credible Freedom of Navigation operations since 2012
and the Obama administration’s failure to offer any significant resistance in the face of China’s
construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea have emboldened the Chinese to press ahead
with their planned campaign to claim sovereignty over those waters. Such claims threaten the national
interests of the United States and directly impinge upon the security of treaty allies and partners in the
region.
Military Presence
Asian decline inevitable – willingfully giving up control is the only way to
prevent power struggle
Tønnesson , 15 Tønnesson, Stein Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden, and Peace Research
Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway
. "Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace." International Area Studies Review, vol. 18, 2015..doi:10.1177/2233865915596660.
Accessed 6/27/16 -O’Brien
The Australian analyst Hugh
White’s The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power (2012) is interesting because it looks ahead to a
situation where China is likely to be more powerful than today. White recommends a drastic revision of the
security system in East Asia, based on increas- ing doubts about the US capacity to maintain its strong
military presence. China’s capacity for nuclear deterrence is growing, and what Yan sees as a boon is for White a
worry. After China car- ried out its first nuclear test in 1964 it could no longer be subjected to ‘nuclear
blackmail’, and the balance shifted determinedly in the 1970s when China developed strategic missiles
that could not just target the USSR but also American cities. China’s strength increased further in the 1980s
when the Soviet threat disappeared, so Chinese forces could be moved to the coast and resources set aside for building a modern
navy. Today China has more than minimum deterrence. By targeting US bases in the region its nuclear forces can deter
conventional strikes. Meanwhile, the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence has been reduced (White, 2012:
63–64, 85). White thus pro- poses that the US give up its dominant role and share power with China, Japan
and India in a ‘concert’. If US primacy ends before a concert has been established, he warns, East Asia will
be ‘divided into competing camps in a classic balance-of-power system, punctuated by serious wars’.
The US has allowed China to grow so vital to the world economy that there is no way to lock it out at any
acceptable cost. Strategic containment would cause a huge economic backlash, and war between the US
and China is already a ‘significant danger’. Washington has three options: resist; pull out; or share power
(White, 2012, 5–6, 25–26, 98–99). While the latter means giving up pri- macy, it does not mean withdrawal. The US can allow China a
greater role while ‘maintaining a strong presence of its own’. At sea this means to give up control while
keeping a capacity to pre- vent anyone else from gaining control. Since 1945, the US Navy has dominated
the seas around China. This cannot continue. China’s naval build-up and deployment of land-based missiles have created a
‘sea-denial era’. Naval powers are able to sink each other’s ships but unable to protect their own. Aircraft
carriers can no longer project power because they have to focus on threats to themselves. White
expects Japan to take responsibility for its own defence, acquire nuclear weap- ons and adopt an independent
foreign policy. India will also have its say, while Russia remains preoccupied in Europe (White, 2012: 5, 72, 86–88). The US will maintain
a great power role but no longer dominate the region.∂
US military presence in Asia is not crucial to national security- presence in the region
could lead to war with China.
Glaser in 2015[John; renowned author with published by Newsweek and the Washington Times; “The
US and China can avoid a collision course – if the US gives up its empire”; The Guardian; British national
daily newspaper; 5/28/2015; https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/28/conflict-uschina-not-inevitable-empire]
To avoid a violent militaristic clash with China, or another cold war rivalry, the United States should pursue a simple
solution: give up its empire. Americans fear that China’s rapid economic growth will slowly translate into
a more expansive and assertive foreign policy that will inevitably result in a war with the US. Harvard Professor
Graham Allison has found: “in 12 of 16 cases in the past 500 years when a rising power challenged a ruling power, the outcome was war.” Chicago
University scholar John Mearsheimer has bluntly argued: “China cannot rise peacefully.” But the apparently
looming conflict between the US and China is not because of China’s rise per se, but rather because the
US insists on maintaining military and economic dominance among China’s neighbors. Although Americans like to think of
their massive overseas military presence as a benign force that’s inherently stabilizing, Beijing certainly doesn’t see it that way. According to political
scientists Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell, Beijing sees America as “the most intrusive outside actor in
China’s internal affairs, the guarantor of the status quo in Taiwan, the largest naval presence in the East
China and South China seas, [and] the formal or informal military ally of many of China’s neighbors.” (All of
which is true.) They think that the US “seeks to curtail China’s political influence and harm China’s interests” with a
“militaristic, offense-minded, expansionist, and selfish” foreign policy. China’s regional ambitions are not
uniquely pernicious or aggressive, but they do overlap with America’s ambition to be the dominant power in its
own region, and in every region of the world. Leaving aside caricatured debates about which nation should get to wave the big “Number 1” foam
finger, it’s worth asking whether having 50,000 US troops permanently stationed in Japan actually serves
US interests and what benefits we derive from keeping almost 30,000 US troops in South Korea and whether Americans will be any
safer if the Obama administration manages to reestablish a US military presence in the Philippines to counter
China’s maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea. Many commentators say yes. Robert Kagan argues not only that US hegemony
makes us safer and richer, but also that it bestows peace and prosperity on everybody else. If America doesn’t rule, goes his argument, the world becomes less free,
less stable and less safe. But a good chunk of the scholarly literature disputes these claims. “ There
are good theoretical and empirical
reasons”, wrote political scientist Christopher Fettweis in his book Pathologies of Power, “to doubt that US hegemony is the primary
cause of the current stability.” The international system, rather than cowering in obedience to American demands for peace, is far
more “self-policing”, says Fettweis. A combination of economic development and the destructive power of modern militaries serves as a much more
satisfying answer for why states increasingly see war as detrimental to their interests. International relations theorist Robert Jervis has written that “the pursuit of
primacy was what great power politics was all about in the past” but that, in a world of nuclear weapons with “low security threats and great common interests
among the developed countries”, primacy does not have the strategic or economic benefits it once had. Nor does US dominance reap much in the way of tangible
rewards for most Americans: international relations theorist Daniel Drezner contends that “the economic benefits from military predominance alone seem, at a
minimum, to have been exaggerated”; that “There is little evidence that military primacy yields appreciable geoeconomic gains”; and that, therefore, “an
overreliance on military preponderance is badly misguided.” The struggle for military and economic primacy in Asia is not really about our core national security
interests; rather, it’s about preserving status, prestige and America’s neurotic image of itself. Those are pretty dumb reasons to risk war. There are a host of reasons
why the dire predictions of a coming US-China conflict may be wrong, of course. Maybe China’s economy will slow or even suffer crashes. Even if it continues to
grow, the US’s economic and military advantage may remain intact for a few more decades, making China’s rise gradual and thus less dangerous. Moreover, both
countries are armed with nuclear weapons. And there’s little reason to think the mutually assured destruction paradigm that characterized
the Cold War between the US and the USSR wouldn’t dominate this shift in power as well. But why take the risk, when maintaining US
primacy just isn’t that important to the safety or prosperity of Americans? Knowing that should at least make the idea of
giving up empire a little easier.
A2: No War
A2: Deterrence
Extended nuclear deterrence doesn’t prevent conflict – America is hesitant to
get involved
Tønnesson , 15 Tønnesson, Stein Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden, and Peace Research
Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway
. "Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace." International Area Studies Review, vol. 18, 2015..doi:10.1177/2233865915596660.
Accessed 6/27/16 -O’Brien
Andrew O’Neil’s Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Atomic Umbrellas in the 21st Century (2013) claims, somewhat
counter-intuitively, that nuclear deterrence is increasing its importance in Asia. What he means, however, is that it is
called into question, so O’Neil actually confirms rather than refutes White’s claim. O’Neil demonstrates how South Korea,
Japan and Australia constantly seek to verify the credibility of US nuclear deterrence, which is becoming
‘more, not less, central’ to their strategic relationships with Washington. This is partly due to China’s rise
and partly to North Korea’s nuclear programme. During the Cold War it was more generally accepted that
the US would use whatever it took to counter a Soviet or Chinese attack on a US ally. Hence America’s Asian
allies did not develop nuclear weapons of their own. The US, however, has always hesitated to officially
confirm any extension of its nuclear deterrence, and has done so explicitly only for Japan. South Korea,
Australia, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines are not covered by any confirmed nuclear
umbrella. The question of whether or not an attack on these territories would unleash a US nuclear response is
thus open. Although O’Neil finds that the US commitment to extended nuclear deterrence on behalf of
South Korea has become ‘more conspicuous than ever’ he does not think it [extended nuclear
deterrence] can deter ‘provocations from Pyongyang below the level of war’ (O’Neil, 2013: 4, 68–69), and there
is always a risk that such provocations could lead to a response unleashing all-out war. As for Japan, O’Neil
finds it paradoxical that with its anti-nuclear public posture it is more pro-nuclear than any country when it comes to US extended deterrence.
Japan’s staunch defence of the Senkaku Islands against Chinese encroachments, defy- ing US cautionary
advice, may have to do with Tokyo’s need to reconfirm the US commitment to prevent China from attacking Japan.
In order to avoid getting into a situation where it must threaten to use nuclear weapons, the US will, however,
hesitate to intervene on behalf of its allies. The threshold for US intervention has thus been lifted, and this
increases the risk of a limited war, which could escalate.∂ The analyses by Yuan, Yan, White and O’Neil’s thus give little
reason for comfort. There can be no assurance that nuclear deterrence will prevent a crisis between China
and a US ally from esca- lating if both sides expect the other to back down first, and it will not prevent
the crisis from emerg- ing in the first place.∂
A2: Interdependence
Interdependence does not guarantee peace – unbalanced relations increases
tensions between the two countries
Tønnesson , 15 Tønnesson, Stein Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden, and Peace Research
Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway
. "Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace." International Area Studies Review, vol. 18, 2015..doi:10.1177/2233865915596660.
Accessed 6/27/16 -O’Brien
Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what
circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least
four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those
who say that interdependence may both inhibit and
drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or
unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars
among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach,
2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking
socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be
analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into
confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia
(China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks
within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, deci- sions for war
and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expecta- tions. International
relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to
economic development and their assess- ments of risks and opportunities. If
leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to
seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external
dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or
credibility, adopt protec- tionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or
prospects of socio- economic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the
instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party.∂ Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and
interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the
region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make
provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances
but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace
more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then
a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and
exacer- bating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with
nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so.
Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a
cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other,
with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene
Deterrence and interdependence can only damp down rivalries – not reverse them.
Tønnesson , 15 Tønnesson, Stein Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden, and Peace Research
Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway
. "Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace." International Area Studies Review, vol. 18, 2015..doi:10.1177/2233865915596660.
Accessed 6/27/16 -O’Brien
What, then, if nuclear deterrence is combined with economic interdependence? In his A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the
Struggle for Mastery in Asia (2011) Aaron
L. Friedberg rejects the possibility that a combination of nuclear
deterrence and interdependence may be relied upon to preserve peace between China and the USA.
Although economic interdependence and the risk of nuclear war can help ‘damp down’ the rivalry, he
affirms, they cannot reverse it. He does not find the record of Cold War nuclear deterrence assuring. Although a
nuclear exchange between the two superpowers was avoided, they sometimes came ‘terrifyingly close’. He acknowledges that
the spectre of nuclear devastation makes an outright Sino–US war unlikely but it will not quell and could
even encourage ‘military competition’. The credibility of US nuclear deterrence may dwin- dle as China’s
strength makes it unlikely that the US will ever resort to nuclear arms. Friedberg thus recommends that Washington
focus on improving its conventional forces, and maintain com- mand of the world’s oceans (Friedberg, 2011: 38, 56, 278–279).∂ Although he
thinks a rivalry cannot be avoided, the key point for this discussion in Friedberg’s analysis is the dampening effect of nuclear deterrence and
economic interdependence. Could it be assumed that as long as both sides maintain policies of economic openness and integration they will
prevent their rivalry from escalating to a level of open confrontation? This
paper shall not now refer to Immanuel Kant or the wellof whether or not economic inter-depend- ence in itself can prevent war. History has
shown that it cannot. When national leaders have other than economic priorities, or expect their nation
to lose out in economic competition with potential adversaries, they may engage in risky behaviour
leading to war (Copeland, 2000: 2, 6, 14, 20; Copeland, 2015: 2, 7). What this paper shall now consider is economic
interdependence in a sys- tem where there is also nuclear deterrence, the assumption being that when
national leaders are imbued with fear of a nuclear crisis and at the same time feel protected by an
assumption that their potential adversaries share the same fear, they are less anxious about economic
dependence and more likely to continue trading with potential adversaries even during a power
transition. Could this explain that China and the US, even after their Cold War alliance receded into history, in spite
of much tension and mutual suspicion, regardless of cultural differences, notwithstanding their opposite
ideologies, have allowed themselves to be knit together economically within a global system of trade
and production networks, thus constantly raising the human, social and economic costs of any future war?
Could this mean that great power war will be avoided unless the US and/ or China reverse course and decide
to reduce their economic interaction?¶
known discussion
Miscalc
The threat of nuclear war with China is highly likely- mismatched perceptions raises
concern.
Kulacki in 2016[Gregory; expert on cross cultural communications between the US and China; “The
Risk of Nuclear War with China: A Troubling Lack of Urgency”; Union of Concerned Scientists; May 2016;
http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/05/Nuclear-War-with-China.pdf]
Lack of mutual trust and a growing sense that their differences may be irreconcilable incline both
governments to continue looking for military solutions—for new means of coercion that help them feel more secure.
Establishing the trust needed to have confidence in diplomatic resolutions to the disagreements,
animosities, and suspicions that have troubled leaders of the United States and the PRC for almost 70 years is extremely
difficult when both governments take every new effort to up the technological ante as an act of bad faith. The
bilateral dialogues on strategic stability aim to manage the military competition, but they do not seek to end
it. Although the two governments work very hard at avoiding conflict, they have yet to find a way out of what Graham
Allison called their “Thucydides trap”—the risk of conflict between a rising power and an established
power invested in the status quo (Allison 2015). Allison’s warning not to minimize the risks of war is sage advice, even if he does
not say how the United States and China can escape the trap he describes. Keeping the peace depends on the skill and
patience of political leaders who seek to avoid conflict as they keep a nervous eye on the balance of rapidly evolving
military technologies. PRC leaders believe it is possible to prosecute a major war without risking a U.S. nuclear
attack. The leaders of the United States believe stopping the PRC from prosecuting such a war may depend, in certain
contingencies, on a credible threat to use nuclear weapons—a threat U.S. leaders state they are prepared to
execute. These mismatched perceptions increase both the possibility of war and the likelihood it will
result in the use of nuclear weapons.
Ambiguity
US/China war more likely then believed- current underestimations contribute to
coming crisis
Allison 15
Graham Allison (director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard
Kennedy School.), 9/24/15, "The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?," Atlantic,
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydidestrap/406756/
When Barack Obama meets this week with Xi Jinping during the Chinese president’s first state visit to America, one item probably won’t be on
their agenda: the possibility that the United States and China could find themselves at war in the next decade. In policy circles, this appears as
unlikely as it would be unwise. And yet 100 years on, World War I offers a sobering reminder of man’s capacity for folly. When we say that war
is “inconceivable,” is this a statement about what is possible in the world—or only about what our limited minds can conceive? In 1914, few
could imagine slaughter on a scale that demanded a new category: world war. When war ended four years later, Europe lay in ruins: the kaiser
gone, the Austro-Hungarian Empire dissolved, the Russian tsar overthrown by the Bolsheviks, France bled for a generation, and England shorn
of its youth and treasure. A millennium in which Europe had been the political center of the world came to a crashing halt. The defining
question about global order for this generation is whether China and the United States can escape
Thucydides’s Trap. The Greek historian’s metaphor reminds us of the attendant dangers when a rising
power rivals a ruling power—as Athens challenged Sparta in ancient Greece, or as Germany did Britain a
century ago. Most such contests have ended badly, often for both nations, a team of mine at the Harvard Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs has concluded after analyzing the historical record. In 12 of 16 cases over the past 500
years, the result was war. When the parties avoided war, it required huge, painful adjustments in
attitudes and actions on the part not just of the challenger but also the challenged. The World According to
Chinese President Xi Jinping Based on the current trajectory, war between the United States and China in the
decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than recognized at the moment. Indeed, judging
by the historical record, war is more likely than not. Moreover, current underestimations and
misapprehensions of the hazards inherent in the U.S.-China relationship contribute greatly to those
hazards. A risk associated with Thucydides’s Trap is that business as usual—not just an unexpected,
extraordinary event—can trigger large-scale conflict. When a rising power is threatening to displace a
ruling power, standard crises that would otherwise be contained, like the assassination of an archduke
in 1914, can initiate a cascade of reactions that, in turn, produce outcomes none of the parties would
otherwise have chosen.
China benefits from opacity on military intentions- US sees this as a threat
Pillsbury 14
Michael Pillsbury (director of the Center of Chinese Strategy at the Hudson Institute),
11-13-2014, "China and the United States Are Preparing for War," Foreign Policy,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/13/china-and-the-united-states-are-preparing-forwar/
At a Nov. 12 news conference in Beijing, General Secretary of the Communist Party Xi Jinping and U.S. President Barack Obama
agreed to notify the other side before major military activities, and to develop a set of rules of behavior for sea and air
encounters, in order to avoid military confrontations in Asia. "It’s incredibly important that we avoid
inadvertent escalation," Ben Rhodes, a U.S. deputy national security advisor, was quoted by the Wall Street
Journal as
saying. An "accidental circumstance," he said, could "lead into something that could precipitate
conflict." Should we really be worried about war between the United States and China? Yes. Over the last
four decades of studying China, I have spoken with hundreds of members of China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and read
countless Chinese military journals and strategy articles. Chinese
military and political leaders believe that their country
is at the center of American war planning. In other words, Beijing believes that the United States is
readying itself for the possibility of a conflict with China — and that it must prepare for that eventuality.
Tensions are high not just because of Beijing’s rapidly expanding military budget, or because the United
States continues to commit an increasingly high percentage of its military assets to the Pacific as part of
its "rebalance" strategy. Rather, the biggest problem is Chinese opacity. While it’s heartening to hear Xi
agree to instruct the PLA to be more open with regard to the United States, it is doubtful this will lead to
any real changes. Washington is willing to share a substantial amount of military information with China,
in order to "reduce the chances of miscommunication, misunderstanding or miscalculation," as then U.S.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates said during a January 2011 trip to Beijing. But the Chinese leadership, which benefits from
obfuscation and asymmetric tactics, refuses to communicate its military’s intentions. Despite repeated
entreaties from American officials, Beijing is unwilling to talk about many key military issues — like the scope
and intentions of its rapid force buildup, development of technologies that could cripple American naval forces in the region, and its military’s
involvement in cyberattacks against the United States — that would lower friction between the two sides. And sometimes, as
in 2010 after U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, Beijing breaks off military-to-military contacts altogether — leading to an especially troubling silence.
As a result, there is a growing mistrust of China among many thoughtful people in the U.S. government.
Chinese military officers have complained to me that journals of the American war colleges now feature
articles on war with China, and how the United States can win. A February 2014 article, for example, in the U.S. Naval
Institute’s Proceedings magazine, entitled "Deterring the Dragon," proposes laying offensive underwater mines along China’s coast to close
China’s main ports and destroy its sea lines of communications. The article also suggests sending special operations forces to arm China’s
restive minorities in the country’s vast western regions. But China is doing the same thing. In 2013, Gen. Peng Guangqian and Gen. Yao Youzhi
updated their now-classic text, The Science of Military Strategy, and called for Beijing to add to the quality and quantity of its nuclear weapons,
in order to close the gap between China and both Russia and the United States. Even
Xi’s "new model" of great-power
relations seems to preclude arms control negotiations, requiring the United States to yield to the
inevitability of China’s rise. Many people outside the Pentagon may be surprised by just how many senior American officials are
worried about a war with China. These include no less than the last U.S. two secretaries of defense, and a former secretary of state. In the
concluding chapter of Henry Kissinger’s 2011 book, On China, he warns of a World War I-style massive Chinese-American war. "Does history
repeat itself?" he asks. Over at least the last decade, on several occasions the United States has pressed China to be more forthright about its
military intentions and capabilities. In April 2006, after a meeting between President George W. Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
and Chinese President Hu Jintao, both governments announced the start of talks between the strategic nuclear force commanders on both
sides. This move would have been extremely important in demonstrating openness about military intentions. But the PLA dragged its feet, and
In a September 2012 trip to Beijing, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta tried to persuade Beijing to enter military
talks. Like his predecessor Gates, Panetta called for four specific areas of strategic dialogue: nuclear weapons,
missile defense, outer space, and cybersecurity. But the Chinese objected, and again the talks never
happened. Sure, Beijing could follow through on the agreements announced during Obama’s recent
trip. But I’m skeptical. One of the biggest advantages China has over the United States is the asymmetry
of military knowledge. Why would they give that up?
the talks never started.
Threat Perception
China sees US in the the Asia-Pacific region as a threat- local nations fear
miscalculation
Mearsheimer 10
John J. Mearsheimer (the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the
University of Chicago), 12/14/10, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia”, The
Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, 2010
The United States has been the most powerful state on the planet for many decades and has deployed
robust military forces in the Asia-Pacific region since the early years of the Second World War. The American
presence has had significant consequences for Australia and for the wider region. This is how the Australian government sees it, at least
according to the 2009 Defence White Paper: ‘Australia has been a very secure country for many decades, in large measure because the wider
Asia-Pacific region has enjoyed an unprecedented era of peace and stability underwritten by US strategic primacy’.1 The
United States,
in other words, has
acted as a pacifier in this part of the world. However, according to the very next sentence in the White
being transformed as economic changes start to bring about changes in the
distribution of strategic power’.2 The argument here, of course, is that the rise of China is having a
significant effect on the global balance of power. In particular, the power gap between China and the
United States is shrinking and in all likelihood ‘US strategic primacy’ in this region will be no more. This is
not to say that the United States will disappear; in fact, its presence is likely to grow in response to
China’s rise. But the United States will no longer be the preponderant power in the Asia-Pacific region, as
Paper, ‘That order is
it has been since 1945. The most important question that flows from this discussion is whether China can rise peacefully. It is clear from the
Defence White Paper—which is tasked with assessing Australia’s strategic situation out to the year 2030— that policymakers in Canberra
are worried about the changing balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. Consider these comments from that
document: ‘As other powers rise, and the primacy of the United States is increasingly tested, power
relations will inevitably change. When this happens there will be the possibility of miscalculation. There
is a small but still concerning possibility of growing confrontation between some of these powers’.3 At
another point in the White Paper, we read that, ‘Risks resulting from escalating strategic competition could emerge
quite unpredictably, and is a factor to be considered in our defence planning’.4 In short, the Australian
government seems to sense that the shifting balance of power between China and the United States may not be
good for peace in the neighborhood. Australians should be worried about China’s rise because it is likely to lead to an intense
security competition between China and the United States, with considerable potential for war. Moreover, most of China’s neighbors, to
include India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, Vietnam—and Australia—will join with the United States to contain China’s power.
put it bluntly: China cannot rise peacefully.
To
Escalation
Risk high of nuke war with China – US and China mistrust each other and are preparing
nukes for ready use, insufficient talks mean coop won’t check
Kulacki 16
(Gregory, May 2016, “The Risk of Nuclear War with China: A Troubling Lack of Urgency,” Pg. 1 Union of Concerned Scientists,
http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/05/Nuclear-War-with-China.pdf) Accessed 6/27/16 BE
The possibility that the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) could become
involved in a nuclear war is increasing. Both governments must acknowledge the danger if they hope to avoid it. Several
factors contribute to the risk of a nuclear war between the United States and the People’s Republic of China: • The United
States and China have a contentious history. Mutual mistrust sustains an entrenched and deepening antagonism
despite sincere and occasionally successful efforts to cooperate on shared concerns such as climate
change and nuclear terrorism. • Both governments are preparing for war, including improving their
nuclear arsenals. U.S. and PRC decision makers believe they need a demonstrable readiness to use
military force— including nuclear weapons—to ensure the other nation will yield in a military confrontation. • U.S. and PRC
leaders try to avoid conflict, but their discussions of contentious issues are inadequate. The extensive military exchanges the
governments have conducted have produced memoranda of understanding on the conduct of naval
vessels and aircraft, but strategic dialogues on their nuclear forces, missile defenses, and anti-satellite
weapons are perfunctory. • U.S. and PRC officials see the risk differently. U.S. officials are concerned that
if a military conflict starts, they may need to use nuclear weapons to stop it. PRC officials assume that no
nation would ever invite nuclear retaliation by using nuclear weapons first. Their concern is to assure the PRC
maintains a credible ability to retaliate after a U.S. nuclear attack.
The threat of nuclear war with China is highly likely- mismatched perceptions raises
concern.
Kulacki in 2016[Gregory; expert on cross cultural communications between the US and China; “The
Risk of Nuclear War with China: A Troubling Lack of Urgency”; Union of Concerned Scientists; May 2016;
http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/05/Nuclear-War-with-China.pdf]
Lack of mutual trust and a growing sense that their differences may be irreconcilable incline both
governments to continue looking for military solutions—for new means of coercion that help them feel more secure.
Establishing the trust needed to have confidence in diplomatic resolutions to the disagreements,
animosities, and suspicions that have troubled leaders of the United States and the PRC for almost 70 years is extremely
difficult when both governments take every new effort to up the technological ante as an act of bad faith. The
bilateral dialogues on strategic stability aim to manage the military competition, but they do not seek to end
it. Although the two governments work very hard at avoiding conflict, they have yet to find a way out of what Graham
Allison called their “Thucydides trap”—the risk of conflict between a rising power and an established
power invested in the status quo (Allison 2015). Allison’s warning not to minimize the risks of war is sage advice, even if he does
not say how the United States and China can escape the trap he describes. Keeping the peace depends on the skill and
patience of political leaders who seek to avoid conflict as they keep a nervous eye on the balance of rapidly evolving
military technologies. PRC leaders believe it is possible to prosecute a major war without risking a U.S. nuclear
attack. The leaders of the United States believe stopping the PRC from prosecuting such a war may depend, in certain
contingencies, on a credible threat to use nuclear weapons—a threat U.S. leaders state they are prepared to
execute. These mismatched perceptions increase both the possibility of war and the likelihood it will
result in the use of nuclear weapons.