Download Notes on battles of North Africa (126338)

Battle for North Africa
The battle for North Africa was a struggle for control of the Suez Canal and access to oil from the Middle East and raw materials from
Asia. Oil in particular had become a critical strategic commodity due to the increased mechanization of modern armies. Britain, which
was the first major nation to field a completely mechanized army, was particularly dependent on the Middle Eastern oil. The Suez
Canal also provided Britain with a valuable link to her overseas colonies–part of a lifeline that ran through the Mediterranean Sea.
The struggle for control of North Africa began as early as October 1935, when Italy invaded Ethiopia from its colony Italian
Somaliland. That move made Egypt very wary of Italy’s imperialistic aspirations. In reaction, the Egyptians granted Britain
permission to station relatively large forces in their territory. Britain and France also agreed to divide the responsibility for
maintaining naval control of the Mediterranean, with the main British base located at Alexandria, Egypt.
Italy was the wild card in the Mediterranean strategic equation at the outset of WWII. If the Italians remained neutral, British access to
the vital sea lanes would remain almost assured. If Italy sided with Germany, the powerful Italian navy had the capability to close the
Mediterranean. The navy’s main base was at Taranto in southern Italy, and operations from there would be supported by Italian air
force units flying from bases in Sicily and Sardinia.
Italy did remain neutral when Germany invaded Poland in September 1939. When Germany invaded France in June 1940, however,
Benito Mussolini could not resist the opportunity to grab his share of the spoils. On June 11, 1940, six days after the British
evacuation at Dunkirk, France, Italy declared war on Britain and France. Britain and Italy were now at war in the Mediterranean.
On paper, at least, Italy enjoyed a considerable advantage over Britain in the Mediterranean theater of operations. In June 1939, the
British navy had only 45 combat ships against the Italian navy’s 183. The Italians held an especially large edge in submarines, with
108 against Britain’s 12. The French surrender on June 25, 1940, placed the entire burden of controlling of the Mediterranean sea
lanes on the Royal Navy.
The Royal Air Force (RAF) was in a slightly better position, with 205 aircraft against the Italian air force’s 313 planes. On the ground,
Italian Marshal Rodolfo Graziani had some 250,000 troops in Libya, while General Lord Archibald Percival Wavell, British
commander in chief of the Middle East, had only 100,000 troops to defend Egypt, Sudan and Palestine. The British ground forces,
however, were far better organized, trained and equipped and had superior leadership.
The British and Italian armies faced each other across the Libyan-Egyptian border in an area known as the Western Desert. It was an
inhospitable region with no vegetation and virtually no water. From Mersa Matruh in western Egypt to El Agheila on the east side of
Libya’s Gulf of Sidra, only one major road connected the region’s few towns and villages. A sandy coastal strip of varying width ran
along the southern shore of the Mediterranean. Inland, a sharp escarpment rose to the 500-foot-high Libyan Plateau. There were only a
few passes where wheeled or even tracked vehicles could ascend the escarpment. Once on the plateau, however, military vehicles had
good cross-country mobility across limestone ground covered by a thin layer of sand. The commander of Germany’s 21st Panzer
Division, Lt. Gen. Johann von Ravenstein, described the area as a tactician’s paradise and a logistician’s hell.
On September 13, 1940, Graziani reluctantly moved into Egypt, almost a month after he had been ordered to do so by Mussolini.
Some six Italian divisions drove east, bypassing a small British covering force along the border, and halted at Sidi Barrani, just short
of the main British positions at Mersa Matruh. Graziani apparently had no intention of going any deeper into Egypt. Italian control of
the airfield at Sidi Barrani, however, seriously reduced the operational reach of British air power and posed a threat to the Royal Navy
in Alexandria. With the Battle of Britain reaching its climax and Great Britain facing a possible German invasion, the British were in
no immediate position to counter the Italian thrust.
By October 1940, the threat of a German invasion of the British Isles had eased, and the British began to reinforce Wavell. Through
that December, an additional 126,000 Commonwealth troops arrived in Egypt from Britain, Australia, New Zealand and India. On
November 11, British naval air power seriously damaged the Italian navy in a surprise attack against Taranto. On December 9, the
Western Desert Force, under Lt. Gen. Sir Richard O’Connor, attacked the Italians at Sidi Barrani.
The British pushed the Italian Tenth Army out of Egypt and then, on January 3, 1941, scored a major victory at Bardia, just inside
Libya. Driving into Cyrenaica (eastern Libya), the British took the vital port of Tobruk on January 22. O’Connor continued to pursue
the Italians, trapping them at Beda Fomm on February 7, 1941. The Italian Tenth Army collapsed. In two months, a British force of
about two divisions had advanced 500 miles, destroyed 10 Italian divisions, and captured 130,000 prisoners, 380 tanks and 845 guns.
In the process, the British had suffered 555 dead and 1,400 wounded.
Following the British successes in North Africa, Prime Minister Winston Churchill decided on February 22 to commit British troops
to defend Greece against the Axis. Most of those forces came out of Cyrenaica, which left Wavell only five brigades in Libya. Just a
few weeks earlier, however, Adolf Hitler had decided to shore up the Italians in North Africa by committing German forces. On
January 8, the Luftwaffe’s Fliegerkorps X arrived in Sicily from Norway and immediately began attacking Allied shipping destined
for the Libyan port of Benghazi. That threat forced the British forward units in Libya to resupply through Tobruk, more than 450 miles
away.
Two German divisions and two additional Italian divisions began crossing from Italy into Libya. On February 12, Brig. Gen. Erwin
Rommel assumed command of the German units that later became the famed Afrika Korps. He lost no time in regaining the initiative.
Rommel probed El Agheila on March 24. When he found that the British defenses were thin, he launched a general offensive despite
Hitler’s orders to maintain an overall defensive posture.
Near the end of March, O’Connor was replaced by Lt. Gen. Sir Philip Neame as commander of the Western Desert Force. The
magnitude of the German attack became apparent when the British were forced out of Benghazi on April 3. O’Connor was sent back
to the front as an adviser to Neame. The Germans captured both British generals from their unescorted staff car on the night of April 6.
Rommel drove rapidly to the east, surrounding Tobruk on April 10. Unable to take the port on the run, he left a siege force of mostly
Italian units there and continued his push for the Egyptian border. It was a decision Rommel later regretted. The Tobruk garrison,
which held out against the siege for 240 days, remained a thorn in Rommel’s side–an annoying sideshow that tied down vital Axis
manpower.
On April 14, Rommel’s main force reached Sollum on the Egyptian border, and his troops occupied the key terrain of the Halfaya
Pass. The German high command, meanwhile, was concerned about the speed of Rommel’s advance and his failure to take Tobruk.
They sent General Friedrich von Paulus to North Africa to assess the situation and ‘bring Rommel under control. Paulus’ report back
to Berlin described Rommel’s weak overall position and his critical shortages of fuel and ammunition. The report also reached
Churchill via Ultra intercepts.
From this report, Churchill wrongly concluded that the Germans were ready to collapse with one strong push, and he started
pressuring Wavell to mount an immediate counteroffensive. Meanwhile, a British supply convoy, code-named Tiger, made its way to
North Africa carrying 295 tanks and 43 Hawker Hurricane fighters.
Prior to launching his counterattack, Wavell wanted to gain control of Halfaya Pass. On May 15, he launched Operation Brevity,
under the command of Brig. Gen. William Gott, to secure the pass and Fort Capuzzo beyond. Rommel skillfully fought the thrust, and
the British withdrew from Fort Capuzzo the next day. By May 27 the Germans had recaptured Halfaya Pass. Unable to advance any
farther because of supply shortages, they dug in and fortified their positions with 88mm anti-aircraft guns. The British troops began
referring to the heavily fortified and fiercely defended Halfaya Pass as Hellfire Pass.
Under continuing pressure from Churchill, Wavell launched his major offensive on June 15. Operation Battleaxe began with a frontal
attack on the Sollum-Halfaya Pass axis. Skillfully using the 88mm anti-aircraft guns as anti-tank weapons, the Germans blunted the
British attack. Then Rommel counterattacked. Battleaxe was over by June 17, and Wavell had lost 91 of his new tanks. Churchill
relieved Wavell on June 21 and replaced him with General Sir Claude Auchinleck. General Sir Alan Cunningham (the brother of
Admiral Cunningham) was given command of the Western Desert Force, recently redesignated the British Eighth Army.
Auchinleck resisted Churchill’s constant pressure for an immediate British counterattack. When Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa
against the Soviet Union on June 22, Rommel’s force in North Africa became even less of a priority for Germany’s logistical support.
Most of the Luftwaffe units in the Mediterranean were sent to Russia, which gave the British a freer hand in attacking Rommel’s
supply convoys at sea and from the air. Rommel continued to grow weaker. By November, he had 414 tanks, 320 aircraft and nine
divisions (three German), four of which were tied down in the siege of Tobruk. The British had some 700 tanks, 1,000 aircraft and
eight divisions.
The British became increasingly obsessed with eliminating Rommel. On the night of November 17, 1941, a small commando force,
led by 24-year-old Lt. Col. Geoffrey Keyes, tried to penetrate Rommel’s headquarters and assassinate the Desert Fox. The raid failed–
Rommel was not even there–and Keyes died in the attempt.
Operation Crusader opened on November 18, with the British XIII Corps advancing on Halfaya Pass and the XXX Corps attempting
to sweep around Rommel’s southern flank to reach the besieged garrison at Tobruk. The XXX Corps reached Sidi Rezegh, 20 miles
southeast of Tobruk. After a series of fierce tank battles on November 22 and 23, Rommel drove deep into the British rear with two
panzer divisions. He attempted to relieve the Axis forces at Halfaya and at the same time cut off the Eighth Army.
With his tank losses mounting, Cunningham wanted to halt the operation. Auchinleck immediately relieved him and replaced him with
Maj. Gen. Neil Ritchie. The British continued to press the attack, and on November 29 they broke through to Tobruk. By December 7,
an overwhelmed Rommel was withdrawing his dangerously depleted forces. In order to avoid encirclement in the Benghazi bulge,
Rommel retreated back across Cyrenaica, reaching El Agheila on January 6, 1942. Operation Crusader resulted in a clear victory for
the British, but one they were unable to exploit due to a lack of reinforcements.
As Rommel withdrew to the east, the RAF continued to attack his supply convoys in the Mediterranean. Only 30 tons of Axis supplies
were shipped to North Africa in November 1941, and 62 percent of them were lost en route. Hitler reacted by shifting Fliegerkorps II
from Russia to Sicily and ordering the German navy to send 10 U-boats into the Mediterranean. Throughout December, Rommel’s
resupply situation improved significantly, with shipping losses dropping to 18 percent. Meanwhile, the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor caused the British to reroute forces from North Africa to India and Singapore. By mid-January 1942, Rommel was operating
on shorter supply lines, and his shipping losses were below 1 percent. He now was ready to return to the offensive.
On January 21, 1942, Rommel launched his second offensive and quickly drove the British back almost 300 miles. The aggressive
German commander recaptured Benghazi on January 29 and continued to push east, reaching Gazala on February 4. There he halted
along the Eighth Army’s defensive line between Gazala and Bir Hacheim. For most of the next four months, the adversaries sat on
either side of the Gazala Line, building up strength.
On May 26, Rommel launched Operation Venezia–his attack against the Gazala Line. Both forces were roughly equal in strength, but
General Ritchie had his armored units widely dispersed, while Rommel kept his concentrated. Using his armor, Rommel swept around
the Free French Brigade at Bir Hacheim and turned north, cutting across the Allied rear. An Axis secondary attack in the north pinned
down the Allied forces there. By May 28, the Axis armored units behind the Allied lines were in trouble. Rommel had lost more than
one-third of his tanks, and the remainder were running short on fuel and ammunition. On May 29, the Italian Trieste Division cleared
a path through the center of the Gazala Line. That opening became a lifeline to Rommel’s panzers. On the 30th, Rommel consolidated
his armor in a defensive position that came to be known as the Cauldron.
On June 5-6, Rommel successfully beat off Ritchie’s series of piecemeal counterattacks. On June 10-11, the Axis finally drove the
Allied forces out of Bir Hacheim, and on June 11 Rommel’s panzers broke out of the Cauldron. The Eighth Army once more started
falling back to the Egyptian border. On June 15, German tanks reached the coast and Rommel shifted his attention to the Tobruk
garrison. This time he would not make the same mistake of leaving the thorn in his side. Tobruk fell on June 21, and the Axis forces
captured 2.5 million gallons of much-needed fuel, as well as 2,000 wheeled vehicles. The fall of Tobruk, however, had unforeseen
consequences for the Axis. Churchill heard the news during a meeting with President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the United States. The
American president immediately offered help. The resulting 300 Sherman tanks and 100 self-propelled guns would later play a pivotal
role at El Alamein.
The British fell back to defensive positions at Mersa Matruh, about 100 miles inside Egypt. Rommel, who had been promoted to field
marshal for his success at Gazala, pursued. With only 60 operational tanks, Rommel attacked at Mersa Matruh on June 26 and routed
four British divisions in three days of fighting. The British fell back again, this time to El Alamein, another 120 miles to the east.
Rommel attacked on July 1st. For three weeks the Allied forces battled Rommel. The Allies launched a major counterattack on July
21-22, but gained no ground. Exhausted, both sides paused to regroup.
. On August 31, 1942, Rommel launched what he believed would be the final attack in the Axis drive to the Nile. The British,
however, had made extensive preparations around El Alamein. The British commander also had the advantage of knowing Rommel’s
intentions through Ultra intercepts.
Rommel planned to sweep south around Ruweisat Ridge, then cut off El Alamein and take it from the rear. In preparation, the British
laid extensive minefields and heavily fortified Alam el Halfa Ridge, which was located behind El Alamein to the southeast. By
September 3, the Axis attack had run short of fuel and petered out. Montgomery counterattacked immediately, but broke off the
operation as soon as the Axis forces were pushed back to the vicinity of their starting positions. Both sides again hunkered down to
build up their strength. Taken together, the battles of Ruweisat Ridge and Alam el Halfa were the real strategic turning point of the
war in North Africa.
Montgomery used the time after the Battle of Alam el Halfa to rest and train his troops, integrate the new American tanks he had
received, and carefully plan his counterattack. Rommel, meanwhile, became ill and returned to Germany on sick leave. When
Montgomery finally launched the attack, his forces and equipment were three times greater than his opponent’s.
The Battle of El Alamein began on October 23 with a massive artillery barrage fired by 900 British guns. Rommel immediately
returned from Germany to resume command. The Allies tried for five days to break through the Axis positions, sustaining 10,000
casualties in the process. On October 30-31, Montgomery renewed the attack with strong support from the RAF. Critically short on
fuel and ammunition, Rommel started to disengage on November 3. At first, Hitler insisted on his usual no-retreat orders. On the 4th,
he grudgingly gave Rommel permission to withdraw, and the 1,400-mile pursuit to Tunisia began.
For the next three months, Montgomery followed Rommel across the northern coast of Africa. Despite constant urging from his
German and Italian superiors, who wanted him to save Libya, Rommel was more interested in preserving his force to fight another
day. Rommel reached Tripoli on January 23 and the Tunisian border at the end of the month. By the time he got to Tunisia, however,
another Allied force was there waiting for him.
On November 8, 1942, just four days after Rommel started his long withdrawal, the British and Americans had executed Operation
Torch, the Northwest African landings. In a coordinated series of landings Allied forces landed along the northern coast of Africa in
regions that were part of Vichy France. The Allies planned to control areas of Tunisia which would allow the Allies to bomb Sicily,
protect the Malta convoys, and strike at Rommel’s supply lines.
While the Allies established themselves ashore, the Germans reacted swiftly, sending troops from Sicily to Tunisia on November 9.
Hitler also gave the order for the German military in occupied France to take control of the remainder of Vichy France. The French
fleet at Toulon, however, was sunk before the Germans could seize it.
From the moment the Allies landed, the campaign in Northwest Africa and the race for Tunis was a logistical battle. The side that
could mass forces the fastest would win. For the Germans, control of the Tunis complex was critical to prevent Rommel from being
trapped between Montgomery in the east and the newly formed British First Army in the west.
The Germans won the initial race for Tunis because they had shorter supply lines, and their aircraft, operating from closer bases, had
greater time over the contested area. In January 1943, the winter rains and resulting mud brought mechanized operations to a halt in
northern Tunisia. Waiting for better weather in the spring, the Allies continued to build up their forces.
Once Rommel’s Panzerarmee Afrika crossed into southern Tunisia, his 10 divisions were well below half strength, with only 78,000
troops and 129 tanks. Before he had to face the rapidly closing Montgomery, Rommel intended to eliminate the threat of the British
First Army to his north.
On February 14, the Germans launched the first leg of a two-pronged offensive, attacking that day through the Faid Pass toward Sidi
Bou Zid. The following day, Rommel, in the south, attacked toward Gafsa. The bulk of Rommel’s forces, however, remained at the
Mareth Line in southern Tunisia. By February 18, Kasserine Pass was in Axis hands, and U.S. ground forces had suffered their first
major defeat of the war. Rommel tried to advance north toward Thala through Kasserine Pass on February 19, but the support he
expected to receive from fellow German divisions did not materialize. After several days of slow advances, he reached Thala on
February 21 but could advance no farther. Hampered by a divided German command structure and rapidly massing Allied
reinforcements, the attack stalled. The Allies pushed forward and recaptured Kasserine Pass on February 25. Rommel returned to the
Mareth Line and prepared to face Montgomery.
When the Eighth Army reached Tunisia, the Allies modified their command structure to conform with decisions made at the
Casablanca Conference in January. General Dwight D. Eisenhower of the United States became supreme commander of all Allied
forces in the Mediterranean west of Tripoli.
On February 24 the Axis also realigned its command structure. Rommel became commander of all of the German divisions in Africa.
The Axis forces finally had a unified command structure in Tunisia, but Rommel probably was not the best choice. By that point in the
war, he had become frustrated and dispirited, the cumulative effect of the long seesaw campaign. To make matters worse, Arnim, who
detested Rommel, continued to do pretty much as he pleased.
The Axis position in North Africa was hopeless, the final outcome clearly in the hands of the logisticians. As the Allies consolidated
their control over the northwest African coast, the Axis pressure on Malta eased, which in turn enabled the Allies to further restrict the
Axis supply convoys from Sicily. Without first coordinating with Rommel, on February 26 Arnim launched Operation Ochsenkopf,a
drive toward Beja. By March 3, that offensive had stalled, at the cost of 71 precious tanks.
Montgomery’s forces, which had crossed into Tunisia on February 4, had reached Medenine on the 16th and established defensive
positions. Hoping to catch the British off-balance, Rommel attacked south from the Mareth Line on March 6. Spearheaded by 140
tanks, it was the most potent offensive Rommel mounted since arriving in Tunisia. It would also be the last. Warned by Ultra
intercepts, Montgomery was waiting. The Germans ran into skillfully prepared anti-tank defenses and lost 52 tanks. Right after the
failure of the Medenine attack, Rommel returned to Germany a sick man.
After the American debacle at Kasserine Pass, command of the U.S. II Corps passed to Patton. He wanted to mount an attack to drive
to the coast, but Egyptian and British forces were wary of the Americans. Patton launched a small attack between March 17 and 25
which was quite successful, however, tying down the 10th Panzer Division.
On March 20, Montgomery attempted a night penetration of the center of the Mareth Line. The attack had failed by March 22. The
next day, he shifted the weight of the main attack around the southwestern flank of the line, through the Matmata Hills. By March 26,
his forces broke through the Tebaga Gap. The Italian First Army and the remainder of the Afrika Korps were forced back. Under
continuous pressure from the Eighth Army on one side and the U.S. II Corps on the other, the Axis forces withdrew to Enfidaville, a
coastal town of Tunisia.
By April 7, the Allied First and Eighth armies linked up, squeezing the Axis into a small pocket. On the east coast of Tunisia, the
Eighth Army took Gabés on April 6, Sfax on April 10, Sousse on April 12, and Enfidaville on April 21. In the north, the U.S. II Corps,
now under Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, took Mateur on May 3 and Bizerte on May 7. Montgomery’s 7th Armoured Division captured
Tunis on May 7. The remaining Axis forces in Tunisia were caught in two pockets, one between Bizerte and Tunis, and the other on
isolated Cape Bon.
The Axis leader surrendered his forces on May 13, 1943. The Royal Navy, waiting in strength offshore, made sure that few Germans
or Italians escaped to Sicily. Axis losses in Tunisia alone totaled 40,000 dead or wounded, 240,000 prisoners, 250 tanks, 2,330 aircraft
and 232 ships. British and American casualties were 33,000 and 18,558 respectively. For the entire North African campaign, the
British suffered 220,000 casualties. Total Axis losses came to 620,000, which included the loss of three field armies
OUTCOMES OF THE WAR IN NORTH AFRICA
On the strategic level, the North African campaign was a watershed for the Western Allies. For the first time in the war they had
decisively defeated the Axis, and especially the Germans, on the ground. The psychological value of the victory cannot be minimized.
The U.S. Army, too, had finally gotten into the war and acquitted itself well after a shaky start. The British and Americans perfected
the combined command structure that would serve the Grand Alliance for the remainder of the war. The various Free French factions
were finally united and organized under the Allied command. And perhaps most important, the British proved the value of Ultra
intelligence and refined the system for getting the necessary information to the field commanders.
On the downside, the Allies were now out of position with a huge force of almost 1 million men and their equipment. With very
limited means of transportation and no way for that force to strike directly at Germany, a follow-up campaign in Sicily was almost the
only feasible next course of action for the Allies.
The loss was a stunning strategic setback for Germany. At first, North Africa had been a rather effective economy-of-force campaign.
At the risk of only three German divisions and a number of Italian divisions of questionable quality, the Axis was able to tie down a
proportionately larger force and at the same time pose a significant threat to one of Britain’s strategic lines of communication. But
after the defeat at El Alamein, Hitler’s sense of pride once again overcame his meager grasp of strategy, and he committed a second
field army to North Africa that he could neither sustain logistically nor afford to lose. The forces Hitler threw away in May 1943 just
might have made some difference for the Germans fighting in Russia or Sicily.
On the tactical and operational levels, several factors conspired against the Axis despite the battlefield brilliance of Rommel and the
superb fighting of the Afrika Korps. Although North Africa was a logistician’s hell, logistics was the deciding factor. In the end, the
Allies triumphed with sheer mass. The Axis forces could not overcome Allied air and sea power–both of which enhanced Allied
logistics and degraded Axis logistics.