Download Balancing Europe`s Eastern and Southern Dimensions

Balancing Europe's Eastern and Southern Dimensions
Esther Barbé
Chapter in Jan Zielonka (ed.) Paradoxes of European
Policy, La Haya, Kluwer Law, 1998, pp. 117-130.
Foreign
After the fall of the Berlin wall Vaclav Havel said that the
European history had started to walk again. The sharpest and most
important boundary in Europe between the countries of OECD Europe
and those of the Warsaw Pact (Davy 1990:141) had dissapeared.
Since that moment a kind of Drang nach Osten filtered the European
construction
process.
The
"return
to
Europe"
of
Central
and
Eastern European countries became the most important aim of the
European foreign policy. Even before Maastricht the European
relations with the outside world concentrated their efforts on
those countries: Phare Plan in 1989; EBRD in 1990; Association
Agreements, including political dialogue, with Visegrad Group
countries in 1991. As a result, the European network of politics
and security began the process to integrate those countries. In
other words, the syndrome of institutional vacuum among Central
and Eastern European Countries could dissapear1. In this sense,
it's worth mentioning the Stability Pact (1994), the statute of
WEU Associated Partnership granted to Central and Eastern European
Countries, the agreements signed by those countries in the
framework of the NATO Partnership for Peace, and the strategy for
EU enlargement approved by the European Council in Essen (December
1994).
1.
The present chapter deals with the group of ten Central and
Eastern European countries that are closer to Western Europe in
terms
of
current
institutional
arrangements
and
future
enlargement: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. They are
members of the Council of Europe, and prior to accesion they have
signed Europe Agreements with the EC, they have the statute of WEU
Associated Partnership, they participate in a privileged way in
the NATO structures for Eastern Europe (NACC and Partnership for
Peace), and some of them even have forces in Bosnia (IFOR, SFOR).
1
It seems to me a paradox that at the same time that the
European Union was concentrating its efforts on Central and
Eastern European Countries it was also dedicating more attention
than ever before to non-EU Mediterranean Countries. As a matter of
fact, the Euro-Mediterranean Conference organized by the Spanish
presidency of the European Union in Barcelona (November 1995) is
the best example of the attention paid by the European
organizations to the Southern Mediterranean Countries2. As a
result of that attention those countries have established
political dialogues wit the EU (Barcelona process), but also with
the WEU and NATO.
The present chapter examines the above mentionned paradox
that links Eastern and Southern dimensions of Europe. How to
explain it? The answer given in this chapter focuses on one of the
main questions raised in this book: are the Union's policy
objectives different from those of individual states?
Geography rises again
Experiences show that foreign policy cooperation has always
been one of the most difficult areas in which to operate in
common. In this sense, Regelsberger and Wessels (1996:31) point
out that a DDS (discreet, discretionary, sovereignty) syndrome is
at work. Therefore cooperation in the foreign policy and security
area raises immediately, and most visibly, issues of national
sovereignty. According to Regelsberger and Wessels (1996:31),
common efforts have to accomodate different historical traditions,
to consider specific sensitivities and prejudices in public
opinion.
Divergent traditions and conflicting interests between the
2.
This chapter deals with the group of Mediterranean nonUnion countries that have signed any kind of agreement with the
EC. It's a group of eleven countries -Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt,
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkeyand the Palestinian Authority. Libya is the outstanding exception.
1
countries participating for two decades in the European Political
Cooperation (EPC) mechanism were obvious. However, since the end
of the cold war the divergences among the EU countries due to the
so-called forces profondes (Renouvin 1953), elements of national
power (Morgenthau 1948) or traditional factors (Aron 1962, Merle
1976), like geographical location, historical experience or
cultural links with the outside world, have been more outstanding.
One more paradox of the European Foreign Policy shows us that at
the same time that the Twelve were negotiating the transfomation
of the EPC into a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the
European
diplomacies
renationalisation due
were
going
through
to the "open space"
a
process
atmosphere.
of
The
dissapearance of the Iron Curtain played a centripetal role,
deepening the European construction process, but also impeled a
centrifugal force. In matters of security this centrifugal force
has impeled a process of sub-regionalization, tending to the
creation of spheres of influence. Thus, whereas the Southern
European countries (Spain, France, Italy), motivated by the risks
deriving from destabilization in the Arab world, recreate a
Mediterranean spécificité, in the North, Germany and the Nordic
countries
rediscover
the
Hanseatic
world,
driven
by
the
disappearance of the Soviet Union. In this way, mental maps based
on geography, history and culture -Mittleuropa, Baltic sea as a
'mythical source of identity' (Oberg 1992:161)- could serve to
indicate the centrifugal forces (renovated divergent traditions,
but also conflicting interests) to which the foreign and security
policy of the Union would be faced.
In this sense, a report of the Bertelsmann Foundation warned
of the danger of being tempted to organize defence following
geographical division of labour criteria. According to that report
(Bertelsmann 1995:4), "There may be some scope for the idea of
some form of "military division of labour" between WEU member
states on functional lines (...) But this should not be extended
to a geographical division of labour, since, by appearing to
1
endorse the idea of national 'spheres of influence', it would tend
to undermine rather than strengthen a common European approach.
Some countries may have more military resources available for
particular areas by virtue of geography -for example Sweden in the
Baltic or Italy in the Mediterranean. But a primary purpose of a
common defence policy is to ensure that members can rely on other
members for support, wherever that support is needed.
(...) The organisation of ad hoc 'coalitions of the willing'
in response to particular crises is unlikely to contribute to the
strengthening of CFSP. Rather, there is a danger that such
coalitions will be regarded as a reflection of the CFSP's
weakness, illustrating the very real risk that, with the Soviet
treath
gone,
European
defence
will
become
increasingly
'renationalised'".
This process of renationalisation, converted into a policy of
spheres of influence, has been evident in the last years. Two
cases can ilustrate this process: the German policy favourable to
the diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, and
the Spanish policy supporting since the end of the cold war a
linkage between European construction and Mediterranean stability.
In both cases the policy followed by Germany and Spain consisted
on converting the national aim into a European priority. In the
first case, the German unilateral move in favour of a rapid
recognition of the two former Yugoslav republics, disolving of any
collective policy, forced the other Europeans to behave alike.
Different explanations have been given to the German behaviour.
Traditional power politics explanations (German sphere of
influence), based on geoeconomics and geopolitics, have clashed
with institutionalist approaches. Following this last approach,
Bulmer and Paterson (1996:17) pointed out that "Germany's
unilateralism was the product not only of domestic pressure for
recognition but also of dissatisfaction at the faltering nature of
EPC decision-making on Yugoslavia (...) German power will become
more evident where European institutions prove to be weak".
1
In the Spanish-Mediterranean case, because of the amount of
financial means necessary to meet the Spanish aims in the
Mediterranean, the unilateral policy had no sense. In this case,
Spain undertook a traditional lobbying policy in European
organizations to commit Europe to Spanish objectives. Indeed
Spain, along with other EU-Mediterranean countries, had been,
already in May 1989, defined in the final resolution approved by
the second Forum on the Western Mediterranean countries as
"mentors" of the Maghreb countries with respect to the EC (Aliboni
1990:157).
Shifting and balancing
In 1989, even before the fall of the Berlin wall, the
relations between the European Community and some countries of the
Eastern bloc changed dramatically. Domestic changes in Poland and
Hungary helped in this sense. Apart from that, Germany, feeling
more powerful than ever before in the Community framework, pledged
for a privileged relationship of the EC with
Central European
countries. The assignment of the Community, during the Arch Summit
(Paris, July 1989), to coordinate the Phare Plan is the point of
inflection. Indeed that coordination meant that the Community was
assuming comprehensive responsabilities concerning those Central
European Countries, beyond the economic assistance (Barbé and
Grasa 1992:101).
Since that moment some relevant persons began to establish a
negative relationship between this new EC interest regarding some
countries of the Eastern bloc and the EC Mediterranean policy. In
other words, they feared that the Community attention and
resources would be shifted from the Mediterranean countries to the
Central and Eastern European countries. In order to prevent that
shifting, the Spaniard Abel Matutes, Commissioner in charge of
Mediterranean policy, relations with Latin America and Asia, and
North-South relations, stated in October 1989 that the Community
should establish a "parallelism" between Eastern Europe and the
1
Mediterranean
(Comisión
1989).
Matutes'
opinion
was
in
full
agreement with Spanish official position. Spaniards have been a
"driving force" (Gillespie 1996:210) behind the Mediterranean
policy of the Union. At the end of 1992 the Mediterranean
portfolio was reallocated from Matutes to another Spaniard, Manuel
Marín.
Spanish official position was quite clear. In this sense,
Felipe González emphasized the danger of that shifting policy for
the interests of the Mediterranean countries. A case in point is
that during a visit to Morocco in December 1995, González (El País
1995) advised the Moroccan prime minister to put pressure on
Brussels to prevent that shifting process.
In other words, the idea, based at once on geopolitics and
geoeconomics, that the first circle of the EC after the EC itself
was formed by the Arab countries and the ACP countries (Khader
1992:177) was over in 1989. During the first half of the nineties
the figures with regard to the EU budget commitment for the
Central and Eastern European Countries in comparison with the
Mediterranean Countries show a rapport of 2.5 to 1. Due to the
demographic differences the result was that each Mediterranean
citizen received in terms of European economic assistance 1 Ecu
meanwhile an Eastern citizen received 5 Ecu. The difference would
be much more important if we took into consideration other
quantitative items like bilateral economic assistance and private
investment.
Confronting those figures of economic assistance the Southern
Mediterranean countries emphasized the paradoxical behaviour of
the Union. As a matter of fact the level of energetic dependance
of the Europeans vis à vis the Arab countries and the figures of
Euro-Mediterranean
trade3
would
have
justified
a
privileged
3.
In 1993, the trade between the EC and the Mediterranean
countries implied 78.8 Ecu billions meanwhile the EC-Central and
Eastern European Countries implied 46.4 Ecu billions. In the
Mediterranean case the balance of trade was much more positive for
the EC (12.4 Ecu billions) than in the Eastern case (5.8 Ecu
1
relationship
with
the
South
instead
of
the
East
option.
The
paradox of the Union behaviour is based on the well-known fact
that the Twelve adopted in 1989 a solidarity approach vis à vis
the other Europeans, based on historical responsability (Moïsi and
Rupnik 1991), meanwhile the relationship with the Mediterranean
countries became an issue of security. Refering to the beginning
of the post-cold war era Dinan (1994:459) points out that "the
Community's preoccupation with Eastern Europe almost blinded
Brussels to developments in the South, where economics and
political instability threatened the Community's security".
The lobbying policy of the Southern members of the Union in
favour of the interests of the non-members Mediterranean countries
began to emphasize the security concerns in that region in front
of the celebratory spirit of the Eastern policy. As a result the
policy of paralelism proposed by Matutes with regard to both
dimensions of Europe, Eastern Europe and Mediterranean, was
developped conceptually into a balancing strategy. In other words
the above mentionned paradox between economic relations and aid
policy generated a balancing strategy, arising from the so-called
solidarity versus security approach.
Balancing is a familiar concept for the experience of the
European construction. In fact, the Union life has been a long
story of checks and balances: balancing small and big countries,
balancing rich and poor countries, balancing supranationalism and
intergovernmentalism,
balancing
European
aims
and
national
particularities. Therefore balancing Eastern and Mediterranean
dimensions of Europe is a new episode in the process of the
European construction. Moreover it's an important one.
Mediterranean stability means European construction
According to some relevant politicians the development of the
Union relationship with the Mediterranean countries will influence
billions) (Khader 1995:19).
1
the future of the European construction. In this sense, Felipe
González, in an interview granted to the French daily Le Monde,
(1990) at the height of the Gulf Crisis said: "I think, like
François Mitterrand, that the construction of Europe cannot be
attained without first trying to resolve the explosive problems
that are building up in North Africa with respect to demography,
development, religion and the standard of living". This conception
of Euro-Mediterranean interdependence made the Mediterranean a
priority area for Spanish, French and Italian diplomacies. Those
countries, along with the Commission, played a relevant role as
promoters of diplomatic initiatives for the Mediterranen region.
All those initiatives were based on a global security approach
(Buzan 1991). A global approach, alongside the more traditional
subjects of security, such as strategic matters and armed
conflicts, points to a multidimensional agenda which includes
environmental, socio-economic and cultural issues. A case in point
is the Spanish-Italian proposal of convening a CSCM presented by
Gianni de Michelis in September 1990, during the Italian EC
presidency, before its time had quite come. That Italian interest
concerning the development of Euro-Mediterranean relations faded
once de Michelis, the "flamboyant Italian foreign minister" (Dinan
1994:459), resigned. Above all, Italy redirected its attention
away from the Mediterranean because of its own domestic
instability.
The CSCM proposal was based on a comprehensive approach of
Mediterranean stability, tackling with economic, social, political
and military dimensions of security. In fact, the CSCM proposal
adopted the CSCE methodology of dividing the areas of cooperation
into
three
'baskets':
political
and
security,
economic,
humanitarian and cultural (Barbé 1992:72). The Gulf War prevented
any meeting of that kind but did not invalidate the economic,
social and cultural dimensions of the European approach to the
region. On the contrary, anti-Western demonstrations in some
North-African countries were a warning. At first sight those
1
demonstrations
were
directed
against
the
allied
operations
in
Irak, but in fact they were showing clear signs of the social and
economic unrest existing in those societies.
It is quite a paradox the fact that at the same time that the
Euro-mediterranean relationship emphasized the traditional civil
power (Duchêne 1972) policy of the Europeans, based on economic,
social and cultural relations, the Gulf War impeled the
trasformation of the European foreign policy in such a way that
military instruments became the center of attention. It's a fact
that the civil power role played by the Europeans for two decades
was partially invalidated due to the Gulf War experience. Some
governments claimed that Europe should have a military dimension
to face the post-cold war risks. Those demands clashed during the
Maastricht Treaty negotiations with the mistrust of those
countries supporting the central role of NATO in European defence.
Article J.4 of the EU Treaty is the cautious result of that clash.
The perception in Southern Europe of risks derived from the
Euro-Mediterranean interdependence (migration, terrorism) was
growing after the end of the Gulf War. Civil war in Algeria,
Libyan support of terrorism and the slowness of the Middle East
peace process impeled those European countries to strengthen its
pro-Mediterranean lobbying policy in the Community at the same
time that Central and Eastern European Countries were getting
closer to the "central circle" of Europe. In this sense it's worth
mentioning the statute of associated partners in the WEU granted
to the Central and Eastern European Countries during the
Petersberg meeting (1992) or the setting of a structured dialogue
between those countries and the Union since the European Council
of Essen (1994). This strategy of preparing enlargement of the
European organizations with regard to the Central and Eastern
European Countries put into operation a new set of instruments
(WEU associated partnership, NATO partnership for peace, EU
structured dialogue).
The EU Mediterranean lobby focused its attention on those
1
instruments, but separating them from the aim they were set for
(enlargement). Consequently, the balancing philosophy assumed by
that lobby was based on instruments, not on final results. Some
examples illustrate this Eastern-Southern parallelism in terms of
instruments: in 1990 Italy proposed to create a Mediterranean Bank
similar to the EBRD; Spain and France supported the idea of
putting into motion a kind of Phare Plan for the Mediterranean
(Europe 1994a:10); Spain proposed to organize a Mediterranean
Partnership for Peace during a NATO meeting of defence ministers
celebrated in Seville in September 1994 (Barbé 1995:20); France
put forward
Mediterranean
the proposal
during
the
of an Stability
Euro-Mediterranean
Pact for
Conference
the
in
Barcelona (November 1995) and Malta has been supporting this idea
in the follow-up process (Europe 1996a:4); the 1996 Italian
presidency of the Union announced the intention of creating a
structured dialogue in matters of security and diplomacy for the
Euro-Mediterranean region (Europe 1996b:4).
In short, Manuel Marín, the Spanish Commissioner in charge of
the Union's relations with the non-member Mediterranean countries
assumed fully the adaptation of partnership instruments created
for Central and Eastern European to the Mediterranean area. In
March 1995 Marín published in the french daily Le Figaro an
article with a very significant title, La Méditerranée: une
priorité au même titre que l'Europe ex-communiste. On this idea
the Spanish Commissioner was responsible of the policy adopted by
the Commission and was personally supported by president Delors.
According to Gillespie (1996:210) Marín has been a central figure
in the development of EU Mediterranean policy from its former
emphasis on cooperation to one on partnership.
Euro-Mediterranean partnership versus Eastern enlargement
Marks (1996:2) points out that "the Southern Mediterranean,
along with the former Soviet Union is considered by Europe to be
one of the two main strategic regions bordering a progressively
1
enlarging
EU".
The
fact
is
that
both
developments,
the
consideration of the Mediterranean as a strategic region and the
enlargement of the Union, have been parallel along the time. This
parallelism has been converted into linkage, and even trade off,
between those two developments in some occasions. The balancing
philosophy between Eastern and Southern dimensions of Europe is a
good example in that sense.
The balancing philosophy supported by the EU Mediterranean
lobby began to give some serious results in the middle of 1994. As
a matter of fact the European Council of Corfu (June 1994) called,
at the same time, for a new policy towards Eastern Europe and the
Mediterranean. As far as Eastern Europe is concerned the policy
was oriented towards enlargement. In Corfu the heads of state and
government agreed that those enlargement negotiations should start
after the end of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. The EU
Mediterranean lobby, led by Spain and France, obtained reciprocal
concessions when the Corfu summit decided to show its political
will to create a zone of cooperation in the Mediterranean and
agreed that enlargement negotiations with Cyprus and Malta will
start six months after the end of the 1996 Intergovernmental
Conference. In this case, the Greek presidency played hard in
order to get Cyprus included in the next enlargement process.
The European Commission, commited as we saw before to develop
the Union Mediterranean policy from its former emphasis on
cooperation to one on partnership, gave contents to a new policy.
In this sense, the Commission issued a document in which the
creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was proposed, with
special mention being made of a free trade area, supported by
substancial financial aid, and a zone of cooperation tending
towards a close association, the content of which will be jointly
defined at a later stage (European Commission 1994:2-3). This
Partnership emphasizes two ideas: in short term, the expansion of
the trade bloc built by and around the Union, and in long term,
the creation of a real Euro-Mediterranen network based on every
1
kind
of
cooperation
(energy,
environment,
terrorism
control,
culture, tourism).
The European Council of Essen (December 1994) endorsed the
idea of the Partnership proposed by the Commission on the basis of
the Mediterranean constituting "a priority zone of strategic
importance for the European Union" (Europe 1994b:1) and accepted
Spain's offer to organize, during the Spanish presidency in the
second
half
of
1995,
a
Euro-Mediterranean
Conference
at
ministerial level. This decision must be considered a reciprocal
concession due to the fact that the Essen summit adopted at the
same time a strategy for enlargement towards the Central and
Eastern European countries based, as we saw before, on structured
dialogue.
The
Essen
decision
concerning
the
Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership was presented by Jacques Delors in such terms during
the summit that the cleavage between the Mediterranean lobby, led
by Spain and France, and the Eastern lobby, led by Germany, was
obvious, even if Delors was talking of the mitigation of those
differences. The president of the Commission emphasized "the image
of the Northern countries, mostly the German presidency, who have
understood that it's necessary to send a message fort to the
South; from now on, the French and Spanish presidencies will be
able to make an "ambitious" policy for this region where we are
very much present" (Europe 1994b:1). Delors' words, in some way,
anticipated the row of the European Council of Cannes (June 1995).
During that summit the "ambitious" Mediterranean policy of the two
1995 presidencies (France and Spain) clashed with Northern
interests, led by Germany. In that occasion, the decision to be
taken was not concerned with political gestures, like adopting the
idea of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, but with the
of resources.
Before Cannes summit the Commission elaborated
concerning the Union relations wit the Mediterranean
With respect to budgetary ressources, the Commission
allocation
a document
countries.
communiqué
1
presented a proposal (Ecu 5.5bn) trying, according to Marin, to
reestablish the credibility of the Union strategy for the
Mediterranean countries as compared to the treatment reserved for
the Central and Eastern European countries (Europe 1995:6). The
idea of treating the Mediterranean partners and the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe on an equal footing was thus insisted
upon. In other words, the balancing philosophy was fully adopted
by the Commission.
The Eastern-Southern balance was also present in the first
report adopted by the Council, on 10 April 1995, to prepare the
Euro-Mediterranean Conference. As a matter of fact that report
emphasized the will of the Union to complement its policy towards
the East with a policy for the South in the interest of
geopolitical coherence (EU Council 1995:2).
However, as we said before, the balancing philosophy was put
to test during the Cannes summit. For the first time, the
objectives of the Mediterranean lobby clashed face to face with
one of the main policies of the Union: the Eastern enlargement.
The French and Spanish desire to reallocate resources between the
East and the South -as proposed by the Commission and translated
into aid proposals for the period 1995-1999 of Ecu 5.5bn for the
Mediterranean compared to Ecu 7bn. for Eastern Europe- clashed
with the views of the Northern countries (Germany, United Kingdom,
Netherlands, Denmark). Those countries were not ready to change
the 5:1 ratio of aid distribution of the last period (1992-1996),
favourable to the Eastern countries. The European Council of
Cannes was the scene of a clash between Kohl and González over the
distribution of aid. As a result of this clash, the resources for
the Mediterranean (Ecu 4.685bn) were increased by 22 per cent
while those for Central and Eastern Europe rose by 8 per cent
(Barbé 1996:32).
The outcome of the Cannes summit suggests two conclusions:
first, the successful leading role played by Spain in the Union
Mediterranean lobby and second, the trade off between Eastern
1
enlargement
and
Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership.
According
to
Gillespie (1996:206), "Spanish lobbying to strenghten the
Mediterranean policy has been linked at important junctures to
other issues on which Madrid's support has been sought by Germany
and other northern member states, particularly in relation to EU
policy towards central-eastern Europe. Spain has never opposed the
European Union's eastward expansion, from which there will be
costs and dangers for economies such as the Spanish, but
González's last two governments were very careful about how Spain
would give its assent, ensuring first that contrapartidas
(reciprocal concessions), such as German acquiescence in the mid1990s increase in the EU spending on the Mediterranean, were
secured in return".
CFSP agenda: Mediterranean plus Central and Eastern Europe
The European Council of Lisbon (June 92) adopted a report on
the possible evolution of the CFSP. That report enumerated some
factors that must be taken into consideration when defining the
issues and areas of joint actions: geographic proximity of regions
or specific countries; an interest in the political and economic
stability of the regions or countries; and the existence of
threats to security interests of the Union" (Informe 1992:20).
According to those factors the report indicated several geographic
areas for which the EU must adopt joint actions: Central and
Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean, particularly
the Maghreb and the Middle East.
One can wonder if the balancing philosophy has also affected
the CFSP development in terms of defining joint actions. This
chapter argues that, apart from the Maghreb, the CFSP agenda
focuses its attention on the same geographic areas that the most
traditional EPC agenda. As a matter of fact, Central and Eastern
Europe, as a part of the CSCE process, and the Middle East
conflict were the first issues approached by the EPC mechanism at
the beginning of the seventies. Therefore, the CFSP has not
1
changed
the
issues
in
the
agenda,
determined
by
geographic
reasons, but the content of the policies, explained by the new
international system (the end of the Soviet bloc and the peace
process in the Middle East). As far as this chapter is concerned
the only CFSP joint action concerning Central and Eastern Europe
that deserves some attention is the Stability Pact. As we saw
before the Stability Pact methodology, as a confidence and
security-building mechanism, was included in the Barcelona
Declaration (1995). As a result of the follow-up meetings of the
Barcelona Conference, the European Council of Dublin (December
1996) supported the proposal of a future Chart for Peace and
Stability in the Euro-Mediterranean Region, aiming towards
confidence building in the region through political dialogue, arms
control and State of Law mechanisms.
With regard to the Middle East, the Council has adopted two
joint actions in support of the Middle East peace process. The
first one, adopted by the Council in April 1994, focused on the
organization and observation of the Palestinian elections, and the
second one, adopted in November 1996, appointed an European envoy
to follow the peace process. As far as this chapter is concerned
those joint actions deserve two comments. First of all, it's
necessary to emphasize the low-profile role played by the Union as
regards the political dimension of the peace process. Those joint
actions, above mentionned, leave high politics, the crux of the
negotiation, in United States hands. Even in the low politics
dimension the Union role in the Middle East is less important that
it has been in Central and Eastern Europe (coordination of the
Phare Plan). As a matter of fact the global coordination of
international aid for the Middle East was entrusted to an Ad Hoc
Liaison Committee and not to the Union, even being the EU the
first donor to the area (Barbé and Izquierdo 1997). In addition to
that, it's necessary to emphasize the Spanish high profile in the
Union's policy for the region. For instance, Madrid was the see of
the Middle East Peace Conference (October 1991). Apart from that,
1
the Council appointed in November 1996 a Spanish diplomat, Miguel
Angel Moratinos, as the European envoy to follow the Peace
Process.
The high profile of the Spanish diplomacy in the Middle East,
in addition to the role played by Spain to impel a EuroMediterranean Partnership, make us wonder if the Mediterranean
lobby of the Union has an outstanding leader, playing a similar
role to Germany in the case of Central and Eastern Europe. In the
case of the Middle East, Salomón (1996:98) points out that "Spain
assumed within EPC the leadership of the so-called progressive
block integrated by France, the UK, Ireland and Greece". The
leadership issue will be approached in detail farther on this
chapter.
Concerning the Mediterranean region, the Lisbon report
brought in a new priority to the European Foreign Policy agenda:
the Maghreb. The report considered that the stability of this
region "acquires great common interest for the Union. Demographic
growth, the repeated social crises, large scale emigration and the
increase of fundamentalism and religious intégrisme are problems
that endanger this stability" (Informe 1992:21). On the basis of
the said dangers, the Lisbon Summit endorsed the idea of a EuroMaghreb partnership that would incorporate free trade, political
dialogue, and economic, technical, cultural and financial
cooperation.
However, since 1992, the problems for the Euro-Maghreb option
were obvious. The internal situation of Algeria and the economic
sanctions on Libya, based on CFSP decisions (common position
adopted in November 1993), in addition to the failure of the Arab
Maghreb Union invalidated the group-to-group logic underlying the
Euro-Maghreb proposal. It became evident that the Maghreb does not
constitute a region in the process of economic integration, given
the scarce horizontal exchanges, nor an area of political entente.
As a result the Euro-Maghreb methodology was finally turned into
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
1
The failure of the Maghreb option meant a shock for the
French leadership in terms of EU Mediterranean policy. As a matter
of fact France had supported along the years initiatives of
cooperation in the Western Mediterranean (Mitterrand proposal of
convening a Western Mediterranean Conference in 1983, the Western
Mediterranen Group initiated in 1990). The Spanish-Italian
proposal of convening a CSCM for the whole Mediterranean, above
mentionned, meant a challenge for the traditional French policy,
based on the difference between the two Mediterranean regions: the
Maghreb, where France has a distinctive leadership, and the Middle
East. The French policy of chasse gardée in the Maghreb has
lessened in the nineties in favour of Spain (Khader 1994) due to
the role played by this country in the EU framework to improve the
Union's Mediterranean policy. According to Gillespie (1996:207),
"by succesfully competing for the European Commission portfolios
relating to the Mediterranean, and making the Mediterranean a
priority area for the diplomatic service, Spain in the first half
of the 1990s was able to play a leading role in shaping this
aspect of EU policy". In short, it's impossible to talk of a
cohesive Mediterranean block within the EU with a clear
leadership.
Above all, neither France nor Spain have been interested on
bringing attention to the Maghreb area following the CFSP scheme
(common positions, joint actions, declarations). For instance,
neither the Algerian civil war nor the Western Sahara conflict
have been privileged topics in the CFSP agenda. Far from being a
privileged topic, the Algerian civil war, for instance, only
deserved three declarations out of three hundred adopted between
the entry into force of the Treaty and the second semester of
1996.
It could seem a paradox that the European Union, that was
starting the ambitious Euro-Mediterranean process, obviate in
diplomatic terms conflicts in Northern Africa. Could it be the
result of differences between the Union's policy and some members'
1
interests? Could it be the result of applying instruments created
for the Central and Eastern Europe to the Mediterranean region?
Conclusions: Priority and Mistrust
It's obvious that the Mediterranean members of the Union are
directly affected by developments in the Southern shore of that
Sea. Material reasons explain it (millions of Maghrebians living
in France, Spanish energetic dependance on Algerian and Libyan
gas, Spanish territories of Northern Africa, drug traffic across
the Strait of Gibraltar, territorial disputes in the Aegean Sea).
Apart from that, common experiences in the past or "past trauma"
(Hill 1993:308) are an important factor in this region where
colonialism
left
an
important
trace.
The
French-Algerian
relationship is much more than a foreign affair issue. It's a
domestic sensitive issue. Spain fought its last international war
in the twenties, against Moroccan troops.
In other words, the relationship with some or all the
Mediterranean countries is a priority for the Southern European
members of the Union due to the issues involved. Low politics are
concerned (fishing, investment, trade, environment) but also high
politics (conflict mediation, migration, terrorism, weapons
proliferation). Are those individual states' interests clashing
with the Union's policy objectives? In this case, can the Union
meet those interests?
This chapter argues that the Eastern-Southern dilemma is a
priority's matter. As a matter of fact the Southern members don't
work
against
the
Eastern
enlargement.
Nevertheless
those
countries, specially Spain, have tried to make the Mediterranean
policy a priority
of the Union agenda in order to get more
resources and a commitment with the region. In fact, creating a
strong Euro-Mediterranean network in that region was the main
objective
of
the
Barcelona
Conference.
The
notion
of
interdependence, as the basis for increasing security in the
region, is the main driving force of the Euro-Mediterranean
1
affair.
The Northern countries of the Union, feeling not directly
affected by that security aspect of the Mediterranean dimension,
must be reluctant to accept some policies of the Southern members
when principles or resources are involved. In other words, has the
Union the means to meet those Southern members objectives?
Concerning principles, the pragmatic policies adopted by Spain or
France in human rights matters in the Maghreb countries have
already clashed with some European Parliament decisions (Feliu
1995:92). Concerning resources the Cannes summit is the best
example to mention, as we saw before.
In any case the Northern countries
of
the
Union
have
converging interests with their Southern partners in Mediterranean
matters if we take into consideration the trade and investment
dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. In this sense,
Marks (1996:2) points out that "the creation of a free trade zone
emcompassing both flanks of the Mediterranean -and linked in to an
area stretching north to the Arctic circle and east to the
confines of the former Soviet Union- fits into the 1990s dynamic
of building large transnational trading and investment blocs".
Inevitably, in terms of Common Foreign and Security Policy,
sensitive issues for some members, like the Algerian civil war for
France, will prevent a European common position on the matter.
Apparently the idea of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, based on
free trade and economic cooperation but also on political
dialogue, resembling the Europe Agreements, is too ambitious for
the time being.
As a matter of fact the UE relationship with Central and
Eastern Europe is basically different of the Euro-Mediterranean
relationship. Conceptualizing those relation in terms of security
one can establish a clear difference. On the one hand, the
relationship between the Union and Central and Eastern European
countries is based on mutual confidence. In other words, those
countries are psychologically accepted to be part of the
1
pluralistic community of security formed by the Fifteen and, as
far as they are concerned, those countries share the identity
elements of that community. In Deutsch words (1957:6) the
countries forming a community of security eliminate the use of
force among them. That is to say, they constitute a "zone of
peace". The Franco-German reconciliation in the framework of the
Union is the best example in this sense. Democratic regimes and
the acceptance of the European integration principles constitute
the basis of that community.
On the other hand the relationship between the members of the
European
Union
and
the
Mediterranean
countries
could
be
conceptualized as a complex of security, meaning for that "a group
of
states
whose
primary
security
concerns
link
together
sufficiently closely that the national securities can not
realistically be considered apart from one another (Buzan
1991:190). The existence of such a complex of security has been
cited as an evidence by Southern members of the Union to develop a
partnership between both shores based on the same kind of
instruments used by the EU, WEU and NATO for Central and Eastern
Europe.
The basic problem of that Partnership in matters of politics
and security is the negative perception of the so-called complex
of security. In other words, the mistrust between both shores. The
Arab world has criticized the Euro-Mediterranean operation arguing
that the Europeans turn the economic and social problems of those
countries into Northern security problems.
The mistrust between the two shores is a fact concerning as
much the traditional dimensions of security (military dimension)
as the economic and societal dimensions, specially the identity
factors. A case in point is the debate between the Europeans and
the Arab World regarding the human rights interpretation, not to
mention the reluctance of the Maghreb countries with regard to the
redefinition of NATO's role in the Mediterranean. At all events
the Maghreb countries have accused the Mediterranean lobby
1
(France, Spain and Italy) of creating troops and units (Eurofor
and Euromarfor) whose mission is nothing other than intervention
on the southern shore of the Mediterranean (Faria and Vasconcelos
1996:11). At the same time some of those European countries have
impeled the beginning of political dialogues with the Southern
shore in order to build confidence: the political dialogue begun
with the Barcelona follow-up process and dialogues of some
Southern countries with NATO and WEU4. That situation resembles
more the defense-detente philosophy of the East-West period than
the present relationship between the Union and Eastern Europe.
In short, balancing Europe's Eastern and Southern dimensions
has been more a suitable political gesture adopted at the right
time than a long term plannified policy. By the time being the
diversity in the Union, due to the international priorities of the
individual states, has been spared without endangering the Union's
policy objectives.
4.
NATO has started dialogues with Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia,
Israel, Mauritania and Jordan. WEU has dialogues with Morocco,
Tunisia, Algeria, Mauritania, Egypt and Israel.
1
References:
Aliboni, R. (1990) "The Mediterranean Dimension", in W. Wallace
(1990), The Dynamics of European Integration, London, Pinter, pp.
155-167.
Aron, R. (1962) Paix et guerre entre les nations, Paris, CalmanLevy.
Barbé, E. (1992) "Espagne: une redécouverte de la Méditerranée",
Confluences. Méditerranée, num. 2, pp. 69-76.
Barbé, E. (1995) "Reinventar el Mare Nostrum: el Mediterráneo como
espacio de cooperación y seguridad", Papers, num. 46, pp. 9-23.
Barbé, E. (1996) "The Barcelona Conference: Launching Pad of a
Process", Mediterranean Politics, vol. 1, num. 1, pp. 25-42.
Barbé, E. and Grasa, R. (1992) La Comunitat Europea i la Nova
Europa, Barcelona, Fundació Bofill.
Barbé, E. and Izquierdo, F. (1997) "Present and Future of the
Joint Actions for the Mediterranean Region", in Holland, M. (1997)
Common Foreign and Security Policy: The record and reform, London,
Pinter.
Bertelsmann Wissenschaftsstiftung (1995) CFSP and the Future of
the European Union, Interim Report of a Working Group prepared in
collaboration with the Research Group on European Affairs
(University of Munich) and the Planning Staff of the European
Commission (DG1A).
Bulmer, S. and Paterson, W.E. (1996) "Germany in the European
Union: gentle giant of emergent leader?", International Affairs,
vol. 72, num. 1, pp. 9-32.
Buzan, B. (1991) People, States and Fear: An Agenda for
International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, New York,
Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 2nd. ed.
Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas (1989) Hacia una política
mediterréanea renovada, SEC (89) 1961, 23 November.
Davy, R. (1990) "The Central European dimension", in W. Wallace,
The Dynamics of European Integration, London, Pinter, pp. 141-154.
Declaration (1995) Barcelona Declaration
Mediterranean Conference, 27-28 November.
adopted
Deutsch, K. et al. (1957) Political Community
Atlantic Area, Princeton, Princeton U.P.
at
the
Euro-
and
the
North
1
Dinan, D. (1994) Ever closer Union?
European Community, London, Macmillan.
An
Introduction
to
the
Duchêne, F. (1972) "Europe's Role in World Peace", in R. Mayne
(ed.), Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead, London,
Fontana.
El País (1995) "González insta a Marruecos a presionar a la CE
para que no olvide el Magreb", 14 December.
EU Council (1995) Conférence Euro-Méditerranéenne de Barcelone.
Rapport de Synthèse, 6532/95, 10 April.
Europe (1994a), num. 6326, 30 September.
Europe (1994b), num. 6376, 11 December.
Europe (1995), num. 6436, 9 March.
Europe (1996a), num. 2821, 31 May.
Europe (1996b), num. 2805, 3 April.
European Commission (1994) Strenghtening the Mediterranean Policy
of
the
European
Union:
Establishing
a
Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership (Communication from the Commission to the Council and
the European Parliament), Brussels, Com (94) 427 final, 19
October.
Faria, F. and Vasconcelos, A. (1996) Security in Northern Africa:
Ambiguity and Reality, Paris, Institute for Security Studies
(Chaillot Papers, num. 25).
Feliu, L. (1995) "La apropiación de la temática de los derechos
humanos por los regímenes marroquí y tunecino: retórica y
realidad", Papers, num. 46, pp.77-94.
Gillespie, R. (1996) "Spain and the Mediterranean: Southern
Sensitivity, European Aspirations", Mediterranean Politics, vol.
1, num. 2, pp. 193-211.
Hill,
C.
(1993)
"The
Capability-Expectations
Gap,
or
Conceptualizing Europe's International Role", Journal of Common
Market Studies, vol. 31, num. 3, September, pp. 305-328.
Informe (1992) "Informe al Consejo Europeo de Lisboa sobre el
posible desarrollo de la Política Exterior y de Seguridad Común
(PESC) con vistas a determinar los ámbitos en que pueden
desarrollarse acciones comunes con respecto a países o grupos de
países particulares" (Anexo I), Boletín de las Comunidades
1
Europeas, 6-1992.
Khader, B. (1992) Europa y el Gran Magreb, Barcelona, Fundación
Paulino Torras Domènech.
Khader, B. (ed.)
L'Harmattan.
Khader,
CERMAC.
B.
(1994)
(1995)
Le Monde (1990)
November.
Le
"Un
L'Europe
parténariat
entretien
et
la
Méditerranée,
euro-méditerranéen,
avec
M.
Felipe
Paris,
Louvain,
González",
20.
Marks, J. (1996) "High Hopes and Low Motives: The New EuroMediterranean Partnership Initiative", Mediterranean Politics,
vol. 1, num. 1, pp. 1-24.
Merle, M (1976) Sociologie des Relations Internationales, Paris,
Dalloz, 2nd. ed.
Moïsi, D. and Rupnik, J. (1991) Le nouveau continent. Plaidoyer
pour une Europe renaissante, Paris, Calman-Levy.
Morgenthau, H.J. (1948) Politics among Nations. The struggle for
power and peace, New York, Alfred A. Knopff.
Oberg, J. (1992) Nordic Security in the 1990s. Options in the
changing Europe, London, Pinter.
Regelsberger, E. and Wessels, W. (1996), "The CFSP Institutions
and Procedures: A Third Way for the Second Pillar", European
Foreign Affairs Review, num. 1, pp. 29-54.
Renouvin, P (1953) Histoire des Relations Internationales, Paris,
Hachette.
Salomón, M. (1996) "Spain: Scope Enlargement towards the Arab
World and the Maghreb", in Algieri, F. and Regelsberger, E.
(eds.), Synergy at Work. Spain and Portugal in European Foreign
Policy, Bonn, Institut für Europäische Politik, pp. 91-110.
1