Download Phobias and Luther Cases

Phobias and
Luther Cases
Athena Hiotis, Devin McKnight, Jon
Hinkle, Gary Hersey, Chelsea
Stewart, Kaleb Amde
The ability to Act
ƒ The ability to act (Davidson): (pg 89) “A can do
X intentionally means that if A has desires and
beliefs that rationalize X, then A does X.”
ƒ Question: What situations can you think of
where one would not be capable of succeeding
in X according to this definition?
Will and Power
ƒ “One fundamental contrast marked by
this basic concept is a distinction
between will and power; it is one thing to
be unwilling to do something, quite
another to be unable” (p.90).
Weakness of will
ƒ An agent acting against her better judgment
ƒ Situation: Going to class- Clara has 9am class
ƒ Cozy Clara: In bed, but is really comfortable. She
wants to stay in bed but there are also reasons
for her to want to go to class. She is physically
able to go, yet her comfort outweighs her desire
to go to class.
Question: Does Clara lack of interest in leaving her
comfortable environment render her impotent??
Inability to Act
ƒ Agent cannot do X intentionally due to forces
independent of her will.
ƒ Paralyzed Clara: In bed, not “chained” to bed
but has no way of getting out. Wants to go to
class but is unable to do so.
Disabilities of the Will
ƒ Volitional impairment, where the agent does
not have the capacity to will
ƒ Examples include pathological disturbances
(i.e. depression, anxiety, phobias, etc.)
ƒ Agoraphobic Clara: She wants to get an
education, yet she cannot bring herself to leave
her room due to her overwhelming fear of large
crowds and the outdoors.
Conditions of the will in
action
ƒ Enabling Conditions- necessary
conditions allowing Clara to act (i.e. Cozy
Clara), i.e. making her able to act
ƒ Performance Conditions- “the intention,
will, reasons, concerns, etc., that would
actually get her to act.”
Cozy Clara
ƒ Physically and psychologically able to go
to class
ƒ Chooses comfort over responsibility to
get to class.
Paralyzed Clara
ƒ Physically unable
ƒ Cannot fulfill intention to go to class even
if she wanted to
Agoraphobic Clara
ƒ Physically able to go to class
ƒ Mentally incapable of willing herself to get out
of bed.
ƒ “Fear is an obstacle to [the agoraphobic
agent’s] efforts to carry out his intentions” (see
rest of quote p. 94)
--Discussion question: What is the difference
between agoraphobic and paralyzed Clara?
Possible answer
ƒ If her dorm were on fire Agoraphobic as well as
Cozy Clara can reasonably fulfill the desire to
get out of dorm.
ƒ [However, Watson still thinks that Agoraphobic
Clara under the present circumstances is
genuinely incapable of acting on the desire.
ƒ In the situation where she can get out of the
dorm fear serves to give her a new motive.]
Williams and Frankfurt
ƒ Luther Cases: “I can do no other…”
ƒ “Genuine Incapacity that in no way
compromises one’s agency or self-control”
(100)
ƒ Williams- “A moral incapacity with which the
agent is identified.”
ƒ Frankfurt- “Volitional necessity is not the same
thing as simply being overwhelmingly averse…
In addition the aversion has his endorsement;
and it constrains his conduct so effectively
precisely because of this” (101).
Cont’d
ƒ “For both philosophers, necessity is
somehow dependent on the agent’s
identifications or sense of what is
important” (101).
Kane’s Proposal
ƒ Luther was responsible because of the past actions
and decisions which made him into the kind of man
he was at that the time of that statement
ƒ According to Watson, this account does not hold up
because Luther is supposed to be acting freely,
whereas this rationale would apply to the case of an
addict. We hold an addict responsible for becoming
addicted, but we still consider him/her unfree once
addicted.
ƒ “This proposal fails to capture the way in which Luther
cases appear to involve a form of necessitation that is
in itself fully voluntary” (102).
Discussion Question
ƒ Let’s say we have an crack addict, and
he approaches his doctor after being
diagnosed with a clinical addiction to
crack-cocaine and says:
ƒ “I can do no other…than smoke crack all
day every day!”
ƒ Is there a sense in which we could
consider him free in the manner of Luther
on Williams’s and Frankfurt’s account?
Normative Necessity
ƒ “Normative necessity asserts not a real
incapacity but a relation among norms” (103)
ƒ Example: I can’t sleep with you. I have to look
after my seven children.
ƒ “According to Williams and Frankfurt, the ‘I
can’t’ in Luther cases is not merely a judgment
about normative priorities…but a conclusion
about oneself” and one’s capacities (103).
Cont’d
ƒ “Statements of normative necessity assert not
only an inconsistency between certain courses
of action certain considerations but also
express a commitment to certain normative
priorities” (103).
ƒ [However, normative necessity still isn’t
enough to capture the genuine element of
incapacity that Luther cases involve, since
normally you can change your commitments.]
Dennett’s Proposal
ƒ “When I say I cannot do otherwise I
mean I cannot because I see so clearly
what the situation is and because my
rational control faculty is not
impaired…reason dictates; I would have
to be mad to do otherwise, and since I
happen not to be mad, I cannot do
otherwise” (104).
Dennett cont’d
ƒ “This proposal attempts to interpret judgments of moral
impossibility from a non-deliberative point of view”
(105).
ƒ [A problem with it is that it would seem to make all acts
that we aren’t motivated to do acts that we’re incapable
of doing, as in the following syllogism:]
ƒ 1) To do otherwise I would have to have a reason or incentive
2) I don’t have such a reason
3) Therefore, I can’t do otherwise
ƒ Our deliberative conclusion here should be #2, not #3. For it to
be a Luther case the deliberative conclusion must assert
necessity, as #3 does but #2 does not.
Cozy Clara Returns!
ƒ Cozy Clara deliberates as follows:
ƒ 1) To get out of bed I would need a reason
or incentive to do so.
2) I do not have such a reason.
3) Therefore I stay in bed.
ƒ Dennett’s proposal does not successfully
differentiate between Luther and Cozy
Clara.
Question!
ƒ What (if any) is the difference between
normative necessity and Dennett’s
proposal?
Unthinkability and
Deliberative Necessity
ƒ Unthinkability- “The quality of being ‘out of the
question,’ in its being altogether off the deliberative
screen” given the agent’s ideals and principles (107).
ƒ Deliberative Necessity- “[J]udgments of
impossibility…are often deliberative starting points
rather than conclusions; they indicate the boundaries of
the space of reasons in which deliberation takes
place.”
ƒ These boundaries (established by principles and
ideals) “determine what is eligible for deliberation”
ƒ [This is what Watson thinks is the right interpretation of
volitional necessity.]
Unthinkability cont’d
ƒ Jane Austen example from Pride and Prejudice
ƒ Because of the kind of a person she is, or her ideals,
Elizabeth deliberates that she cannot marry Collins.
ƒ “Contrast Elizabeth with Cozy Clara. For Clara, getting
out of bed is an option in both senses. It is not out of
the question; it just doesn’t come up…,” [whereas for
Elizabeth accepting Collins’s proposal is unthinkable,
something she couldn’t possibly consider (109).
ƒ In Watson’s terms, it’s an option but not a deliberative
option.]
Question
ƒ In cases such as Luther’s and
Elizabeth’s, are there alternatives to
accepting their claim that they “can
do no other”?
ƒ How else might one account for their
claim?
Williams and Frankfurt :
A Comparison
ƒ Thus far Watson has been using Williams and
Frankfurt in this discussion interchangeably.
However, now he wishes to “distinguish the
kind of necessity involved in what Frankfurt
and Williams (respectively) call volitional or
moral impossibility” (110).
ƒ Differences come to light based if we ask how
we should understand that which is
necessitated, or the relevant notion of volition
(Frankfurt).
Distinguishing between
Williams and Frankfurt
ƒ Williams: Luther Cases are deliberative conclusions
e.g. conclusions about what it’s best to do.
ƒ Frankfurt: Luther Cases, are not necessarily
conclusions about what’s best but may instead be
expressions of the agent’s deep attachments.
ƒ Frankfurt’s example: A mother has to make the
decision whether to keep her newborn child or to put it
up for adoption. She might think it best to put the child
up for adoption, but her emotional attachment will not
permit her to do so.
Evaluation and Volition
ƒ “To be a person entails evaluative attitudes
(not necessarily based on moral
considerations) toward oneself. A person is a
creature prepared to endorse or repudiate the
motives from which he acts and to organize the
preferences and priorities by which his choices
are ordered. He is disposed to consider
whether what attracts him is actually important
to him.”
ƒ In Frankfurt’s terms, being a person (as
opposed to wanton) means having second
order volitions.
Endorsement
ƒ To endorse= to evaluate as best
ƒ This is the same as what is most choiceworthy to an agent.
ƒ Endorsement is not just a matter of
emotional attachment, then.
Cont’d
ƒ Williams says that, “moral incapacities
depend upon, and express, the agent’s
ethical conception of the alternatives.”
ƒ For Frankfurt, however, volitional
necessities don’t necessarily have to be
ethical. What is choice-worthy may even
be “less than rational” and “need not be
reason-sensitive.” (113)
Other Examples?
ƒ Besides the case of the mother and her
child can you think of any other examples
that represent Frankfurt’s view??
Identification
ƒ For Williams, “to oppose one’s own moral
incapacities is to cease to have them.”
ƒ But for Frankfurt, an agent can change
his incapacities by altering what he
identifies with: “The fact that a person
cannot bring himself to perform an action
does not entail that he cannot bring
himself to act with the intention of
changing that fact”
Question Time!
ƒ If you have the ability to change your
moral incapacities, as Frankfurt asserts,
do you really have moral incapacities at
all?
ƒ Williams would say no. Which
philosopher would you side with?
Endorsement,
Identification, and Caring
ƒ Frankfurt argues that volitional necessity “delineates
the province of the will.” (114)
ƒ When an agent is constrained by volitional
necessities, there are things he can’t help willing or
cannot bring himself to will. These volitional
boundaries shape and define his very nature as a
person.
ƒ If an agent works against the limits of his own will in
effort to overcome a volitional necessity, he seems to
be exhibiting a source of agency independent of the
will.
The Unfortunate Mother
Returns
ƒ A mother has to make the decision to either keep her newly
born child or put it up for adoption. She sincerely thinks it is
best to put the child up for adoption, but her will won’t let
her give up the child.
ƒ Through the mother’s unsuccessful attempts to overcome
her deep attachment to the child, she discovers the limits of
what she can will.
ƒ “A person is active when it is by his own will that he does
what he does, even when his will is not itself within the
scope of his voluntary control.” (115)
ƒ The mother is not just a passive witness but rather is active
on behalf of her sense of what is best. [Where she is
successful in overcoming a volitional necessities, she’s
using her will to alter its own boundaries.]
Volitional Necessity vs.
Other Kinds of Incapacity
ƒ Frankfurt helps to clarify volitional necessity
(on the basis of either endorsement or
caring) by contrasting it with psychological
aversion.
ƒ Aversion affects motivation, but it’s not
dependent on the agent’s sense of what’s
important to him.
ƒ Volitional necessity is dependent on the
agent’s sense of what’s important or of
what’s important to him.
Endorsement vs. Caring
ƒ Endorsement is dependent upon what an
agent is committed to or stands behind.
ƒ [This can be distinct from what the agent
cares most about, as in the case of the
mother.]
ƒ What one cares about can also be
changed if the agent takes steps to
extinguish his incapacity.
Frankfurt’s Caring Criterion
of Volitional Necessity
ƒ Caring is measured by how much one is
“invested” in or bound up with something, by
one’s sense of loss upon not achieving the
object of one’s care.
ƒ A person exhibiting volitional necessity “may
care about something even though he wishes
that he didn’t, and despite strenuous efforts to
stop” (117).
Question Time!
ƒ Consider two people in a failed
relationship who nontheless stay together.
Sexpert Chelsea Stewart asks:
ƒ What’s more important to agency,
endorsement or caring?
ƒ Can you think of an example where what
someone endorses conflicts with what he
cares about?
The Unfortunate Mother:
Remix!
ƒ Recall the example of the unfortunate mother,
and imagine that the woman, despite her
attachment (care), manages to give up her
child for adoption (what she endorses as most
choiceworthy).
ƒ Here her effort to overcome her attachment
“manifests an identification with the standpoint
of what is best.” (119)
Unfortunate Mother
Scenarios
Scenario
Gives Up Baby
(endorsement)
Keeps Baby
(caring)
Harm to herself Success / Failure
of Agency
Injury to herself:
“Feels empty”,
“going through the
motions”
Agency has not
been damaged or
defeated
May or may not feel
Easier for her to
guilty; not so
live with, but fails as
personally
an agent
devastating
Conclusion
ƒ Volitional necessities are based on the
interaction of three motivational structures:
1) influences independent of either one’s
endorsement (i.e. one’s values) or what one cares
about (e.g. phobias, addiction).
2) what one cares about (e.g. keeping child)
3) what one endorses as an end, project or principle
(e.g. giving child up)
ƒ These levels of volitional necessity can and
often do overlap