Download Japanese Surrender and Arguments Against and For The Bomb

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Japanese Surrender
- By 1945, the Japanese had suffered nearly two years, including the Marianas Campaign with the defeat of Saipan and the Philippine
Campaign
- Defeat at Iwo Jima and Okinawa by June, 1945
- The War Journal of the Imperial Headquarters concluded:
“We can no longer direct the war with any hope of success. The only course left is for Japan's one hundred million people to
sacrifice their lives by charging the enemy to make them lose the will to fight.”
- Japanese Imperial High Command called for an all-out defense of Kyushu, the southern-most island of Japan, calling upon more
than 3,000 kamikaze pilots and 5,000 suicide boats to attack the beachhead in preparation for an Allied attack of the mainland
islands.
The “Big Six”
- Publicly, the “Supreme Council for the Direction of the War” (also known as the “Big Six”), had stated the intention of fighting on to
the end until death.
- Privately, Japanese diplomats were meeting with Russian diplomats, encouraging Russia to mediate between itself and the U.S.
in an attempt to secure better conditions for peace.
At the formation of the Suzuki government in April 1945, the council's membership consisted of:
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Prime Minister: Admiral Kantarō Suzuki
** All of these positions were
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Shigenori Tōgō
appointed by the Emperor
Minister of the Army: General Korechika Anami
and answerable only to him.
Minister of the Navy: Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai
Chief of the Army General Staff: General Yoshijirō Umezu
Chief of the Navy General Staff: Admiral Koshirō Oikawa(later replaced by Admiral Soemu Toyoda)
** In keeping with the custom of a new government declaring its purposes, following the May meetings the Army staff produced a
document, "The Fundamental Policy to Be Followed Henceforth in the Conduct of the War," which stated that the Japanese people
would fight to extinction rather than surrender. This policy was adopted by the Big Six on June 6.
Reaching Out to the Soviet Union for Mediation
- Diplomatic tone taken with the U.S.S.R.:
“It should be clearly made known to Russia that she owes her victory over Germany to Japan, since we remained neutral, and
that it would be to the advantage of the Soviets to help Japan maintain her international position, since they have the United
States as an enemy in the future.”
- However, the U.S.S.R. was preparing to attack Japanese territory gained during its fighting in Asia in the 1930s – Manchuria, Korea,
etc. in fulfillment of promises made to Great Britain and the U.S. during the Tehran and Yalta Conferences
Japanese Response to Crisis
On June 9, the Emperor's confidant Marquis Kōichi Kido wrote a "Draft Plan for Controlling the Crisis Situation," warning that by the
end of the year Japan's ability to wage modern war would be extinguished and the government would be unable to contain civil
unrest. "...
** Food rations for Japanese society was less than 1,500 calories a day
In order to safeguard the Imperial Household and preserve the national government, Kido proposed that the Emperor take action,
by offering to end the war on "very generous terms."
- Withdraw from the formerly European colonies occupied during war, provided the colonies were granted independence
- Disarm militarily provided this not occur under Allied supervision
- Japan would be "content with minimum defense"
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** Kido's proposal did not contemplate Allied occupation of Japan, prosecution of war criminals or substantial change in Japan's
system of government.
Japanese Reaction to the Potsdam Declaration:
- From Prime Minister Suzuki to the press, on July 27, regarding the Potsdam Declaration:
“I consider the Joint Proclamation a rehash of the Declaration at the Cairo Conference. As for the Government, it does not
attach any important value to it at all. The only thing to do is just kill it with silence (mokusatsu). We will do nothing but press
on to the bitter end to bring about a successful completion of the war.”
Japanese Reaction to Atomic Bombings:
- Aug. 6 – bombing of Hiroshima
- President Truman, speaking regarding the bombing of Hiroshima …
“Their leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from
the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth ...”
- Aug. 8 – Russia declares was on Japan and then after midnight attacks on Aug. 9 (in violation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact)
- Aug. 9 – bombing of Nagasaki
** These twin shocks caused Emperor Hirohito to intervene and order the “Supreme Council for the Direction of War” to accept the
terms of surrender the Allies had established in the Potsdam Declaration for ending the war.
** Still, there was a stalemate …
- The hardliners – Generals Anami, Umezu, and Admiral Toyoda – a insisted on three further terms that modified Potsdam:
- Japan handle their own disarmament
- Japan deal with any Japanese war criminals
- There be no occupation of Japan
** On Aug. 13, there was still a stalemate by the “Big Six” … and, thus, believing that the latest Allied demands would be rejected
Aug. 14 Bombing Raid
In the largest bombing raid of the Pacific War, more than 400 B-29s attacked Japan during daylight on August 14, and more than 300
that night. A total of 1,014 aircraft were used with no losses.
In the longest bombing mission of the war, B-29s from the 315 Bombardment Wing flew 3,800 miles to destroy the Nippon Oil
Company refinery at Tsuchizaki on the northern tip of Honshū. This was the last operational refinery in the Japan Home Islands and
it produced 67% of their oil.
- There followed, still, several more days of negotiations in Japan until the “Big Six” voted unanimously to surrender.
Formal Reading of the Surrender
Aug. 15 – Emperor announces surrender
- Emperor gives the famous “Jewel Voice Broadcast” when he announces the surrender of Japan to the Allies, though he never uses
that word “surrender”
** Attempted military coup – Aug. 15 to surround the Imperial Palace and establish military rule
- Surrender of Japan – Sept. 2, 1945 aboard the U.S. Naval battleship, the USS Missouri
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Adapted From:
http://www.authentichistory.com/1939-1945/1-war/4-Pacific/4-abombdecision/3-against/index.html
Arguments Against The Bomb
by Michael Barnes
Argument 1: The Bomb Was Made For Defense Only
Bomb opponents argue that the atomic bomb was built as a defensive weapon, not an offensive one. It was intended to
be a deterrent, to make Germany or any other enemy think twice before using such a weapon against the United
States. From 1949-1991 the Cold War was waged under the shadow of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), and even
though the United States fought major wars in Korea (while Truman was still in office), Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan,
nuclear weapons were never again deployed. In other words, not using them in those wars has been an admission that
they should never have been used offensively in the first place.
Argument 2: Use of the Bomb was Illegal
On September 39, 1938, the League of Nations, "under the recognized principles of international law," issued a
unanimous resolution outlawing the intentional bombing of civilian populations, with special emphasis against bombing
military objectives from the air. The League warned, "Any attack on legitimate military objectives must be carried out in
such a way that civilian populations in the neighborhood are not bombed through negligence." Significantly, the
resolution also reaffirmed that "the use of chemical or bacterial methods in the conduct of war is contrary to international
law."
Argument 3: Use of the Atomic Bombs Was Racially Motivated
Opponents of President Truman’s decision to use the atomic bomb argue that racism played an important role in the
decision; that had the bomb been ready in time it never would have been used against Germany or Italy. All of America’s
enemies were stereotyped and caricatured in home front propaganda, but there was a clear difference in the nature of
that propaganda. The Japanese were universally caricatured as having huge buck teeth, massive fangs dripping with
saliva, and monstrous thick glasses through which they leered with squinty eyes.
Americans didn’t like Mussolini, Hitler, and Nazis, but many hated the Japanese race. The
official magazine of the US Marine Corps, The Leatherneck, in May 1945 called the Japanese a
“pestilence,” and called for “a giant task of extermination.” American racism led to a failure to
distinguish between the Japanese government, dominated by hard-line
militarists, and the Japanese civilian who was caught up in their government’s
war.
Poster: "Tokio Kid
Say: Much Waste
of Material Make
So-o-o-o Happy!
Thank You"
Racism surely played a role in President Truman’s decision making
regarding using the atomic bomb. In his July 25, 1945 diary entry, as
Truman is writing about the bomb, he refers to the "Japs" as "savages,
ruthless, merciless and fanatic." On August 11, after both Hiroshima and
Nagasaki had been devastated, an American clergyman named Samuel
McCrea Cavert wrote the President urging him to give the Japanese time
to surrender before using any more atomic bombs. Truman replied,
"When you have to deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast."
Whether these comments are racist about the Japanese people, or only
express the President’s opinion about the Japanese military is a matter of
interpretation.
Argument 4: There Were Alternatives
Supporters of President Truman’s decision to use atomic weapons against Japan tend to paint the decision as a difficult
choice between two stark options—it was either American boys or the bomb. Opponents of the bomb are adamant that
there were other options available to the President, which at the very least should have been tried before resorting to the
bomb.
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Alternative 1: A Demonstration of the bomb
One alternative might have been to arrange a demonstration of the bomb. After the war, the United States did conduct
numerous atomic bomb tests on small volcanic atolls in the Pacific. Such a site could have been prepared in 1945. If
representatives of the Japanese government, military, and scientific community could have seen the bomb, it might have
been enough to convince them of the foolishness of continued resistance. If not, at least the U.S. could say that they
had tried, thereby maintaining the moral high ground.
Alternative 2: Wait For the Russians
Military analysts working for the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in 1945 believed that the Japanese had to
acknowledge defeat was inevitable, which could have been achieved by the Soviet Union declaring war on Japan earlier.
In July, when President Truman traveled to Germany to meet his Allied leaders for the first time, pinning down Stalin on
the exact date was at the top of his agenda. When Truman and Stalin met on July 17th, the Soviet leader confirmed they
would declare war on Japan on August 15. Later that night, Truman wrote in the diary, “Most of the big points are
settled. He'll be in the Jap War on August 15th. Fini Japs when that comes about” (meaning, they’ll be finished), so
the President believed by July 17, and some in the Japanese military leadership, were of a mind that a Soviet
intervention in the war would prove decisive.
Alternative 3: Let the Japanese Keep Their Emperor
The third and perhaps most important alternative to both the bomb and the land invasion was to
modify the demand for unconditional surrender and allow the Japanese to keep their emperor.
Of course he would have to be demoted to a powerless figurehead (much like the Royal Family in Great
Britain), but it was possible that this one condition alone might have been enough to satisfy the
American War Department’s conclusion that it was necessary to convince the Japanese that they
would not be “annihilated” if they surrendered. The American government clearly understood
that if they harmed the emperor, whom the Japanese revered as a god, the Japanese would
resist forever. And the key to this argument lies in the fact that the American government
already planned on letting the emperor stay.
Alternative 4: Continue Conventional Bombing
Some military analysts were convinced in the summer of 1945 that Japan was very near surrender, that the pounding
they were taking from conventional weapons would soon convince the Japanese cabinet that further resistance was
futile. That position was bolstered when, after the war, Secretary of War Stimson commissioned a board to perform a
detailed investigation into the effectiveness of Allied bombings during the war. They subsequently interrogated 700
Japanese military, government and industrial officials, and they recovered and translated documents related to the war
effort. Their report, the Strategic Bombing Survey, makes the obvious observation that Japan might have surrendered
earlier if they had had a different government. But it goes on to express a more startling opinion:
Nevertheless, it seems clear that, even without the atomic bombing attacks, air supremacy over Japan
could have exerted sufficient pressure to bring about unconditional surrender and obviate the need for
invasion...Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the
surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945,
and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs
had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned
or contemplated.
Argument #5: Use of the bomb was more to scare Russia than to defeat Japan.
The dropping of both atomic bombs probably had more to do with preventing the Soviet Union from gaining territory in
Asia, much like what had happened in Europe. American leaders believed the shock-and-awe effect of using the atomic
bomb against Japan would make the Soviet Union more manageable in post-war negotiations. (This argument had been
made most consistently by historian Gar Alperovitz). There was certainly reason to be concerned about the Soviet
Union. When Germany collapsed, the Russians had made huge advances. Russian troops moved into Hungary and
Rumania and showed no inclination to leave there or the Balkans. But was it an acceptable trade-off to annihilate several
hundred thousand civilians just so the Russians wouldn’t be able to get in on the kill of Japan, and so the U.S. might
have the upper-hand in the post-war world? Bomb opponents are abhorred by the moral implications.
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Argument 6: The Atomic Bomb Was Inhumane
The logical conclusion to the list of arguments against the bomb is that use of such a
weapon was simply inhumane. Hundreds of thousands of civilians with no democratic
rights to oppose their militarist government, including women and children, were
vaporized, turned into charred blobs of carbon, horrifically burned, buried in rubble,
speared by flying debris, and saturated with radiation. Entire families, whole
neighborhoods were simply wiped out. The survivors faced radiation sickness,
starvation, and crippling mutilations. Then there were the “hidden cracks,” the spiritual,
emotional, and psychological damage. Japanese outside of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
scared and ignorant about radiation sickness, treated bomb victims as if they had a
communicable disease. They were shunned and ostracized from Japanese society.
Bomb survivors in 2004,
most with cancer
Adapted From:
http://www.authentichistory.com/1939-1945/1-war/4-Pacific/4-abombdecision/2-support/index.html
Arguments Supporting The Bomb
by Michael Barnes
Argument #1: The Bomb Saved American Lives
For American military commanders, determining the strength of Japanese forces and anticipating the level of civilian
resistance were the keys to preparing casualty projections. Numerous studies were conducted, with widely varying
results, for instance one study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April 1945 resulted in an estimate of 1,200,000 American
casualties, with 267,000 fatalities. Former President Herbert Hoover sent a memorandum to President Truman and
Secretary of War Stimson, with “conservative” estimates of 500,000 to 1,000,000
fatalities.
Argument #1.1: The Bomb Saved Japanese Lives
A concurrent, though ironic argument supporting the use of the bomb is that because of
the expected Japanese resistance to an invasion of the home island, its use actually
saved Japanese lives. Military planners included Japanese casualties in their
estimates. The study done for Secretary of War Stimson predicted five to ten million
Japanese fatalities. In 1983, at the annual observance of Hiroshima's destruction, an
aging Japanese professor recalled that at war’s end, due to the extreme food rationing,
he had weighed less than 90 pounds and could scarcely climb a flight of stairs. "I couldn't
have survived another month," he said. "If the military had its way, we would have fought
until all 80 million Japanese were dead. Only the atomic bomb saved me. Not me alone,
but many Japanese, ironically speaking, were saved by the atomic bomb."
Argument #1.2: It Was Necessary to Shorten the War
Another concurrent argument supporting the use of the bomb is that it achieved its primary objective of shortening
the war. The bombs were dropped on August 6 and 9. The day after the bombing of Nagasaki, the Japanese
requested a halting of the war. On August 14 Emperor Hirohito announced to the Japanese people that they would
surrender, and the United States celebrated V-J Day (Victory over Japan).
Argument #1.3: Only the Bomb Convinced the Emperor to Intervene
A third concurrent argument defending the bomb is the observation that even after the first two bombs were dropped,
and the Russians had declared war, the Japanese still almost did not surrender. The Japanese cabinet convened in
emergency session on August 7. Military authorities refused to concede that the Hiroshima bomb was atomic in nature
and refused to consider surrender. The following day, Emperor Hirohito privately expressed to Prime Minister Togo his
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determination that the war should end and the cabinet was convened again on August 9. At this point Prime Minister
Suzuki was in agreement, but a unanimous decision was required and three of the military chiefs still refused to admit
defeat. Then Nagasaki was bombed. Even so, hours of meetings and debates lasting well into the early morning hours of
the 10th and still resulted in a 3-3 deadlock. Prime Minister Suzuki then took the unprecedented step of asking Emperor
Hirohito, who never spoke at cabinet meetings, to break the deadlock. Hirohito responded:
“I have given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and abroad and have concluded that continuing the war
can only mean destruction for the nation and prolongation of bloodshed and cruelty in the world. I cannot bear to see my
innocent people suffer any longer.”
In his 1947 article published in Harper’s, former Secretary of War Stimson expressed his opinion that only the atomic
bomb convinced the emperor to step in: “All the evidence I have seen indicates that the controlling factor in the final
Japanese decision to accept our terms of surrender was the atomic bomb.”
Argument 2: The Decision was made by a Committee of Shared Responsibility
Supporters of President Truman's decision to use atomic weapons point out that the President did not act unilaterally, but
rather was supported by a committee of shared responsibility. The Interim Committee, created in May 1945, was
primarily tasked with providing advice to the President on all matters pertaining to nuclear energy. Most of its work
focused on the role of the bomb after the war. But the committee did consider the question of its use against Japan.
Argument #3: The Japanese Were Given Fair Warning (Potsdam Declaration & Leaflets)
Supporters of Truman’s decision to use the atomic bomb point out that Japan had been given ample opportunity to
surrender. On July 26, with the knowledge that the Los Alamos test had been successful, President Truman and the
Allies issued a final ultimatum to Japan, known as the Potsdam Declaration (Truman was in Potsdam, Germany at the
time). Although it had been decided by Prime Minster Churchill and President Roosevelt back at the Casablanca
Conference that the Allies would accept only unconditional surrender from the Axis, meaning the Japanese could not
request conditions, such as the Japanese emperor staying in power, the Potsdam Declaration did lay out some terms of
surrender. However, the Japanese leadership was not provided with knowledge of the Los Alamos test bombing.
The Potsdam Declaration detailed that the military, after being disarmed, would be permitted to return home to
lead peaceful lives. The document concluded with an ultimatum: "We call upon the Government of Japan to
proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces…the alternative for Japan is
prompt and utter destruction." To bomb supporters, the Potsdam Declaration was more than fair in its surrender
terms and in its warning of what would happen should those terms be rejected. The Japanese did not respond to
the Potsdam Declaration.
Additionally, bomb supporters argue that Japanese civilians were warned in advance through millions of leaflets dropped
on Japanese cities by U.S. warplanes. In the months preceding the atomic bombings, some 63 million leaflets were
dropped on 35 cities targeted for destruction by U.S. air forces. The Japanese people
generally regarded the information on these leaflets as truthful, but anyone caught in
possession of one was subject to arrest by the government. Some of the leaflets mentioned
the terms of surrender offered in the Potsdam Declaration and urged the civilians to
convince Japanese government to accept them—an unrealistic expectation to say the least.
Generally, leaflets warned that the city was considered a target and urged the civilian
populations to evacuate.
Argument 4: The atom bomb was in retaliation for Japanese barbarism
Although it is perhaps not the most civilized of arguments, Americans with an “eye for an eye” philosophy of justice argue
that the atomic bomb was payback for the undeniably brutal, barbaric, criminal conduct of the Japanese Army. Pumped
up with their own version of master race theories, the Japanese military committed atrocities throughout Asia and the
Pacific. The infamous “Bataan Death March” provides support for this argument, as the American prisoners were treated
inhumanely.