Survey
* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
Socialist Growth Revisited: Insights from Yugoslavia Leonard Kukić London School of Economics, Department of Economic History Introduction (I) • Successor states of Yugoslavia have essentially stagnated over the past 30 years. • Diverging European economic development after WWII had attracted much public interest. Not academic interest necessarily. • Planned economies performed relatively well in the 1950s and the 1960s. • In the 1980s their performance turned dismal. • (Usual) Explanation: Growth based on capital and labour expansion, and the transfer of resources from farms to factories, intrinsically limited (Krugman, 1995). Introduction (II) • Failure of planned economies mostly attributed to embedded inefficiencies. • Doom argument: Employers and employees faced poor incentives since property was state owned (Bardhan and Roemer, 1993). • Nuanced argument: performance was relatively OK during mass production technology of the 1950s/1960s. But bad with onset of flexible production technologies during late 1970s (Broadberry and Klein, 2011) . Motivation (I) • Existing literature suffers from two problems. • 1st Problem: Excessive focus on Soviet Union. • Masks heterogeneity of E. European countries. • I analyse Yugoslavia. • Yugoslavia was taken as an example of one of fastest growing countries in 1950-70s. • Thus, Balassa and Bertrand (1970) found Yugoslavia did better than the average of other 9 sample countries, in terms of output and TFP growth. • In AER, Horvat (1971) attributed this to Yugoslavia’s decentralised economic system. Motivation (II): 1980s Motivation (III): The evolution of macroeconomic indicators in Yugoslavia and in the U.S., 1952-90. Figure 1.2: Capital to labour ratio 90 70 50 1990 Int. GK$, log scale 1990 Int. GK$, log scale Figure 1.1: GDP per capita 70 50 30 10 5 2 1952 1960 1970 Year 1980 30 10 5 2 1952 1989 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 1952 1970 Year 1980 1989 Figure 1.4: Hours worked per capita 0.5 Hours per person Ratio Figure 1.3: Investment to output ratio 1960 0.5 0.4 0.3 1960 1970 Year 1980 1989 0.2 1952 Yugoslavia 1960 1970 Year 1980 U.S. Note: Capita is defined as working age person, while labour is defined as total hours worked ((average yearly hours worked per employee) x (total number of employees)). Hours worked per capita are total hours worked divided by the working age population. 1989 Motivation (IV) • 2nd Literature problem: Typically relies on a simple comparison of macro indicators, like productivity and growth (van Ark, 1996; Broadberry and Klein, 2011). • Hence, arguments not quantified or tested. • Some growth accounting exercises (Balassa and Bertrand, 1970; Vonyo, 2010). Very useful, but growth acc. suffers from its own problems. • So what can be done? Motivation (V) • I apply business cycle accounting (BCA). Developed by Cole and Ohanian (2002) and Chari et al. (2007), among others. • BCA is a diagnostic tool like growth accounting, but moves towards explanations. • Hence, I can “explain” both the success and failure episodes. • BCA composed of two steps: 1. Calculate from data. 2. Insert wedges into a prototype model to determine their impact on econ. growth. • As a dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) model, confers two major advantages. 1. Adds a timing dimension. 2. Identifies the incentives that drive output, capital and labour. Preview of results • 1. TFP became more important over time in sustaining growth. Reconciles conflicting results in literature about relative importance of factors and TFP (Balassa and Bertrand, 1970; Weitzman, 1970; Sapir, 1980; Bergson, 1983; Kontorovich, 1986). • 2. The labour wedge consistently deteriorated since the mid-1960s. And drove the collapse of growth during the 1980s. • Similar to findings of Weitzman (1970), Sapir (1980), and Easterly and Fischer (1995). But on completely different grounds. • Does not mean that technology and diminishing returns on capital were un-important. Rather, labour frictions were more important. History • Evolution of socialist economic system can be divided into four phases. Gradual move from central planning, through market socialism, to decentralised planning. • 1st Phase, 1947-1951: Rigid central planning focused on heavy industrialisation. Soviet Union Template. • 2nd Phase, until 1965; Yugoslav officials sought to distance themselves from Soviet Union. Yugoslavia began gradually opening towards the West. • 3rd Phase, until 1975: 1965 reform important. Heyday of market socialism. Economic power further decentralised to work councils within firms. • 4rd Phase, until the end: 1974 constitution led to further decentralisation of power to the level of departments within firms. History IV: Trade as per cent of GDP (1990 Int. GK$), and composition of trade, 19521988. 90 80 70 50 40 30 20 10 0 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 % 60 Year Trade as % of GDP OECD as % of total trade Socialist Bloc as % of total trade Note: This measure of openness can be considered real, since GDP is PPP adjusted. Trade means exports and imports of goods and services. Composition of trade, however, reefers to composition of trade in goods, due to data constraints. History V: Western aid as per cent of GDP and gross investments (1990 Int. GK$), 1952-1965. 12.00 10.00 % 8.00 6.00 4.00 2.00 0.00 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 Year % of gross investments % of GDP 1962 1963 1964 1965 Methodology • BCA based on a standard Ramsay-Cass-Koopmans growth model. • Chari et al. (2007) argue that a large set of DGE models can be simplified through addition of “wedges”. • BCA developed for accounting for business cycle fluctuations. But can be applied to study episodes of economic growth (Lahiri and Yi, 2009; Lu, 2012; Chakraborty and Otsu, 2013; Cheremukhin et al., 2014. Intuition (I) • BCA cannot identify the policies that effect the economy, bur rather the evolution of incentives that firms and households face. • Four wedges used are channels through which policies affect growth. • Taken together, they drive economic growth, and match data. • Labour wedge is related to incentives that determine the supply of labour. • Increasing labour wedge can be interpreted as an increase in the return for work effort. • Capital wedge is related to incentives that determine savings and investments, both physical and human capital. • Increasing capital wedge can be interpreted as an increase return on capital. Intuition (II) • Income wedge embodies aggregate demand shocks stemming from G and NX. • Efficiency wedge (TFP) measures the efficiency with which inputs are transformed into output. • Drawbacks: 1. Wedges do not interact. 2. Can’t identify the exact incentives. Prototype model: Setup Utility f.: Budget constraint: Production function: Capital law of motion: Equilibrium with wedges (I) • Efficiency wedge: . As in RBC models, is measured as the deviation around (labour augmenting tech. progress). • Labour wedge: . • Measures discrepancy between and MPL. Equilibrium with wedges (II) • Capital wedge: (1+𝛾)𝑐𝑡+1 𝑐𝑡 𝛽 +𝛿−1= 𝑦𝑡+1 𝜃 𝑘𝑡+1 1 − 𝜏𝑘,𝑡+1 . Measures the discrepancy between intertemporal substitution and the real interest rate. • Income wedge: 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 𝜏𝑖,𝑡 . Measures the expenditure gap for the resource constraint to hold. Data (I) • Official output series problematic (Social Product). • Services excluded (education, healthcare, government, and etc.). • But input from excluded services into other sectors included. • Gross inconsistency in the application of the Material Planning System. • Furthermore, official output growth inflated due to: 1. Index number problems (Gerschenkron, 1947). 2. Distorted prices (Staller, 1986). 3. Perhaps outright fabrication. • As such, I use output series from Maddison (2010). But created by Thad Alton et al. (1970, 1992). Data (II) • Working age population (15-64), employment of social sector, and data on private farming employment taken from official sources. • Total yearly labour input de-trended by 3600. • Human capital initially approximated by average years of schooling from Barro and Lee (2013). I take their estimate for Serbia. • Avg. years of schooling turned into mincerian human capital as in Hall and Jones (1999). • Capital stock series problematic. Exclude an investment category called “other”. Calibration • Assume 𝛽 is 0.95, and assume that 𝜙 is 2, as in similar countries (Lu, 2012; Cheremukhin et al., 2014). • 𝜃 is 0.4, as in Easterly and Fischer (1995). Kukic (2015) finds 0.43 for Yugoslavia. • • • • Remaining parameters taken from data. 𝜐𝑡 is time-varying, and on average 1.1 % per annum. 𝛾 is 0.9 % (constant). 𝛿 is 5.46 %, to ensure modelled capital stock matches the 1990 data. Assumptions • 1990 is the terminal period of wedges. • Profit maximisation is a poor description of socialist firms. But a socialist economy can be seen as a heavily distorted version of a perfectly competitive economy. • Cobb-Douglas assumption of unit substitution between capital and labour is problematic (Weitzman, 1970; Sapir, 1980; Easterly and Fischer, 1995). • Might be below one. If so, provides an elegant explanation for socialist growth - planned economies ran into acute diminishing returns on capital. Results: The evolution and interpretation of wedges Figure 4.2: Capital wedges Frictionless benchmark model =1 Steady State in benchmark =100 Figure 4.1: TFP 280 260 240 220 200 180 160 140 120 100 1952 1960 1970 Year 1980 1989 1.4 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 1952 1960 1970 Year 1980 1 0.5 0 1952 1960 1970 Year 1980 1989 Figure 4.4: Income wedges (as a share of GDP) 0.5 1.6 Percentage of output (Y) Frictionless benchmark model =1 Figure 4.3: Labor wedges 1.5 1989 Yugoslavia 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 1952 1960 1970 Year 1980 1989 U.S. Note: Business cycles have been cycled out using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (smoothing parameter = 6.25). No technological growth rate is imposed (γ = 0), rendering TFP growth comparable to standard growth accounting exercises. Interpreting TFP (I) • Nishimizu and Page (1982) argue that TFP was driven by efficiency rather than technology. Similar to Hsieh and Klenow (2009). • Viable interpretations: • 1. Reconstruction dynamics (Vonyo, 2008). • 2. Structural change or improvements in sectoral allocation of resources (Lewis, 1954; Vollrath, 2009). Year 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963 1962 1961 1960 1959 1958 1957 1956 1955 1954 1953 1952 Share Interpreting TFP (II): Share of agricultural workers in total workforce in Yugoslavia, 1952-89 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 Interpreting TFP (III) • Trade might had boosted output through TFP (Alcala and Ciccone, 2004). • Yugoslavia did specialise according to its comparative advantage. Interpreting labour wedge (I) Hall (1997) argues labour wedge reflects frictions that lead households to spend a long time on non-market activities. Figure 6.1: Total hours worked 18 In billions 17 16 15 14 1952 1960 1970 Year 1980 1989 1980 1989 Figure 6.2: Working age population 17 16 15 In millions • 14 13 12 11 10 1952 1960 1970 Year Interpreting labour wedge (II) • Mismatch between total hours worked and the working age population reflected in increasing unemployment. • Unemployment rate an average 8.2 per cent during 1967-75, rose to an average 12.6 percent during 1976-87. • Migration patterns not helpful. Interpreting labour wedge (III) • Chari et al. (2007) argue that labour wedge can reflect distortions caused by monetary contraction (deflation) and trade unions (nominal wage rigidity). • In Yugoslavia during 1980s, real money balances halved (Bradley and Smith, 1991). • Labour managed firms under-invested, to pay out high(er) wages (Estrin, 1983). Interpreting labour wedge (IV): Unit wage cost in efficiency units 150 140 130 110 100 90 80 70 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963 1962 1961 1960 1959 1958 1957 1956 1955 1954 1953 60 1952 Index, 1952 = 100 120 Year Note: Unit wage cost is the ratio of the wage per worker to the GDP per efficiency unit of labour (labour productivity augmented by technology). For each year, the said ratio is divided by the same ratio of 1952. Wage rate has been deflated using the official output deflator. Interpreting labour wedge (V): Labour unrest in Yugoslavia, 1958-89 1958 1978 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Frequency of strikes* Number of strikes Number of workers on strike 2.8 30 62 47 18 96 100 104 163 227 228 232 n/a n/a 235 216 174 336 393 696 851 1685 n/a n/a n/a n/a 13,504 13,507 10,997 21,776 29,031 60,062 88,860 288,686 n/a n/a Media reports of strikes n/a n/a 3 8 24 36 86 158 195 734 320 n/a Note: *1980 to 1989 shows data for Slovenia, a member republic of Yugoslavia. Source: Stanojević (2003) for the frequency of strikes; Jovanov (1989) for the number of strikes and the number of workers involved; Lowinger (2009) for media reporting of strikes Results (I): The contribution of wedges to economic growth 1952-1960 Average annual Growth rate TFP Capital wedge Labour wedge Income wedge 1960-1970 Average annual Growth rate TFP Capital wedge Labour wedge Income wedge 1970-1980 Average annual Growth rate TFP Capital wedge Labour wedge Income wedge 1980-1989 Average annual Growth rate TFP Capital wedge Labour wedge Income wedge Output per working age person Labour Capital to labour ratio 5.6 5.0 (90%) 2.0 (36%) 0.3 (5%) 1.32 (24%) -1.3 0.5 (38%) -1.6 (-123%) -6.6 (-508%) -2.1 (-162%) 4.6 1.6 (35%) 5.6 (122%) 5.2 (113%) 4.2 (91%) 3.3 2.6 (79%) 1.2 (36%) 0.2 (6%) 1.5 (45%) -7.1 -3.9 (-55%) 2.0 (28%) -6.2 (-87%) 1.0 (14%) 8.3 4.1 (49%) 3.1 (37%) 3.8 (46%) 8.2 (99%) 3.7 4.7 (127%) 0.0 (0%) 0.0 (0%) 3.2 (86%) -3.6 0.0 (0%) -4.4 (-122%) -4.4 (-122%) 6.3 (175%) 6.3 5.5 (87%) 1.3 (21%) 1.8 (29%) 2.4 (38%) -1.2 0.5 (38%) 1.0 (83%) -0.9 (-75%) 0.0 (0%) -2.5 -2.2 (-88%) 2.4 (96%) -3.9 (-156%) -0.8 (-32%) 1.0 4.6 (460%) -0.9 (-90%) 0.4 (40%) -0.7 (-70%) Results (II): The actual evolution of GDP per capita versus the counterfactual evolution of it (without TFP), 1952-89 Yugoslavia: GDP per working age person 400 Index, 1952=100, log scale 300 200 100 1952 1960 1970 Year Without TFP 1980 1989 Actual Notes: The 1952 level of GDP per working age person is indexed to 100. If the two lines move in parallel, it means that the combined capital, labour and income wedges are responsible for most of economic growth. Results (III): Simulations of GDP per working age person versus the actual GDP per working age person, 1952-89 Yugoslavia: GDP per working age person 400 Index, 1952=100, log scale 300 200 100 1952 1960 Capital wedge only 1970 Year TFP & capital wedge 1980 TFP, capital & labor wedges 1989 Actual Conclusion (I) • I hope I had filled a knowledge void. • TFP became more important. Reconciles conflicting finding in the literature. • Labour frictions were the most important drag on growth. Reconfirms older findings. • Natural step forward: Determine the quantitative causality between policies and TFP and labour frictions. Conclusion (II) • For TFP, trade might have been important. • More research needed to understand the incentive/ability of households to provide work effort. Largely ignored so far. • Wages, driven by behaviour of labour-managed firms, might had led to deterioration of labour wedge in the 1960s and the 1970s, but not the 1980s. • Unemployment, and potentially labour unrest, seem important for the 1980s. Appendix slides Baseline wedges: Simulations of GDP per working age person versus the actual GDP per working age person, 1952-89 Yugoslavia: GDP per working age person 400 Index, 1952=100, log scale 300 200 100 1952 TFP only 1960 Capital wedge only 1970 Year Labor wedge only 1980 Income wedge only 1989 Actual Baseline wedges: Actual and simulated I/Y, 1952-89 Non-agriculture: The actual evolution of Nonagricultural GDP per capita versus the counterfactual evolution of it (without TFP), 1952-89 Yugoslavia: GDP per capita 500 400 Index, 1952=100, log scale 300 200 100 1952 1960 1970 Year Without TFP 1980 Actual 1989 Data parameters (Beta = 0.93, phi = 4.02): Simulations of GDP per working age person versus the actual GDP per working age person, 1952-89 Yugoslavia: GDP per working age person 600 500 Index, 1952=100, log scale 400 300 200 100 1952 1960 Capital wedge only 1970 Year TFP & capital wedge 1980 TFP, capital & labor wedges 1989 Actual Data parameters (Beta = 0.93, phi = 4.02): The actual evolution of GDP per capita versus the counterfactual evolution of it (without TFP), 1952-89 Yugoslavia: GDP per working age person 600 500 400 Index, 1952=100, log scale 300 200 100 1952 1960 1970 Year Without TFP 1980 Actual 1989 Linear leisure utility function: Simulations of GDP per working age person versus the actual GDP per working age person, 1952-89 Yugoslavia: GDP per working age person 400 Index, 1952=100, log scale 300 200 100 1952 1960 Capital wedge only 1970 year TFP & capital wedge 1980 TFP, capital & labor wedges 1989 Actual Linear leisure utility function: The actual evolution of GDP per capita versus the counterfactual evolution of it (without TFP), 1952-89 Yugoslavia: GDP per working age person 400 Index, 1952=100, log scale 300 200 100 1952 1960 1970 Year Without TFP 1980 Actual 1989 Stone-Geary utility function: Simulations of GDP per working age person versus the actual GDP per working age person, 1952-89 Yugoslavia: GDP per working age person 400 Index, 1952=100, log scale 300 200 100 1952 1960 Capital wedge only 1970 Year TFP & capital wedge 1980 TFP, capital & labor wedges 1989 Actual Stone-Geary utility function : The actual evolution of GDP per capita versus the counterfactual evolution of it (without TFP), 1952-89 Yugoslavia: GDP per working age person 400 Index, 1952=100, log scale 300 200 100 1952 1960 1970 Year Without TFP 1980 Actual 1989