Download Operation Barbarossa * what went wrong?

Operation Barbarossa – what went wrong?
Source 1 Questions
1.
2.
3.
4.
How powerful was the German position in Europe by the summer of 1941? Why?
Why did war between Germany and the USSR seem inevitable?
What resource problems was Germany having by 1941?
What were Germany’s two options for dealing with these problems? Mark and explain
them on the maps on the following pages.
5. Write down the pros and cons of each plan. State which one you think it would have
been most sensible to implement.
6. What other factors (apart from strategic) influenced Hitler in his choice of target?
7. Compare and contrast the Wehrmacht and the Red Army in 1941.
8. What was the difference between German and Russian society at this time? How did
this add strength or weakness to each side?
9. Mark the targets of Operation Barbarossa on the map. Include:
a. Minsk
b. Smolensk
c. Baltic States
d. Moscow
e. Ukraine
f. Kiev
g. Stalingrad and the Caucus oilfields
10. List some figures to show the early successes of the German Army during the invasion
of the USSR.
11. What reason does the author give for the Nazi failure to capture the USSR?
Source 2 Questions
1. How was the invasion going by the summer of 1942?
2. What was Operation Blue? What were the two main objectives of this plan? Why do you
think it had these objectives?
3. Which allied troops did Germany have supporting them in their invasion of southern
Russia?
4. Mark the River Volga on your map.
5. Which two Russian commanders were selected to defend Stalingrad?
6. What problems did the Russian defenders face?
7. What was Operation Uranus? What disagreement did it cause between Hitler and his
generals?
8. What problems did the German 6th Army face once encircled?
9. Why do you think Hitler promoted the hopelessly trapped von Paulus to Field Marshall?
10. What were the results of the Battle of Stalingrad?
Name:
Operation Barbarossa – what went wrong?
Source 1 - Was Hitler right to invade Russia in 1941?
by Andrew Wright , published on www.militaryhistoryonline.com, retrieved 5th April 2011
It is commonly believed that the invasion of Russia was one of Hitler's greatest strategic
blunders. Up to that point the German war machine had conquered and subjugated all her
enemies (except for Britain), while at the same time Russia had been providing her with much
needed resources such as oil and wheat. England's position was deteriorating quickly and the
United States was still neutral. The invasion of Russia cut off those precious supplies, and even
though the Russians took unprecedented losses the Germans ultimately failed to take Moscow
and suffered heavily in the winter that followed. While this event is usually judged by the results,
it must be remembered how close the Russians came to collapsing, and had Hitler had
concentrated on taking Moscow instead of switching the axis of advance during the campaign,
the Germans would have likely won the war. The invasion of Russia in 1941 offered Hitler the
best chance of winning World War 2.
Europe by 1941
To understand why Hitler invaded Russia it is necessary to go back to the spring of 1941 and
look at the general situation in Europe. After lightning campaigns against his enemies, Hitler
controlled Western Europe, Central Europe, Scandinavia and most of Eastern Europe. A further
campaign against the Balkans during the spring secured his southern flank. After witnessing its
continental allies fall one by one, England was fighting for mere survival, never mind taking the
fight to the enemy. This left Germany with only two major threats, the United States and the
Soviet Union. The former was neutral and wanted nothing to do with what it saw as a purely
European conflict, but the latter was just across the border and fielded the biggest army in the
world.
Thus it is obvious that Russia was not only the greatest threat to Nazi Germany, but also the
last major obstacle to German domination of Europe. It is likely that the only reason Stalin never
attacked Germany was because of the pathetic state of the Red Army at the time. Despite this
logic, some historians have alleged that Stalin was bent on attacking Germany during the
summer of 1941 and insists this is why so much of the Red Army was massed near the border
during the time of the German invasion. Either way, given certain strategic, economic and
ideological considerations, there is little doubt that war between the two powers was inevitable.
Time Running Out
During the spring of 1941 time was not on Germany's side. Although isolated and nearing
bankruptcy, England was no closer to suing for peace than she had been the year before.
America, though neutral, was not only supplying Britain with much needed war materials, but
drifting closer into a state of war with Germany. Russia might have appeared docile at the
moment, but that was not guaranteed to last. As for German industry, after many years of
rearmament and war, it was showing signs of strain and running low on precious resources,
especially oil. Though Germany was getting substantial oil from Russia and the Ploesti Oilfields
in Romania, it was not enough.
Operation Barbarossa – what went wrong?
Germany’s Two Options
Given her lack of oil, and the potential threat of fighting on two fronts, Germany had to make a
choice of whether to finish off England, or attack the Russia. This left the Germans with two
strategic options:
1) The Mediterranean option: Essentially, Rommel would receive massive reinforcements and
supplies and the Axis would attempt to overrun Egypt, the Suez Canal and finally the Oil Rich
countries of the Middle East. Germany and Italy are much closer to Libya than England is to
Egypt and would therefore find it easier to supply their forces. However, this could only be done
effectively if British-held Malta, located between Sicily and Libya, was either neutralized or
invaded. Considering Germany did neutralize Malta for long periods during World War 2, it is
possible the Germans could have reinforced their army in Libya with enough men and resources
to take over the Middle East, fix their oil shortages, and turn the Mediterranean into an "Axis
Lake."
2) The Russian Option: An all-out attack on Russia. Russia's armies would be destroyed before
winter in huge battles of encirclement, Moscow would be taken and the Germans would occupy
Russia from Archangel on the White Sea to Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea. Defeating Russia
would depend on the successful use of Blitzkrieg: Destroying or neutralizing the enemy's air
force in the first few hours of attack, paralyzing the enemy's command and communications,
quick advances behind the enemy's frontline designed to surround and destroy their armies, etc.
Which option to choose?
Both options offered a solution to the oil problem, and both had the potential to defeat one of
Germany's enemies. The only question is which one had the most potential for safeguarding the
Reich.
It is a sound strategic principle that when it comes to war, the strongest enemy should be dealt
with first. Between, Russia and Britain, there can be no doubt that the Russians were the bigger
threat to Germany. The Russian army alone had the manpower and resources to challenge the
German army. Even if Britain was backed by a powerful American army she would have little
chance of defeating Germany. With hindsight it is questionable whether or not even Russia
could have defeated Germany on its own, but it is very probable that Britain and America could
not have.
Another consideration is whether it would have been easier to defeat England after Russia had
been subdued, or easier to defeat Russia after England had been defeated.
If the Germans would have attacked Britain via the Middle East in 1941 and managed to knock
them out of the war, Russia's position would have been worse off, but not hopeless. She would
still have all her territory, all her armies and more time to prepare. Additionally, it is possible that
America would have been so frightened by Britain's collapse she would have sent as much
military aid to Russia as possible. It should also be remembered that Stalin and his Generals
were implementing many wide-ranging reforms during 1941 that would have borne fruit in 1942
and the Russian army would have displayed much more competence and skill than it managed
Operation Barbarossa – what went wrong?
to do when the Germans actually invaded. With these considerations in mind, it is likely that
Russia would have been in a better position to resist the Germans in 1942 than 1941.
But what chance would Britain have had if Russia had been attacked and defeated first? She
would have had no allies on the continent to support, and even if the U.S. would have joined the
war and fielded an army, the two combined would not have been able to land on the continent
and defeat the Germans. It is even likely that the intervention of the United States would not
have been enough to avert the defeat of England in the case of Russia being defeated in 1941.
It would have taken years (as it did) for the U.S. to build forces in the United Kingdom to any
significant degree. In that period of time, Germany could either have built a large enough air
force to defeat the R.A.F. and invade England, built a big enough U-Boat fleet to starve England
into submission, or maybe even both. It is even possible the defeat of Russia could have
convinced the British to give in, assuming Churchill was kicked out of office.
Ideological Problems
Even if we completely disregarded the sound strategic and economic reasons for the invasion of
Russia, the ideological differences between the two states alone could have been enough to
make war inevitable. It is ironic that Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, likely the two most
wicked and amoral regimes in the world at the time, were poles apart in their politics, beliefs and
values. Fascists and Communists are sworn enemies and the feelings of the leaders and people
on both sides towards each other ran from indifference at best, to undying hatred at worst. Both
countries wanted to become the sole arbiter of Europe. The Russians signed the MolotovRippentrop Pact so they could secure territories in Eastern Europe while Germany fought what
Stalin believed would be a war of attrition against France and Britain. He hoped that the
combatants would wear each other down to the point where Russia could defeat them and
dominate Europe. Hitler, for his part, had clearly laid out his plans for European Hegemony in
"Mein Kampf." In his book, Hitler spoke about securing "Lebensraum" (living space) in the east,
which could only mean invading Russia. Additionally, there was no attempt on the part of the
Nazis to mask their venomous hatred of the Slavs, Communists and Jews. Though the
Russians never displayed the same amount of hatred for other races, they certainly did not like
the Germans or even Jews (despite their huge numbers in Russia); though it should be
remembered that anti-Semitism was rife all over Europe at the time.
German Advantages, Russian Weaknesses
Now that it has been established that war between the Germans and Russians was inevitable,
and that the best chance for Germany to defeat Russia was in 1941, the question remains,
could they have won? Most countries at the time certainly thought so. Churchill's Generals
estimated the Russians would collapse in six weeks; the Americans gave a similar figure. If
there ever was a stunning mismatch of forces in the history of warfare, it is the Wehrmacht and
the Red Army in 1941.
Operation Barbarossa – what went wrong?
The Wehrmacht was unequivocally the best army in Europe at the time, while the Red Army
was likely the worst. The Russians may have had more men and tanks, but the Germans were
better trained, better equipped and better led. Hitler may not have been the greatest
commander in chief, but at least he did not shoot the flower of his army like Stalin did during the
purges. The Germans were also taught to think and take the initiative, while the Russian
soldiers were paralyzed by rigid procedures and political commissars who could overrule
commanders on the spot. German communications and coordination between the services were
harmonious, while the Russian systems were primitive or non-existent. The only advantages the
Russians enjoyed (superior numbers and a vast country) were wasted when Stalin insisted that
his armies were not to retreat and would fight to the last man. Given the German superiority
listed above, there was only one likely result.
More advantages that the Germans enjoyed were the loyalty of the populace and the
confidence of their army. Hitler remains the most popular leader in German History (this is not to
say he is still popular in Germany today, just that he was more popular during his time than any
other German leader was during his). Opposition to Hitler was always very small, while most
Germans fought loyally to the bitter end. The fact remains, as long as you were not a Jew, a
Gypsy, a Homosexual, a Communist (the list goes on), in other words, as long as you were a
normal German, life was good in the Third Reich, and it is a sad fact that whenever life is good
for the majority of citizens in any country, they will tend to turn a blind eye to the evils of the
state. Yet happy citizens make good soldiers, and good soldiers with battlefield experience
make confident soldiers.
The same cannot be said of the Russians, or at least of all the peoples of the Soviet Union.
Stalin was a bloodier dictator than normal. While most dictators do not shy away from
bloodshed to maintain their grip on power, Stalin's excesses went far beyond the reaches of
realpolitik. It is estimated that he is responsible for the murder of 14 million Soviet Citizens.
While many people in the Soviet Union were either naïve about the communist dream, felt that
the sacrifices were worth it, or were used to living under a brutal leader (Russia is not known for
soft leaders), a great deal of the masses were scared of Stalin and so desperate to escape his
wrath that even Hitler looked like a saviour. When the Germans invaded, most people from the
Ukraine and the Baltic States saw them as liberators. Many willingly fed and supplied the
Germans, and many even volunteered to fight against Russia. During the war more than one
million Soviet Citizens took up arms against their former leaders.
Operation Barbarossa – The Plan
The planning of "Operation Barbarossa," the Invasion of Russia, reflected the confidence of the
Germans. It was assumed the Red Army could be destroyed in huge battles of encirclement and
that most of Russia west of the Ural Mountains could be occupied before winter.
The plan was simple, but as Clausewitz says "everything in strategy is simple." Given the size of
Russia, the German army would be divided into 3 groups. Army Group North would advance
through the Baltic States towards Leningrad, Army Group South would move into the Ukraine
and then the Caucasus to take the wheat and oil fields of Russia, and Army Group Centre would
advance through White Russia towards Moscow. While all the Army Groups would move
Operation Barbarossa – what went wrong?
independently and all had their own objectives, there were only enough resources, especially
Panzer Divisions, to ensure that only one of the groups received priority to complete their final
objectives at any one time. For example, although Army Group North and Army Group South
could make much progress on their own, they could not seize their final objectives (Leningrad or
the Caucasus Oil Fields) without the massive Panzer forces which we assume would be
concentrated in Army Group Centre for the main effort against Moscow.
Disagreements with Hitler
This limitation became the cause of many heated debates between Hitler and his Generals and
proved disastrous for "Operation Barbarossa." When a country goes to war, it is only sensible
that the Government and the Military have already determined the enemy's "Centre of Gravity",
and have already planned on how to neutralize it. The enemy's "Centre of Gravity" can be their
armed forces, their capital, a powerful ally, etc.
Hitler and his Generals disagreed from the start about what Russia's "Centre of Gravity" was.
The Generals thought it was Moscow, while Hitler thought it was Ukraine and the Oil fields of
the Caucasus.
Hitler's reasoning, if it can be called that, was based on history. Napoleon had taken Moscow,
but the Russians had not given in, and in the end Napoleon had to retreat, with disastrous
results for his Empire. Hitler was determined not to repeat that mistake; he was going to head
south, take the Ukraine and the Oil fields, and deny the Russians the resources he felt they
needed to continue the war.
His Generals could not have disagreed more. They argued that Russia was so vast, and
capable of replacing whole armies, that only the capture of Moscow would destroy the Soviet
Regime. They argued that Moscow was the political and logistical hub of European Russia, and
if it was taken, the Russians would not be able to continue the war west of the Urals. A simple
glance at any world atlas will indeed show that in Western Russia, "all roads lead to Moscow."
Since most of Russia's population, resources and industry are located west of the Urals, even if
the Russians elected to fight on, it would be a lost cause. Finally, they argued that Stalin was so
feared and despised, that if the Red Army was destroyed, and Moscow taken, the people would
overthrow him and sue for peace.
While Hitler was the head of state and commander in chief, and therefore had the last word, in
this case he was absolutely wrong. The attempt to seize of Ukraine in 1941 was by itself
ambitious, but to try and take the Caucasus oilfields as well was truly blind optimism, at least as
long as there was a Russian Government in Moscow. Even if the Germans had taken Ukraine
and all of the oilfields, the Soviet Regime would still be intact and worse, given the still
considerable Russian armies to the north and the long lines of communications the Germans
would have in the south, the Russians could have possibly cut off the German army in southern
Russia as they actually did in late 1942.
But the seizure of Moscow would have been decisive. Not only would the Russians have put
every available soldier in front of it giving the Germans the opportunity to destroy the Red Army,
Operation Barbarossa – what went wrong?
but as listed above, its capture would have likely spelt ruin for Stalin and his regime, or at least
destroyed it as an effective entity.
Now all that remains is to show what happened when the Germans invaded, and why they failed
to defeat Russia in 1941.
What actually happened?
Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Despite the fact that all the
intelligence given to Stalin pointed to a German attack, plus the obvious preparations the
Germans were making, the Wehrmacht achieved complete surprise. In the first day alone more
than 1000 planes were caught on the ground and destroyed (more planes than the German Air
force managed to destroy during the whole "Battle of Britain"), while the German Panzers were
already slicing through the Russian lines, beginning the first of many encirclements of the
Russian Armies. Since a large part of the Red Army was massed along the border, the German
Army managed to capture or destroy whole armies. On the 28th of June they took Minsk and
managed to surround 15 Soviet Divisions, which later surrendered. On July the 15th, the
Germans took Smolensk, and on August 5th they captured the 250,000-300,000 Russians
soldiers encircled around it. Similar progress was made by Army Group North in the Baltic
States, while Army Group South's advance was slow but steady.
While the battle around Smolensk had been hard fought and took longer to clear up then the
Germans had hoped for, the road was now clear for an advance on Moscow. Unfortunately for
Hitler's Generals, Nazi Germany, and in the end Hitler himself, it was not to be. Instead of
ordering Army Group Centre to continue its advance on Moscow, Hitler ordered that the
Panzers, and thus the axis of advance, be switched towards the Ukraine. When Heinz
Guderian, the main commander of the Panzer Armies, flew to visit Hitler and pleaded to let him
advance on Moscow, Hitler replied "my generals know nothing about the economic aspect of
war." What followed is probably the greatest example of gaining a magnificent tactical victory, at
the cost of strategic success. Guderian's Panzers advanced south, took Kiev on September the
19th, and netted 650,000 more prisoners on the 27th. At the time, it was the greatest defeat
ever suffered by an army. But for Germany, it was a hollow victory.
Once the Ukraine had been secured, Hitler finally relented and continued the advance to
Moscow on October the 2nd. Between the 2nd and the 30th of October, when the advance had
to be halted, the Germans took more than 600,000 Russian prisoners. Although the German
army had scored another significant victory, they had still not reached Moscow. A final, last ditch
offensive, "Operation Typhoon," began on November 25th and by the time it finally wore out, the
Germans were within 20 miles of Moscow, or 2 days march according to many of the
commanders. In fact, Fedor von Bock, the Commander of Army Group Centre, could see the
Spires of the Kremlin through his binoculars.
But it was too late. On December the 5th, 1941, the Soviets, reinforced with fresh forces from
Siberia and commanded by the able General Zhukov launched a massive counteroffensive.
While the German army did not disintegrate like Napoleon's "Grande Armée" before it, it took
Operation Barbarossa – what went wrong?
horrific losses and had to retreat a significant distance from the steps of Moscow. Never again
did the Germans threaten Moscow, and it is likely that from there on the war was lost.
Was defeating Russia unrealistic?
In 1941, Hitler gambled that he could defeat the Soviets, and lost. But does the result by itself
mean he was wrong to have tried, or that he was doomed to fail? Considering the losses
suffered by the Russian Army, and how close the Germans came to taking Moscow, surely not.
During 1941, the Russian Army lost somewhere around 4,500,000 casualties. Of this, at least
2,400,000 were prisoners of war. Their total losses surpassed the amount of men they had in
arms when the invasion began. During the campaign the Germans inflicted casualty ratios on
the Russians from 10-1 to 20-1. The Germans captured around half of Russia's industry and
two fifths of their population. To suggest that Germany had no chance of winning is absurd.
But Germany did not win, and it is necessary to ask why. Why did they not succeed after
destroying countless armies, seizing important cities and overrunning vital economic and
industrial sectors? How could an army so superior to its enemy in almost every way not defeat
them? How was it possible that a people so confident in their soldiers and their leaders fail to
conquer a disillusioned people scared of its own soldiers and leaders?
The answer is remarkably simple: Hitler's failure to observe the sound strategic principle of
"maintenance of the objective." The Germans had to defeat the Russians before winter arrived.
As explained above, the only way to decisively beat them would be the seizure of Moscow. In
the summer of 1941, wherever the German army advanced, it destroyed everything in its path.
What stopped the Germans from taking Moscow was the arrival of winter. Had Hitler let his
Generals advance on Moscow after the "Battle of Smolensk" it is probable that Moscow would
have been captured and the Soviet Regime destroyed. It was Hitler's decision to switch the
"Axis of Advance" to the Ukraine during the middle of the campaign that ultimately saved
Moscow. Considering how close the Germans came to taking it in October and November, it is
more than likely they could have taken Moscow in September if they would have advanced on it
instead of Kiev.
Whether or not Hitler would have taken Moscow and won the war if he had continued the
advance to it after the "Battle of Smolensk" is one of the big "what ifs" of military history.
However, Europe, the free world, and especially Russia are all eternally grateful that they never
had to find that out.
Operation Barbarossa – what went wrong?
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Operation Barbarossa – what went wrong?
Source 2 - Background to the battle of Stalingrad
Taken from http://www.2worldwar2.com/stalingrad.htm, 5th April 2011
The Situation in 1942
By mid 1942, the German invasion had already cost Russia over six million soldiers, half killed
and half captured by the Germans, and a large part of its vast territory and resources. With the
help of its arctic winter, it stopped the exhausted Germans just before Moscow and pushed
them back a bit. But in the summer of 1942, when Russia was still very weak from its
tremendous losses, the German military was again ready to demonstrate its formidable fighting
force.
Hitler's Generals wanted to attack in the direction of Moscow again, in order take Russia's
capital city, its heart and nerve centre, and to crush most of Russia's remaining military forces
while doing so, but Hitler now personally commanded the German army, and he listened to his
Generals much less than before.
Operation Blue
In April 1942, Hitler issued "war directive 41", which detailed his plan for the Russian front for
summer 1942, code named Operation Blue. The plan was to concentrate all available forces in
the southern flank of the long front, destroy the front line Russian forces there, and then
advance in two directions to the primary and secondary objectives, which were the two most
important remaining industrial centres in South Russia:
1. Advance far South-East, through the mountainous Caucasus region, to capture the rich
oil fields on the Caspian Sea.
2. Advance East, to Stalingrad, a major industrial and transportation centre on the West
bank of the wide Volga River, the main waterway of inner Russia, which runs all the way
from North of Moscow to the Caspian Sea in the South.
It's important to note that Hitler's directive did not demand to occupy the city of Stalingrad. The
directive was "to reach Stalingrad itself, or at least to cover it with heavy artillery, so that it will
no longer be an industrial or transportation centre". The German army achieved this objective
with minimal losses in the first day of the battle of Stalingrad. It was the stubborn battle to
occupy the city itself to the last ruined meter, and later Hitler's refusal to retreat from Stalingrad,
that cost him his entire southern campaign, and horrible losses to both sides. Once his forces
entered the city named after Stalin, the Soviet dictator and Hitler's arch enemy, Hitler became
obsessed with occupying Stalingrad, and remained obsessed with it despite everything, until the
large German force in and near Stalingrad was destroyed to the last man.
The German attack in South Russia began on June 28, 1942, a year after the invasion of
Russia began. The Germans advanced rapidly in a Blitzkrieg of armour and air power, and were
followed by their Italian, Romanian, and Hungarian allies, whose task was to secure the long
German flanks. The Russian front collapsed and the Germans rapidly advanced towards South
Russia's last natural line of defence, the river Volga.
Operation Barbarossa – what went wrong?
On August 23, 1942, the spearhead of the German 6th army reached the Volga just North of
Stalingrad and captured an 8km wide strip along the river bank, and the German tanks and
artillery began to sink crossing ships and ferries. On that day, other units of the 6th army
reached the outskirts of Stalingrad, and the hundreds of bombers and dive bombers of the
Luftwaffe's 4th air fleet began to heavily bombard the city, and would continue to do so daily for
weeks, destroying or damaging every building in the city. The battle of Stalingrad began.
Fighting in Stalingrad
In the first days of the fighting, the Germans were confident that although Stalingrad's defenders
fought fanatically from the beginning, they will quickly occupy the city. From the Russian side
things didn't look better. There were initially 40,000 troops in Stalingrad, but mostly ill-equipped
reserve soldiers and those of the local population who were not evacuated, and it was assumed
that Stalingrad might be lost in a few days. It was desperately clear to the Russian leadership
that the only thing which could still save Stalingrad from falling, is a superb commander with a
combination of the highest military skill and an iron will, and every possible reinforcement.
Actually two such commanders were selected and given the task of saving Stalingrad:
In the national level, Stalin ordered General Zhukov to leave the Moscow front and simply go to
South Russia and save what he can. Zhukov, the best and most influential Russian General of
World War 2, practically served as Stalin's military "crisis solver".
In the local level, General Vasily Chuikov, the deputy commander of the 64th army South of
Stalingrad, and an aggressive and determined commander, was called to the regional command
post. The severe situation was presented to him, and he was appointed the new commander of
the Russian 62nd army, which still held most of Stalingrad. Before he left, he was asked "How
do you interpret your mission?” Chuikov's answer was "We will defend the city or die". His
personal leadership during the following months, which projected catching determination and
fatalism to Stalingrad's defenders, shows that he meant it.
Stalingrad's defenders were informed that the secret police guards all crossing points on the
Volga, and everyone crossing the river without permission will be shot on the spot. In addition, a
stream of fresh reinforcements, including elite units, began to arrive and cross the Volga under
German fire into Stalingrad. Most were killed, but they enabled Chuikov to keep holding at least
part of Stalingrad despite the tremendous German pressure. The average life expectancy of a
reinforcement soldier in Stalingrad was as low as 24 hours. Whole units were sacrificed in
Stalingrad's desperate defence. One unit which perhaps sacrificed most in the battle of
Stalingrad was the elite 13th Guards division, which was sent across the Volga into Stalingrad
just in time to repel a German attack that reached the Volga near the centre of the city. 30% of
the 10,000 warriors of the 13th division were killed in the first 24 hours of their arrival, and only
320 survived the battle of Stalingrad, a horrible 97% death rate, but they saved Stalingrad in the
most critical moment.
The Russians nicknamed the city "the Stalingrad street fighting academy". They also starved
most of the time, because the German artillery made crossing the Volga so dangerous that what
was shipped across the river was mostly more soldiers and ammunition, not food. Many
Operation Barbarossa – what went wrong?
Russian soldiers were killed while crossing the river to Stalingrad or while being evacuated back
after being wounded in the city.
At the end of October 1942, the Russians held only a narrow strip and some isolated pockets in
Stalingrad, and the Germans tried one more major attack in an attempt to take it before winter,
but the exhaustion and rising shortage of ammunition stopped them, but fighting continued.
Hitler, increasingly frustrated with the standstill, pushed more divisions closer to Stalingrad and
into the city, further weakening the long German flanks in the empty prairies West and South of
Stalingrad. He assumed that the Russians were consuming their last remaining reserves and
that therefore a massive Russian attack in the German flanks was not expected. He was wrong.
The Russian counter attack – Operation Uranus
General Zhukov planned and prepared a massive Russian counter attack, code named
operation Uranus, which would attack the German flanks at their two weakest points, 100 miles
West of Stalingrad, and 100 miles south of it. The two Russian forces will meet far Southwest of
Stalingrad and encircle the entire German 6th army near Stalingrad and cut its supply lines. It
was a classic large scale Blitzkrieg plan, except that this time the Russians will do it to the
Germans. Zhukov's goal was to win not just battle of Stalingrad but the entire campaign in
South Russia.
The Russian preparations covered every operational and logistical aspect. In maximum secrecy,
over a million Russian soldiers were gathered, now greatly outnumbering the Germans, and
14,000 heavy artillery guns, 1000 T-34 tanks, and 1350 aircraft. Zhukov prepared a giant
surprise attack, and when the Russian concentrations were finally noticed by the Germans at
the end of October, it was almost too late to do anything, but the disbelief at the German side,
and Hitler's obsession, prevented them from significantly responding. When the German chief of
staff suggested to abandon Stalingrad to shorten the German lines, Hitler shouted "I will not
abandon the Volga!".
The Russian counter attack began on November 19, 1942, three months after the battle of
Stalingrad began. It was the first fully prepared Russian attack in World War 2, and it was a
great success. The Russians attacked the sectors of the German flanks held by the 3rd and 4th
Romanian armies. The Russians knew, from interrogating kidnapped POWs, that the Romanian
forces had the lowest morale and least supplies.
Under the sudden pressure of the massive Russian artillery and advancing tank columns, the
Romanian lines collapsed within hours, and after two days the Romanians surrendered.
German units moved to face the advancing Russians, but it was too late, and in four days the
two spearheads of the Russian pincer movement met each other about 100km West of
Stalingrad.
Operation Barbarossa – what went wrong?
German Army Surrounded
The entire German 6th army was now trapped in and near Stalingrad. To prevent the Germans
from breaking the encirclement, the Russians expanded the corridor which separated the 6th
army from the rest of the German military to a width of over 100 miles, and quickly moved 60
divisions and 1000 tanks there. But instead of breaking out of the encirclement, General von
Paulus, the 6th army's commander, was immediately ordered by Hitler to remain in his position
and hold it at all cost.
Hermann Goering, Hitler's deputy and head of the Luftwaffe, promised Hitler that his Luftwaffe
will supply the 6th army, promising to fly 500 tons of supplies per day. Goering did not consult
Luftwaffe headquarters about this and it was far beyond its ability, but it was what Hitler wanted
to hear.
The air supply operation continued until the 6th army's surrender, but it flew less than 100 tons
per day, much less than needed, and the Luftwaffe lost 488 cargo aircraft in it. The 6th army
quickly ran out of fuel, ammunition, and food, and the German soldiers starved severely.
Only three weeks later, Field Marshal von Manstein's army group finally attacked the Russian
barrier on December 12, 1942, but it could not reach the encircled 6th army. The Germans
advanced just 60 kilometres in the direction of Stalingrad, before they were pushed back by a
Russian counter attack.
Despite their isolation and starvation, the German 6th army kept fighting, and fortified its
positions as much as it could. Hitler demanded that they'll keep on even after it was clear that
they will remain isolated after von Manstein's rescue attempt failed. When the 6th army rejected
an ultimatum to surrender, the Russians started the final attack to crush it. They estimated the
number of besieged Germans at 80,000 while there were over 250,000 encircled Germans.
On January 10, 1943, 47 Russian divisions attacked the 6th army from all directions. Knowing
that captivity in Russia will be very cruel, the Germans kept fighting a hopeless battle.
A week later, the large German pocket was shrunk by half, pushed towards Stalingrad, and only
one runway remained in German hands, and it was under fire. On January 22, 1943, the
starved, frozen, and exhausted 6th army began to collapse. A week later Hitler promoted von
Paulus to Field Marshal, and reminded him that no German Field Marshal was ever captured
alive, but von Paulus was captured the next day in a cellar in Stalingrad.
The results of the battle of Stalingrad
On February 2, 1943, the last German resistance ended. Hitler was furious, accusing von
Paulus and Goering for the tremendous losses, instead of accusing himself. The Germans lost
almost 150,000 soldiers, and 91,000 more were captured by the Russians. Only 5,000 of them
returned home after years in Russian prison camps. Together with the losses of their Romanian
and Italian allies, the German side lost about 300,000 soldiers. The Russians lost 500,000
soldiers and civilians.
Operation Barbarossa – what went wrong?
In Stalingrad, in addition to its heavy losses, the German army also lost its formidable image of
being invincible. Russian soldiers everywhere now knew that they were victorious, and their
morale boosted and remained high until the end of the war, which was still 2 1/2 years away. It
boosted British and American morale too. In Germany, the bad news was censored, but
eventually they were released and shocked German morale. It was clear that the battle of
Stalingrad was a major turning point of World War 2 that the direction of the war turned against
Germany. The happy Stalin promoted Zhukov to Field Marshal. He made himself a Field
Marshal too, although he was a civilian.
The surviving defenders of Stalingrad could finally leave the destroyed city, and the 62nd army
was renamed a "guards" army, an honour indicating an elite unit. They deserved that honour.
General Vasily Chuikov led his men until the end of the war, and because of their experience in
"the Stalingrad street fighting academy", they led the Russian army into Berlin in 1945, and
Chuikov personally received Berlin's surrender in May 1, 1945. He was promoted to Field
Marshal, and was Russia's deputy minister of defence in the 1960s. He is buried in Stalingrad,
with so many of his men.