Download slides Trannoy

Redistributive land taxation
Alain Trannoy
Canazei Winter school January 2017
Modern public economics
• When we think nowadays about redistributive
taxation
• Progressive income tax
• Capital tax, inheritance tax
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
2
Georgism
• Single tax movement: Henry George is best known for
his argument that the economic rent of land (location)
should be shared by society
• George proposed to create a pension and disability
system, and an unconditional basic income from
surplus land rents. It would be distributed to residents
"as a right" instead of as charity.
• Georgists often refer to this policy as a citizen’s
dividend in reference to a similar proposal by Thomas
Paine
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
3
Letter to Gorbatchev
November 7, 1990
Mikhail Gorbachev, President
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Dear Mr. Gorbachev:
The movement of the Soviet Union to a market economy will greatly
enhance the prosperity of your citizens. Your economists have learned
much from the experience of nations with economies based in varying
degrees on free markets…
It is important that the rent of land be retained as a source of
government revenue. While the governments of developed nations
with market economies collect some of the rent of land in taxes, they
do not collect nearly as much as they could, and they therefore make
unnecessarily great use of taxes that impede their economies--taxes
on such things as incomes, sales and the value of capital.
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
4
30 economists among whom
• William Vickrey, Jacques Thisse, Tibor
Scitovsky, James Tobin, Richard Musgrave,
Franco Modigliani, Zvi Griliches, William
Baumol, Robert Solow
• “In my opinion, the least bad tax is the
property tax on the unimproved value of land,
the Henry George argument of many, many
years ago.” Milton Friedman
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
5
Henry Georges’ Theorem
• Arnott and Stiglitz (1979)
• Under some conditions, it is optimal to
finance local public infrastructures and
utilities with a tax on rents or tax on real
estate”
• Different perspective, not local public finance,
but nationwide public finance.
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
6
Outline
1.
Why a revival of Georgism?
2.
Is it possible to fund a basic income with a property tax on land
which correct both inequalities in ownership of land and capital?
3.
In the likely case where the level of tax rate on the real estate
cannot be politically accepted by landowners, is a tax on rents
(without including imputed rents) second best?
4.
The actual world is quite different from that of Henry George with
the emergence of a vast middle class which becomes homeowner
when people are sufficiently old. Should the property tax also be
borne by the “old middle class”?
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
7
Based on forthcoming WP
Land is back…and it must be taxed
Odran Bonnet, Guillaume Chapelle, Alain
Trannoy, Etienne Wasmer
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
8
1. Aftermath of Piketty’s book
• The impetus: “Capital in the twenty-First Century”
• Piketty did three things:
1. From an empirical view point: new series about 𝐾/𝑌
2. From a theoretical view point: exploding accumulation of
capital and linkage with growing inequality
3. From a policy view point: a world tax on capital
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
9
Housing land: main source of
divergence of K/Y (France)
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
10
Housing price indices
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
11
Residential-structure price indices
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
12
Housing Land prices indices
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
13
Share of land in housing capital
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
14
Why increasing housing land prices/income
ratio ?
1. Credit
2. Population growth
3. Land regulation
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
15
Credit exuberance (Robert Shiller)
• Credit exuberance during the beginning of this
millenium.
– Lower interest rates
– Longer mortgage maturity
– Lower downpayment or higher loan-to-value ratio
– Higher cap for debt-to-income ratio
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
16
Credit exuberance
France: Mortgage-to-downpayment ratio for existing properties:
first-time owners, other owners
4.00
3.50
3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
1985
1990
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
1995
2000
2005
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
2010
2015
17
Real causes
• Growth of population
“The value and thus economic rent of land, which is permanently
inelastic in supply, is governed by the growth in demand for land
for purposes of food production and housing, which in turn is
driven by population growth. The increasing value and rent is, in
the Ricardo-George context, entirely due to the growth of
population” Warren Samuel
You don’t need sunspots to trigger a housing land
bubble
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
18
Housing land regulation
• Three different periods for France
• 1955-1975 : the influence of Le Corbusier
• Social housing and large housing estates
• Relatively « land use saving »
• 1975-1995 : Middle class left large housing estates for new houses
in suburbs.
• Urban sprawn, « land use augmenting »
• 1995: « Greenness » more respectful of agricultural land and
recreative areas.
• Restrictive zoning
• Local political equilibrium (because it will increase the price of housing land for
already homeownert)
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
19
Paris Le Corbusier 1937
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
20
Credit maybe not the original cause
• Suppose that bankers are smart.
– They remember the Ricardo-George result for countries
with growing population or shift to smaller household’size
– They expect land regulation to be a political equilibrium
– They deduce that on the long run the value of the
mortgage collateral will be pushed up.
– They will be very friendly when new mortgages are asked.
• Credit lines up with the fundamentals
• And people are just bayesians with respect to the
evolution of housing land prices.
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
21
Our reading of Piketty
Empirical side
1. The evolution of 𝐾/𝑌 is mainly governed by housing
2. The evolution of the market value of housing is mainly driven by land price
for both real, policy and financial reasons
Policy side
Suppose that we can tax housing land separately from structures.
(Example of Pittsburgh of “two rates” or “Split-rates” from 1913 to 1979-1980)
see Oates and Wallace 1997 NTJ)
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
22
2. Macroeconomic foundation of
Neogeorgism
• Is it possible to fund a basic income with a
property tax on land which correct both
inequalities in ownership of land and capital?
• Judd’s model (close but a bit different from
Chamley)
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
23
Judd’s model
• Two types of agents, one type of capital, one
aggregate consumption good
– Capitalists optimally choose capital and intertemporally
allocate consumption 𝐶𝑡 , and capital investment 𝐼𝑡
– Workers consume their wages 𝑐𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡
• Capital taxation is not first best, and not even
second best.
• Judd = Negative Ramsey result.
• Still some mathematical pbs (Straub & Werning
(2015))
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
24
Extension to land use and property
• Two classes: capitalists and landlords vs workers and tenants.
• Benchmark: Housing = Land housing
• The capitalists own all land 𝐻
• For their housing use, 𝐻𝑡 , and they rent the remaining to
workers ℎ𝑡
• Purely redistributive aim of taxation to redistribute welfare
from capitalists to workers. (No public expenditure)
• Link with equality of opportunity
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
25
Model (I)
Capital investment equation:
𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝐾𝑡 1 − 𝛿 + 𝐼𝑡
Utility of capitalists-landowners:
∞
𝛽𝑡 𝑈(𝐶𝑡 , 𝐻𝑡 )
𝑡=0
Utility of workers-tenants:
∞
𝛽 𝑡 𝑢(𝑐𝑡 , ℎ𝑡 )
𝑡=0
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
26
Model (2)
Ressource constraint of the economy:
𝑐𝑡 + 𝐶𝑡 + 𝐾𝑡+1 ≤ 𝑓 𝐾𝑡 + 1 − 𝛿 𝐾𝑡
Factor’s returns:
𝑤𝑡 = 𝑓 𝐾𝑡 − 𝑓 ′ 𝐾𝑡 𝐾𝑡
𝐾𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑅𝑡
= 𝑓 ′ 𝐾𝑡 + 1 − 𝛿
Tax on capital: 𝜏𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙,𝑡
Net return on capital :
𝑅𝑡𝐾𝑛𝑒𝑡
= (1 −
𝐾𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝜏𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙,𝑡 )𝑅𝑡
Tax rate of the rent: 𝜏𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑡
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
27
Capitalists/landlords program
Maximisation program:
∞
𝛽𝑡 𝑈(𝐶𝑡 , 𝐻𝑡 )
Max
𝐶𝑡 ,𝐻𝑡 ,𝐾𝑡+1
𝑠. 𝑡.
𝐶𝑡 + 𝐾𝑡+1 =
𝐾
𝑅𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑡=0
𝐻
1 − 𝜏𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙,𝑡 𝐾𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 (1 − 𝜏𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑡 )(𝐻 −𝐻𝑡 )
Euler equation:
𝐾
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑈𝐶′ 𝐶𝑡 , 𝐻𝑡 = 𝛽𝑅𝑡+1
1 − 𝜏𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙,𝑡 𝑈𝐶′ (𝐶𝑡+1 , 𝐻𝑡+1 )
Intra-period allocation:
𝑈𝐻′
𝐶𝑡 , 𝐻𝑡 =
𝐻𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑅𝑡
1 − 𝜏𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡,𝑡 𝑈𝐶′ (𝐶𝑡 , 𝐻𝑡 )
Transversality condition: 𝛽t 𝑈𝐶′ (𝐶𝑡 , 𝐻𝑡 ) → 0
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
28
Workers/tenants program
Worker does not save. Live in ℎ units of rented housing
and consume from their wage and of a government
transfer 𝑇
Maximization program:
∞
𝛽𝑡 𝑢(𝑐𝑡 , ℎ𝑡 )
Max
𝑐𝑡 ,ℎ𝑡
𝑠. 𝑡.
𝑡=0
𝑐𝑡 +
𝐻𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠
ℎ𝑡 𝑅𝑡
= 𝑤𝑡 + 𝑇𝑡
First order condition:
𝑢ℎ′
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
𝑐𝑡 , ℎ𝑡 =
𝐻𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 ′
𝑅𝑡
𝑢𝑐
𝑐𝑡 , ℎ𝑡
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
29
First best setting
• The Gvt is able to commit to future tax policies
• In a model without land, we already know that the
first best can be implemented through
– constant tax on consumption for all periods (Coleman
(2000) JpubE) or
– tax on capital with tax credit on new capital = tax rate
(Abel (2007 JPubE)
– Way to tax initial capital
• No restrictions on instruments
– Tax on land
– Tax on rents including imputed rents
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
30
Program of the social planner
∞
𝛽𝑡 𝑢 𝑐𝑡 , 𝐻 −𝐻𝑡 + 𝛾𝑈(𝐶𝑡 , 𝐻𝑡 )
Max
𝑐𝑡 ,𝐶𝑡 ,𝐻𝑡 ,𝐾𝑡+1
𝑠. 𝑡.
𝑡=0
𝑐𝑡 + 𝐶𝑡 + 𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝑓 𝐾𝑡 + 1 − 𝛿 𝐾𝑡
𝛾𝑈′𝐶 (𝐶𝑡 ,𝐻𝑡 ) = 𝑢′𝑐 (𝑐𝑡 , 𝐻 -𝐻𝑡 ) = λ𝑡
𝛾𝑈′𝐻 (𝐶𝑡 ,𝐻𝑡 ) = 𝑢′ℎ (𝑐𝑡 , 𝐻 -𝐻𝑡 )
λ𝑡 / λ𝑡+1 = 𝛽(𝑓 ′ 𝐾𝑡+1 + 1 − 𝛿))
At the steady state: 𝑅
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
𝐾𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠
=
1
𝛽
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
31
First-best taxation Results
• A tax on land or a tax on rents including imputed
rents decentralizes the first best
• Taxation of capital or rents are not first-best optimal
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
32
3. Second best setting
• The set of available distortionary tax instruments is given and
the optimal tax system within this set is explored
• Not possible to confiscate initial capital
• Three constraints on land tax instruments
– No land register
• Only 50 countries have one (over 200) (Van der Molen et Al 2014)
– The most hated tax: in the US (Cabral-Hoxby (2012)), among
the Swedes (Hammar and al.(2008))
• Cap on the property tax as in California proposition 13 (June 6,
1978).
– Not possible any more to tax imputed rent
• Likely because ownership becomes widespread (up to 1963 in
France)
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
33
Ramsey problem
• Tax on “new” capital vs tax on housing rents
– Gvt finances redistribution by a flat tax either on rents or
capital
• Maximize social welfare under constraints
– Resource constraint of the economy for each period
– FOCs of the capitalist (Euler, intraperiod allocation between
consumption and housing, transversality)
– FOC of the worker
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
34
Without Housing: Planner Program
∞
𝛽𝑡 𝑢 𝑐𝑡 + 𝛾𝑈(𝐶𝑡 )
Max
𝑐𝑡 ,𝐶𝑡 ,𝐾𝑡+1
𝑡=0
𝑐𝑡 + 𝐶𝑡 + 𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝑓 𝐾𝑡 + 1 − 𝛿 𝐾𝑡 Mutiplier 𝜆
𝛽𝑈 ′ 𝐶𝑡 𝐶𝑡 + 𝐾𝑡+1 − 𝑈 ′ 𝐶𝑡−1 𝐾𝑡
Mutiplier 𝜇
𝛽𝑡 𝑈 ′ 𝐶𝑡 𝐾𝑡+1 → 0
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
35
Statement of Judd’s result
• (Version of Straub & Werning (2015)
Theorem:
Suppose quantities and multipliers converge to an
interior steady state, i-e, 𝑐𝑡 , 𝐶𝑡 , 𝐾𝑡 converge to positive
values and 𝜇𝑡 converges. Then the tax on capital is zero
in the limit.
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
36
Completing Judd’s statement
We define
𝛾𝑈 ′ (𝐶)
=𝛼
′
𝑢 (𝑐)
𝐶 1−𝜎
𝑈 𝐶 =
1−𝜎
Proposition:
Suppose quantities converge to an interior steady state.
Then The mutiplier 𝜇𝑡 converge iff 1 − 𝛼 1 − 𝜎 > 0.
More specifically, if 𝛼 < 1 then the convergence of
mutipliers occurs iff 𝜎 < 1.
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
37
The case of separable preferences
𝑈 𝐶𝑡 , 𝐻𝑡 = 𝑈1 𝐶𝑡 + 𝑈2 (𝐻𝑡 )
𝑢 𝑐𝑡 , 𝐻 −𝐻𝑡 = 𝑢1 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑢2 ℎ𝑡
𝑥 1−𝜎
𝑢1 ∙ = 𝑈1 ∙ =
1−𝜎
𝑢2 ∙ and 𝑈2 ∙ unspecified
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
38
The optimization pb with housing
∞
Max
𝐻𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑐𝑡 ,𝐶𝑡 ,𝐻𝑡 ,𝐾𝑡+1 ,𝑅𝑡
𝛽𝑡 𝑢 𝑐𝑡 , 𝐻 −𝐻𝑡 + 𝛾𝑈(𝐶𝑡 , 𝐻𝑡 )
𝑡=0
C1 𝑐𝑡 + 𝐶𝑡 + 𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝑓 𝐾𝑡 + 1 − 𝛿
C2 𝛽𝑈1′ 𝐶𝑡
𝐻
mutiplier 𝜆
𝐶𝑡 + 𝐾𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐻 −𝐻𝑡
− 𝑈1′ 𝐶𝑡−1 𝐾𝑡 = 0 multiplier 𝜇
𝐻
C3 𝑅𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑢1′ 𝑐𝑡 − 𝑢2′ 𝐻 −𝐻𝑡 ≥ 0 multiplier 𝜂1 ≥ 0
𝐻
C4 𝑅𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑈1′ 𝐶𝑡 − 𝑈2′ 𝐻𝑡 ≥ 0
multiplier 𝜂2 ≥ 0
C5 𝛽𝑡 𝑈1′ 𝐶𝑡 𝐾𝑡+1 → 0
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
39
Two parameters
𝛾 the relative social welfare weight of capitalists ≤ 1
𝛾𝑈1′ 𝐶𝑡
𝛼= ′
𝑢1 𝑐𝑡
Distance to first
best
𝛾𝑈2′ 𝐻𝑡
𝛼ℎ = ′
𝑢2 ℎ𝑡
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
40
Local result
Proposition
Consider the steady state of the second best optimum
when 𝛼 < 1 and 𝜎 < 1 and the tax on capital is zero
in the limit. If we consider a small pertubation around
the steady state with a small rent tax financing a lump
sum benefit to the worker, then social welfare is
improving at the margin.
However, we do not know whether a zero tax on capital is still
optimal in the limit in the economy with a rent tax as an
additional instrument.
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
41
Main result
• Proposition
– Assume that the following instruments are available to the
decision-maker: tax on capital, lump sum benefit to workers, tax
on rents.
– Consider an economy where the preferences of both the
capitalist and worker are separable, with a CRRA subutility of
consumption.
– Suppose that quantities converges to an interior steady state
and that 𝜎, 𝛼 and 𝛼ℎ < 1.
– Then the optimal tax on capital is 0 and the optimal tax on rents
is positive in the limit.
– the stock of capital = the stock of capital in the first best.
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
42
The second best optimal housing rent tax
Proposition: The optimal rent tax is given by
𝜏∗
1−𝜏∗
=
1−𝛼
𝜖𝑠
where 𝜖𝑠 the supply elasticity of rental housing land wrt to
net rent
With CRRA sub-utility of housing 𝜖𝑠 = 1/𝜎𝐻
𝜏∗
1−𝜏∗
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
= 𝜎𝐻 (1 − α)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
43
Interpretation of the result
• In a static setting, Diamond&Mirrlees (1971) shows
that it is better not to tax production. Depending on
the context, it may be second best optimal to tax
consumption.
• In a dynamic setting, not optimal to tax capital
because it is productive.
• Housing is a consumption good and under some
conditions it can be optimal to tax it.
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
44
4. Middle class
• Karl Marx’s description of 19th century England : 36,000
homeowners
• Alternative to Henry Georges, dissemination of property
thanks to mortgage
• Mortgage might be partially responsible for housing land
inflation (a bad thing) but also for a good thing (reducing
wealth inequality)
• Life-cycle savers. They rent when young and accumulate
savings for the downpayment. They become homeowners
when old.
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
45
Only 3 meaningful wealth classes
4 wealth classes France 2015
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Average age
% of total population
% of total gross wealth
% total housing gross wealth
% of total non-housing gross
wealth
1- Tenants with wealth lower than € 100,000
2- Tenants with wealth larger than € 100,000
3- Homeowners with non-housing wealth lower than € 100 000
3- Homeowners with non-housing wealth larger than € 100 000
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
46
Main Issue
• In that context, is George’s idea useless?
• Or should we just exempt the (old) middle class
from the property tax? (in that case, we are
almost back to the previous model)
• Dilemma: Housing Land is more evenly
distributed than financial capital but the
deadweight loss to tax housing land is lower
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
47
Three class model
• Capitalists: as previously + they can sell land instead of renting it to lifecycle savers
• Workers-tenants
• Life-cycle savers (live two periods)
–
–
–
–
They have a higher productivity and then wages than workers
They are workers-tenants-savers when young
They buy land (no credit) at the end of their working time period.
When they retired they sell their house and consume hand to mouth until
they died. No bequest.
• Housing Land market between the capitalists and young life-cyle savers
during the transition period
• Housing land market between young and old life-cycle savers at the steady
state
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
48
Discussion
• If you do not exempt the old life-cycle savers
– Transfer to the young
– Transfer to the tenant-worker
• Transfer to the young vs gifts
• Transfer to the tenant-worker: does the
inequality of opportunity argument works?
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
49
Global new Georgian view
• Two-tier property tax
1. Property tax to finance local public goods (à la
Arnott-Stiglitz) on all owners
2. Additional property tax at the national or federal
level on homeowners whose wealth is above
some threshold to finance means of fight against
poverty.
Land is back… (Leuven – April 2016)
Bonnet, Bono, Chapelle, Trannoy, Wasmer
50