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WEIMARGERMANY
THE FAILURE OF THE WEIMARREPUBLIC
In November 1918 the state that Bismarck had founded collapsed.
It was replaced by a republic, which had 14 years of troubled life before
expiring.
There were many reasons for the failure of the WEIMARREPUBLIC;
some of the forces that worked against its chances of survival
were external in origin and beyond the capacity of Germans to
control. Nevertheless, the Republic's basic vulnerability was
rooted in the circumstances of its creation.
At the end of September, when Ludendorff told Field-Marshal von Hindenburg
and Chancellor Hertling, that an immediate armistice was necessary, he also
urged the formation of a government that would be capable of impressing the
Allies by its representative character and its liberal philosophy. As a result, the
majority parties in the Reichstag - The Progressives, The Centre and The
Social Democrats - suddenly discovered that they were actually being urged to
carry out their desired reforms.
Behind the new Chancellor, PRINCE MAX von BADEN, the new government
renewed the legislation. The ministerial responsibility to The Parliament was
introduced and the royal power of command over the armed forces was
eliminated - henceforth to be under the control of the cilvil government.
The news that the new government was seeking an armistice (after all the talk
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about victory) had a shattering effect. It paralysed the will of the
warsupporters, it destroyed the restraint (självbehärskning, återhållsamhet)
with which the working and peasant classes had bore the deprivations
(förluster) that the conflict had forced upon them, undermined the
armydiscipline and galvanized (sporrade) the hopes and ambitions of the
leaders of the extreme left. THE ATMOSPHERE SUDDENLY BECAME
VERY REVOLUTIONARY.
It is possible that the situation might have been stabilized if Emperor Wilhelm
II had surrendered the throne to one of his grandsons. His stubborn retention of
office not only destroyed the last chance of a survival of his dynasty it also
encouraged the belief that Germany was not doing everything it could to secure
peace.
This impression was strengthened by the fact that the armistice negotiations
were taking longer than expected. This was because President Wilson had
responded to the German appeal with caution and, rightly suspecting that the
German military might be hoping to use an armistice as a preparation for a
renewed effort, had been defining conditions and seeking assurances that
would make this impossible. The effect of this was, on the one hand to increase
the clamour for the abdication of the Emperor and, on the other, to encourage
local efforts to end the war before it caused new bloodshed. The November
Revolution was essentially the outgrowth of actions of this kind in the naval
base at Kiel.
The troubles in Kiel originated in Admiral Reinhard Scheer's fear that an
armistice would require an ignominous (skamlig) surrender of the navy to the
British fleet. To avoid this kind of humiliation Scheer attempted to order the
High Sea Fleet to steam out from Kiel on a suicidal attack against the British
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Navy. Rumours of the projected operation aroused resistance among the
enlisted men, whose relations with the officers were weren't good from the
start - resulted in open sabotage. The mutineers organised themselves and
demanded the abdication of the Emperor and immediate conclusion of peace.
Alarmed by what now threatened to become a rebellion against the state, the
naval authorities appealed to the goverment for support. The Chancellor the
Majority Socialist Gustav Noske to Kiel and he succeeded in restoring order.
Even if Noske had been able to outmanoevre the most radical elements in the
sailors movement he didn't gain the sailors trust for the government. The
victory in Kiel inspired imitation and on the 5 of November a sailor's council
took effective control of Germany's largest naval base. The rebellion spread
and by the end of the first week of November the government could no longer
rely on the garrisons in any of its northern cities.
As in Kiel, so in Munich did the fear of the consequences of the continuation
of the war serve to undermine local authority. The surrender of AustriaHungary made the Kingdom of Bavaria vulnerable to invasion from the south.
It was the fear of the war coming home to Munich that catapulted the left-wing
Socialist Kurt Eisner to power. On the 8 November Eisner had succeeded in
setting up a cabinet of Socialists, retaining the posts of Prime Minister and
Foregn minister for himself.
These incidents convinced Prince Max von Baden that the situation was
beyond his control and on the 9.11 he announced the resignation of his
government. As an last effort he announced that the head of the
Socialdemocratic Party, Friedrich Ebert, was to be named Reich Chancellor
and charged with the task of calling a Consituent Assembly to determine the
form which the new state should take.
Ebert himself had nothing against the monarchy but he and his government felt
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that the tide was so heavily in the direction of republicanism that they had to
go with it (they feared that the extreme left would seize power otherwise).
At 2 p.m. on 9 November came the proclamation that the Hohenzollerns had
abdicated but actually it wasn't until late in that evening that Wilhelm resigned
and fled across the border into Holland. The Kaiser's abdication was welcomed
by many of his supporters (right-wing) since it meant that the defeat and
peacesettlement would be attached to the new republican government, so
paving the way for the Kaiser's restoration.
The new government didn't have a good start; After the armistice was
concluded on the 11 November, the disorders caused by wandering bands of
leaderless and undisciplined troops was so great that it was impossible for
anyone in Berlin to know what was going on in much of the country. There
was nothing that Ebert and his colleagues could do for the time being to affect
the course of events in Munich or big parts of northern Germany; and even in
Berlin itself their power was challenged by the soldiers' and workers' councils,
the Independent Socialists, and the Spartacus Union.
The most formidable of these opponents were the Spartacists. The Spartacus
Union, which was to become the Communist Party (KPD) in January 1919 was
a serious threat, for it possessed two outstanding leaders, Karl Liebknecht, the
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son of one of the founders of the Social Democratic Party, and the remarkable
Polish revolutionary, Rosa Luxembourg. She had a insight into the nature of
political action (she was thought to be the most brilliant socialist since K.
Marx). Her views had been shaped by her experience of the revolution of 1905
and by her progressive disillusionment with German Social Democracy, which
in her opinion had withdrawn from the tasks of real life to devote itself
exclusevily to the growth of the party organization. She believed that
revolutions were made by the spontaneous will of the masses but often baulked
of their goals by the short-sightedness of party bureaucrats. These were the
main reasons why she saw Ebert as an enemy. Ebert (who had been chosen
head of the SPD in 1913) regarded Lxembourgs faith in natural impulses of the
working class as romantic and potentially dangerous. To him Socialism was
organization, disorganisation was the worst enemy of Socialism. He was
determined that Germany should avoid the Russian way.
Confronted with Chaos and upheaval Ebert made a decision which
overshadowed everything in his career. He decided to ally himself with the
Supreme Command against the threat of the extreme left. Already on the 9.11
General Wilhelm Groener, who had replaced Ludendorff in supreme Command
contacted Ebert and promised that the army would be at the disposal of the new
Chancellor to combat the forces fo Bolshevism on the home front.
It has been argued that Ebert took an exaggerated view of the Red menace and
missed an opportunity to mobilize working-class enthusiasm for the new
regime which was more interested in economic security than ideological issues.
A Congress of Councils from all over the country assembled in Berlin on 16
December. This congress didn't give any support to the Spartacists but backed
up Eberts plan for the election of a National Constituent Assembly. On only
one subject did the Congress show a will of its own, and that was the future
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constitution of the Military establishment. The delegates voted for the
immediate dismissal of Field-Marshal von Hindenburg and the dissolution of
the schools (kadettenhäuser) which had in the past been the first stage in the
education that produced the officer corps. They proposed a replacement of the
old military system by a popular militia (Volksvehr) that elected its own
officers and was under the over-all command of the cabinet and the Executive
Committee.
As soon as the Congress had finished Ebert received a visit from General
Groener and his chief aide, Major Kurt von Schleicher, who informed him that
unless these resolutions were rejected out of hand the assurances made by
Groener in the army's name would be rewoked and the government left to its
own recources.
Ebert promised that these resolutions would not apply to the field army. This,
unfortunately, was interpreted as a betrayal by the Independent Socialists end
led to their withdrawal from the cabinet.
The result of this was a rash of new disorders, beginning on 23 December,
when the most radical and undisciplined of the Councils surrounded the Reich
Chancellery and for a time held the government captive.
The rebellions escaleted and the Spartacists tried to carry out a coup. Faced
with what appeared to be an imminent Communist takeover Ebert turned to the
army which had few reliable units left at their disposal but also so called Free
Corps, former officers who had recruited volunteer forces of their own. These
forces rushed to fight off the Communists but they weren't very loyal to the
Republic;
Colonel Wilhelm Reinhard (one of the first free corps commanders:
"I make no bones of the fact that I am a monarchist. My God! when one has
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served his king and his country faithfully for 30 years, he can't suddenly say,
'starting tomorrow i'm an republican! but you don't have to be afraid. I don't
believe it's possible to set up a monarchy again in a minute. The Allies
wouldn't let us do that in any case. But what will happen in ten years time-."
The free corps gave them the order they wanted, but at a fateful cost. On 10
January the Reinhard Brigade opened the bloody and protracted campaign
agains communism by a succesful assault upon Spartacist headquarters.
Among the communist casualties were Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg brutaly murdered. These murders inflicted a wound upon the German workingclass movement from which it didn't recover. The memory of Liebknecht and
Luxemburg was to be one of the most potent factors in preventing a true
reunion of the left even when A. Hitler was standing at the gates.
The free corps continued liquidating Spartacist inserructions all over Germany
in February and March and in May they reached Munich (Eisner had been
assassinated 21 February).
The liquidations in Munich removed the last threat to the Ebert government
from the extreme left.
When the German people went to the polls in mid-January 1919 Eberts
Majority Social Democrats received 38% of the votes and secured 163 of the
Assemblys 421 seats, not a very strong vote of confidence for Eberts party.
Socialist unity was destroyed and the Majority SPD's were not strong enough
to implement sosialization alone.
The government was also confronted with too many other problems and crises
in 1919 and 1920 to be able to devote much time to serious economic and
social planning.
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WEAKNESSESS OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC
The delegates who had been elected to the National Assembly in mid-January
assembled a month later in Weimar (which points out the problems the new
state struggled with).
After it had elevated (upphöjt) Friedrich Ebert to the office of Reichspresident
and authorized his party to undertake negotiations with the others for the
formation of a government - from February until August, when the Weimar
constitution was promulgated (förkunnades).
"Democracy" - Manyof those who were loudest in their professions of
democracy were in their hearts as monarchist as the outspoken Colonel
Reinhard. They adopted democracy as a means of persuading the Allies to
grant Germany lighter peace terms, and when the victorious Powers in Paris
refused to oblige, they reverted to their true sentiments with a vengeance. As
for the great majority of the German people they didn't understand or desire
democratic government.
§1 'Political authority derives from the people'
-They were to elect the Reichspresident by secret, direct and universal suffrage
(every 7/years).
-Their will was to be given legislative expression in the Reichstag (The Lower
House, elections/4 years).
-All legislation was to originate in the Reichstag, and before its members the
Chancellor and other cabinet ministers had to defend their policies. The
Reichstag had control of the finances (direct and indirect taxes).
- The Reichstag - sole right to declare War.
-The Reichsrat (Upper House) represented the regional governments (18
states). Had the power to delay but not veto legislation.
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-The Constitution provided for the use of proportional representation in
elections to the Reichstag and introduced the wholly untried practice of
REFERENDUM.
Much disruption was to result from these innovations (the most democratic
constitution). Proportional repr. is doubtless the most effective method of
assuring that all shades of opinion find expression, but it works best in time of
political and social peace.
The new electoral method had the effect of complicating the legislative process
by increasing the number of parties and making it unlikely that any single party
would command a majority. This made coalition government inevitable, while
also jeopardizing the security of the republic by giving representation and an
opportunity for publicity and growth to anti-republican splinter
(oppositionella) groups that might otherwise have died of lack of attention.
This and the too frequent dissolution of the Reichstag (which brought new
elections), tended to reduce general respect for parliamentary government.
The conditions for making an referendum were so easy to fulfill that enemies
of the Republic could use it for purposes of obstruction (Young Plan -29,
major stepping stone in Hitler's ascent to power).
The plebiscitary power was given an dangerously exaggerated role in the new
constitution.
PRESIDENT
The plebiscitary counterpoise (motvikt) to parliamentary power found
expression in the position of the President (Ersatz-Kaiser);
-elected every 7 years
-command of the armed forces
-right to dismiss and appoint the Chancellor
-right to dissolve the Parliament and order new elections
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-call for national referenda
-§48 gave the President even more powers than the Emperor had had; 'Should
Public order and safety be seriously disturbed or threatened, the President may
take the necessary measures to restore public order and safety; in case of need
he may use armed force...and he may, for the time beeing, declare the
fundamental rights of the citizen to be wholly or partly in abeyance.'(These
emergency powers that were given the President in 1919 to deal with the
Communists became critical in the years after 1930).
ELECTORAL LAW
A reform of the electoral law weakened the constitution; single-member
consituency (valkrets) were abolished and representation in the Reichstag had
to be based on party lists. This tended to elevate the party caucus
(partledningen) to a dominant position and to reduce the independence of the
party's Reichstag delegation and of those who served as ministers in coalition
governments in particular. Ministries came to exist at the sufferance (tyst
medgivande) of party organizations which had the power to order their
representatives to withdraw if their wishes were not met.
STATE VS. STATES
The National Assembly failed in dealing with the issue of centralization versus
states' rights. The idea had been to re-order the federal structure of Germany in
such way as to centralize power in the national government and to reduce the
rest of the country to homogeneous and identical units with uniformly
subordinate instutions - but it remained an aspiration.
There was some diminution in the powers of the separate states. The states lost
their right to own armed forces and the right of independent representation in
foregn affairs. But eventhough the federal governments had to acknowledge
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the national goverment's exclusive over foreign and colonial affairs, national
defence ... the separate states still retained much power;
They had concurrent (jämsides löpande) rights in the matters that afected the
lives of the citizens most directly, notably in the area of civil and criminal law,
religion, education and social welfare - quarrels and conflict inevitable.
The knowledge that the legitimacy of the Republic was widely challenged
encouraged its enemies to exploit the ambiguities (tvetydighet, otydlighet) in
the relationship between the separate states and the national government in
order to defy(trotsa) the policies of the Reich.
THE CIVIL SERVICE (statsförvaltningen), ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM.
Already during the last chaotic weeks of 1918 both Reich and state
governments came to the conclusion that any radical reform of the Civil
Service wasn't necessary. This decision was confirmed by the Weimar
constitution which recognized the freedom and political opinion and
expression of all members of the State service as long this did not conflict with
their loyalty to the state. Result;
The administration of the Republic's business was left in the hands of
professional civil servants who shared a basically anti-democratic approach to
government.
More flagrant in the way they abused their position were the hudges. Art. 54 of
the constitution guaranteed their positions, and this was interpreted by many of
them as giving them licence to express their prevalently monarchist sentiments
from the bench, both in words and deeds. More lenient tretment to putschists of
the right. The federal penal code stipulated that anyone seeking by force to
overthrow the constitution of the Reich or of any of the single states should be
punished by life imprisonment (When it came to the Kapp-putsch 1920 and
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the Beer-Hall Putsch in 1923 the judges turned an blind eye to this statute).
Later one could notice that it definetily had been a mistake not to start with a
clean slate.
The educational system continued to be what it had been before the war. A
stronghold of uncritical nationalism which now took on a pronounced antirepublican colouration. The education was left, as before, in the hands of the
separate states. In the universities the monopoly of power remained in the
hands of the very conservative professors. The lecture rooms were used for
attack's upon the 'system'. Nothing was done to broaden the social base of the
student body. In 1928 4% of male students and 1,2% of female students in
German universities had working or lower-middle-class backgrounds.
The school-books praised aggressive nationalism and the monarchial past and
placed the respnsibility for all of Germany's present misfortunes at the door of
Foreign Powers and the republican government. The Historybooks usually
insisted that Germany's armies had not been defeated in the first World War.
Allowed the post-war generation to be systematically indoctrinated with antidemocratic ideas.
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THE VERSAILLES TREATY AND THE GERMAN REACTION
The Versailles Treaty was to become the most hated object among the Germans
and the most used among the antidemocrats.
This was inevitable, for there were few Germans who were not left aghast
(förskräckta) when its terms were revealed.
Having placed their faith in the American President and convinced themselves
that the decisions made at Paris would be guided by a spirirt of reconciliation.
The Germans were outraged to discover that the Victors intended to carry out a
very harsch settlement (guilt and revenge). Even people who had expected the
terms to be severe were shocked by what appeared to them to be the Entene's
flagrant violation of their own declarations (for example, in their plundering of
Germany's colonial Empire), of the facts of history (war guilt clause), and of
the rules of economic reason (the reparations that the war guilt clause was
intended to justify. The Germans were also shoched by, what they saw as the
Allied countris apparent lack of interest in the question whether Germany was
to become a viable (livskraftig) democracy or not.
It would be to simple to say that the Versailles Treaty made the downfall of the
Weimar Republic inevitable, but certainly the Treaty was directly responsible
for two crises in 1919 and 1920 that seriously shook the authority of the new
republican government.
1) The first of this came when the German government received the Terms of
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the Treaty on 7 May.
The initial reaction of the Scheidemann cabinet was unanimously (enhälligt)
negative. The Chancellor declared that acceptance of the treaty would be
incompatible (oförenligt) with German honour. When the Allies rejected
German proposals for extensive amandment the unity of the cabinet dissolved.
Chancellor Scheidemann therefore submitted the resignation of his cabinet to
Ebert.
This first cabinet crisis in the Republic's history was complicated by what
promised to become a soldiers' revolt. The military had special reasons for
repudiating (förkasta) the Treaty. It stipulated that the army was to be reduced
to 100.000 officers and men, without aircraft, armour, or offensive weapons,
and that its General Staff, war academy, and cadet schools were to be
dissolved. The Rhineland, which was to be permanently demilitarized, would
be occupied by Entente troops. The Fleet was to become a token (symbol)
force with no larger vessels and no submarines.
Finally, the Emperor and other war leaders were to be surrendered for trial on
charges of violating the laws of war. The German generals discussed the
possibility of rejecting the Treaty even at the cost of renewed military action.
The split in the cabinet and the highly ambiguous (oklara) position adopted by
Field-Marshal von Hindenburg encouraged these generals (under the
leadership of General Walter Reinhardy, the commander of the provisional
Reichsvehr that was now being organized to take the place of the old army) to
call a conference of commanding officers at Weimar on 19 June that was
clearly designed to force the government to defy the Allies.
The new reconstructed cabinet led by the Socialist Gustav Bauer requested for
the elimination of the offensive clauses but the Allies refused and demanded
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acceptance of the Treaty by 23 June.
The soldiers immediately prepared for action. On 23 June, as the time limit set
by the Entente ran out, President Ebert telephoned Wilhelm Groener (head of
the Supreme Command) and told him that he would throw his considerable
weight on the side of rejection (of the Allied demands), if The Supreme
Command thought that there was the slightest chance of resistance being
successful. Both Groener (and Hindenburg) told Ebert that Germany's position
would be hopeless, as all but the most romantic soldiers realized. THERE
WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO ACCEPTANCE. Ebert followed Groener's
advice and told the cabinet to do their unhappy duty. Within minutes of the
expiration of the ultimatum (Allied occupation), the Treaty was accepted. But
the officers dissatisfaction with the Treaty and the Government did not end in
June 1919. (The Kapp-putsch 9 monts later).
The Allied Powers demanded that the force limits (100.000) set by the treaty
should be met as quickly as possible. The disbanding of auxiliary
(hemförlovningen av reserven) forces should begin immediately. In June and
again in August 1919 the Council of Principal Allied Powers in Versailles
ordered that all German forces be withdrawn from territory that had belonged
to Russia before 1914. These referred to the mixed force of Free Corps and
Baltic militia units which, in conjunction with the forces raised by the Baltic
governments and under the command of General Rudiger von der Goltz
(Finland), had been engaged since Feb. 1919 in operations against the
Bolosheviks in Lithuania and Latvia. This campaign had succeeded in
stemming the western surge of Bolshevism.
There is no doubt that Allied policy was inconsistent and even disingenuous
(falsk). Just as they had tolerated the Existence of Goltz's force until it had, to
their advantage, removed the Red threat to the Baltic, so did they, for a long
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time, avert their gaze from the Bavarian lokal defence force (250.000 in 1920).
The Baltic units were forced to come home, and the Allies pressed for their
dissolution together with that of all other units that could not be absorbed in
the new REICHSVEHR without exceeding the figure of 100.000 laid down in
the Treaty.
The governments attempts to comply (foga sig) led to a serious of mutinuous
acts on the part of the soldiers. As early as July 1919, Captain Waldemar Pabst
ordered units of the Guards Cavalry Rifle Corps to march on Berlin on the
pretext that the communists were about to seize the Capital. This order was
intercepted(uppsnappades) by Pabst's astonished superiors, and Pabst was
dismissed and the Corps dispersed (upplösta). But this was only an earnest of
more serious things to come. Pabst soon resurfaced as a leading spirit in a
political organisation called the National Association to which the most
determined anti-republican leaders gravitated (Ludendorff). Under the
leadership of General von Luttwitz and a not very distinguished Prussian
politician named Wolfgang Kapp, this body began to lay serious plans for the
overthrow of the Republican government.
THE KAPP-PUTSCH
In February 1920 the German Government ordered the disbandment of two
first-rate free Corps. Their commanders appealed to Luttwitz, and he stamped
into Ebert's office and demanded the revocation (återkallandet) of the orders.
At the same time he also demanded;
-The cessation of the whole policy of troop resduction
-The dismissal of the present head of the Reichsvehr, General Reinhardt
(republican sympathies).
-New elections and the appointment of a non-party government of experts.
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Ebert rejected these demands out of hand and G. Noske (minister of Defence),
who was present, told the General that, if he were not prepared to obey the
government's policy, he should hand in his resignation. Instead of this Luttwitz
sent orders to begin the action against the Republic by marching on Berlin.
Warned by a journalist Noske hastily called a meeting of headquarters staff in
the ministry of Defence. He discovered to his stupefaction (bestörtning) that he
could not count on the army to resist the mutineers. Although Reinhardt called
for action, the local commanders took their line not from him but from General
Hans von Seeckt, chief of the Army's Chief of Staff. Seeckt informed that the
army could not fire upon its wartime comrades without destroying itself. The
government would have to find their own protectors.
Ebert and his colleagues retreated by car to Dresden end then, by train to
STuttgart, from where they appealed to the working class to defend the
Republic.
The GEneral strike that followed made a quick end of the Putsch. Kapp and
Luttwitz, who headed the mutineers government didn't know what to do and
the breakdown of the public services and the signs of dissatisfaction in some of
the Berlin garrisons bewildered and defeated them. By March 17 their
adventure was over.
It had, however, made one thin clear;
THAT THE LEADERS OF THE ARMY HAD NOT BEEN AS FAITHFUL
TO THE BARGAIN STRUCK ON 9 NOV. 1918 AS EBERT HAD.
Seeckt's neutrality during the putsch seemed to show that the army would
defend the Republic against attacks from the left but did not feel obliged to
adopt a similar attitude towards the 'national' opposition.
The general strike that had been used against the Kappists was so successful
that it reawakened hopes of revolution among the Communists and touched off
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disorders in the Ruhr during which a 'Red army' (50-80.000) captured the main
industrial centres.
To put down what seemed to be a renewal of the Spartacus troubles on a wider
scale, Ebert felt compelled to call upon the very man who had failed him
earlier in the month. General von Seeckt was appointed as commander of the
nation's armed forces and was authorized to restore order in Ruhr. This he did
with brutallity. No one who had failed to defend the Republic against the
Kappists was punished, except Noske , who was held responsible for failing to
control Luttwitz and therefore lost his post.
Seeckt made the army an autonomous body within the state. If this spelled
future trouble so did a further consequence of the Kapp Putsch;
The preparations for the Kapp Putsch had been known to the commander of
the Bavarian Einwohnervehr, Georg Escherich, and had led him to discuss a
parallell action with the President of the Upper Bavarian district, Gustav von
Kahr, and the chief of the Provincial Police, Ernst Pöhner. When the news of
the capture of Berlin reached Munich, this trio urged the local Reichsvehr
commander, General von Möhl, to declare martial law and assume dictatorial
powers. Möhl succeeded in scaring the Bavarian socialists to leave the
government (with the p.m) and appointed a new cabinet without representation
from the left. By this coup Bavaria became pronouncedly anti-republican.
ELECTIONS 1920
The socialist set-back in Bavaria was followed by a more general political
defeat. In the Reichstag elections of 6 June 1920, all three members of the
Weimar coalition suffered severe losses;
The Democrats - lost 36 of its 75 seats
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SPD from a total of 11,5 million votes it dropped to 6,1 - retaining only 102 of
its 163 seats.
The Centre went from 91 to 64 seats.
The control of the Republic's policies had slipped from the hands of the
republicans. The Republicans controlled 205 of the Reichstags 452 seats.
SPD withdrew from the government and made way for the formation of the
first all-bourgeois government.
REPARATIONS, INFLATION AND THE CRISIS OF 1923
"Under the Kaiser everything was better" - The normal state for the Weimar
republic was crisis. Upon the political shock of the military defeat and the
humiliation of the peaceterms followed the harrowing experience of the
inflation. Many of the Germans who had accepted the German transition from
Empire to Republic lost their faith in the democracy due to personal economic
losses in the inflation - something which left them cynical and alienated.
INFLATION
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The hyperinflation was rooted in the fiscal policy of the Imperial Government
during the war years and, specifically in its decision to finance the war by
loans rather than taxes.
The custom was that the circulation of notes should be covered by gold
reserves but these customary restrictions were abandoned in August 1914.
As a result the printing press became the principal means of meeting the needs
of the government and business, and, as wartime expenditures increased, the
amount of money in circulation increased also, so that by the end of the war it
had quitnupled.
Until the end of the war, the absence of normal market activity and the
pervasiness of government economic regulation hid this from the German
people, but once the conflict was over the truth was out, and the resultant
slump of national confidence in the currency accelerated the wartime
depreciation (värdeminskning).
The inexperience of the first post-war governments and the distraction
(förvirring) of their energies to the tasks of maintaining civil order doubtless
prevented them from taking measures that might have brought the growing
inflation under control.
But the main reason for the German failure was 'that the task had been
rendered impossible by the magnitude of the financial and economic burdens
imposed upon Germany in the early years after the Armistice' (British Treasury
official report-1921).
The economic terms of the Versailles treaty and the reparations policies made
it impossible.
From the beginning, the Powers in Paris were divided in their views of the
purpose and desirable scope of reparations.
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The allied powers expanded their definition of reparations from ' compensation
... for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and to their
property by the aggression of Germany by land, sea, or from the air' so as to
make it include the costs of all pension payments to allied combatants as well,
an addition that increased the burden imposed on Germany to inordinate
(omåttliga) dimensions. The Allied Powers also refused to face up to the
problem of how reparations payments were to be made.
It was common knowledge, at least among the financial advisers of the Allied
governments, that they could not be made by transfers of gold, since the
goldreserves of the Reichbank, which amounted to only about 2-4 billion gold
marks, were clearly inadequate to satisfy Allied expectations. The alternatives
were labour services and exports of manufactured and other goods. The French
and Belgian governments, while willing to discuss the first of these possible
solutions, were too concious of the lively opposition of their trade unions and
construction companies to go very far towards implementing it.
The allied governments also crippled Germany's ability to mount a significant
export programme by confiscating its merchant fleet and a considerable
amount of its rolling stock and subsequently, by erecting tariffs against
German goods.
The final figure of the costs was to be set by a reparations commission later but
the allied governments demanded that payments should begin in August 1919
and that they would reach a sum of 20 billion gold marks by 1 may 1921, when
the reparations Commission would make its report. Part of these transfers, and
of the payments made after may 1921, would be in the form of goods.
In addition, the Germans were obliged to pay all the costs of the Allied
occupation of the Rhineland. In 1920 the allied powers showed some
willingness to consider alternate plans for payment but Germany lost this
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golden opportunity due to tactless negotiaters (Seeckt, Stinnes).
In january 1921 a French plan for the payment was supported by the British. It
required the Germans to make annual payments that would increase from 2 to 6
billion gold marks over a period of 42 years and, in addition, to pay 26% of the
proceeds (vinst) of German exports during that period.
The German counter-proposal was a total of 30 billion marks, to be made in
easy payments.
Infuriated by this scheming and also by evidence of Germany's continued
failure to meet the military terms of the treaty and reports of the rapid growth
of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr the Allied governments resorted to sanctions
and, in march, occupied the towns of Düsseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort.
At the end of April the Reparations Commission set the sum at 132 billion gold
marks.
When the Allies made the Commission's figure known to the German
government on 5 may 1921, their note included an ultimatum demanding
unconditional acceptance of the total obligation and the remission (tillgift) of a
billion gold marks within 25 days. The sum was paid by the German
government but only by selling newly printed paper marks on the foreign
currency exhanges. As a result, depreciation (värdeförsämring) was
accelerated.
This resulted in a governmental crisis in Germany and the change of the
cabinet. The new government was headed by Josef Wirth and Walther
Rathenau. Rathenau began as the minister of reconstruction and from 1922 as
foregn minister. Wirth and Rathenau advocated the necessity to fulfil the
Allied demands and at the same time try to start negotiations. This wasn't very
popular among the nationalistic germans but it seemed to produce an opening
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in French-German relations until the French p.m Aristide Briand was replaced
(beginning of 1922) by Poincaré, a leading rightwing politician who refused to
any changes in the French attitude.
United States expected the Allied Powers to pay their debts and the French,
Belgian and Italian governments remained uncompromising with respect to the
German obligation.
As a German protest against the Allied policy Rathenau concluded a separate
treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union (Rapallo).
As a result of this Poincaré adopted a very anti-German line and Rathenau was
murdered by German nationalist fanatics (partly due to the fact that he was a
jew). His death took the spirit of the Wirth cabinet and Wirth resigned in
november 1922. The situation called for new leadership and vision but there
was no hope to get a strong coalition government and as next chancellor Ebert
authorized Wilhem Cuno to form a cabinet.
When he took office, Cuno believed that he could count on the support of
industry and banking in his efforts to reach an agreement with the allies for a
final settlement of reparations. Instead of asserting the authority of the
government against his refractory associates, Cuno showed a dangerous
tendency to defer to their wishes; and this contributed to the weakness of his
position when it became apparent that the French government intended to use a
German default in shipments of coal and timber as an excuse for occupying the
Ruhr. Only an impressive and plausible German proposal could be expected at
this late date to stay Poincaré's hand. Cuno failed to produce it because he
relied upon the bankers and industrialists to tell him what it should include,
and they proved incapable of rising above their special interests. The 11
january 1923 French and Belgian troops began their move into the Ruhr.
No plans had been made for this contingency (eventualitet), for Cuno had
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persisted in believing until the last moment that something would intervene to
stop Poincaré. President Ebert, Seeckt and the cabinetmembers decided to
organise passive resistance against the occupation. This decision received the
massive support of the Germans but in fact by doing this the government
commited itself to a policy which, as experience would prove, was as difficult
to abandon as it was impossible to support.
From the very beginning the costs were staggering. When the government
ordered German officials and railway and factory workers in the Ruhr to refuse
to co-operate with the occupying Powers, the French responded by putting
officials of their own in charge of civil affairs and the administration of
transport facilities, by sequestering bankreserves and factory inventories, and
by responding to strikes with eviction (vräkningar) and imprisonment.
This imposed upon the German government the obligation of supporting the
victims of this treatment and their families.
At the same time, the systematic conversion of Ruhr into an economic system
under foreign control deprived Germany of vital raw materials (85% of the
German coal came from Ruhr), disrupted production and eventually increased
the unemployment in the rest of Germany.
It was impossible for the Reich treasury to meet these extraordinary obligations
with its existing resources. The country was breaking apart.
The taxpolicy of Cuno's cabinet didn't live up to the existing demands. The
deficits were covered by 'floating debts' - the printing press. The result;
hyperinflation. In january a dollar was worth 191,8 mark but in november
4,200,000,000,000.0 - Germany turned into a lunatic World. A very large
number of middle-class people lost everything they had including their dreams.
By the end of 1923 only 29.3 % of the total labour force was fully employed.
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The trade unions lost their position in the society. The 8-hour working day,
which had been achieved in 1919 was lost and Germany generally went back to
a 10-hour working day.
After the inflation the tradeunion movement as a whole had less of the
cohesive spirit and militancy that had been so effective in defeating the Kapp
Putsch in march 1920.
The persons, however, who proved to be the most vulnerable were the sick and
the young. The mounting costs of hospital care and the increase in doctors' fees
placed adequate medical treatment beyond the capacity of millions at a time
when the ballooning price and frequent shortage of essential foodstuffs were
causing widespread malnutrition (undernäring) and the reapperance of diseases
that had been common during the worst days of the Allied blockade.
It was obvious that the republican regime couldn't be blamed for the
misfortunes of Germany but people who are treated outrageously are not prone
to the balanced view; and many of those whose security and hopes had
disappeared struck back at the most covenient target. Organisations
representing the artisans (hantverkare) and the small trades accused the
government of flagrant violation of the constitution which clearly stated that it
was the resposibility of the government to protect and promote economic
freedom by maintaing an independent middle class in agriculture, trade and
commerce - the middle-class support was lost.
This was a loss that was not made good after the currency was stabilized. The
resentment was lasting and reflected in political attitudes hostile to democracy.
When National Socialism became a mass movement in the 30's, the
MITTELSTAND was, in retation to its size, over represented in it. The same
tendency was manifest among white-collar workers.
Before the year 1923 was over the government had to face threats from both
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left and right.
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OH-notes on the crisis of 1923
“Under the Kaiser everything was better” – sentimentality
ORIGINS OF THE INFLATION
a) FISCAL POLICY;
To finance the war by loans. The amount of money quintupled
1914-18. The decline of the mark on the international market.
After the war the truth was out – slump.
b) The inexperience of the first post-war governments and the
distraction of their energies to the tasks of maintaining civil
order prevented them from fighting the growing inflation.
c) (main reason) The magnitude of the financial and economic
burdens imposed upon Germany.
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d) Allied sanctions 1921 (march); occupation of Düsseldorf,
Duisburg and Ruhrort (impounded the customs receipts)
e) The Reparations commission informed the German
government their demands 5.5.21. The note included an
ultimatum; unconditional acceptance of the total obligation
and one billion Gold Marks to be paid in 21 days. The sum was
paid. Depreciation was accelerated and the inflation was to
increase remorselessly.
Allied debts to US resulted in an uncompromising attitude with
respect to the German obligation.
RAPALLO TREATY(Germany-Sovietrussia, april 1922) was
interpreted as an provocative act by the allies. Rathenau (f.m.)
was murdered by right-wing nationalists. The Wirth cabinet
resigned in nov. 1922.
The new cabinet (chancellor W. Cuno) was weak and easy to
manipulate. 11.1.1923 – French and Belgian troops occupied
Ruhr. Pressure on the German government to fulfil their
reparationpayments.
German passive resistance. The government committed itself to a
policy which was difficult to abandon and impossible to support.
The costs were staggering (supporting the victims of Ruhr).
-deprived Germany of vital raw materials
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-disrupted production
-increased unemployment
Extra origin of the inflation;
-Great deficiency of the Cuno government’s tax policy. Didn’t
produce enough revenue to meet its obligations. The deficits were
covered by ‘floating debts’ (printing press)
RESULTS; Catastrophic inflation (july-nov. 1923). Some profited
but the vast majority lost.
The blame on the Weimar constitution and the government. The
population lost its confidence in the state.
Further results;
- unemployment (by the end of –23 only 29% fully employed)
- working unions lost their power (10h day-normal). The spirit
fighting of the Kapp-putsch was lost)
- sick and young ones most vulnerable (malnutrition,
reappereance of diseases, rising death rates)
ACCUSATIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT:
Flagrant violation of the constitution (§164) – The government’s responsibility
to protect and promote economic freedom by maintaining an independent middle
class in agriculture, trade and commerce.
REACTIONS; Between June-August a wave of strikes swept across the country.
Agitations and riots. Danger of General Strike. Cuno was replaced (11.8.23) by
G. Stresemann.
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POLITICAL PROGRAM;
1) The adaption of the best features of the old order to the new
conditions.
2) Economic recovery.
3) Rehabilitation as a strong and respected Germany in Europe.
26.9.1923 . Termination of passive resistance in the Ruhr. Opened
the way to negotiations.
Political upheavals; Germany was alive with rumours of
impending coups. The 13.10 the Reichstag passed an enabling act
which gave the government freedom to operate by decree.
PUTSCHES;
a) Major B. Buchrucker and the’Black Reichswehr’
b) The German Communist Party (subordinated to control from
Moscow). In Thuringen and Saxony a communist revolt
attempting to set up a dictatorship of the proletariat.
c) ‘The Beer Hall Putsch’
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