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REFLECTING ON CALLON WITH A CASE OF FAIR TRADE COFFEE Julie Whittaker University of Exeter University of Exeter Discussion Papers in Management Paper number 06/06 ISSN 1472-2939 Correspondence address: School of Business and Economics, University of Exeter, Streatham Court, Rennes Drive, Exeter EX4 4PU, United Kingdom Tel: +44 (0) 1392 263845, Fax: +44 (0) 1392 263242, Email: [email protected] Reflecting on Callon with a case of Fair Trade coffee Julie Whittaker Abstract Michel Callon’s writings on markets offer a new approach for studying market organisation. In the light of his understanding of market dynamics Callon has suggested that issues of economic justice can be re-examined. This paper explores the robustness and relevance of some of his concepts by applying them to an analysis of Fair Trade in coffee. Callon’s work gives weight to the influence of material artefacts in networks, and while this has relevance for understanding the processes leading to market development, his explanation of the causes of market change are limited by an overemphasis on the direct effect of material factors. This highlights the lack of attention to price determination in his framework, which proves to be problematic in trying to analyse just markets, where the rate of exchange is crucial to the discussion. 2 Reflecting on Callon with a case of Fair Trade coffee Michel Callon, in his recent writings on markets, has argued anew that markets can take many forms and that society has some choice in how they operate (Callon 1998a,b, Callon 1999, Callon, Méadel and Rabeharisoa 2002, Callon and Muniesa 2005). Indeed, the title of his initial book on the subject, The Laws of the Markets (Callon 1998), reflects his belief that there is no natural market laws, and therefore society can create a diversity of market processes. In Callon and Muniesa (2005) he suggests that with a new understanding of the potential diversity of forms, it is relevant to reconsider the ability of markets to address issues of justice and equity. This is timely in so far as one of the causes of unease about global market liberalization has been that market values will dominate moral principles leading to what Baumann (2001:25) has termed the ‘dissipation of responsibility for the distant stranger’. Recent years have witnessed significant expression of concern about a lack of fairness within international markets, reflected in the widespread emergence of campaigns for economic justice at the global level.1 These focus on trading arrangements considered to be biased against the poor either because of unfair world trade rules or because of the dominance of multinational companies. Associated with the intensification of public interest in these campaigns, has been a growth in Fair Trade sales, providing concrete demonstration of significant interest in markets that appear just. Under Fair Trade arrangements, consumers, typically in the northern hemisphere, voluntarily purchase products that guarantee a minimum price for producers that are located mainly in the southern hemisphere. Goodman (2004:893) has described Fair Trade as the ‘re-linking of production and consumption, 3 rising Polanyi-like from the ashes of globalization’. But Fair Trade has been criticised by economists, for example Lindsey (2004), who has argued that those proclaiming sympathy for the world’s poor lack understanding of how markets work, and suggests that Fair Trade measures only exacerbate global poverty. It seems that Fair Trade highlights some of the keen differences in focus between economic sociologists and economists, the former being more preoccupied with distributional issues, and the latter with efficiency criteria. Callon attempts to bridge the divide between sociologists and economists, by embracing a network approach associated with new economic sociology, whilst also emphasizing the relevance of economics within the network. Fair Trade provides an opportunity to reflect upon Callon’s writings on markets, which while rich in ideas, have some propensity for ambiguity. His view on the relevance of economics already has been a subject of debate (see for example Miller 2002, 2005, Fine 2003). Simultaneously, this paper uses Callon’s perspective on markets to try to understand how Fair Trade initiatives emerged and exist, and to consider whether they are sustainable, whether they can achieve their long term objectives. The relevant issues are reflected upon by considering the market for the most widely Fair Traded commodity, coffee. The paper begins by providing some background to Fair Trade coffee, and then following, Callon’s approach to the study of markets is reviewed. Callon argues that markets are inherently unstable as boundaries of markets are perpetually contested. Reflecting on factors that have caused contestation in the case of coffee, deliberation is given to what is included within Callon’s definition of overflowing 4 effects. At issue is Callon’s presumptions about price determination, and whether concern for others can be expressed within his framework. Fair Trade coffee Fair Trade coffee developed from the impetus of two Dutchmen, who after working on development projects in Central America for many years, reached the conclusion that development efforts were wasted without reformation of the coffee market (Pendergrast 2001). Like many agricultural commodities, the world coffee market is characterized by millions of producers, geographically separated. Under such conditions, prices have been unstable, and in common with most agricultural commodities there has been long run price decline. In 1988 the Max Havelaar coffee label2 was introduced in 1988 in the Netherlands, as the first of many Fair Trade coffee brands launched into conventional marketing channels with the purpose of improving market arrangements for small coffee growers. Now there is an internationally agreed certification and labeling system, known as the Fairtrade Mark that underpins fair trading arrangements for many coffee brands as well as other products. The creation of this alternative supply chain was original in being neither an initiative of the commercial sector, nor instigated by governments. Instead the architecture of the Fair Trade chain was the result of the work of individuals operating in non-profit organizations, collectively referred to as the Fair Trade movement. A result of this is that although the designers chose to achieve development objectives via the market, they appeared to be little influenced by economists’ conceptions of markets, being primarily motivated to enhance the welfare of the coffee growers. Consequently, the Fair Trade pricing structure gives emphasis to the needs of producers, providing 5 coffee growers with long-term contracts with minimum prices set to cover the costs of production. Advance partial payments are made to avoid debt, with all transactions conducted through producer co-operatives. In addition to the minimum price (or market price if it is larger), a social premium is paid to the growers’ community to provide opportunities to develop either their co-operative or a community project related to educational, health or environmental goals. These pricing arrangements in effect redistribute income within the supply chain. This is a clear aim of Fair Trade which operates on the presumption that mainstream coffee companies receive too great a proportion of returns from the retail coffee market. Ponte (2002) and Gilbert (1998) provide evidence that there has been a decline in the proportion of income received by producers from the supply chain over time and this has led to the opinion that liberalisation and deregulation of the coffee market in the early 1990s encouraged a buyer-led commodity chain (Ponte 2002, Raynolds 2002, Ponte and Gibbon 2005). The sense of injustice to coffee growers, associated with this arrangement, appeared greatest with the significant slump in coffee bean prices in 2001, when low bean prices were not translated into lower retail coffee prices, leading to the conclusion that company profits benefited whilst growers suffered (Oxfam 2002). Fair Trade schemes3 not only provide price guarantees, they also develop trading partnerships which are based on principles of dialogue, transparency and respect. Producer co-operatives are encouraged in order to develop capacity, with coffee growers becoming part of a business team rather than merely commodity suppliers. The assurance 6 of a long-term partnership provides security and the chance for growers to engage in long term planning with others in the commodity chain as equal partners. Such an approach not only addresses economic issues but also has a role in restoring dignity. In addition Fair Trade products are considered to be a means of expressing concern about the current unfairness of world trade rules. For example, the Fairtrade Foundation (2002) suggests that buying Fair Trade coffee will ‘signal our support for much wider change in the economic relationships between rich and poor countries’.4 In effect, Fair Trade coffee is a product that embodies a set of principles, and it provides a means by which concerns about economic justice can be materialized and demonstrated through purchases. Callon on markets Michel Callon considers that the organisation of markets increasingly is a subject of public debate. To date, interest in Callon’s writings on markets (Callon 1998a,b,1999) has focused principally on the performative role of economics in formatting the economy (see Aspers 2004, MacKenzie and Milo 2003, MacKenzie 2004, Miller 2002, 2005). But Smelser and Swedberg (2005) identify that Callon makes another contribution to new economic sociology with his emphasis on the material, the non-human, in network relations, a relevance derived from his work in actor-network theory (ANT).5 This appears a constructive contribution given that markets are about humans exchanging goods, which even when they are services typically have a material component and furthermore, given anthropological research that suggests that objects have a social life (Appadurai 1986). Even so, Callon (1999:183) initially considered markets to be a test for ANT because the latter ‘was developed to analyse situations in which it is difficult to 7 separate humans and non-humans…whereas the market is diametrically opposed to this situation; everything is delimited and roles are perfectly defined’. However, with reflection he argues that ANT can contribute to an understanding of markets because it can explain the emergence of rational calculative actants which enable the delineation and alienation that is required for exchange. Callon’s work has affinity with Granovetter (1985) in focusing on networks, and disputing the duality imposed by analyses that assume the economy and society to be distinct, with either society conditioning the economy, or the economy conditioning society. Such positions are problematic because they imply the agent is homo clausus, in the Eliasian sense (Elias 1994) being either an over-socialised homo sociologicus, conditioned by conventions and culture, or an under-socialised homo economicus, constrained by individualistic passions. Instead, Callon and Granovetter perceive the agent to be homo apertus, part of a network of actors, each of whom is open to influence and simultaneously influencing others. In effect the network configures ontologies (Callon 1998, 1999). When asserting that the economy is embedded in social relations, Granovetter not only accentuated the role of human agency in shaping markets, rather than being dupes to social conventions, he also refuted the tenet of neo-institutional economics that institutional arrangements are solely the result of efforts to maximise efficiency, arguing that they can be designed also to meet social needs. Significantly, Callon does not give emphasis to this latter point, but stresses the relevance of the material, in shaping markets. Effectively he not only dismisses the dualism between 8 economy and society, but also discards the division between human and non-human actors. A key element of Callon’s thesis is that while individuals can be influenced by all kinds of relations between human and non-human elements within the network, in choosing to engage in a market, the buyer and seller at the point of transaction, become temporarily alienated from the network entanglements; they make a rational calculation and exchange, and in doing so are momentarily disentangled.6 Markets therefore are distinctive in being calculating collective devices, with material artefacts and established procedures necessary for constructing calculative agency (Callon and Muniesa 2005) in a ANT like fashion. For goods to be exchanged they need to be qualified, made comparable or differentiatable from other goods, and this requires material elements. Callon contends that economics, rather than being dismissed by sociologists, should be recognised as a technology which helps to create the tools that establish a market within a network. Marketing and accountancy practices, for example, have been developed from economics, and they enable the calculative process. He does not believe that individuals are born psychologically endowed like homo economicus, but argues that for markets to exist, homo economicus has to be created, ‘formatted, framed and equipped with prostheses which help him in his calculations and which are, for the most part, produced by economics’ (Callon 1998a:51). Provocatively he states that the ‘economy is embedded not in society but in economics’ (1998a:30). However, in Barry and Slater (2002), Callon argues that he is not trying to bolster economic arguments, but acknowledge that economic discourse has a bearing on calculative market practices. He regards economists 9 and their texts as only one group of actors that influence markets, that other actors also have a sway, determining what they want to include within a calculation, and how values are computed (Callon, Méadel and Rabeharisoa 2002). Callon’s starting position has appeal because it both recognises that agents operate within an open system which configures their ontologies, so takes a broad view as to what influences behaviour, yet also demarcates the market as a unique entity within a network. Slater (2002: 248) argues that Callon’s ideas help economic sociology to move on from two ‘impossible alternatives’ that either ‘the market is absolutized as abstraction or it is dissolved into culture’. Nevertheless, inevitably there are questions still begging. For example, which aspects of economics are relevant for understanding and designing calculative agency, and can they be separated easily from a market ideology based on self-interest and price signals? Specific to this paper, is the question of whether markets can be established and persist when distributional goals are prominent. The case of Fair Trade also raises the issue of whether prices set to cover producer costs are sustainable over time? With regard to Callon’s work, these questions highlight two areas for examination. The first concerns the range of factors he considers can be included within a market decision, and the second relates to his understanding of the role of prices. Taking things into account Callon recognises that for calculation to be achievable, there have to be limits on the elements within the network which are actually taken into account. He gainfully introduces Goffman’s concept of framing (Goffman 1971) to theorise that the arena for 10 market operations is but a framed portion of the network (Callon 1998a,b). Within the social sciences, framing is primarily considered as a cognitive and linguistic device, a schema which enables the processing of information to generate meaning. Callon, consistent with the rest of his work, emphasises the material aspects of framing arguing that investment is required to make relations visible and goods calculable, and ultimately determine what is taken into account in a decision to exchange. Although not very distinct within his writings, he identifies two dimensions of framing. First, in (Callon 1998a) he highlights the infrastructure that is required to define the goods as calculable things, delineating their qualities, a process referred to as objectification. Associated with the process of objectification is singularisation, which is the means by which consumers become attached to the objective properties of a product, such that it acquires a calculable value. However, in his discussion on framing in Callon (1998b) he gives greatest emphasis to the material aspects of property rights, as factors that frame market decisions. Certainly property rights are a vital aspect of a calculative market, determining to whom the results of calculation can be attributed (Callon 1998a). They define legal entitlements, and provide necessary bedrock for market exchange. Nonetheless, as argued below, this does not preclude individuals from bringing other factors into the frame of their transaction decisions. Callon tends to overstate the relevance property rights, insofar as he neglects of other relevant factors that may be taken into account within a market setting. Consequently he can appear to set limits on the new universe of potential forms of market organisation that he claims his explanation of markets heralds. 11 Critical to a construal of Callon’s position is the interpretation of his idiom, overflows. Callon argues that although framing is a requirement for market exchange, any frame is permeable, it can never encompass all market impacts because of the complex interconnectedness within a network. Life in the network beyond the frame ultimately has an influence. The result is that market exchange inevitably leads to effects that overflow beyond the boundaries into other parts of the network. Since overflows are typical, market frames are always open to contestation. Therefore market instability is the norm, as actors seek to reframe the market boundaries to accommodate the overflow effects. However, Callon seems to constrain the factors that can cause reframing by aligning his term of overflowing effects with the economists’ term of externalities (Callon 1998a,b). This is limiting as externalities have a precise meaning within economic theory. They are the impacts of economic activity on a third party which are not taken into account by the economic decision maker, and are not reflected in their prices. Such impacts can be either positive (in which case no impetus for change) or negative. As suggested by Callon, pollution problems provide many illustrations of negative externalities. For example, if a chemical company disposes of waste material into a river without regard for the impact on the quality of river water extracted by a brewery downstream, it will affect brewery costs and profits. Alternatively, an externality may affect the well-being of individuals, e.g. nitrous oxides emitted from cars causing respiratory problems. The crucial aspect about externalities is that there is a direct non-monetary effect on a third party’s welfare, resulting from a lack of clearly defined property rights. In the examples given the externalities occurred because it was not defined in law who had rights to use the river and the atmosphere. Clearly, when there is public objection to the pollution, the 12 government can intervene, property rights can be redefined, and the market, in Callon’s terms can be reframed. While externalities fit neatly with Callon’s standpoint because they entail a material impact, a problem is that the factors that lead to market reorganisation are not solely externalities; they frequently revolve around distributional issues. These are not covered within the externality definition, which as Callon rightly notes is centred on efficiency concerns (1998b:247). To elaborate the point, consider a supermarket that achieves new economies of scale, so lowering its costs and leading to lower shop shelf prices. The detrimental effect on the profitability of small high street shops is not an externality, as the impact is pecuniary, it is reflected in the market and it is not a material effect.7 Therefore, an implication of Callon’s association of overflows with externalities is that distributional effects are never a reason for market reframing. If Callon is aiming to be prescriptive here, then he seems to align himself with the economists as this is clearly in line with much of their advice that improving efficiency should be the only objective of policy. If instead, Callon’s intention is to be descriptive, then he is factually wrong, as the historical reality is of frequent attempts to reorganise market operations for distributional reasons, as the case of coffee illustrates. Coffee market instability Coffee is a valuable cash crop for around 25 million smallholders, who need to earn a living from small patches of land. Furthermore, for the low-income countries where coffee is grown, it is often a critical source of foreign exchange, sometimes accounting for over 50% of total export earnings. There is long history of price variation and price decline for coffee and because of the dependency of both poor farmers and whole 13 economies on this cash crop, the question of how the coffee market might be organised to ameliorate the distributional effects of price instability and decline, has been a subject of contestation for decades. A major attempt at market reframing to stabilize prices was an inter-governmental effort in the early 1960s. This was because during the Cold War there was a fear in western economies that price instability in coffee dependent economies would lead them to Communism. As a result the International Coffee Organisation (ICO) was founded and a market system heavily dependent on government intervention, in the form of a quota system, introduced (Ponte 2002). However, after nearly four decades this form of market organisation collapsed, because it proved costly, the political threat removed, and market liberalization was the zeitgeist. Producer countries were advised by international agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF, to dismantle marketing boards and reduce government influence on commodity prices, leading to greater price instability once again. It was the perceived negative impact of this on small vulnerable coffee growers which gave impetus to the to development of the Fair Trade movement (FTM), to bring into being a new type of supply chain, and campaign for more widespread change. The story of the coffee market since the early 1960s demonstrates how the limitations of one form of market organisation gave birth to another; from free market to ICO quotas, back to free market, and then for some producers, to Fair Trade. Callon’s terminology of overflowing effects leading to market reframing would seem to have relevance for expressing such developments. However, since neither price instability nor political change, nor concern for the less economically fortunate, can be defined as externality 14 effects, to apply the expression of overflowing, it is necessary to clarify that its definition extends beyond externalities, to include any spillover effects from market activities that are perceived to have a detrimental impact.8 This may be Callon’s intention, given his claim that the notion of externality denotes ‘all the connections, relations and effects which agents do not take into account in their calculations’ (Callon1998a:16). This description is an incorrect economic definition of an externality, but is broad enough to include distributional issues. Clarification of Callon’s position is required by seeking for evidence elsewhere in his writings that might indicate that issues of justice can lead to market change. A leading question is, whether Callon’s framework allows for interests other than the self to be included in market decisions. Calculating for whom? Although Callon recognises that the relationship between two transacting partners can have relevance in an exchange, but his focus is on the social connections that ease economic transactions, rather than human relations that motivate duty or altruism. For example, when there is market uncertainty he appreciates that it can make sense to take account of whom you are trading with, and it can be an advantage to establish long-term trusting trading relationships (Callon 1998a). However, what is at issue with regard to Fair Trade, is whether Callon’s framework can encompass market arrangements that privilege an individual or group on the grounds of compassion and altruism. There appears to be some haziness within Callon’s writings on whether he assumes that human actors always act out of self-interest, when operating in the market. The fact that Callon’s agents live within an evolving network confers a broad view of what influences 15 behaviour, that an individual’s preferences are not static, and that unlike homo economicus are not derived from an innate self, unswayed by the world around. They are open to influences from all parts of the network. Nevertheless, by stating that the tools derived from economics are an important influence on the network, indeed that homo economicus can be created in the market, and that the economy is embedded in economics, there is an implication in Callon’s work that within the market setting at least, self interest is the expected pattern of behaviour. But then his position is tempered by comments that other members of society can decide what to calculate and how. In a certain respect, this can be viewed as no different from the neo-classical economic position which does effectively allow for any preferences to be expressed (see Hargreaves-Heap 2001 for an interesting discussion). Although the term calculating has Machiavellian overtones, concern for others can be included within a calculation. A consumer can be inclined towards ethical purchases, goods which are not bought solely for the pleasure of individual consumption but also for the beneficial effects it brings to other agents. For example, a consumer may be motivated to purchase solar panels for her property because she wants to make a contribution to limiting carbon emissions, to reduce climate change risks to future generations. Some economists consider this to result in a warm glow effect that contributes to utility, and therefore there can be an element of satisfaction from this action to the purchaser. Curiously though, Callon (2005) suggests that an individual will buy environmentally friendly products only if the relevant aspects of the environment are considered within the market frame. Given the emphasis he gives to market reframing as involving the internalization of externalities, this is a precarious statement because it insinuates that there are no voluntary purchases of environmentally 16 friendly products, and thereby that the only social obligation in market exchange is to act within the law of property rights. However, before presuming that Callon’s framework does not allow for such purchases, it is relevant to recall that his concept of market framing, although stressing the delineation of property rights, does include also product definition, and this could embrace the ethical credentials of a product. Therefore, in spite of ambiguity caused by the overemphasis on reframings associated with externality type ethical purchases, even though this is not entirely obvious from all his work. Fair Trade goods are comparable to environmentally friendly products in so far as consumers voluntarily purchase them, it is merely that concern for other humans rather than concern for the environment is objectified and incorporated within calculations. However, there is also difference. The raison d’être of Fair Trade is not directly related to the physicality of the product (although as Fair Trade has evolved more attention has been given to product quality). Instead, the main focus of Fair Trade is the rate of exchange. Therefore, whereas the voluntary purchase of environmental goods is compatible with a free market, within current Fair Trade schemes, there is an element of price fixing. Although the final product on shop shelves can be sold at whatever price the retailer chooses, a minimum price is guaranteed for the producers of the raw product, in this case coffee beans. This is anathema to liberal minded economists, unsupportive of pricing arrangements based on distributional criterion, but sociologists may view such price agreements as merely a continuation of the history of market operations based on social conventions. To consider whether Callon’s insights can help to bridge the gap 17 between understandings of economists and sociologists, requires reflecting on Callon’s understanding on pricing arrangements. Price determination Callon views price agreement as being a peaceful means of resolving conflict between opposing buyers and sellers (Callon 1998a:3). Price resolution is aided by a range of collective calculative devices (see for a full discussion), amongst them accounting practices and pricing tools, which help to attain a monetary expression of the value (derived from entanglement) which enables the disentanglement required for exchange (Callon 1998a, Callon and Muniesa 2005). For Callon, calculation does not solely involve quantitative procedures, but also judgment areas of where there is uncertainty. Therefore, his definition of calculation is a form of reckoning involving both quantitative and qualitative data that might be paraphrased as ‘weighing things up’. Another dimension of price determination is the process through which buyers place bids, and sellers respond. Callon and Muniesa (2005) argue that various systems can be applied in exchange encounters, and different ‘algorithmic configurations’ can lead to different final prices. For example, the price achieved through a Dutch auction, may be differ from one achieved through open bidding. Callon and Muniesa stress the role of material devices in price determination, referring in particular to automated systems on stock exchanges, but consistent with a network approach, they acknowledge that buyer/seller relationships can have a bearing as well. An outcome of this is that at a given point in time and space, a commodity can be sold at different prices to different buyers. Drawing 18 on research by Kirman (2001), they cite the Marseilles fish market as an example, where the same species of fish are sold at different prices to loyal and disloyal customers. Nonetheless, at the aggregate level, when quantities sold are reduced, then the average price rises; the law of demand holds. The conclusion reached by Kirman (see also Härdle and Kirman (1995)) is that observations made at the aggregate level should not be used to make deductions of what happens at the micro level. At the aggregate level it might appear that sales and purchases are totally price dependent, but analysis at the micro level indicates that interactions are not solely price based. The reason given for this is that individuals have imperfect information on overall levels of supply and demand. Therefore buyers and sellers can gain from implicit contracts which guarantee sales and purchases, even if price to one party might seem disadvantageous compared to the average market price. In effect, the agents involved in the partnership have weighed up the benefits of repeated exchange.9 The existence of implicit contracts leads Kirman (an economist) to the conclusion that markets are much less predictive than might be presumed in some economic forecasts. However Callon seems to view price uncertainty as being adequately dealt with through the calculative relationships between buyers and sellers and the result is no significant instability within the price system. For example, Callon et.al., (2002: 194) state ‘One can find multiple socio-technical devices that are designed by economic agents, which ensure the distribution of cognitive competencies, and which constantly and finely tune supply and demand.’ In reality, price variation can result from four related reasons. First, close links between buyers and sellers do not always exist, secondly, aggregation from individual firm to industry level can lead to unpredicted effects, thirdly, production cannot always be controlled so actual output 19 diverges from planned output, fourthly, (though not typically in the case of coffee) demand can be capricious. Uncontrollable environmental events such as disease and frost are at the root of price instability in the coffee market, but their impact has been compounded by the thinness of network ties, which contributes to aggregated effects that are detrimental. Because production of coffee beans is by a large number of geographically dispersed small growers, knowledge of consumer requirements and production strategies of competitors is far from perfect, and there is heavy reliance on price signals. This lack of ties and nonprice information has meant that when disease or frost severely impacts on coffee harvests as they regularly have done, they have had particularly destabilising effects. The reduced supply leads to upward movements in price, and in an atomistic market, this typically encourages new plantings. Two years on, when the bushes bear fruit, the increased production results in significantly lower prices. Therefore prices fluctuate. Because coffee consumption is fairly insensitive to price change, price reductions are not fully offset by greater sales, and so income instability is closely associated with price instability. Another consequence of limited network ties has been that price fluctuations have occurred along a declining long run price trend. The tendency for the production of coffee to increase and put downward pressure on prices over time is the result of individual producers and producer countries calculating in isolation that expanding their own supply will be profitable. Often governments have provided planting subsidies to harvest foreign currency, with expansion plans based on an assumption that prices will not change, or at least will not fall below a level which makes the expansion unprofitable. 20 However, if many countries independently raise output then the aggregate increase in supply can reduce returns to all. A recent example of this was the severe slump in coffee prices in 2001, which can be attributed largely to the promotion of low cost coffee growing in Vietnam and expansion in Brazil (ICO 2004). The materialisation of Fair Trade Although Callon’s framework has limitations in explaining the factors that gave impetus to Fair Trade initiatives, his interest in the linkages between actors (including the nonhuman) gives his work an edge in understanding how new markets come into being. He argues that the key to understanding new market forms is to appreciate what are the entangling, framing and disentangling processes involved (Callon 2005). In the case of Fair Trade, the Fair Trade movement (FTM) has sought to principally differentiate products by the favourable trading arrangements with primary producers. To signal this to consumers, every accredited Fair Trade product has the internationally agreed Fairtrade mark on its packaging, which comprises of a logo and the maxim 'Guarantees a better deal for Third World Producers'. Accordingly, the product is objectified and distributional issues brought into the market frame. The FTM fosters a connection between coffee producers and consumers with promotional literature focusing at least as much on the producers as the product. Visual images and script contribute to the process of singularisation by encouraging consumers to positively relate to growers. In contrast to the proponents of unrestricted markets who engage the attention of a network of policy makers with a discourse based in neo-liberal economics, the FTM has 21 used various literary inscriptions in the form of reports,10 web pages and campaigning newsletters to persuade a network of coffee consumers of the case for alternative trading arrangements (see Raynolds (2002) for further detail). When the movement was young and resources scarce, the message was conveyed almost solely through NGO campaigning networks, and through church based organisations where the appeal for trade justice resonated with the message of the gospel. Thus it was possible to target a group of consumers with established sensibilities towards helping those in difficult economic circumstances. This group of consumers provided an initial base from which the Fair Trade became established, with early sales of Fair Trade coffee made from NGO outlets (charity shops and mail order) and from churches. In the UK case, in 1994, the FTM established a company, Café Direct, to extend sales into supermarkets. Consequently, through the increased availability of the product, and the use of more conventional media channels, such as newspaper adverts and magazine articles the case for Fair Trade was made to a wider audience. A few years later, Café Direct decided that in order to significantly expand sales, it needed to reposition itself in the market as a premium product since research conducted in 1998 revealed that although buying Fair Trade goods made people feel slightly better about themselves, ultimately they wanted to purchase a good tasting product.11 From a production perspective, promoting quality was entirely complementary with Fair Trade arrangements, because providing a reasonable bean price is a necessity for guaranteeing quality coffee. Bean quality is in part determined by the maturity of the coffee cherry when it is picked and when growers expect a low return for their crop they will harvest a coffee bush only once collecting cherries of varying maturity. If the price is higher, growers can afford to pick just the 22 mature cherries, returning to the bush later in the season for the rest. Café Direct now objectifies its product and promotes it on both its ethical and taste qualities with the slogan ‘Excellent Café, Direct from the growers’. Evolving outside the normal channels of commerce, using an unconventional business model, Fair Trade coffee provides a clear example of a product emerging from a network, co-produced by consumers and enabled by non-human objects. Callon names this process of co-production, the economy of qualities (Callon, Méadel, and Rabeharisoa 2002). Fair Trade products were able to gain a critical mass of support in early stages by operating in networks where there were strong ties between actors holding sympathetic values, while less ethical consumers provided the drive for higher quality. The FTM has used a variety of media to communicate a different narrative on what is appropriate market conduct, and to a degree has begun to change the dynamics of power, by altering social opinion of expected company behaviour.12 The movement has achieved a degree of success in overriding the neo-liberal market argument that any exchange is freely entered into, outcomes are the result of abstract market forces, so responsibility cannot be ascribed to any agent, therefore companies are under no social obligation to consider the circumstances of their suppliers. Instead the FTM have developed a message that challenges the indifference to human consequences of liberalised markets. In particular it confronts the distributional consequences of the free market by arguing that questions of power and responsibility should not be ignored. Callon’ network approach which stresses the role of material devices is appropriate for reflecting on how such novel market arrangements came into 23 being. However, it needs to be deliberated whether Fair Trade arrangements are sustainable over time? Overflowing Fair Trade coffee Fair Trade sales have risen significantly in recent years, but it remains a small market niche. An ambition of the FTM is that this is changed by persuading large coffee companies that dominate final coffee sales to adjust their mode of operation. By producing a product with distinctive moral credentials and developing a customer base, there has been a degree of pressure on large companies to change.13 However, some predict that an expansion of Fair Trade would result in excess unsold coffee, what might be termed an overflowing effect. Lindsey (2004:9) in a report for the Adam Smith Institute argues that ‘Those who single out companies as scapegoats and advocate halfbaked schemes to prop up prices may have the best of intentions, but they are not really helping.’ His reasoning is that if the principle of paying growers a minimum price to cover costs of production was to be extended to the whole coffee market it would exacerbate the problems of oversupply. Such a viewpoint, based in neoliberal economics assumes that decisions are based solely on market price information, and does not take into consideration that other ties within the network might reduce the disparity between levels of production and consumption, for example, an arrangement whereby the price is negotiated for a limited amount of beans. Nonetheless, even where some form of contract is attractive, the extension of Fair Trade pricing conceivably would be too formulaic to suit all players. Negotiating prices to encourage a long term trading partnership is significantly different from having prices determined institutionally by the 24 Fair Trade formula. Furthermore, there is the conceptual problem that if all coffee was bought under Fair Trade arrangements, there would be no world market price to base the Fair Trade price upon. Therefore, the arithmetic of the Fair Trade payment system is not effectively transferable to the whole world coffee market, such a market organization has overflowing effects. However, this is not necessarily a serious concern, given that there is evidence that the actual price is not the most important aspect of Fair Trade. Some Fair Trade producers have indicated that the ability to engage in a long-term business arrangement is more significant than prices.14 Fair Trade can be an opportunity to demonstrate skills, witness the following comment from a coffee grower. ‘We don't want the consumer to try our product because we are poor, because we have problems. The image we want to present to you is that we offer a high quality product and we are a sustainable organization.’ (Blanca Rosa Molina, CECOCAFEN, Nicaragua).15 The building of partnerships is considered to be a less controversial aspect of the Fair Trade supply chain than the Fair Trade pricing system, (Oxford Policy Management and Sustainable Markets Group 2000, Lindsey 2004). Examples of good long term partnerships already exist outside Fair Trade between roasters of speciality coffee and growers. Nonetheless, the FTM has been instrumental in developing the capacity of some growers to respond to consumer requirements for improved bean quality and develop business acumen so they can play a strong role within a partnership. It would seem to be this aspect of Fair Trade that is more likely to be sustained over time. Such an approach, when there is an imbalance of power, is dependent on a respectful relationships and is redolent of the argument made by Sayer (2004) that factors such as the interests, 25 commitments, moral dispositions and characters of participants should be included within a market frame. It follows that Fair Trade as it currently exists, perhaps should be viewed as having an intermediate role, no longer being required once development objectives are met. Indeed Fair Trade itself could be conceived as being a temporary socio-technical device, something that is a means towards achieving fair trading relationships, rather than being an end in itself. Conclusion Opinions have differed between economists and others on whether Fair Trade initiatives can effectively address concerns about inequity within international commodity markets. Callon’s writings on markets are interesting in this regard because he argues that both economics and economic sociology have relevance for understanding how markets operate. He recognises that people live in a constantly evolving network which shapes their values and determines what is produced, and stresses the role of non-human elements within those processes. In particular, he emphasises the significance of sociotechnical devices which translate economic ideas into actual market activity. Thereby Callon emphasises the performative role of economics. However, while arguing that economic concepts have significance in real markets, Callon also proposes that other actors, with their ideas and values, can have a role in shaping markets, and that issues of justice can be addressed. Essentially he perceives economics and its associated tools as providing the necessary equipment for the calculations required for market exchange, but 26 other actors have an opportunity to determine what should be included within a calculation and how values should be established. An object acquires value from network entanglements that give it substance and meaning, but a calculation is required to translate the value into a monetary equivalent for exchange. Callon contributes to our understanding of the processes that establish use value and new markets through his explanation of entanglements and framing, but study of the coffee market identifies that his analysis does not go sufficiently far to develop an explanation for exchange value. In effect, he does not adequately explicate price determination. Though Callon and Muniesa (2005) provide a discussion on algorithmic configurations which enable the process of reaching a price, no attention is given to a fundamental determinant of price, the degree of scarcity. This seems to be the result of a presumption in Callon’s work that typically there is close co-ordination between production and consumption decisions such that supply and demand always match at a price that is comfortable for both of the bargaining parties. Therefore price volatility is not an issue for him. This discussion on prices is important for understanding Fair Trade markets, for it is the variability and overall decline in commodity prices that led to the establishment of Fair Trade initiatives, and reasonably under such natal conditions, the price to be received by producers became a central feature of the Fair Trade market design. Focusing on prices is also central for reflecting on the differences between economists and sociologists, for prices send important signals, but also have distributional consequences. Interestingly, for 27 economists, market instability is synonymous with price instability, but in Callon’s work market instability is anything but price related.16 Neither does he give attention to declining prices. This is somewhat curious particularly given that Polanyi discussed how price instability and decline can be factors that prompt market reorganisation, in his book The Great Transformation (Polanyi 1957), a text Callon refers to (1998a: 2). The cause of Callon’s omission may be that his main aim is to stress the importance of the material within networks. This intent leads him to disregard the conditions where there is actually a deficiency of material conduits to communicate the information which facilitates price stability. Intriguingly though, given his emphasis on non-human actors, there is also a failure to appreciate that the material can be a direct player in determining price levels. Specifically, if there is an increase in supply of a material product, for example coffee beans, the price is likely to fall and the converse when supply is lower than expected, because price acts as a rationing device. Callon does not discuss this. Instead, he accentuates the connections that exist between buyers and sellers which can result in differing prices between differing pairs of actors, for the same commodity at a given point in time (Callon and Muniesa 2005). While this may be so, it is likely that such relationships are sometimes mediated by overall conditions of supply relative to requirements. Adopting a network perspective, we can consider A and B who trade with each other frequently, trying to agree on a price. To some extent they may be bound by a combination of loyalty and self interest to maintain an established trading partnership. However, alternative options are likely to have some influence on the exchange decision to. Although neither actor may have exact information on overall supply conditions, nonetheless they are likely to be aware when other agents in the network, C and D, are 28 having problems selling all their goods. Therefore, B knows that if he disagrees with A’s terms, another seller (C or D) can easily be found, while simultaneously A appreciates that it will be difficult to find alternative buyers. Therefore external conditions are likely to have at least some effect on the price negotiations between A and B, with prices having a tendency to fall when supply increases. The greater the change in supply conditions, the greater will be the strain on implicit contracts. In the longer, through network entanglements, tastes might change but in the shorter run if supply increases, normally the only way that all beans (in the case of coffee) can be sold is for them to be offered at a lesser price so sales are extended to lower income groups and to existing coffee drinkers with declining marginal utility. Sayer (2002:52) in a critique of embeddedness has highlighted insufficient recognition in new economic sociology that ultimately for some there is an economic actuality that ‘the bottom line remains the bottom line’. Human agents do not always have control of prices, and some markets have become ‘systems’, in the sense of operating ‘behind actors’ backs’ (Habermas 1987) and thereby making actors subject to ‘blind’ market forces (Sayer 2002). Economic history provides countless examples of social conventions and long term arrangements that have been altered as a result of changes in relative scarcities. Meanwhile, Callon argues that economics has relevance, but only as a mental construct that actors collectively materialise. Market regularities have merely ‘the obduracy of the real’ (Callon 1998a:47). His position has utopian undertones, in that members of society are considered to have a significant degree of choice and influence in determining how markets operate. 29 The emergence of Fair Trade, appears to support his case, in so far that it was designed by actors who dispensed with typical economic thinking to create a new form of supply chain with an explicit social goal. Callon’s tools also help in gaining an understanding of how the Fair Trade concept was enabled. However, the impetus for the new market arrangements (variable and declining prices) cannot be sufficiently explained by his framework. This is because his theory on price is deficient, and his emphasis on the causes of market change being related to externality effects is historically imprecise. Callon chooses to focus on direct material effects on markets but fails to give attention to material effects that impact indirectly via price changes. Whilst economic discussion that blithely refers to the laws of supply and demand can accredit actors with too little influence over their destiny, there is a danger of naivety in assuming that humanly controlled co-ordination is sufficient to manage prices within acceptable levels. Nonetheless, even though Callon’s work is not illuminating in considering the sustainability of the Fair Trade pricing scheme, there is a confluence between Callon’s view of market arrangements involving close relations between producers and consumers, and the most likely durable aspect of Fair Trade which is enduring partnerships. Callon’s application of the concept of framing is useful for considering how markets might be organized. However, for issues of justice to be addressed effectively, there needs to be a more complete explanation of what is included within the frame, and of the determinants of the rate of exchange. 30 Notes 1 These campaigns are internationally co-ordinated by the Global Call to Action against Poverty. This is a worldwide alliance of a variety of actors including existing coalitions, community groups, trade unions, individuals, religious and faith groups committed to the cause of ending poverty. They focus on several issues of which trade justice is one, and others are debt cancellation Details on http://www.whiteband.org/ 2 Named after a character in a Dutch novel who protested against the poor treatment of coffee plantation workers in Java in the nineteenth century. 3 There is an international accreditation scheme for products that meet the Fair Trade standards. When the standards are met, permission is granted to label the product and describe it as fairtrade (one word). 4 There is a link between low coffee prices and world trade arrangements, in so far as existing trade barriers exacerbate the problems in the coffee and other commodity markets, by reducing diversification options for agricultural producers in the southern hemisphere, there is a link between low coffee prices and world trade arrangements. 5 Actor-network theory now also is referred to as Science and Technology Studies (STS). 6 Callon adopts the expression of disentanglement and its antonym, entanglement from Thomas (1991). 7 In the UK there is currently a debate about the impact of supermarkets on local shops and communities. Competition policy, based on economic principles does not provide any basis for intervention. 8 There can be positive knock-on effects as well, but these are likely to reinforce the current system of market organisation and therefore do not prompt reframing. 9 Repeated exchange is a behaviour pattern that is a familiar assumption within economic game-theoretic models. 10 See for example Oxfam(2002) Mugged: Poverty in your coffee cup and Fairtrade Foundation (2002) Spilling the beans on the coffee trade. 31 11 CaféDirect's Share Prospectus, 2004. 12 Ponte and Gibbon (2005) also draw attention to how the ‘diffusion of dominant normative paradigms’ (p3) can influence the way supply chains are managed. 13 In October 2005 one of the largest coffee companies, Nestle, introduced a Fair Trade coffee into their brand range. They said that their decision had been driven by the consumer. 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