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Chapter 8 Network Security A note on the use of these ppt slides: We’re making these slides freely available to all (faculty, students, readers). They’re in PowerPoint form so you can add, modify, and delete slides (including this one) and slide content to suit your needs. They obviously represent a lot of work on our part. In return for use, we only ask the following: If you use these slides (e.g., in a class) in substantially unaltered form, that you mention their source (after all, we’d like people to use our book!) If you post any slides in substantially unaltered form on a www site, that you note that they are adapted from (or perhaps identical to) our slides, and note our copyright of this material. Thanks and enjoy! JFK/KWR All material copyright 1996-2009 J.F Kurose and K.W. Ross, All Rights Reserved Computer Networking: A Top Down Approach , 5th edition. Jim Kurose, Keith Ross Addison-Wesley, April 2009. Chapter 8 roadmap 8.1 What is network security? 8.2 Principles of cryptography 8.3 Message integrity 8.4 Securing e-mail 8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL 8.6 Network layer security: IPsec 8.7 Securing wireless LANs 8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS Chapter 8: Network Security Chapter goals: understand principles of network security: cryptography and its many uses beyond “confidentiality” authentication message integrity security in practice: firewalls and intrusion detection systems security in application, transport, network, link layers What is network security? Confidentiality: only sender, intended receiver should “understand” message contents sender encrypts message receiver decrypts message Authentication: sender, receiver want to confirm identity of each other Message integrity: sender, receiver want to ensure message not altered (in transit, or afterwards) without detection Access and availability: services must be accessible and available to users Network Security The field of network security is about: how bad guys can attack computer networks how we can defend networks against attacks how to design architectures that are immune to attacks Internet not originally designed with (much) security in mind original vision: “a group of mutually trusting users attached to a transparent network” Internet protocol designers playing “catch-up” Security considerations in all layers! Introduction 1-5 Bad guys can put malware into hosts via Internet Malware can get in host from a virus, worm, or trojan horse. Spyware malware can record keystrokes, web sites visited, upload info to collection site. Infected host can be enrolled in a botnet, used for spam and DDoS attacks. Malware is often self-replicating: from an infected host, seeks entry into other hosts Introduction 1-6 Bad guys can put malware into hosts via Internet Trojan horse Hidden part of some otherwise useful software Today often on a Web page (Active-X, plugin) Virus infection by receiving object (e.g., e-mail attachment), actively executing self-replicating: propagate itself to other hosts, users Worm: infection by passively receiving object that gets itself executed self- replicating: propagates to other hosts, users Sapphire Worm: aggregate scans/sec in first 5 minutes of outbreak (CAIDA, UWisc data) Introduction 1-7 Bad guys can attack servers and network infrastructure Denial of service (DoS): attackers make resources (server, bandwidth) unavailable to legitimate traffic by overwhelming resource with bogus traffic 1. select target 2. break into hosts around the network (see botnet) 3. send packets toward target from compromised hosts target Introduction 1-8 The bad guys can sniff packets Packet sniffing: broadcast media (shared Ethernet, wireless) promiscuous network interface reads/records all packets (e.g., including passwords!) passing by C A src:B dest:A payload B Wireshark software used for end-of-chapter labs is a (free) packet-sniffer Introduction 1-9 The bad guys can use false source addresses IP spoofing: send packet with false source address C A src:B dest:A payload B Introduction 1-10 The bad guys can record and playback record-and-playback: sniff sensitive info (e.g., password), and use later password holder is that user from system point of view C A src:B dest:A user: B; password: foo B Introduction 1-11 Friends and enemies: Alice, Bob, Trudy well-known in network security world Bob, Alice (lovers!) want to communicate “securely” Trudy (intruder) may intercept, delete, add messages Alice channel data secure sender Bob data, control messages secure receiver Trudy data Who might Bob, Alice be? … well, real-life Bobs and Alices! Web browser/server for electronic transactions (e.g., on-line purchases) on-line banking client/server DNS servers routers exchanging routing table updates other examples? Chapter 8 roadmap 8.1 What is network security? 8.2 Principles of cryptography 8.3 Message integrity 8.4 Securing e-mail 8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL 8.6 Network layer security: IPsec 8.7 Securing wireless LANs 8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS The language of cryptography Alice’s K encryption A key plaintext encryption algorithm ciphertext Bob’s K decryption B key decryption plaintext algorithm m plaintext message KA(m) ciphertext, encrypted with key KA m = KB(KA(m)) 15 Simple encryption scheme substitution cipher: substituting one thing for another monoalphabetic cipher: substitute one letter for another plaintext: abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz ciphertext: mnbvcxzasdfghjklpoiuytrewq E.g.: Plaintext: bob. i love you. alice ciphertext: nkn. s gktc wky. mgsbc Key: the mapping from the set of 26 letters to the set of 26 letters 16 Polyalphabetic encryption n monoalphabetic cyphers, M1,M2,…,Mn Cycling pattern: e.g., n=4, M1,M3,M4,M3,M2; M1,M3,M4,M3,M2; For each new plaintext symbol, use subsequent monoalphabetic pattern in cyclic pattern dog: d from M1, o from M3, g from M4 Key: the n ciphers and the cyclic pattern 17 Breaking an encryption scheme Cipher-text only attack: Trudy has ciphertext that she can analyze Two approaches: Search through all keys: must be able to differentiate resulting plaintext from gibberish Statistical analysis Known-plaintext attack: trudy has some plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext eg, in monoalphabetic cipher, trudy determines pairings for a,l,i,c,e,b,o, Chosen-plaintext attack: trudy can get the cyphertext for some chosen plaintext 18 Types of Cryptography Crypto often uses keys: Algorithm is known to everyone Only “keys” are secret Public key cryptography Involves the use of two keys Symmetric key cryptography Involves the use one key Hash functions Involves the use of no keys Nothing secret: How can this be useful? 19 Symmetric key cryptography KS KS plaintext message, m encryption ciphertext algorithm K (m) S decryption plaintext algorithm m = KS(KS(m)) symmetric key crypto: Bob and Alice share same (symmetric) key: K S e.g., key is knowing substitution pattern in mono alphabetic substitution cipher Q: how do Bob and Alice agree on key value? 20 Two types of symmetric ciphers Stream ciphers encrypt one bit at time Block ciphers Break plaintext message in equal-size blocks Encrypt each block as a unit 21 Stream Ciphers pseudo random key keystream generator keystream Combine each bit of keystream with bit of plaintext to get bit of ciphertext m(i) = ith bit of message ks(i) = ith bit of keystream c(i) = ith bit of ciphertext c(i) = ks(i) m(i) ( = exclusive or) m(i) = ks(i) c(i) 22 RC4 Stream Cipher RC4 is a popular stream cipher Extensively analyzed and considered good Key can be from 1 to 256 bytes Used in WEP for 802.11 Can be used in SSL 23 Block ciphers Message to be encrypted is processed in blocks of k bits (e.g., 64-bit blocks). 1-to-1 mapping is used to map k-bit block of plaintext to k-bit block of ciphertext Example with k=3: input output 000 110 001 111 010 101 011 100 input output 100 011 101 010 110 000 111 001 What is the ciphertext for 010110001111 ? 24 Block ciphers How many possible mappings are there for k=3? How many 3-bit inputs? How many permutations of the 3-bit inputs? Answer: 40,320 ; not very many! In general, 2k! mappings; huge for k=64 Problem: Table approach requires table with 264 entries, each entry with 64 bits Table too big: instead use function that simulates a randomly permuted table 25 From Kaufman et al Prototype function 64-bit input 8bits 8bits 8bits 8bits 8bits 8bits 8bits 8bits S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 8 bits 8 bits 8 bits 8 bits 8 bits 8 bits 8 bits 8 bits 64-bit intermediate Loop for n rounds 8-bit to 8-bit mapping 64-bit output 26 Why rounds in prototype? If only a single round, then one bit of input affects at most 8 bits of output. In 2nd round, the 8 affected bits get scattered and inputted into multiple substitution boxes. How many rounds? How many times do you need to shuffle cards Becomes less efficient as n increases 27 Encrypting a large message Why not just break message in 64-bit blocks, encrypt each block separately? If same block of plaintext appears twice, will give same cyphertext. How about: Generate random 64-bit number r(i) for each plaintext block m(i) Calculate c(i) = KS( m(i) r(i) ) Transmit c(i), r(i), i=1,2,… At receiver: m(i) = KS(c(i)) r(i) Problem: inefficient, need to send c(i) and r(i) 28 Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) CBC generates its own random numbers Have encryption of current block depend on result of previous block c(i) = KS( m(i) c(i-1) ) m(i) = KS( c(i)) c(i-1) How do we encrypt first block? Initialization vector (IV): random block = c(0) IV does not have to be secret Change IV for each message (or session) Guarantees that even if the same message is sent repeatedly, the ciphertext will be completely different each time 29 Cipher Block Chaining cipher block: if input block repeated, will produce same cipher text: t=1 … t=17 m(1) = “HTTP/1.1” block cipher c(1) m(17) = “HTTP/1.1” block cipher c(17) cipher block chaining: XOR ith input block, m(i), with previous block of cipher text, c(i-1) c(0) transmitted to receiver in clear what happens in “HTTP/1.1” scenario from above? m(i) c(i-1) + block cipher c(i) = “k329aM02” = “k329aM02” Symmetric key crypto: DES DES: Data Encryption Standard US encryption standard [NIST 1993] 56-bit symmetric key, 64-bit plaintext input Block cipher with cipher block chaining How secure is DES? DES Challenge: 56-bit-key-encrypted phrase decrypted (brute force) in less than a day No known good analytic attack making DES more secure: 3DES: encrypt 3 times with 3 different keys (actually encrypt, decrypt, encrypt) 31 Symmetric key crypto: DES DES operation initial permutation 16 identical “rounds” of function application, each using different 48 bits of key final permutation 32 Time to break a code (106 decryptions/µs) Triple DES Uses three keys and three executions of the DES algorithm (encrypt-decryptencrypt) • • • • C = ciphertext C = EK3[DK2[EK1[P]]] P = Plaintext EK[X] = encryption of X using key K DK[Y] = decryption of Y using key K Effective key length of 168 bits Triple DES AES: Advanced Encryption Standard new (Nov. 2001) symmetric-key NIST standard, replacing DES processes data in 128 bit blocks 128, 192, or 256 bit keys brute force decryption (try each key) taking 1 sec on DES, takes 149 trillion years for AES Origins clear a replacement for DES was needed have theoretical attacks that can break it have demonstrated exhaustive key search attacks can use Triple-DES – but slow with small blocks US NIST issued call for ciphers in 1997 15 candidates accepted in Jun 98 5 were short-listed in Aug-99 Rijndael was selected as the AES in Oct2000 issued as FIPS PUB 197 standard in Nov- AES Requirements private key symmetric block cipher 128-bit data, 128/192/256-bit keys stronger & faster than Triple-DES active life of 20-30 years (+ archival use) provide full specification & design details both C & Java implementations NIST have released all submissions & unclassified analyses AES Evaluation Criteria initial criteria: security – effort to practically cryptanalyse cost – computational algorithm & implementation characteristics final criteria general security software & hardware implementation ease implementation attacks flexibility (in en/decrypt, keying, other factors) The AES Cipher - Rijndael designed by Rijmen-Daemen in Belgium has 128/192/256 bit keys, 128 bit data an iterative rather than feistel cipher treats data in 4 groups of 4 bytes operates an entire block in every round designed to be: resistant against known attacks speed and code compactness on many CPUs design simplicity AES Decryption AES decryption is not identical to encryption since steps done in reverse but can define an equivalent inverse cipher with steps as for encryption but using inverses of each step with a different key schedule works since result is unchanged when swap byte substitution & shift rows swap mix columns & add (tweaked) round key Other Symmetric Block Ciphers International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) 128-bit key Used in PGP Blowfish Easy to implement High execution speed Runs in less than 5K of memory Other Symmetric Block Ciphers RC5 Suitable for hardware and software Fast, simple Adaptable to processors of different word lengths Variable number of rounds Variable-length key Low memory requirement High security Data-dependent rotations Cast-128 Key size from 40 to 128 bits The round function differs from round to round Public Key Cryptography symmetric key crypto requires sender, receiver know shared secret key Q: how to agree on key in first place (particularly if never “met”)? public key cryptography radically different approach [DiffieHellman76, RSA78] sender, receiver do not share secret key public encryption key known to all private decryption key known only to receiver 44 Public key cryptography + Bob’s public B key K K plaintext message, m encryption ciphertext algorithm + K (m) B - Bob’s private B key decryption plaintext algorithm message + m = K B(K (m)) B 45 Public key encryption algorithms Requirements: 1 2 + need K ( ) and K - ( ) such that B B - + K (K (m)) = m B B . . + given public key KB , it should be impossible to compute private key KB RSA: Rivest, Shamir, Adelson algorithm 46 Prerequisite: modular arithmetic x mod n = remainder of x when divide by n Facts: [(a mod n) + (b mod n)] mod n = (a+b) mod n [(a mod n) - (b mod n)] mod n = (a-b) mod n [(a mod n) * (b mod n)] mod n = (a*b) mod n Thus (a mod n)d mod n = ad mod n Example: x=14, n=10, d=2: (x mod n)d mod n = 42 mod 10 = 6 xd = 142 = 196 xd mod 10 = 6 47 RSA: getting ready A message is a bit pattern. A bit pattern can be uniquely represented by an integer number. Thus encrypting a message is equivalent to encrypting a number. Example m= 10010001 . This message is uniquely represented by the decimal number 145. To encrypt m, we encrypt the corresponding number, which gives a new number (the cyphertext). 48 RSA: Creating public/private key pair 1. Choose two large prime numbers p, q. (e.g., 1024 bits each) 2. Compute n = pq, z = (p-1)(q-1) 3. Choose e (with e<n) that has no common factors with z. (e, z are “relatively prime”). 4. Choose d such that ed-1 is exactly divisible by z. (in other words: ed mod z = 1 ). 5. Public key is (n,e). Private key is (n,d). + KB - KB 49 RSA: Encryption, decryption 0. Given (n,e) and (n,d) as computed above 1. To encrypt message m (<n), compute c = m e mod n 2. To decrypt received bit pattern, c, compute m = c d mod n Magic d m = (m e mod n) mod n happens! c 50 RSA example: Bob chooses p=5, q=7. Then n=35, z=24. e=5 (so e, z relatively prime). d=29 (so ed-1 exactly divisible by z). Encrypting 8-bit messages. encrypt: decrypt: bit pattern m me 00001100 12 248832 c 17 d c 481968572106750915091411825223071697 c = me mod n 17 m = cd mod n 12 51 Why does RSA work? Must show that cd mod n = m where c = me mod n Fact: for any x and y: xy mod n = x(y mod z) mod n where n= pq and z = (p-1)(q-1) Thus, cd mod n = (me mod n)d mod n = med mod n = m(ed mod z) mod n = m1 mod n =m 52 RSA: another important property The following property will be very useful later: - + B B K (K (m)) + = m = K (K (m)) B B use public key first, followed by private key use private key first, followed by public key Result is the same! 53 Why - + B B K (K (m)) + = m = K (K (m)) B B ? Follows directly from modular arithmetic: (me mod n)d mod n = med mod n = mde mod n = (md mod n)e mod n 54 Why is RSA Secure? Suppose you know Bob’s public key (n,e). How hard is it to determine d? Essentially need to find factors of n without knowing the two factors p and q. Fact: factoring a big number is hard. Generating RSA keys Have to find big primes p and q Approach: make good guess then apply testing rules (see Kaufman) 55 Session keys Exponentiation is computationally intensive DES is at least 100 times faster than RSA Session key, KS Bob and Alice use RSA to exchange a symmetric key KS Once both have KS, they use symmetric key cryptography 56 Chapter 8 roadmap 8.1 What is network security? 8.2 Principles of cryptography 8.3 Message integrity 8.4 Securing e-mail 8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL 8.6 Network layer security: IPsec 8.7 Securing wireless LANs 8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS Message Integrity Allows communicating parties to verify that received messages are authentic. Content of message has not been altered Source of message is who/what you think it is Message has not been replayed Sequence of messages is maintained Let’s first talk about message digests 58 Message Digests Function H( ) that takes as input an arbitrary length message and outputs a fixed-length string: “message signature” Note that H( ) is a manyto-1 function H( ) is often called a “hash function” large message m H: Hash Function H(m) Desirable properties: Easy to calculate Irreversibility: Can’t determine m from H(m) Collision resistance: Computationally difficult to produce m and m’ such that H(m) = H(m’) Seemingly random output 59 Internet checksum: poor message digest Internet checksum has some properties of hash function: produces fixed length digest (16-bit sum) of input is many-to-one But given message with given hash value, it is easy to find another message with same hash value. Example: Simplified checksum: add 4-byte chunks at a time: message I O U 1 0 0 . 9 9 B O B ASCII format 49 4F 55 31 30 30 2E 39 39 42 D2 42 B2 C1 D2 AC message I O U 9 0 0 . 1 9 B O B ASCII format 49 4F 55 39 30 30 2E 31 39 42 D2 42 B2 C1 D2 AC different messages but identical checksums! 60 Hash Function Algorithms MD5 hash function widely used (RFC 1321) computes 128-bit message digest in 4-step process. SHA-1 is also used. US standard [NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1] 160-bit message digest 61 Message Authentication Code (MAC) s = shared secret message s message message s H( ) H( ) compare Authenticates sender Verifies message integrity No encryption ! Also called “keyed hash” Notation: MDm = H(s||m) ; send m||MDm 62 HMAC Popular MAC standard Addresses some subtle security flaws Concatenates secret to front of message. 2. Hashes concatenated message 3. Concatenates the secret to front of digest 4. Hashes the combination again. 1. 63 Example: OSPF Recall that OSPF is an intra-AS routing protocol Each router creates map of entire AS (or area) and runs shortest path algorithm over map. Router receives linkstate advertisements (LSAs) from all other routers in AS. Attacks: Message insertion Message deletion Message modification How do we know if an OSPF message is authentic? 64 OSPF Authentication Within an Autonomous System, routers send OSPF messages to each other. OSPF provides authentication choices No authentication Shared password: inserted in clear in 64bit authentication field in OSPF packet Cryptographic hash Cryptographic hash with MD5 64-bit authentication field includes 32-bit sequence number MD5 is run over a concatenation of the OSPF packet and shared secret key MD5 hash then appended to OSPF packet; encapsulated in IP datagram 65 End-point authentication Want to be sure of the originator of the message – end-point authentication. Assuming Alice and Bob have a shared secret, will MAC provide end-point authentication. We do know that Alice created the message. But did she send it? 66 Playback attack MAC = f(msg,s) Transfer $1M from Bill to Trudy MAC Transfer $1M from MAC Bill to Trudy Defending against playback attack: nonce “I am Alice” R MAC = f(msg,s,R) Transfer $1M from Bill to Susan MAC Digital Signatures Cryptographic technique analogous to handwritten signatures. sender (Bob) digitally signs document, establishing he is document owner/creator. Goal is similar to that of a MAC, except now use public-key cryptography verifiable, nonforgeable: recipient (Alice) can prove to someone that Bob, and no one else (including Alice), must have signed document 69 Digital Signatures Simple digital signature for message m: Bob signs m by encrypting with his private key - KB, creating “signed” message, KB(m) Bob’s message, m Dear Alice Oh, how I have missed you. I think of you all the time! …(blah blah blah) Bob K B Bob’s private key Public key encryption algorithm - K B(m) Bob’s message, m, signed (encrypted) with his private key 70 Digital signature = signed message digest Alice verifies signature and integrity of digitally signed message: Bob sends digitally signed message: large message m H: Hash function Bob’s private key + - KB encrypted msg digest H(m) digital signature (encrypt) encrypted msg digest KB(H(m)) large message m H: Hash function KB(H(m)) Bob’s public key + KB digital signature (decrypt) H(m) H(m) equal ? 71 Digital Signatures (more) - Suppose Alice receives msg m, digital signature KB(m) Alice verifies m signed by Bob by applying Bob’s + - + - public key KB to KB(m) then checks KB(KB(m) ) = m. + - If KB(KB(m) ) = m, whoever signed m must have used Bob’s private key. Alice thus verifies that: Bob signed m. No one else signed m. Bob signed m and not m’. Non-repudiation: Alice can take m, and signature KB(m) to court and prove that Bob signed m. 72 Public-key certification Motivation: Trudy plays pizza prank on Bob Trudy creates e-mail order: Dear Pizza Store, Please deliver to me four pepperoni pizzas. Thank you, Bob Trudy signs order with her private key Trudy sends order to Pizza Store Trudy sends to Pizza Store her public key, but says it’s Bob’s public key. Pizza Store verifies signature; then delivers four pizzas to Bob. Bob doesn’t even like Pepperoni 73 Certification Authorities Certification authority (CA): binds public key to particular entity, E. E (person, router) registers its public key with CA. E provides “proof of identity” to CA. CA creates certificate binding E to its public key. certificate containing E’s public key digitally signed by CA – CA says “this is E’s public key” Bob’s public key Bob’s identifying information + KB digital signature (encrypt) CA private key K- CA + KB certificate for Bob’s public key, signed by CA 74 Certification Authorities When Alice wants Bob’s public key: gets Bob’s certificate (Bob or elsewhere). apply CA’s public key to Bob’s certificate, get Bob’s public key + KB digital signature (decrypt) CA public key Bob’s public + key KB + K CA 75 Certificates: summary Primary standard X.509 (RFC 2459) Certificate contains: Issuer name Entity name, address, domain name, etc. Entity’s public key Digital signature (signed with issuer’s private key) Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) Certificates and certification authorities Often considered “heavy” 76 Chapter 8 roadmap 8.1 What is network security? 8.2 Principles of cryptography 8.3 Message integrity 8.4 Securing e-mail 8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL 8.6 Network layer security: IPsec 8.7 Securing wireless LANs 8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS Secure e-mail Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m, to Bob. KS m KS K ( .) S + . K B( ) K+ B KS(m ) KS(m ) + + KB(KS ) Internet . K S( ) - KS + K B( ) KB(KS ) Alice: generates random symmetric private key, KS. encrypts message with KS (for efficiency) also encrypts KS with Bob’s public key. sends both KS(m) and KB(KS) to Bob. - KB- . m Secure e-mail Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m, to Bob. KS m KS K ( .) S + . K B( ) K+ B KS(m ) KS(m ) + + KB(KS ) Internet . K S( ) - KS + K B( ) KB(KS ) Bob: uses his private key to decrypt and recover KS uses KS to decrypt KS(m) to recover m - KB- . m Secure e-mail (continued) • Alice wants to provide sender authentication message integrity. m H(.) KA- - . + m - - KA(H(m)) KA(H(m)) KA( ) + KA Internet - + . KA( ) H(m ) compare m . H( ) • Alice digitally signs message. • sends both message (in the clear) and digital signature. H(m ) Secure e-mail (continued) • Alice wants to provide secrecy, sender authentication, message integrity. KAK A(H(m)) KS m KA( ) H( ) . . + . K S( ) m KS + . K B( ) K+ B + Internet + KB(KS ) Alice uses three keys: her private key, Bob’s public key, newly created symmetric key Pretty good privacy (PGP) Internet e-mail encryption scheme, de-facto standard. uses symmetric key cryptography, public key cryptography, hash function, and digital signature as described. provides secrecy, sender authentication, integrity. A PGP signed message: ---BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-Hash: SHA1 Bob:My husband is out of town tonight.Passionately yours, Alice ---BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE--Version: PGP 5.0 Charset: noconv yhHJRHhGJGhgg/12EpJ+lo8gE4vB3 mqJhFEvZP9t6n7G6m5Gw2 ---END PGP SIGNATURE--- 82 Pretty Good Privacy Philip R. Zimmerman, the creator of PGP, was target of 3-year federal investigation PGP provides a confidentiality and authentication service that can be used for electronic mail and file storage applications. 83 Why Is PGP Popular? It is availiable free on a variety of platforms. Based on well known algorithms. Wide range of applicability Not developed or controlled by governmental or standards organizations 84 Operational Description Consist of five services: Authentication Confidentiality Compression E-mail compatibility Segmentation 85 86 Compression PGP compresses the message after applying the signature but before encryption The placement of the compression algorithm is critical. The compression algorithm used is ZIP 87 E-mail Compatibility The scheme used is radix-64 conversion The use of radix-64 expands the message by 33%. 88 Segmentation and Reassembly Often restricted to a maximum message length of 50,000 octets. Longer messages must be broken up into segments. PGP automatically subdivides a message that is too large. The receiver strip of all e-mail headers and reassemble the block. 89 Summary of PGP Services Function Algorithm Used Digital Signature DSS/SHA or RSA/SHA Message CAST or IDEA or Encryption three-key triple DES with Diffie-Hellman or RSA Compression ZIP E-mail Radix-64 conversion Compatibility Segmentation - 90 91 Format of PGP Message 92 Chapter 8 roadmap 8.1 What is network security? 8.2 Principles of cryptography 8.3 Message integrity 8.4 Securing e-mail 8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL 8.6 Network layer security: IPsec 8.7 Securing wireless LANs 8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS SSL: Secure Sockets Layer Widely deployed security protocol Supported by almost all browsers and web servers https Tens of billions $ spent per year over SSL Originally designed by Netscape in 1993 Number of variations: TLS: transport layer security, RFC 2246 Provides Confidentiality Integrity Authentication Original goals: Had Web e-commerce transactions in mind Encryption (especially credit-card numbers) Web-server authentication Optional client authentication Minimum hassle in doing business with new merchant Available to all TCP applications Secure socket interface 94 SSL and TCP/IP Application TCP Application SSL TCP IP IP Normal Application Application with SSL • SSL provides application programming interface (API) to applications • C and Java SSL libraries/classes readily available 95 Could do something like PGP: - KA m . H( ) - . KA( ) - KA(H(m)) + KS . KS( ) + m KS + . K B( ) + Internet + KB(KS ) KB • But want to send byte streams & interactive data •Want a set of secret keys for the entire connection • Want certificate exchange part of protocol: handshake phase 96 Toy SSL: a simple secure channel Handshake: Alice and Bob use their certificates and private keys to authenticate each other and exchange shared secret Key Derivation: Alice and Bob use shared secret to derive set of keys Data Transfer: Data to be transferred is broken up into a series of records Connection Closure: Special messages to securely close connection 97 Toy: A simple handshake MS = master secret EMS = encrypted master secret 98 Toy: Key derivation Considered bad to use same key for more than one cryptographic operation Use different keys for message authentication code (MAC) and encryption Four keys: Kc = encryption key for data sent from client to server Mc = MAC key for data sent from client to server Ks = encryption key for data sent from server to client Ms = MAC key for data sent from server to client Keys derived from key derivation function (KDF) Takes master secret and (possibly) some additional random data and creates the keys 99 Toy: Data Records Why not encrypt data in constant stream as we write it to TCP? Where would we put the MAC? If at end, no message integrity until all data processed. For example, with instant messaging, how can we do integrity check over all bytes sent before displaying? Instead, break stream in series of records Each record carries a MAC Receiver can act on each record as it arrives Issue: in record, receiver needs to distinguish MAC from data Want to use variable-length records length data MAC 100 Toy: Sequence Numbers Attacker can capture and replay record or re-order records Solution: put sequence number into MAC: MAC = MAC(Mx, sequence||data) Note: no sequence number field Attacker could still replay all of the records Use random nonce 101 Toy: Control information Truncation attack: attacker forges TCP connection close segment One or both sides thinks there is less data than there actually is. Solution: record types, with one type for closure type 0 for data; type 1 for closure MAC = MAC(Mx, sequence||type||data) length type data MAC 102 Toy SSL: summary encrypted bob.com 103 Toy SSL isn’t complete How long are the fields? What encryption protocols? No negotiation Allow client and server to support different encryption algorithms Allow client and server to choose together specific algorithm before data transfer 104 Most common symmetric ciphers in SSL DES – Data Encryption Standard: block 3DES – Triple strength: block RC2 – Rivest Cipher 2: block RC4 – Rivest Cipher 4: stream Public key encryption RSA 105 SSL Cipher Suite Cipher Suite Public-key algorithm Symmetric encryption algorithm MAC algorithm SSL supports a variety of cipher suites Negotiation: client and server must agree on cipher suite Client offers choice; server picks one 106 Real SSL: Handshake (1) Purpose 1. Server authentication 2. Negotiation: agree on crypto algorithms 3. Establish keys 4. Client authentication (optional) 107 Real SSL: Handshake (2) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Client sends list of algorithms it supports, along with client nonce Server chooses algorithms from list; sends back: choice + certificate + server nonce Client verifies certificate, extracts server’s public key, generates pre_master_secret, encrypts with server’s public key, sends to server Client and server independently compute encryption and MAC keys from pre_master_secret and nonces Client sends a MAC of all the handshake messages Server sends a MAC of all the handshake messages 108 Real SSL: Handshaking (3) Last 2 steps protect handshake from tampering Client typically offers range of algorithms, some strong, some weak Man-in-the middle could delete the stronger algorithms from list Last 2 steps prevent this Last two messages are encrypted 109 Real SSL: Handshaking (4) Why the two random nonces? Suppose Trudy sniffs all messages between Alice & Bob. Next day, Trudy sets up TCP connection with Bob, sends the exact same sequence of records,. Bob (Amazon) thinks Alice made two separate orders for the same thing. Solution: Bob sends different random nonce for each connection. This causes encryption keys to be different on the two days. Trudy’s messages will fail Bob’s integrity check. 110 SSL Record Protocol data data fragment record header data fragment MAC encrypted data and MAC record header MAC encrypted data and MAC record header: content type; version; length MAC: includes sequence number, MAC key Mx Fragment: each SSL fragment 214 bytes (~16 Kbytes) 111 SSL Record Format 1 byte content type 2 bytes 3 bytes SSL version length data MAC Data and MAC encrypted (symmetric algo) 112 Real Connection Everything henceforth is encrypted TCP Fin follow 113 Key derivation Client nonce, server nonce, and pre-master secret input into pseudo random-number generator. Produces master secret Master secret and new nonces inputed into another random-number generator: “key block” Because of resumption: TBD Key block sliced and diced: client MAC key server MAC key client encryption key server encryption key client initialization vector (IV) server initialization vector (IV) 114 Chapter 8 roadmap 8.1 What is network security? 8.2 Principles of cryptography 8.3 Message integrity 8.4 Securing e-mail 8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL 8.6 Network layer security: IPsec 8.7 Securing wireless LANs 8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS What is confidentiality at the network-layer? Between two network entities: Sending entity encrypts the payloads of datagrams. Payload could be: TCP segment, UDP segment, ICMP message, OSPF message, and so on. All data sent from one entity to the other would be hidden: Web pages, e-mail, P2P file transfers, TCP SYN packets, and so on. That is, “blanket coverage”. 116 Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) Institutions often want private networks for security. Costly! Separate routers, links, DNS infrastructure. With a VPN, institution’s inter-office traffic is sent over public Internet instead. But inter-office traffic is encrypted before entering public Internet 117 Virtual Private Network (VPN) Public Internet IP header IPsec header Secure payload laptop w/ IPsec salesperson in hotel Router w/ IPv4 and IPsec headquarters Router w/ IPv4 and IPsec branch office 118 IPsec services Data integrity Origin authentication Replay attack prevention Confidentiality Two protocols providing different service models: AH ESP 119 IPsec Transport Mode IPsec IPsec IPsec datagram emitted and received by end-system. Protects upper level protocols 120 IPsec – tunneling mode (1) IPsec IPsec End routers are IPsec aware. Hosts need not be. 121 IPsec – tunneling mode (2) IPsec IPsec Also tunneling mode. 122 Two protocols Authentication Header (AH) protocol provides source authentication & data integrity but not confidentiality Encapsulation Security Protocol (ESP) provides source authentication,data integrity, and confidentiality more widely used than AH 123 Four combinations are possible! Host mode with AH Host mode with ESP Tunnel mode with AH Tunnel mode with ESP Most common and most important 124 Security associations (SAs) Before sending data, a virtual connection is established from sending entity to receiving entity. Called “security association (SA)” SAs are simplex: for only one direction Both sending and receiving entites maintain state information about the SA Recall that TCP endpoints also maintain state information. IP is connectionless; IPsec is connection-oriented! How many SAs in VPN w/ headquarters, branch office, and n traveling salesperson? 125 Example SA from R1 to R2 Internet Headquarters Branch Office 200.168.1.100 R1 172.16.1/24 SA 193.68.2.23 R2 172.16.2/24 R1 stores for SA 32-bit identifier for SA: Security Parameter Index (SPI) the origin interface of the SA (200.168.1.100) destination interface of the SA (193.68.2.23) type of encryption to be used (for example, 3DES with CBC) encryption key type of integrity check (for example, HMAC with with MD5) authentication key 126 Security Association Database (SAD) Endpoint holds state of its SAs in a SAD, where it can locate them during processing. With n salespersons, 2 + 2n SAs in R1’s SAD When sending IPsec datagram, R1 accesses SAD to determine how to process datagram. When IPsec datagram arrives to R2, R2 examines SPI in IPsec datagram, indexes SAD with SPI, and processes datagram accordingly. 127 IPsec datagram Focus for now on tunnel mode with ESP “enchilada” authenticated encrypted new IP header ESP hdr SPI original IP hdr Seq # Original IP datagram payload padding ESP trl ESP auth pad next length header 128 What happens? Internet Headquarters Branch Office 200.168.1.100 SA 193.68.2.23 R1 R2 172.16.1/24 172.16.2/24 “enchilada” authenticated encrypted new IP header ESP hdr SPI original IP hdr Seq # Original IP datagram payload padding ESP trl ESP auth pad next length header 129 R1 converts original datagram into IPsec datagram Appends to back of original datagram (which includes original header fields!) an “ESP trailer” field. Encrypts result using algorithm & key specified by SA. Appends to front of this encrypted quantity the “ESP header, creating “enchilada”. Creates authentication MAC over the whole enchilada, using algorithm and key specified in SA; Appends MAC to back of enchilada, forming payload; Creates brand new IP header, with all the classic IPv4 header fields, which it appends before payload. 130 Inside the enchilada: “enchilada” authenticated encrypted new IP header ESP hdr SPI original IP hdr Seq # Original IP datagram payload padding ESP trl ESP auth pad next length header ESP trailer: Padding for block ciphers ESP header: SPI, so receiving entity knows what to do Sequence number, to thwart replay attacks MAC in ESP auth field is created with shared secret key 131 IPsec sequence numbers For new SA, sender initializes seq. # to 0 Each time datagram is sent on SA: Sender increments seq # counter Places value in seq # field Goal: Prevent attacker from sniffing and replaying a packet • Receipt of duplicate, authenticated IP packets may disrupt service Method: Destination checks for duplicates But doesn’t keep track of ALL received packets; instead uses a window 132 Security Policy Database (SPD) Policy: For a given datagram, sending entity needs to know if it should use IPsec. Needs also to know which SA to use May use: source and destination IP address; protocol number. Info in SPD indicates “what” to do with arriving datagram; Info in the SAD indicates “how” to do it. 133 Summary: IPsec services Suppose Trudy sits somewhere between R1 and R2. She doesn’t know the keys. Will Trudy be able to see contents of original datagram? How about source, dest IP address, transport protocol, application port? Flip bits without detection? Masquerade as R1 using R1’s IP address? Replay a datagram? 134 Internet Key Exchange In previous examples, we manually established IPsec SAs in IPsec endpoints: Example SA SPI: 12345 Source IP: 200.168.1.100 Dest IP: 193.68.2.23 Protocol: ESP Encryption algorithm: 3DES-cbc HMAC algorithm: MD5 Encryption key: 0x7aeaca… HMAC key:0xc0291f… Such manually keying is impractical for large VPN with, say, hundreds of sales people. Instead use IPsec IKE (Internet Key Exchange) 135 IKE: PSK and PKI Authentication (proof who you are) with either pre-shared secret (PSK) or with PKI (pubic/private keys and certificates). With PSK, both sides start with secret: then run IKE to authenticate each other and to generate IPsec SAs (one in each direction), including encryption and authentication keys With PKI, both sides start with public/private key pair and certificate. run IKE to authenticate each other and obtain IPsec SAs (one in each direction). Similar with handshake in SSL. 136 IKE Phases IKE has two phases Phase 1: Establish bi-directional IKE SA • Note: IKE SA different from IPsec SA • Also called ISAKMP security association Phase 2: ISAKMP is used to securely negotiate the IPsec pair of SAs Phase 1 has two modes: aggressive mode and main mode Aggressive mode uses fewer messages Main mode provides identity protection and is more flexible 137 Summary of IPsec IKE message exchange for algorithms, secret keys, SPI numbers Either the AH or the ESP protocol (or both) The AH protocol provides integrity and source authentication The ESP protocol (with AH) additionally provides encryption IPsec peers can be two end systems, two routers/firewalls, or a router/firewall and an end system 138 Chapter 8 roadmap 8.1 What is network security? 8.2 Principles of cryptography 8.3 Message integrity 8.4 Securing e-mail 8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL 8.6 Network layer security: IPsec 8.7 Securing wireless LANs 8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS WEP Design Goals Symmetric key crypto Confidentiality Station authorization Data integrity Self synchronizing: each packet separately encrypted Given encrypted packet and key, can decrypt; can continue to decrypt packets when preceding packet was lost Unlike Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) in block ciphers Efficient Can be implemented in hardware or software 140 Review: Symmetric Stream Ciphers key keystream generator keystream Combine each byte of keystream with byte of plaintext to get ciphertext m(i) = ith unit of message ks(i) = ith unit of keystream c(i) = ith unit of ciphertext c(i) = ks(i) m(i) ( = exclusive or) m(i) = ks(i) c(i) WEP uses RC4 141 Stream cipher and packet independence Recall design goal: each packet separately encrypted If for frame n+1, use keystream from where we left off for frame n, then each frame is not separately encrypted Need to know where we left off for packet n WEP approach: initialize keystream with key + new IV for each packet: Key+IVpacket keystream generator keystreampacket 142 WEP encryption (1) Sender calculates Integrity Check Value (ICV) over data four-byte hash/CRC for data integrity Each side has 104-bit shared key Sender creates 24-bit initialization vector (IV), appends to key: gives 128-bit key Sender also appends keyID (in 8-bit field) 128-bit key inputted into pseudo random number generator to get keystream data in frame + ICV is encrypted with RC4: Bytes of keystream are XORed with bytes of data & ICV IV & keyID are appended to encrypted data to create payload Payload inserted into 802.11 frame encrypted IV Key data ID MAC payload ICV 143 WEP encryption (2) IV (per frame) KS: 104-bit secret symmetric key plaintext frame data plus CRC key sequence generator ( for given KS, IV) k1IV k2IV k3IV … kNIV kN+1IV… kN+1IV d1 d2 d3 … dN CRC1 … CRC4 c1 c2 c3 … cN cN+1 … cN+4 802.11 header IV & WEP-encrypted data plus ICV Figure WEP protocol New7.8-new1: IV for802.11 each frame 144 WEP decryption overview encrypted IV Key data ID ICV MAC payload Receiver extracts IV Inputs IV and shared secret key into pseudo random generator, gets keystream XORs keystream with encrypted data to decrypt data + ICV Verifies integrity of data with ICV Note that message integrity approach used here is different from the MAC (message authentication code) and signatures (using PKI). 145 End-point authentication w/ nonce Nonce: number (R) used only once –in-a-lifetime How: to prove Alice “live”, Bob sends Alice nonce, R. Alice must return R, encrypted with shared secret key “I am Alice” R KA-B(R) Alice is live, and only Alice knows key to encrypt nonce, so it must be Alice! 146 WEP Authentication Not all APs do it, even if WEP is being used. AP indicates if authentication is necessary in beacon frame. Done before association. authentication request AP nonce (128 bytes) nonce encrypted shared key success if decrypted value equals nonce 147 Breaking 802.11 WEP encryption security hole: 24-bit IV, one IV per frame, -> IV’s eventually reused IV transmitted in plaintext -> IV reuse detected attack: Trudy causes Alice to encrypt known plaintext d1 d2 d3 d4 … IV Trudy sees: ci = di XOR ki Trudy knows ci di, so can compute kiIV IV IV IV Trudy knows encrypting key sequence k1 k2 k3 … Next time IV is used, Trudy can decrypt! 802.11i: improved security numerous (stronger) forms of encryption possible provides key distribution uses authentication server separate from access point 802.11i: four phases of operation STA: client station AP: access point AS: Authentication server wired network 1 Discovery of security capabilities STA2and AS mutually authenticate, together generate Master Key (MK). AP servers as “pass through” 3STA derives Pairwise Master Key (PMK) STA, 4 AP use PMK to derive Temporal Key (TK) used for message encryption, integrity 3 AS derives same PMK, sends to AP EAP: extensible authentication protocol EAP: end-end client (mobile) to authentication server protocol EAP sent over separate “links” mobile-to-AP (EAP over LAN) AP to authentication server (RADIUS over UDP) wired network EAP TLS EAP EAP over LAN (EAPoL) IEEE 802.11 RADIUS UDP/IP Chapter 8 roadmap 8.1 What is network security? 8.2 Principles of cryptography 8.3 Message integrity 8.4 Securing e-mail 8.5 Securing TCP connections: SSL 8.6 Network layer security: IPsec 8.7 Securing wireless LANs 8.8 Operational security: firewalls and IDS Firewalls firewall isolates organization’s internal net from larger Internet, allowing some packets to pass, blocking others. public Internet administered network firewall Firewalls: Why prevent denial of service attacks: SYN flooding: attacker establishes many bogus TCP connections, no resources left for “real” connections prevent illegal modification/access of internal data. e.g., attacker replaces CIA’s homepage with something else allow only authorized access to inside network (set of authenticated users/hosts) three types of firewalls: stateless packet filters stateful packet filters application gateways Stateless packet filtering Should arriving packet be allowed in? Departing packet let out? internal network connected to Internet via router firewall router filters packet-by-packet, decision to forward/drop packet based on: source IP address, destination IP address TCP/UDP source and destination port numbers ICMP message type TCP SYN and ACK bits Stateless packet filtering: example example 1: block incoming and outgoing datagrams with IP protocol field = 17 and with either source or dest port = 23. all incoming, outgoing UDP flows and telnet connections are blocked. example 2: Block inbound TCP segments with ACK=0. prevents external clients from making TCP connections with internal clients, but allows internal clients to connect to outside. Stateless packet filtering: more examples Policy Firewall Setting No outside Web access. Drop all outgoing packets to any IP address, port 80 No incoming TCP connections, except those for institution’s public Web server only. Drop all incoming TCP SYN packets to any IP except 130.207.244.203, port 80 Prevent Web-radios from eating up the available bandwidth. Drop all incoming UDP packets - except DNS and router broadcasts. Prevent your network from being used for a smurf DoS attack. Drop all ICMP packets going to a “broadcast” address (eg 130.207.255.255). Prevent your network from being tracerouted Drop all outgoing ICMP TTL expired traffic Access Control Lists ACL: table of rules, applied top to bottom to incoming packets: (action, condition) pairs action source address dest address protocol source port dest port allow 222.22/16 outside of 222.22/16 TCP > 1023 80 allow outside of 222.22/16 TCP 80 > 1023 ACK allow 222.22/16 UDP > 1023 53 --- allow outside of 222.22/16 222.22/16 UDP 53 > 1023 ---- deny all all all all all all 222.22/16 outside of 222.22/16 flag bit any Stateful packet filtering stateless packet filter: heavy handed tool admits packets that “make no sense,” e.g., dest port = 80, ACK bit set, even though no TCP connection established: action allow source address dest address outside of 222.22/16 222.22/16 protocol source port dest port flag bit TCP 80 > 1023 ACK stateful packet filter: track status of every TCP connection track connection setup (SYN), teardown (FIN): can determine whether incoming, outgoing packets “makes sense” timeout inactive connections at firewall: no longer admit packets Stateful packet filtering ACL augmented to indicate need to check connection state table before admitting packet action source address dest address proto source port dest port allow 222.22/16 outside of 222.22/16 TCP > 1023 80 allow outside of 222.22/16 TCP 80 > 1023 ACK allow 222.22/16 UDP > 1023 53 --- allow outside of 222.22/16 222.22/16 deny all all 222.22/16 outside of 222.22/16 flag bit check conxion any UDP 53 > 1023 ---- all all all all x x Application gateways filters packets on application data as well as on IP/TCP/UDP fields. example: allow select internal users to telnet outside. host-to-gateway telnet session application gateway gateway-to-remote host telnet session router and filter 1. require all telnet users to telnet through gateway. 2. for authorized users, gateway sets up telnet connection to dest host. Gateway relays data between 2 connections 3. router filter blocks all telnet connections not originating from gateway. Limitations of firewalls and gateways IP spoofing: router can’t know if data “really” comes from claimed source if multiple app’s. need special treatment, each has own app. gateway. client software must know how to contact gateway. e.g., must set IP address of proxy in Web browser filters often use all or nothing policy for UDP. tradeoff: degree of communication with outside world, level of security many highly protected sites still suffer from attacks. Types of Firewalls Bastion Host A system identified by the firewall administrator as a critical strong point in the network’s security The bastion host serves as a platform for an application-level gateway 163 Firewall Configurations In addition to the use of simple configuration of a single system (single packet filtering router or single gateway), more complex configurations are possible Three common configurations 164 Firewall Configurations Screened host firewall system (single- homed bastion host) 165 Firewall Configurations Screened host firewall, single-homed bastion configuration Firewall consists of two systems: A packet-filtering router A bastion host 166 Firewall Configurations Configuration for the packet-filtering router: Only packets from and to the bastion host are allowed to pass through the router The bastion host performs authentication and proxy functions 167 Firewall Configurations Greater security than single configurations because of two reasons: This configuration implements both packetlevel and application-level filtering (allowing for flexibility in defining security policy) An intruder must generally penetrate two separate systems 168 Firewall Configurations This configuration also affords flexibility in providing direct Internet access (public information server, e.g. Web server) 169 Firewall Configurations Screened host firewall system (dual-homed bastion host) 170 Firewall Configurations Screened host firewall, dual-homed bastion configuration The packet-filtering router is not completely compromised Traffic between the Internet and other hosts on the private network has to flow through the bastion host 171 Firewall Configurations Screened-subnet firewall system 172 Firewall Configurations Screened subnet firewall configuration Most secure configuration of the three Two packet-filtering routers are used Creation of an isolated sub-network 173 Firewall Configurations Advantages: Three levels of defense to thwart intruders The outside router advertises only the existence of the screened subnet to the Internet (internal network is invisible to the Internet) 174 Firewall Configurations Advantages: The inside router advertises only the existence of the screened subnet to the internal network (the systems on the inside network cannot construct direct routes to the Internet) 175 Intrusion detection systems packet filtering: operates on TCP/IP headers only no correlation check among sessions IDS: intrusion detection system deep packet inspection: look at packet contents (e.g., check character strings in packet against database of known virus, attack strings) examine correlation among multiple packets • port scanning • network mapping • DoS attack Intrusion detection systems multiple IDSs: different types of checking at different locations application gateway firewall Internet internal network IDS sensors Web server FTP server DNS server demilitarized zone The Stages of a Network Intrusion 1. Scan the network to: • locate which IP addresses are in use, • what operating system is in use, • what TCP or UDP ports are “open” (being listened to by Servers). 2. Run “Exploit” scripts against open ports 3. Get access to Shell program which is “suid” (has “root” privileges). 4. Download from Hacker Web site special versions of systems files that will let Cracker have free access in the future without his cpu time or disk storage space being noticed by auditing programs. 5. Use IRC (Internet Relay Chat) to invite friends to the feast. 178 17 Intrusion Techniques aim to increase privileges on system basic attack methodology target acquisition and information gathering initial access privilege escalation covering tracks key goal often is to acquire passwords so then exercise access rights of owner 179 Password Guessing one of the most common attacks attacker knows a login (from email/web page etc) then attempts to guess password for it try default passwords shipped with systems try all short passwords then try by searching dictionaries of common words intelligent searches try passwords associated with the user (variations on names, birthday, phone, common words/interests) before exhaustively searching all possible passwords check by login attempt or against stolen password file success depends on password chosen by user surveys show many users choose poorly 180 Password Capture another attack involves password capture watching over shoulder as password is entered using a trojan horse program to collect monitoring an insecure network login (eg. telnet, FTP, web, email) extracting recorded info after successful login (web history/cache, last number dialed etc) using valid login/password can impersonate user users need to be educated to use suitable precautions/countermeasures 181 Intrusion Detection inevitably will have security failures so need also to detect intrusions so can block if detected quickly act as deterrent collect info to improve security assume intruder will behave differently to a legitimate user but will have imperfect distinction between 182 Intrusion Detection The intruder can be identified and ejected from the system. An effective intrusion detection can prevent intrusions. Intrusion detection enables the collection of information about intrusion techniques that can be used to strengthen the intrusion prevention facility. 183 Profiles of Behavior of Intruders and Authorized Users 184 Measures used for Intrusion Detection Login frequency by day and time. Frequency of login at different locations. Time since last login. Password failures at login. Execution frequency. Execution denials. Read, write, create, delete frequency. Failure count for read, write, create and delete. 185 Audit records Fundamental tool for intrusion detection - record of ongoing activity used as input to an intrusion detection system, Two kinds : - native audit records used normally by an accounting software and collecting information on user activity - have to be filtered and may not be complete; - detection specific audit records containing only information required by the the intrusion detection system - have to be especially generated. 186 Audit Record Analysis foundation of statistical approaches analyze records to get metrics over time counter, gauge, interval timer, resource use use various tests on these to determine if current behavior is acceptable mean & standard deviation, multivariate, markov process, time series, operational key advantage is no prior knowledge used 187 Statistical Anomaly Detection threshold detection count occurrences of specific event over time if exceed reasonable value assume intrusion alone is a crude & ineffective detector profile based characterize past behavior of users detect significant deviations from this profile usually multi-parameter, e.g. counter, gauge, interval timer, resource utilization Different tests can performed, e.g. mean and standard deviation, multivariate, Markov process 188 Base-Rate Fallacy practically an intrusion detection system needs to detect a substantial percentage of intrusions with few false alarms if too few intrusions detected -> false security if too many false alarms -> ignore / waste time this is very hard to do existing systems seem not to have a good record 189 Template driven logic analysis Notable events – failed file accesses, accessing system files, changing file access control; Signatures – known attack patterns; Noteworthy sessions - anomalous behavior with respect to the number of programs executed, number of files accessed 190 Honeypots decoy systems to lure attackers away from accessing critical systems to collect information of their activities to encourage attacker to stay on system so administrator can respond are filled with fabricated information instrumented to collect detailed information on attackers activities may be single or multiple networked systems 191 Malicious Software What is the concept of defense: The parrying of a blow. What is its characteristic feature: Awaiting the blow. —On War, Carl Von Clausewitz Viruses and Other Malicious Content computer viruses have got a lot of publicity one of a family of malicious software effects usually obvious have figured in news reports, fiction, movies (often exaggerated) getting more attention than deserve are a concern though Malicious Software Trapdoors secret entry point into a program allows those who know access bypassing usual security procedures have been commonly used by developers a threat when left in production programs allowing exploited by attackers very hard to block in O/S requires good s/w development & update Logic Bomb one of oldest types of malicious software code embedded in legitimate program activated when specified conditions met eg presence/absence of some file particular date/time particular user when triggered typically damage system modify/delete files/disks Trojan Horse program with hidden side-effects which is usually superficially attractive eg game, s/w upgrade etc when run performs some additional tasks allows attacker to indirectly gain access they do not have directly often used to propagate a virus/worm or install a backdoor or simply to destroy data Zombie program which secretly takes over another networked computer then uses it to indirectly launch attacks often used to launch distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks exploits known flaws in network systems Viruses a piece of self-replicating code attached to some other code cf biological virus both propagates itself & carries a payload carries code to make copies of itself as well as code to perform some covert task Virus Operation virus phases: dormant – waiting on trigger event propagation – replicating to programs/disks triggering – by event to execute payload execution – of payload details usually machine/OS specific exploiting features/weaknesses Virus Structure program V := {goto main; 1234567; subroutine infect-executable := {loop: file := get-random-executable-file; if (first-line-of-file = 1234567) then goto loop else prepend V to file; } subroutine do-damage := {whatever damage is to be done} subroutine trigger-pulled := {return true if some condition holds} main: main-program := {infect-executable; if trigger-pulled then dodamage; goto next;} next: } A Compression Virus Types of Viruses can classify on basis of how they attack parasitic virus memory-resident virus boot sector virus stealth polymorphic virus macro virus Macro Virus macro code attached to some data file interpreted by program using file eg Word/Excel macros esp. using auto command & command macros code is now platform independent is a major source of new viral infections blurs distinction between data and program files making task of detection much harder classic trade-off: "ease of use" vs "security" Email Virus spread using email with attachment containing a macro virus cf Melissa triggered when user opens attachment or worse even when mail viewed by using scripting features in mail agent usually targeted at Microsoft Outlook mail agent & Word/Excel documents Worms replicating but not infecting program typically spreads over a network cf Morris Internet Worm in 1988 led to creation of CERTs using users distributed privileges or by exploiting system vulnerabilities widely used by hackers to create zombie PC's, subsequently used for further attacks, esp DoS major issue is lack of security of permanently connected systems, esp PC's Virus Countermeasures viral attacks exploit lack of integrity control on systems to defend need to add such controls typically by one or more of: prevention - block virus infection mechanism detection - of viruses in infected system reaction - restoring system to clean state Virus Protection Have a well-known virus protection program, configured to scan disks and downloads automatically for known viruses. Do not execute programs (or "macro's") from unknown sources (e.g., PS files, Hypercard files, MS Office documents, Avoid the most common operating systems and email programs, if possible. Anti-Virus Software first-generation scanner uses virus signature to identify virus or change in length of programs second-generation uses heuristic rules to spot viral infection or uses program checksums to spot changes third-generation memory-resident programs identify virus by actions fourth-generation packages with a variety of antivirus techniques eg scanning & activity traps, access-controls Advanced Anti-Virus Techniques generic decryption use CPU simulator to check program signature & behavior before actually running it digital immune system (IBM) general purpose emulation & virus detection any virus entering organization is captured, analyzed, detection/shielding created for it, removed Advanced Antivirus Techniques Behavior-Blocking Software integrated with host O/S monitors program behavior in real-time eg file access, disk format, executable mods, system settings changes, network access for possibly malicious actions if detected can block, terminate, or seek ok has advantage over scanners but malicious code runs before detection Summary have considered: various malicious programs trapdoor, logic bomb, trojan horse, zombie viruses worms countermeasures