Survey
* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
* Your assessment is very important for improving the workof artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
Sociology 3301: Sociology of Religion Lecture 7: Becoming and Being Religious 1: Religious Socialization Over Time It has been argued by Zuckerman (2003) that, at its root, people become religious through a social learning or socialization process. The argument was that if someone – anyone - was born and raised in a devout Muslim culture, and another a devout Christian enclave in the American South, they would in all likelihood be either Muslim and Christian respectively. From this, he asserted that religious identity and conviction aren’t generally so much a matter of choice, faith, or soul searching as a matter of who and what one’s parents, friends, neighbors, and community practice and profess. Religion is, on this view, an accident of birth. Not everyone would entirely agree with this view, and many can think of exceptions. For that reason, today we begin looking at the process of being and becoming religious. Yes, Zuckerman may be right in many cases: people are socialized into their religious identities and orientations, beliefs and practices (or lack thereof) by those close to them. Nevertheless, we must be careful to avoid an oversocialized conception of human beings that leaves no room for individual interpretation of, or deviance from, social norms. As we will see, the transmission of religion from a community to its residents, from parents to children, and even from a religious group to its members is not perfect. Religiosity also changes over the course of an individual’s life, and this may be magnified or diminished by broader changes taking place in a person’s sociocultural environment. Some even argue that it is the individual’s lived religion, in all of its uniqueness, which ultimately matters. Though this may lead us to an equally problematic undersocialized conception of humans, it is nonetheless an important position to consider. Religious Socialization and the Intergenerational Transmission of Religion: Socialization is the process whereby individuals are taught the beliefs, values, and norms (i.e. the culture) of their community and society. Religious socialization, in turn, is how religion is reproduced and transmitted from one generation to the next. The same processes by which people are socialized into culture generally can be seen more specifically in religious socialization. For most of human history and in most parts of the world, people become religious by inheriting their beliefs and practices from their ancestors. In early societies, religion is inherited from the clan. It serves as an extended family unit, and there is little difference seen between one’s society and one’s family. In such societies, religious beliefs are passed from generation to generation through stories, folktales, ballads, and chants which were told and enacted in a ritual context. Children learned the beliefs and practices through this informal form of socialization, and no distinction can be made between general and religious socialization. The transmission of religion takes place more or less mechanically. 1 As societies grow in size and complexity, such as during the industrial revolution in the West, the nuclear family emerged as the core. Under such conditions, religious socialization becomes more distinct and primarily the job of parents, together with other social organizations like congregations, youth programs and schools. Religious socialization occurs through these agents in societies where religion has been institutionally separated from an earlier, integrated culture that carries religious meaning and practices everywhere. While informal socialization continues, the intergenerational transmission of religion outside the home becomes more formalized (e.g. in Sunday schools and the like, instruction is often supervised by professionally trained clergy and educators). In turn, religious primary and secondary schools grow as parents seek to reinforce their religious teachings – especially as public schools grow more secular. Thus, those studying religious socialization focus on the major agents of socialization in modern society: parents and the family, congregations, and religious education, peers and schools. All socialize by providing models for children to observe and imitate, by providing positive reinforcement for the desired and negative reinforcement for unwanted religious beliefs and behaviors. Social Learning Theory: Social learning theory suggests that parents are the primary models for and agents of religious socialization, and most research shows that family religiousness is the most powerful predictor of adult religiousness. This is particularly true of mothers, though grandparents can also play a role. If parents have a strong religious identity and engage in religious education and practice at home, children will be more likely to develop and maintain the religious practices to which they were exposed. This is a powerful process, yet it is not inevitable. Indeed, several variable characteristics of parenting and family life have been shown to affect outcomes: (1) quality of relationships; (2) unity of tradition; and (3) stability of family structure. With regard to quality, religious socialization is stronger in families characterized by considerable warmth and closeness – where parents enjoy marital happiness and show affection towards their children. Having parents that are supportive and accepting rather than judgmental also plays a part. In such cases, children are likely more receptive to their parents’ beliefs and preferences – religion included. Turning to unity, higher levels of marital conflict are found in marriages between people of different religious backgrounds. This disrupts the religion/family linkage and thereby weakens the socialization of children into a faith. When there is unity religious practice is more open and the couple is more likely to want to pass this on. Families with religious unity give more reinforcing religious cues to kids. Conversely, parents from different backgrounds send mixed messages. Indeed, intermarriage may lead kids to withdraw from religious commitments altogether instead of choosing one parent’s faith over another. Thus, parents are more likely to transmit religious affiliation and their faith perspective to their children when they have common religious commitments. 2 Family stability, finally, is important. Intact families are more likely to practice religious rituals, attend services, and affiliate with a religious tradition. This translates into stronger religious socialization of children and a greater likelihood that children will continue with religious practice as adults than seen among single-parent households and step-families. This is in part because single parents are less involved in faith communities and divorced fathers are less involved in religious socialization. Of course, the roles played by family unity and stability in religious socialization have significant implications for the future. With the rise in religious intermarriage in recent decades due to globalization, reduction in stigmas surrounding intermarriage, increased rates of marital dissolution in the last century, and the breakdown of the traditional family structure in favor of a diverse array of alternatives, the future intergenerational transmission of religion may be adversely affected. Channeling Through Peers and Schools: Parents may also have more indirect influence on their children’s subsequent religiousness by channeling them into groups, settings, and experiences (such as friendships and schools) that reinforce their religious socialization efforts in the home. As many of us know, from childhood to later adolescence friends have an increasing influence on kids’ lives. This includes their religious beliefs and practices. Longitudinal studies confirm that youth religiosity is significantly predicted by peers’ religiosity. When peers’ attendance is low, youth attendance is low – and vice versa. Another extrafamilial agent of socialization over which families have some discretion is schools. Some parents like to send their kids to religious schools that align with family religious teachings, while others go so far as to home school their kids. While the effect of such practices is not as strong as that of parents and peers, the fact is that the more one’s schoolmates attend services, the more one is likely to attend. However, it is not merely being in a religious school that matters, but the level of religiosity within the school. This is just a cursory overview of the many factors that go into childhood religious education, but it gives the flavor of the major processes involved. Religion Over the Life Course: Religiosity does not proceed in a straight line over the course of life for most people, either upward or downward or straight across. Sociologists recognize this and thus have sought to identify systematic patterns of variation in religiosity over the life course. As modern society has become more pluralistic, differentiated, even fragmented, it has become harder to find these patterns. Still, I will try to bring some order out of all this and consider how religion evolves and changes as people age and experience major events in their life course. 3 Since we have discussed childhood above, we begin with adolescence. Several longitudinal data sets in this area tell a similar (and hardly surprising) story: adolescence is a major period of instability. Often that instability manifests itself in religious decline (e.g. dropping off of religious attendance). Yet, there are some caveats to this. First, most adolescents only change their levels of religious attendance slightly (e.g. from weekly to bi-weekly). Second, very few (7%) went from regular attendance to non-attendance. Third, 15% reported increased levels of attendance. What this adds up to is that, despite an overall trend, the religious story of adolescence is not simply one of uniform decline. It is more a period of religious polarization. When looked at more closely, compared to those whose religiosity drops off, those whose increased during adolescence tended to come from highly religious families and from conservative Protestant traditions, suggesting the continuing importance of religious socialization in later years of childhood. Turning to emerging adulthood, it is the case that in every society adolescents make a transition into adulthood. In some traditional cultures this involves elaborate, maybe even dangerous rites of passage conducted in the context of religious celebrations. Even in the West, adult baptism, confirmation, and bar/bat mitzvah’s may dimly echo these, but cannot really be seen as corresponding transitions into adulthood in the secular world. For most Western youth today, the passage to adulthood is far from clear. Half as century ago, the age of 18 was quite significant as you graduated from high school, entered college or work, could vote, drink, and (for men) could be drafted. As well, the average age of marriage and childbearing was much lower, so 18-22 effectively represented a sort of divide or transition to self-sufficient adulthood. Not any more. Today young people stay financially connected to their parents, delay marriage (or have ‘starter marriages’), and postpone childbearing, if they have any. Those who leave home for college and return have been called boomerang kids. Now even college graduation doesn’t often separate things. Arnett (2004) calls this grey area, the years between 18-29 today “emerging adulthood.” Some, less generally, have called it “adultescence.” Not surprisingly, this period is characterized by considerable instability, compounded by the labor market, cost of living, and the process of leaving home. The effect of all this on religion is clear: emerging adults are the least religious adults. On measures of service attendance, prayer, and religious importance, emerging adults consistently register lower levels of religiosity than others. They also tend to be less involved in and committed to a wider variety of other, nonreligious social and institutional connections, associations, and activities (e.g. volunteer groups). Indeed, it doesn’t matter if they attend college or not. It is their lack of stability in work and personal relationships that is the hallmark of emerging adulthood as a developmental stage. Mature adulthood is characterized for most people by two of the most significant life course events: marriage and childbearing. Both family formation events are related to higher levels of religious practice, while, conversely, divorce and cohabitation generally 4 reduce religious activity. However, there are important qualifications that must be made, The exact timing of such events mediates their influence on religious behaviors (e.g. people who have kids in mature adulthood boost their religious participation while those who do so earlier do not). Also, mature adulthood is often fraught with responsibilities and stresses that can negatively affect religious involvement. For those who buy into “competitive parenting,” Sunday may not mean church so much as a day to run their kids around to numerous activities. Stress at work, concern for aging parents, saving for retirement, and the like may take one’s mind off religion, while, in contrast, personal illnesses or tragedies may do the opposite. The point is that there are a variety of countervailing influences at work during this stage of life that affect religious involvement. In later life, studies consistently show that religion increases in importance and involvement (e.g. attendance, prayer, ratings of religion as “very important,” etc.) One explanation for this rise in religiosity in later life is that participation provides a system of social, emotional, and spiritual support. As people age they lose social ties and their role in society changes. They retire and lose friends. The social ties of religious congregations help to fill this void. Many religious communities also still believe in the concept of respecting one’s elders as opposed to the prevalent ageism in the secular world. Older adults are also encouraged to perform volunteer work through religious organizations, providing social ties and an opportunity to participate in important productive activities. There is even evidence that such involvement may have health benefits for older adults. Krause (2001) suggests that people in active social networks have better mental and physical health. People with stronger support systems like found in religious organizations also live longer (Hummer et.al, 1999). Indeed, ultimately, religious ties are uniquely suited to relieving the fear and uncertainty of death. Age, Cohort, and Generational Effects on Religion: Beyond focusing on different age groups and current religious fluctuations between them, it is important that we do not consider that the effects of aging on religiosity are constant over time. For example, it is unlikely that someone experiencing adolescence in the Great Depression will experience religiosity over the life course in the same way as someone coming of age in the 1960’s. Living through a specific period of history combines with the “age effect” to represent a “period effect.” Together, these produce what sociologists call a “cohort effect, that of being a certain age at a certain period of time. Cohort analysis reminds us that cultural context shapes the expectations of agerelated behavior. Indeed, the “emerging adulthood” discussed above may be more properly seen as a cohort phenomenon as it did not exist 50 years ago (and might not in the future). This highlights the importance of looking at cohorts (or several, making up a “generation”), but also illustrates the difficulty of separating age and cohort effects in any particular analysis. 5 A good example of how age and cohort/generation can independently affect religious participation is Dillon’s (2007) analysis of longitudinal data collected over a 60 year time span. This included 2 cohorts born 8 years apart (1921 and 1929). The older group were children of the Great Depression, often served in the military in WWII, and experienced the social upheavals of the 1960’s when in their 50’s. The younger cohort did not experience the deprivation of the Depression so much, were too young to serve in WWII, and were almost to middle age by the ‘60’s. These differences were not so much in cohort as in generation. Dillon’s study showed that religiousness did not follow a linear trend across the life course so much as a U-curve. Religiousness was high in adolescence and later life and generally lower in middle adulthood. That this pattern was the same for both generations suggests that age effects might be at work more than cohort effects. However, the timing of the post-adolescence decrease differed between the generations: the younger group declined in their 30’s while the older did during their late 40’s. This suggests a cohort or generational explanation: the older group remained more committed to social institutions, including religion, for a longer period of time. Using more contemporary data, generational analysis in the sociology of religion has grown more popular in the past few decades as the baby boomers have worked their way through the life course, spawning the “millenials” and “echo” generations. The key to a generational analysis of religion is to understand how the period influences fundamentally shape the outlook of people who live through them at key developmental moments (e.g. adolescence). That unique outlook then shapes the specific way the generation understands and practices religion. Wade Clark Roof (1993; 1999) argues, for example, that the particular generational experiences of baby boomers led them to fundamentally reorient themselves to religion by adopting the posture of spiritual seekers. Having come of age in the 1960’s-1970’s, being fully exposed to the cultural ferment of the time as well as the authority damaging revelations of the Vietnam war and Watergate, boomers feel authorized to choose their own religious paths, emphasize the experiential aspect over the doctrinal, and tend to be skeptical of traditional religious organizations. They are, in a word, “spiritual not religious.” This brings us back to cohorts. Cohort replacement – the replacement of older cohorts (through death) by younger cohorts – is a fundamental engine of social change. Roof’s argument that boomers are remaking American religion reflects this idea: that their seeker orientation, passed on to their kids, will gradually replace older cohorts more oriented toward traditional religious practices. Yet, for this to occur, boomers need to effectively socialize their kids into their spiritually seeking orientation. Have they done this? No comprehensive study of generation Y (“echo boomers”) yet exists. Yet some scholars have highlighted the spiritual quest of the post boomers. Flory and Miller (2008) argue that this generation also has formative experiences specific to their time and place which influences their orientation to religion. They inherit an ethos of questioning institutional authority and 6 focusing on a personal journey. This has been reinforced by unethical and hypocritical actions of some major institutions (e.g. corporate crime, poor handling of pedophilia in the church). Beyond this, generation Y has been affected by the increasing pluralism of the world exhibited in both their neighborhoods and new media, leading to an attitude of relative tolerance and acceptance of difference. How do these cultural influences and generational responses affect the practice of religion? Flory and Miller argue that post boomers approach religious institutions with some suspicion and so focus on the quality of relationships therein more than on the institution itself. They also emphasize experience and embodiment in their religious practices. Though in the spiritual marketplace, they are not content simply to browse and consume, but want a hand in the production of the religious goods to be consumed (“expressive communalism”). According to Wade Clark Roof (2009), generational patterns like these not only have significance in terms of individual level beliefs and practices, but also in the implications for the religious organizations that have to adapt to these generational shifts. Faced with children of baby boomers who have no strong attachment to particular religious institutions, but who, as “digital natives” (who have never lived in a world without such technology) are strongly attached to their mobile devices, religious organizations must respond. They are currently scrambling to figure out ways to harness the power of new media in order to connect with this new generation. Successful congregations need to recognize the ways the cultural winds are blowing and find ways of putting up sails to harness the power of these winds rather than fighting or ignoring them. 7