Download Hissa_Essa...d_1_

History Essay Sofia Langenskiöld 23-11-08
Analyse the part played by Cuba in the development of the Cold
War
I will evaluate the part played by Cuba in the development of the Cold
War from 1959 as then the deterioration of Cuban – US relations were
crucial, to the withdraw of the Soviets in November 1962. I chose this
time span because the events just before 1962 also contributed to the
crisis; the Cuban Missile Crisis was one of the most dangerous moments
of the Cold War and a turning point in its history.
Cuba has had a long history of economic and political entanglement with
the United States dating back to the 1890’s and in January 1959
revolutionary forces took control over Havana. Shortly afterwards Castro
arrived in Havana and the US government officially recognized the new
Cuban government, in the lead was Fidel Castro.
In February 1960, the Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan
arrived to Havana. The visit resulted in a trade agreement in which the
Soviet Union purchased 5 million tons of sugar over a five-year period.
The Soviets also supplied Cuba with crude oil, petroleum products, wheat,
iron, fertilizers and machinery. Mikoyan’s visit was the turning point in
transforming the Cuban revolution into a Cold War conflict. The merging
of these two countries gave the Cuban revolution its peculiar
destablishing influence upon the Cold War.
President Eisenhower approved a covert action plan against Cuba that
included the use of a "powerful propaganda campaign" designed to
overthrow Castro. The plan included; the termination of sugar purchases,
the end of oil deliveries, continuation of the arms embargo in effect since
mid-1958 and the organization of a paramilitary force of Cuban exiles to
invade the island.
In May 1960 Cuba and the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations
and supplied weapons and gave advice to Cuba.
Partisan pressure, business pressure, diplomats’ anti – communist or
pro – Batista views and Eisenhower’s reluctance to compromise with left
left – leaning nationalists combined to drive Cuban policy away from
conciliation during 1960. This situation culminated in the CIA operation to
land anti – Castro Cubans on the island as the start of a counter revolution. Kennedy inherited this plan and changed but dared not stop
it, having made much of Cuba in his campaign. The US – backed invasion
in April 1961 went disastrously wrong. The fear of communism and the
historic animosity between some Cuban nationalists and the US was
renewed as Cuba sought to regulate, nationalize or limit US interest and
power there. Fidel Castro also sought Soviet backing as relations with
Eisenhower administration deteriorated. This increased US fears that
Cuba might become a part of the Soviet bloc increased tension between
the United States and Soviet Union.
Outside the Caribbean, the ongoing deadlock over Berlin and the poor
relations between the leaders highlighted the continuing Soviet – US
tensions.
As the newly established Cuban Revolution drifted towards a MarxistLeninist political system in the early months of the new decade, relations
with the US grew cold and stale, and came to an abrupt end in early 1961,
in January 1961 the US officially broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba.
In May 1961 Khruschev was pondering upon Castro’s request for
substantial conventional military aid, he hit upon the idea of deploying
strategic weapons. It would bring home to the US what it meant to face
missiles within a few hundred miles of their territory and alter the global
‘correlation of forces’ in his favour, perhaps giving him the chance to
force the Americans out of Berlin.
Castro’s reluctance to accept this idea was overcome by appealing to the
solidarity and interests of the communist movement.
By early summer 1962, NSA analysts concluded that the Cubans were
putting together an air defense system copied from the Soviet model.
Equipment, training, and procedures were the same. In fact, by early fall
NSA was listening to Russian ground controllers speaking in heavily
accented Spanish to Cuban pilots.
Confronted with American concerns about this military buildup, several
Soviet spokesmen, including the foreign minister, assured the U.S.
government that the military equipment sent to Cuba was for defense
only. Offensive weapons would not be introduced.
After obtaining Fidel Castro's approval, the Soviet Union worked quickly
and secretly to build missile installations in Cuba.
On October 16, President John Kennedy was shown reconnaissance
photographs of Soviet missile installations under construction in Cuba.
During the week, President Kennedy and his civilian and military
assistants canvassed the alternative courses open to the United States.
Seven days of guarded and intense debate in the United States
administration followed, during which Soviet diplomats denied that
installations for offensive missiles were being built in Cuba.
As the crisis progressed, and the ExCom considered a wide variety of
diplomatic and military options, the need for information on Cuba and
the Soviet Union increased.
President Kennedy, in a televised address on October 22, announced the
discovery of the installations and proclaimed that any nuclear missile
attack from Cuba would be regarded as an attack by the Soviet Union and
would be responded to accordingly. He also imposed a naval quarantine
on Cuba to prevent further Soviet shipments of offensive military
weapons from arriving there. These measures included a strict quarantine
on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba, increased
close surveillance of Cuba, reinforcement of the American base at
Guantanamo, and various diplomatic measures, including the
endorsement of the quarantine by the Organization of American States.
When this endorsement was given on October 23, the President issued
Proclamation 3504 establishing the quarantine effective on October 24
and directed the Secretary of Defense to take appropriate measures.
During the crisis, the two sides exchanged many letters and other
communications, both formal and "back channel." Khrushchev sent
letters to Kennedy on October 23 and 24 indicating the deterrent nature
of the missiles in Cuba and the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union.
On October 26, Khrushchev sent Kennedy a long rambling letter
seemingly proposing that the missile installations would be dismantled
and personnel removed in exchange for United States assurances that it
or its proxies would not invade Cuba. But neither Castro nor the soviet
soldiers were aware of the messages Khrushcev sent to Kennedy of
settling the crisis, this could’ve and lead to misunderstandings from the
Cubans to attack the US, and a U2 plane was shot down.
The break in the crisis came on Sunday, October 28, when the Soviet
Government finally agreed to dismantle its offensive weapons in Cuba
and return them to the Soviet Union subject to United Nations
verification. Khrushchev expressed his trust that the United States would
not invade Cuba.
At one level the missile crisis developed as a Soviet – American
confrontation in which the Cubans played relatively little part in. Yet
whilst Cuba was excluded from the high diplomacy of the Cuban missile
crisis, Castro remained influential in Cuba itself.