Download Moral Foundations Theory: Building Value Through Moral Pluralism

Moral Foundations Theory: Building Value Through Moral Pluralism
[to appear in Handbook of Virtue Ethics in Business and Management by Springer, forthcoming]
Spassena (Sena) Koleva1, Ph.D., Erica Beall2, M.A., Jesse Graham2, Ph.D.
1
California State University, Los Angeles; 2 University of Southern California
Abstract
Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) is a novel psychological framework that advances a pluralist
view of morality, expanding it beyond commonly-discussed themes of preventing harms and
injustices to individuals. According to MFT societies construct moral virtues, norms, and
meanings based upon multiple psychological systems (moral foundations): Care/harm,
Fairness/cheating, Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, and Purity/degradation. MFT thus
identifies moral concerns which govern how we treat other individuals, as well as how we
operate within groups. Insights and concepts from MFT, particularly its attention to group-level
moral concerns and virtues, have a range of potential applications in business, from increased
understanding of clients and employees, to improving organizational culture and leadership, to
value-based marketing.
Key words: psychology, moral foundations theory, intuition, value fit, value-based marketing
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Introduction
Moral judgments and observations are a simple fact of everyday life. Whenever a
situation strikes us as morally relevant, we quickly and automatically cast a judgment of “that’s
good” or “that’s bad” upon the actions of our friends, our neighbors, people we’ve never met,
and even ourselves. There are a number of scholarly approaches to conceptualizing morality and
virtue, such as virtue ethics in philosophy, moral reasoning in developmental psychology, and
social intuitionism in social psychology. In this chapter we briefly discuss the limitations of
virtue ethics from a psychological perspective, present a pluralistic psychological theory of
moral judgment and virtue, and offer two applications of this theory to the business world:
fostering organizational value fit and value-based marketing. Integral to the study of virtue ethics
is the question of how to effect a practical application of its theories in human affairs. By
bridging empirical findings in psychology with philosophical theorizing in virtue ethics we hope
to enrich both areas, while simultaneously bringing them out of the Ivory Tower and applying
them to practical questions in business.
The Limitations of Virtue Ethics
What exactly do we mean when we identify someone as a “decent person” or write them
off as “no good”? In the philosophical tradition of virtue ethics, such judgments are made in
reference to virtues and vices – traits like courage, honesty, fidelity, industriousness, or cruelty,
duplicity, gluttony, and so on – that are assumed to guide an individual’s behavior in a
consistent way across various situations and circumstances. This, however, leaves open the
crucial question: what defines virtue? Aristotle, considered by many to be the founder of virtue
ethics, offered as a basic definition the idea that a virtue is a “state of character” – not simply
knowledge about virtuous actions, or skills that might promote them, but a consistent underlying
tendency to behave in the right ways. He also held that such dispositions do not come about
naturally, but require both practice and habituation (Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. 2). As the theory
goes, virtues are essentially properties of persons themselves – cultivated “states of character”
that give the individual a stable and consistent propensity for a certain kind of virtuous action.
Research in social psychology over the last century has stoked heated debate over the
legitimacy of a virtue ethics framework, particularly as a descriptive account of ethicallyrelevant human behavior (e.g, Harman, 1999; Sabini & Silver, 2005). A virtue ethics perspective
predicts (and normatively demands) that virtuous individuals will exhibit consistent, habitually
"good" behavior, regardless of circumstances (Aristotle, Doris, 2009). Empirical results suggest,
however, that individual tendencies to behave “ethically” or “unethically” are not necessarily
guided inflexibly by properties of the persons themselves. In particular, the infamous Milgram
obedience experiments provide evidence for the underlying potential in all of us, given the right
(or wrong) circumstances, to behave in ways that we ourselves would otherwise deem atrocious
(Milgram, 1963). Even when it comes to acts of virtue, the classic Good Samaritan study
suggests that it is not so much the generous people who engage in acts of generosity, but those
for whom generosity constitutes the smoothest course of action (Darley & Batson, 1973). Again,
the execution of virtuous behavior seems to be guided not only by a “state of character”
belonging to the individual, but also by the situation in which that individual is placed. The
question of how contextual factors affect moral behavior continues to fascinate researchers in
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this area. Importantly, what is considered a feature of “the context” has been viewed broadly,
ranging from parts of the world (e.g., East vs. West) to properties of the physical environment
(e.g. cleanliness, lighting) to words or pictures flashed subliminally during a previous task.
If individual behaviors are not necessarily, or even primarily, rooted in “states of
character” (or what psychologists call “personality”), then perhaps it is necessary to look beyond
the idea of character to answer our original question regarding what, exactly, people are reacting
to when they engage in moral judgments of others’ or their own behavior. For example, work on
moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Smith, Aquino, Koleva, & Graham, in press) views moral
behavior as a function not so much of specific virtues, but as a reflection of the general mental
accessibility of moral constructs, and a person’s tendency to view moral traits as central to
his/her core sense of self. Similarly, Rai & Fiske (2011) have proposed a model in which moral
judgment is a function not of the moral actors’ personalities but of the relationship between
them, wherein the same act (e.g., refusing to help) can be viewed as morally acceptable when
occurring between strangers, but as morally suspect when occurring between friends or family
members.
Moral Foundations Theory
Moral Foundations Theory (MFT; Graham et al., 2013) is a recent approach with broad
and growing application across disciplines; it is also the focus of the current chapter. At its core
is the idea that, instead of organized around notions of individuals’ virtues and vices, moral
judgments are guided primarily by intuitive responses to the moral value of actions themselves,
and the general principles that those actions affirm or violate. This framework suggests that,
insofar as they pertain to moral judgments, morally-relevant behavior must be approached not as
habituated propensities, but as characteristics whose moral valence is in the eyes (or as we will
see, “in the guts”) of the beholder.
MFT aims to describe and explain why individuals and groups differ in what they see as
moral right and wrong. The theory rests on four key premises about human morality. The first
premise is nativism, according to which moral concerns are at least partially innate. This is not to
say that morality is “hardwired” or “built-in,” but simply that the moral mind has a “first draft,”
i.e. that moral concerns and judgments are organized “in advance of experience”. However, the
second key premise is that this “first draft” of the moral mind gets heavily edited by experience
and environment, such as by one’s upbringing into a specific culture. For example, people in all
cultures develop moral concerns about fairness very early in life, but in some cultures these
concerns are encoded in norms about standing in line (Japan), while in others this is not the case
(China). In short, morality is both innate and highly dependent on environmental influences.
The third key premise of MFT is that moral intuitions precede moral reasoning – we
quickly and automatically “sense” that something is morally good or bad, and only then recruit
deliberate and “rational” reasons that justify our judgment (Haidt, 2001). Furthermore, the
sources of these flashes of moral approval and disapproval may or may not match the content of
their explicit justification (e.g. moral disapproval of same sex marriage is most strongly
predicted by moral concerns about purity and sanctity, and its associated emotion of social
disgust, and not by moral concerns about respect for traditional institutions or individual rights;
Koleva et al, 2012). Thus MFT is particularly helpful not just for describing the psychology of
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moral concerns and judgments but also for explaining the psychological roots of morallycomplex attitudes.
Lastly, MFT is built around the idea that there is more to morality than concerns about
preventing harm and unfairness, which dominate Western moral teachings (e.g. the familiar
notion that if it doesn’t hurt anyone or violate anyone’s rights then it is not morally wrong).
Indeed, according to MFT moral judgments are rooted in at least five related but distinct moral
foundations: Care/harm, Fairness/cheating, Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, and
Purity/degradation1. Briefly, intuitions based on the Care foundation might lead us to disapprove
of individuals that cause pain and suffering and to admire those who prevent or alleviate harm
(e.g., doctors, firefighters). The Fairness foundation is activated by perceiving violations of
reciprocity, equality, justice, and individual rights. The Loyalty foundation arises from our sense
of attachment and obligation to groups that we identify with (e.g. family, sports team, or country)
and thus to approve of those who contribute to or sacrifice for the group (e.g., soldiers). The
Authority foundation is based on our tendency to create hierarchically structured societies of
dominance and subordination, and it underlies intuitions that favor leadership, respect, or
deference and to disapprove of those who skirt their duties. Finally, the Purity foundation
engenders concerns about sanctity and desecration and physical (e.g. feces or rotten food) and
spiritual corruption (e.g. being unable to control one’s animalistic impulses). It also underlies our
tendency to imbue entities (God, nature) with sacred meaning.
In line with the above nativism and cultural learning premises, concerns driven by these
moral foundations are posited to be universally available but socially constructed and culturally
variable (see also Graham et al., 2013; Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). Thus,
different societies, as well as cultural subgroups in the same society, can build their moral
virtues, claims, and institutions to varying degrees on each moral foundation. The theory’s
constructs have been used to explain a broad range of phenomena, including ideological
disagreements (Graham et al., 2009; Iyer et al., 2012), gender differences in morality (Koleva et
al., 2014), moral links between seemingly unrelated attitudes (Koleva et al., 2012), accuracy of
moral stereotypes (Graham et al., 2012), and morality-based persuasive appeals (Feinberg and
Willer, 2013).
Moral Foundations Theory at work
Two exciting potential applications of MFT in business are the creation of internal and
external value fit. Internally, companies can use the moral foundations to create organizational
cultures that foster desired values. Externally, companies can use the foundations to better
identify, as well as target, their customer base. In the remainder of this chapter we elaborate on
these possibilities.
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In the original formulation of the theory the moral foundations were called Harm, Fairness, Ingroup, Authority, and
Purity. Colleagues noted the incongruence in valence (i.e. Harm is negative, Ingroup’s valence is unclear) so we
moved to change the names to reflect a pair of virtues and vices associated with each foundation.
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Fostering a value-centered corporate culture
Many organizations have discovered the broad utility that can be derived from internal
cultivation of certain morally-relevant values. For example, the concrete economic and social
benefits of intra-organizational values such as mindfulness and sustainability have begun to be
elaborated empirically (Dane, 2011; Epstein & Roy, 2003).
Of particular importance to instilling a value-based organizational culture is the hiring of
individuals who will be likely to assimilate successfully into that value-environment. It is almost
universally the case that the hiring process seeks a “fit” between the person and the organization,
broadly defined as “the congruence of an individual’s beliefs and values with the culture, norms,
and values of an organization” (Chatman, 1989; Vandenberghe, 1999). Research done on the
Theory of Work Adjustment (TWA) has demonstrated a strong relationship between personorganization fit, and numerous measures of employee satisfaction and job performance (Bretz
and Judge, 1994; Caldwell and O’Reilley, 1990). At the same time, research in MFT has
reinforced the notion that moral value fit, including in terms of moral foundation concerns, is
predictive of a variety of positive outcomes (Motyl et al., 2014). Taken together, the research on
MFT and Person-Organization fit suggests that an optimally healthy workplace environment
should facilitate value congruence, both between the employee and the organization itself, as
well as among the workforce.
In order to fully reap the psychological benefits of moral value fit, employees would need
to not only accept, but internalize and seek to uphold and “live” the organization’s values. The
challenge then becomes: how can organizations take a plurality of employee values and channel
them into a cohesive culture centered around the target values and virtues of the organization?
One example of a particularly sought-after organizational value is sustainability – the
consideration of social equity and environmental responsibility in calculations of “bottom line”
outcomes and profitability (Epstein, 2008). It is one thing to simply declare “we, as an
organization, value sustainability,” and quite another to succeed in fostering virtuous actions
such as turning off lights, recycling, conserving office materials, and carpooling to work. How,
then, can an organization promote internalization of values such as sustainability in such a way
that they will lead to employees “living their values”?
MFT suggests that one way to ensure that organizational values are readily adopted and
“lived” by its employees is to build such values around the employees’ underlying moral
intuitions. One of MFT’s most valuable contributions to the field of psychology is that it
provides an understanding of the underlying emotional needs and intuitions that ground people’s
endorsement (or rejection) of more specific secondary values. By secondary values, we mean
beliefs or judgments about particular behaviors and issues that arise in specific contexts, as
opposed to the moral foundations themselves, which are universal domains of intuitive moral
concern. Examples of secondary values would include the many political views and issue
positions that are predicted by levels of concern for the various foundations, e.g. everything from
animal rights to same sex marriage to fiscal policies (Koleva et al., 2012). Such judgments and
values are not themselves universal foundations of moral sensibility, but the concrete
manifestation of the evolved moral concerns articulated by MFT in the form of specific beliefs
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about the particular societies in which we live, and the groups to which we belong. Armed with
such an understanding, it is possible to frame a desired secondary value or policy position – e.g.
sustainability, generosity, the importance of a healthy lifestyle – in such a way that it will appeal
to a plurality of underlying moral intuitions. Research has also demonstrated that there are
specific behavioral outcomes associated with particular moral foundations. For example, high
intuitive concern for binding foundations (Loyalty and Authority) coupled with relatively low
concern for individualizing foundations (Care and Fairness) predicts individuals’ willingness to
commit unethical behaviors for the sake of benefitting the organization (Teo and Chan-Serafin,
2013). Although this particular study presents a case of the relationship between moral intuitions
and virtue lapses, it demonstrates the ways in which moral foundations can deeply affect
individuals’ construal of what constitutes virtuous behavior, and further underscores the potential
utility of capitalizing on these intuitions to produce desired behaviors. A system of embedded
pluralistic values can provide a solid foundation on which to cultivate virtuous behaviors such as
honesty, adherence to organizational policy, and positive representation of the organization
outside the workplace so long as these virtues are connected explicitly to individuals’ underlying
moral intuitions.
Of the five moral foundations, Loyalty in particular can be central to the success and
internal health of groups, including corporations (Ewin, 1993; Haidt, 2010). Indeed, much
research has focused on ways to cultivate and reap the benefits of employees’ loyalty to their
organizations (Roehling et al., 2001). This work has demonstrated the benefits of strong
employee loyalty, such as reducing turnover and making it possible to place greater trust in
employees without excessive direct supervision (Hiltrop, 1995; Mowday et al., 1982).
To a certain extent, capitalizing on individuals’ intuitive moral concern for loyalty may
be a good strategy for encouraging employees’ sense of identification with and obligation to the
organization. But MFT has demonstrated that intuitive moral concerns for loyalty are not
necessarily universally beneficial in an organizational context. In some cases, other moral
foundations provide a better basis for the cultivation of virtuous workplace behavior. For
example, it may seem intuitive that a high degree of loyalty would predict employees’
willingness to report others’ ethical lapses at work. However, recent research has demonstrated
that individuals who are induced to focus on the Fairness foundation are more likely than those
encouraged to focus on Loyalty to support reporting of unethical behavior in the workplace
(Waytz et al., 2013). Thus, while a sense of loyalty might seem to be the driving force behind
actions like whistleblowing that protect the integrity of the organization, empirical evidence from
MFT demonstrates that placing an emphasis on individuals’ moral concerns for the Fairness
foundation is the most effective strategy for encouraging such virtuous behavior.
In general, the pluralism of deeply-rooted intuitive moral values demonstrated by MFT
underscores that many workplace values and behaviors cannot simply be presumed to be
universally virtuous (or unvirtuous) in and of themselves. One of the most important lessons that
MFT offers us is that the moral meaning of actions can be construed quite differently depending
on individuals’ underlying moral intuitions (Graham et al., 2009). At the same time, MFT makes
it possible to characterize with great specificity the underlying moral intuitions that are most
likely to support or discourage particular actions. This has important implications for both the
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cultivation of organizational values like loyalty and sustainability, and for the establishment of
virtuous behavioral norms in the workplace.
Value-based marketing
Perhaps the most promising application of MFT is to value-based marketing (VBM).
While we do not claim to have marketing expertise, it seems reasonable to expect that the moral
foundations can be used to brand and sell a product. Firstly, a business can identify which moral
foundations are, or would ideally be, associated with their product and then develop marketing
approaches that embody intuitions and virtues related to said foundation(s). In some cases the
links between a product and a moral foundation are highly intuitive and thus commonly used
already, e.g. a diapers ad showing a mother lovingly caring for her baby intends to trigger
positive moral intuitions related to the Care/harm foundation (e.g. a “good” mother uses
Huggies). But more often, such links can be subtle or multipotential, offering businesses many
opportunities to stand out with a unique value-based campaign, even for products that at first
glance have nothing to do with morality. For example, a private vehicle can be marketed as
exceptionally safe (appealing to the Care foundation), affordable to people of all walks of life
(Fairness), an American tradition (Loyalty), a wise parental choice for a first-time teen driver
(Authority), or a pristine sanctuary in the chaos and pollution of traffic (Purity). Companies can
choose to appeal to multiple foundations creating a patchwork of moral associations that can
connect with a broad audience (e.g. the car example above), or they can single out a foundation
as the guiding principle of a targeted campaign (e.g. “our brand is about safety and caring for
those you love”).
A second form of value-based marketing takes advantage of the empiricallydemonstrated individual differences in foundation endorsement. Numerous studies have revealed
stable individual differences in valuing/endorsement of the moral foundations, such as gender
(Graham et al., 2011; Koleva et al., 2014), political ideology (Graham et al., 2009; McAdams et
al., 2008; Van Leeuwen and Park, 2009), or culture (Graham et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2012).
Businesses and marketers can use this information to tailor their message to uniquely resonate
with the moral profile of their target audience. Indeed, several studies support the utility of moral
foundation framing in a persuasive context. Drawing on empirical demonstrations of a liberalconservative differences in moral foundation concerns, Feinberg and Willer (2013) framed a
persuasive message about environmental policy as either focusing on Care (with images of
habitat destruction caused by human actions) or on Purity (with images of garbage and
pollution). The Care frame is dominant in environmental messages and did not appear to change
liberals nor conservatives attitudes, relative to a control frame. However, the Purity frame was
uniquely persuasive for conservative participants, whose support for the environmental policy
rose to the levels report by the liberals. Similarly, Kidwell, Farmer, and Hardesty (2013) assessed
their audience’s political attitudes, created ideologically tailored foundation-based appeals to
recycling, and successfully increased both intended and actual recycling behavior. Finally,
Winterich and colleagues (2013) demonstrated that when a charity is positioned in terms of
moral foundations that are aligned with potential donors’ political identity (e.g. Care and
Fairness for liberals; Loyalty, Authority, and Purity for conservatives), donations to that charity
increase. Thus, recent empirical findings support the idea that a product, or event an entire
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organization, can be marketed using specific moral foundations as a method for branding as well
as morality-based audience targeting.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have highlighted how one particular form of moral pluralism – Moral
Foundations Theory – can be of use to organizational scholars and practitioners. Although MFT
is focused on providing a descriptive understanding of the full range and variety of human moral
concerns (including explanations of how “morality” can mean such different things to different
people and groups), its approach can have applied benefits in business settings as well, from
maximizing employee-organization value fit, to understanding the moral conflicts inherent in
whistle-blowing situations, to value-based marketing. As the fields of social psychology and
organizational behavior continue to become more integrated, both theoretically and
methodologically, moral pluralism and moral psychological theory in general are poised to play a
more central role in empirical business ethics.
Acknowledgements
During work on this article Dr. Sena Koleva was partially funded by a research grant from the John
Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation.
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