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May 13, 2014 Final Paper Jonathan Gallo History 220-0 Nationalism and Revolution in Modern Latin America Spring 2014 St. John’s University Prof. Alejandro Quintana Disunited Fruit: The Role of the US in 1954 Guatemala On June 14, 1954 the government and country of Guatemala was invaded by Castillo Armas and his rag tag army of refugees.1 After some brief intense fighting President Jacobo Arbenz resigned from the presidency on June 27, 1954. This event would lead to the installation of a military junta, and the eventual rule of the Carlos Castillo Armas.2 Much has been said about this revolution. Was it an organic homegrown rise against communism, or was much of it well orchestrated by foreign powers? The United States’ and the United Fruit Company’s involvement in the conflict has been questioned. Was the United States motivated to act on behalf of the United Fruit Company? Was it the result of Cold War politics and the Good Neighbor Policy, or was the United States’ involvement overstated? The founder of the Guatemalan Communist Party José Manuel Fortuny and close friend to President Arbenez stated that the revolution would have occurred even if there were no bananas.3 Land expropriation is wildly believed to have been the main cause for the revolution overthrowing Arbenz. United States economic interests in the region fostered the rise of the Armas led rebellion. Jacobo Arbenz was the last link of a revolution in 1944 that ousted Jorge Ubico. Ubico was a tyrant, an enemy of the middle and lower classes. He opposed unionization and executed munion leaders on a whim. . He was a harsh ruler who opposed unionization, and even pushed 1 Blanche Wiesen Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower: A Divided Legacy of Peace and Political Warfare (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company Inc. 1981), 277. 2 Ibid., 284. 3 Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope the Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954 (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press 1991), 7. for the execution of union leaders. He took land from and abused the native people. Guatemalans wanted a more liberal and progressive ruler. They wanted a president like Lazaro Cardenas of Mexico, who pushed for reform and land distribution. They wanted a president like Franklin Delano Roosevelt, because of his economic reforms.4 This anger and resentment lead to the natural overthrow of the Jorge Ubico government. Guatemalans believed that if they were in control of their own resources, it would no longer exist as a feudal impoverished society. Under Ubico the United Fruit Company paid no taxes, were in control of the railroads and ports. The United States was fine with the overthrowing of the Ubico government.5 The United States valued the income they earned through the United Fruit Company, but the Ubico government crossed the line with its totalitarian tactics. Juan Jose Arevalo was not directly involved with the armed forces that helped overthrow Jorge Ubico. Arevalo was a former Education minister, who was democratically elected president in 1944.6 Arevalo offered moderate social reforms, which included increasing the minimum wage, and nationalizing formerly German owned plantations abandoned due to World War II. Very few saw Arevalo was a communist or a threat to the country and the United States.7 The United Fruit Company, as well as the International Railways of Central America (IRCA), however did oppose many of Arevalo’s reforms.8 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles served as an attorney for the IRCA thus complicating the matter.9 In response Arevalo emphasized that Guatemala was indeed allies with the United States, and that his people, as agrarian peasants 4 Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America (London: University of North Carolina Press 1988), 43. Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower, 221. 6 "Juan José Arévalo," The Biography.com website, http://www.biography.com/people/juan-josé-arévalo39364 (accessed May 13 2014). 7 Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower, 223. 8 Bryce Wood, Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press 1985), 154. 9 Wood, Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy, 158. 5 2 were not ideologically wired for communism. He knew that it would a major mistake diplomatically to cross the United States.10 These reforms laid the groundwork for Jacabo Arbenz, who in March 1951 assumed power, marking the first successful and democratic transfer of power in Guatemalan history.11 Arbenz decided to build off Avevalo’s legacy, and came out strong issuing vast and expansive reforms. Upon ascending to the presidency his stated objectives were “to covert our country from a dependent nation with a semi-colonial economy into an economically independent country; secondly, to transform our nation from a backward past with a predominantly feudal economy, into a modern capitalist country; and, third, to see that this transformation is carried out in such a way that it brings with it the highest possible elevation of the standard of living of the great masses of people."12 Arbenz's first act was an Agrarian Reform Law. In it he states that the law would "eliminate all feudal type property in rural areas, abolish antiquated relations of production, especially work-servitude and the remnants of slavery,... to give land to the agricultural workers who do not possess such or who possess very little, facilitate technical assistance, expand agricultural credit for the benefit of all who work the land."13 During the years 1952 to 1954 1.5 million acres of land were redistributed, including 1,700 acres of land which were owned by Jacobo Arbenz’s family and wife.14 This land reform was seen as more moderate, than similar reforms in the US, UK, and Mexico. This was seen and hailed as a Guatemalan Homestead Act. Arbenz sought to create a nation of land owners. 10 Ibid., 156. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America,44. 12 Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower, 224. 13 Ibid., 224. 14 Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America,44-45. 11 3 The United Fruit Company owned 550,000 acres of land, 85% of which were unused. They claimed they needed them as reserves for crop rotation. 15 Guatemala wanted to pay the US $3 an acre for United Fruit Company land. This was the approximate value the United Fruit Company priced their assets, but the US wanted $75 an acre.16 This was the major point of contention between Guatemala and the United States and this sowed the seeds for the eventual ousting of Arbenz government. Jacobo Arbenz saw reform as a way to modernize society. Many of the ideals he supported were upheld by both Adam Smith and Karl Marx. Arbenz and Arevalo were both against the subsidies, tax cuts, and sweetheart deals the United Fruit Company received from the Ubico government. This goes against the idea of lassie-faire and nongovernment inference in the economy. Arevalo and Abenz’s references to agrarianism, and feudalism are direct references to Karl Marx. Karl Marx believed that a society progressed from feudalism to capitalism and then to communism. That is why Arevalo insisted that his agrarian peasants were not ideologically communists. 17 Flora Lewis put it best in the New York Times Magazine that “the arguments are about land reform, imperialism, and so on, not Marxism versus capitalism… Tales of Russian plots to soak up all of Central America's coffee dollars with cheap Soviet exports are jungle fantasies."18 John Foster Dulles admitted that it'd "be impossible to produce evidence clearly tying the Guatemalan Government to Moscow."19 The United States could have interfered in many other Latin American and Guatemalan affairs, but they just so happened to wait until Guatemalan expropriated land that belonged to the US government connected United Fruit Company. The United States manufactured many of its own crises. Its 15 Ibid., 45. Ibid., 46. 17 Wood, Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy, 156. 18 Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower, 256. 19 Ibid., 269. 16 4 refusal to sell Guatemala weapons, lead Guatemala to trade and rely on Czechoslovakia.20 This was not ideologically, but a mere matter of convenience. Arbenz offered reform and did not rely on a strict political and economic code to do so. This would eventually become his undoing. The coup d'état that overthrew Jacobo Arbenz’s government and lead to the presidency of Carlos Castillo Armas, is often seen as one in a long line of American proxy wars in Latin America in the midst of the Cold War. It is remiss to ignore the role economics and agrarian reform played in the revolution, it is not at all to place all the blame on the United States, or to even refer to Castillo Armas as a Yankee puppet. The situation in Guatemala was far more complex, contrary to many people’s popular beliefs, Arbenz was no saint. He made many crucial mistakes which lead to his downfall, these mistakes and incompetencies justified Armas’ revolution. Armas ushered in a fair amount of moderate reforms and was not a right-wing strong man. Arbenz’s crackdown on civil liberties, Armas’ moderate policies, and Arbenz’s inept foreign policy, justified the actions of conservatives Guatemalans. The demographic makeup of Guatemala helps to put the revolution in context. In 1954, Guatemala had a population of around 2,900,000. A substantial portion of this population was comprised of indigenous peoples. These peoples were relatively outside the political process, many were poor, illiterate, and not familiar with modern politics.21 The capital was described as comprising of some Europeans, and mestizos, but native peoples were the dominate force.22 It is interesting to the limited role they played in the revolution. This revolution was for the political elite. This was not an organic grassroots uprising. Most political advocacy and protest came from educated college students, there were no mass protests. Indians were drawn to the Communist 20 Ibid., 273. "Guatemala Erupts," New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 20, 1954, http://search.proquest.com/docview/112878959?accountid=14068. 22 Flora Lewis, "Communism in Guatemala: A Case History," New York Times (1923-Current File), Feb 21, 1954, http://search.proquest.com/docview/112982856?accountid=14068. 21 5 ideals surrounding land redistribution.23 They had a sympathetic ear for the Communist cause. The political culture in Guatemala was rather non-existent at the time of the revolution. There was vast political apathy, democracy was less than a decade old, the economy was in turmoil, and there was a great need for both social and economic reforms. The liberals and conservatives knew that whoever held control of the 6,000 man army would control the country.24 The main backers of the conservative cause were the finqueros, who were comprised of large land owners, coffee brokers, and lawyers. These men were the brains and the money behind the coup.25 It was through this apathetic and infantile democratic culture that Communists were able to ascend and control certain sectors of society. This included control of the radio, control of newspapers, and various governmental organizations.26 This revolution pitted the liberal educated elite versus the conservative wealthy elite. Much of the discontent among military officials surrounding Jacobo Arbenz, was due to an incident that occurred, before his presidency. During the election of 1950, candidates were running to replace President Arevalo. One of Jacobo Arbenz’s primary rivals was Francisco Javier Arana. They were both army officers, but Arana became chief of the armed forces, and attracted more conservative and moderate supporters. He represented Arbenz's main political challenge.27 It was believed that it was Arbenz’s close friends and allies that orchestrated and carried out the assassination.28 During the campaign two of Arbenz's opponents, General Ydigoras Fuentes and Colonel Miguel Angel Mendoza were forced into hiding; mobs also 23 Ibid. "The World," New York Times (1923-Current File), Jul 4, 1954, http://search.proquest.com/docview/113007030?accountid=14068. 25 Milton Bracker, "The Lessons of the Guatemalan Struggle," New York Times (1923-Current File), Jul 11, 1954, http://search.proquest.com/docview/112872620?accountid=14068. 26 Lewis, "Communism in Guatemala”, 11. 27 Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Change in Latin America 1910-1985 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), 152. 28 "Guatemala Chief a Career Officer," New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 28, 1954, http://search.proquest.com/docview/112989229?accountid=14068. 24 6 interfered with the campaign of Jorge Garcia Granados. Arbenz, won the election by a fair margin, and did not need the help of these strong arm tactics. It was widely believed and held that the Arbenz campaign was guilty of election fraud. Arbenz employed Marxist rhetoric referring to the transition from a feudal to capitalist economy.29 The repression of civil rights did not just start under Arbenz. In July, 1950 students were killed at an anti-Communist rally.30 Castillo Armas states that, Jacobo Arbenz purchased weapons from Czechoslovakia, in order to fend off and harshly deal with citizen uprising. 31 Armas claimed that ninety percent of Guatemalans would rise up against the government, and he claimed that he was the target of assassination attempts by the Guatemalan government.32 The $10,000,000 worth of weapons, would pose great danger to the region, and would be the first step toward spreading communism in the region.33 In the midst of conflict, the Arbenz regime was guilty of kidnappings, assassinations, torture, deportations, economic vengeance, suspending civil liberties, as well as the writ of habeas corpus.34 As Anthony Trawick Bouscaren of the World Affairs Institute stated “Arbenz and his associates were not conventional Latin Absolutists but totalitarians who believed in class struggle and in the annihilation of their opponents.”35 Castillo Armas and his troops were a breath of fresh air for Guatemala. They were inevitably tied to the United States and its alleged business interest in the United Fruit Company, but Information Chief Manuel Orellana Portillo said that “With or without the recent declarations 29 Blasier, The Hovering Giant, 152. Paul P. Kennedy, "Castillo Pledges Guatemala Gains," New York Times (1923-Current File), Jul 13, 1954, http://search.proquest.com/docview/113081802?accountid=14068. 31 "Guatemalan Exiles Firm," New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 14, 1954, http://search.proquest.com/docview/112877461?accountid=14068. 32 Ibid. 33 "Exile Warns of Red Plans." New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 8, 1954. http://search.proquest.com/docview/112880703?accountid=14068. 34 Anthony Trawick Bouscaren, “Guatemala in Transition,” World Affairs 120, no. 4 (Winter 1957): 108-110. accessed April 4, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20669444. 35 Ibid. 30 7 of General Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles [about the Communist menace in Guatemala], we would have entered Guatemala.”36 While Armas and his forces represented the more conservative side of the conflict, his policies were not inherently regressive. A lot of his policies that he put forth were slight variations and extensions of Jacobo Arbenz’s policies. Armas felt as though the Agrarian Reform Law was purely political pandering. He opposed the government control of property, and wanted to revise the law so that it would “give more land and more economic independence to a greater number of campesinos [farm workers].”37 Castillo Armas did have some support among Guatemalans. In 1950 his name was associated with a possible presidential run. He did not run, but he did maintain a group of supporters and backers.38 Armas and his men spent most the time leading up to the invasion in exile. He firmly believed he was not leading an invasion, but “thousands of Guatemalans who are just forcing the doors of our own country to return to our homes.39 Government aims were to be “social justice, sustenance, education, employment, improved economy, and respect for the human being.”40 Armas wanted to deal with labor, education, land reform, and foreign policy issues. The Arbenz government placed all their attention and funds on land reform, and by doing so they ignored improving local healthcare facilities, most notably the Roosevelt Hospital.41 Communism permeated all aspects of society, outside of organized religion. Once Armas came to power he granted basic labor 36 Milton Bracker, "U. S. Likely to Get the Blame however Latin Revolt Ends," New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 21, 1954, http://search.proquest.com/docview/112876188?accountid=14068. 37 "Rebel Chief Maps Farm Law Change," New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 21, 1954, http://search.proquest.com/docview/112877369?accountid=14068. 38 Ibid. 39 "Rebels Demand Surrender," New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 22, 1954, http://search.proquest.com/docview/112903736?accountid=14068. 40 Kennedy, "Castillo Pledges Guatemala Gains," 41 Ibid. 8 rights, ended organized labor abuse, pushed moderate land reform, and lifted the ban on all political parties, outside of the communist party.42 Castillo Armas was nowhere near the regressive politician he is made out to be. One area where he clearly trumped Arbenz, was foreign policy. Arbenz offered an inept and divisive foreign policy. He seemingly went out of his way at times to stick it to the “Colossus of the North.” When you are neighbor to a global power it is best to seek cooperation, and not conflict. The leaders of Latin American countries sought continental unity. They saw the adoption of Soviet style foreign ideologies as a deterrent to this unity, and a violation of the Monroe Doctrine.43 American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, scolded Guatemalan Foreign Minister Guillermo Toriello for denying the existence of “international communism.”44 Arbenz refused to assuage the army’s fears, and failed repudiate communism.45 Guatemala consistently voted against Pan American resolutions.46 After Armas took over US-Guatemalan relations improved. Aid and investment increased GNP four percent each year, between 1954 and 1960, infrastructure improved, and Vice President Nixon declared that the US improved Guatemala more in two years than the communist leaning government has in a decade.47 Jacobo Arbenz’s blatant disregard for civil liberalities helped facilitate and justified Castillo Armas’ actions. Arbenz’s involvement in the overthrow of Jorge Ubico does not give Arbenz a free pass in his actions. The United States does not back coup d'états for every country Bouscaren, “Guatemala in Transition, ”. Sam Pope Brewer, "Unity Plea Opens Caracas Meeting," New York Times (1923-Current File), Mar 02, 1954, http://search.proquest.com/docview/113153589?accountid=14068. 44 “The Americans: Keeping Communists Out,” Time, Mar 15, 1954, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,857395,00.html. 45 "Uprising Plotted Early This Year," New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 19, 1954, http://search.proquest.com/docview/112851646?accountid=14068. 46 "The Text of Dulles' Speech on Guatemalan Upset," New York Times (1923-Current File), Jul 01, 1954, http://search.proquest.com/docview/113078028?accountid=14068. 47 Stephen M. Streeter, “The Failure of ‘Liberal Developmentalism’: The United States’s Anti-Communist Showcase in Guatemala, 1954-1960,” International History Review 21, no. 2 (Jun 1999): 386-413. accessed April 4, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40109008. 42 43 9 it has a disagreement with. Arbenz should have dealt with the political and social upheaval in Guatemala more democratically, being more sympathetic towards opposing political views and ideologies would have gone a long way in keeping Arbenz in power. The Guatemalan coup d'état of 1954 pitted liberal and conservative forces against each other. The army of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas prevailed over the democratically elected President Jacobo Arbenz, it was not a populist uprising as it was made out to be. History has not been on the side of Armas, The United Fruit Company, and the United States for their respective roles in the revolution. Arbenz advocated and passed moderate reforms. These reforms were needed for the vastly rural Guatemala living under a quasi-feudal system. He tried to foster the growth of a democratic tradition, but that was shot down by the armies of Armas. Arbenz, did err in the realm of foreign policy, in particular regards to Guatemala’s relationship to the United States and Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Guatemala’s actions were justifiable, and were hardly unprecedented especially compared to other countries in the region, particularly the United States and Mexico. Most Latin American countries were ambivalent towards speaking out against the United States and its perceived business interests in Latin America. Many of these Latin American countries were reliant on the United States as trade partners. In many cases the United States was one of the largest land owners and employers throughout Latin America. At the Tenth InterAmerican Conference, held in March 1954, in Caracas, Venezuela, Guatemalan Foreign Minister Guillermo Toriello used the forum to attack the United States for its policies towards Latin America. He challenged the idea and theory of international Communism, he labeled the United States as imperialists and monopolists, and he stated that recent United States’ actions were a pretext to war. Guillermo Toriello referenced earlier “Big Stick” and “dollar diplomacy “which 10 wreaked havoc on the region, which ultimately lead to the intervention of United States’ mariners in Latin American ports.48 It is interesting to see Guillermo Toriello decry the theory of international communism. The fear of the spread of communism, and Domino Theory loomed largely over the United States during the Cold War. The United States believed that if communism were to grow, undeterred, it would spread country to country, making its way around the globe and eventually to the United States. While Guatemala marked the closest country to date to be associated with communism, it is ludicrous to believe a series of social and economic welfare policies, would plant the red roots of communism in the region. All politics are local, and the situation in Guatemala is truly unique to Latin America. Americans did not have to deal with foreign countries and companies owning American land. There are few if any parallels between the United States and Guatemala. Even Castillo Armas would go so far to say to the New York Times’ Mexico City correspondent, Sydney Gruson that the United States did not believe that the Communists are trying to win Guatemala for the Communist camp in the internationalist sense.”49 The idea that the Guatemalan coup d'état was a populist uprising is very much a fallacy. The belief that Castillo Armas was leading thousands of Guatemalans back to their exiled homeland and not leading a coup is rather laughable.50 The majority of Guatemalans were native Maya-Quiche, who stood outside the country’s economic and political systems.51 There was no real middle class, and politicians often had to rely on rhetoric and political pandering to get their message across. It is often said that “in a land of prevailing illiteracy, the vote can be delivered “The Americans: Keeping Communists Out”. "Guatemala Chief a Career Officer". 50 "Rebels Demand Surrender". 51 William Krehm, “A Victory for the West in Guatemala?,” International Journal, 9, no. 4, (Autumn 1954): 295, accessed April 4, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40197909. 48 49 11 so neatly packaged that as to make Tammany Hall itself turn green with envy.”52 This perfectly describes the lack of democratic tradition in Guatemala. Native Guatemalans were often exploited by capitalists, in order to produce goods such as coffee. While this system of economic exploitation was not new to Guatemala, the United Fruit Company sought to exploit the economy of Guatemala. Through the use of subsidies the United Fruit Company was able to gain control of the ports and most of the trade in Guatemala.53 Jacabo Arbenz’s reforms were very comparable to those of other Latin American leaders. During the 1930s, President Lazaro Cardenas of Mexico, expropriated foreign oil companies as well as instituted his own form of agrarian reform. He too, like Arbenz, was reliant on the thoughts and inputs of communist in order to carry out his social and economic programs. Cardenas was not viewed as a communist by the United States government, despite the fact that he took many suspicious decisions such as granting asylum to revolutionary Russian Marxist, and former head of the Red Army, Leon Trotsky. The Good Neighbor Policy was still in full effect, and American oil companies were compensated well for their land.54 The United States criticized Guatemala for its paranoia surrounding American and other Latin American countries possible involvement in a coup. Guatemala discovered a so called “white paper” which allegedly mentioned American, Venezuelan, El Salvadorian, and Dominican Republic support in overthrowing Jacobo Arbenz.. The United States State Department strongly refuted said reports, and criticized the Guatemalan government for implicating the United States in such a fanciful plot.55 This paranoia was justified. More evidence came out implicating the United States and its American allies in a coup. The 52 Ibid., 297. Ibid., 296. 54 Ibid., 297-298. 55 "Guatemala: Plot Within a Plot," Time, February 8, 1954, accessed March 11, 2014. http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,860376,00.html. 53 12 Guatemalan government published conversations between the exiled Castillo Armas, and Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza. These conversations revolved around the idea of purchasing arms from Germany in order to launch an attack on Guatemala.56 It is understandable with such news that Guatemala felt the need to protect itself, bearing in mind the close relationship the Somoza family and the United States. Germany associated with arming the region. After the fiasco dealing with expropriation the United States decided not send Guatemala arms, even for their police or shooting clubs. The United States presumably told Europe to follow their precedent. Meanwhile, the United States armed Guatemala’s hostile neighbors, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador.57 With this Western weapon ban, as well as the mobilization of its hostile, anti-democratic neighbors and militants, it is of no shock to see Guatemala turn towards the Soviet bloc for protection. This essentially gave the United States, the justification to attack. In the midst of the struggle over the control of Guatemala, the Arbenz government suspended civil liberties. The Eisenhower administration saw the suspension of liberties for more than it was worth. Democracy within Latin America was nowhere near entrenched as it was to its northern neighbors. Democracy was less than a decade old in Guatemala, and they were in the midst of a civil war. The United States did not seem to mind the behaviors of the anti-democratic Rafael Trujillo and Somoza regimes58 Why is that? After all did not the United States suspend habeas corpus in the midst of the American Civil War? The United States’ justification could not have been a pro-civil liberty one, for the aforementioned reason. It couldn’t have been a pro-democratic one since the United States helped prop up anti-democratic regimes in the region, and it could not have been a pro-capitalist one either, for the United States did not attack the Cardenas government in Mexico for its expropriation of the oil industry, and 56 Ibid., 299. Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower, 274. 58 Krehm, 300-301. 57 13 because the United Fruit Company was the benefactor of subsidies and corporate welfare from the Guatemalan government. These economic principles are the exact opposite of those espoused by economic liberalism. Upon entering office the United States vied Arbenz as a political opportunist whom they expected to eventually eliminate extremist leftists from the government and political life.59 When that did not occur, the United States became distressed “the communists were too successful at democratic politics for the United States to allow democracy to survive.”60 The United States’ statements and actions in Guatemala are mired in contradictions. The Guatemalan ambassador to the United States, Guillermo Toriello told American Secretary of State Dean Acheson that the goal of the Arbenz government was "to avoid dictatorship" he stated that the "best way to combat Communism is to improve the maladjusted social and economic conditions which produce unrest among the under-privileged classes." Repression would "drive communism underground." The idea of a harsh crackdown was counter intuitive.61 This policy is somewhat similar to the one employed by President Theodore Roosevelt. President Roosevelt, who is seen as the father of the modern progressive movement, ushered in progressive and socially liberal policies in order to deter popular support from communists and socialists. Jacobo Arbenz was a transcendent figure in Guatemalan political history. He never truly got to fully implement the policies he advocated for as President. Guatemala was due for some growing pains, after all a decade earlier Guatemala was still under totalitarian rule. Critics may point at Arbenz for the death of Francisco Javier Arana. Arana’s death largely remains a mystery. Conservative forces, who were upset that Arana failed to lead a right wing coup, were Gordon L. Bowen, “U.S. Foreign Policy toward Radical Change: Covert Operations in Guatemala, 1950-1954,” Latin American Perspectives 10, no. 1 (Winter, 1983): 90, accessed April 4, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2633365. 60 Ibid., 92. 61 Cook, 232. 59 14 also implicated in his death.62 It is unfair to blame his death on Arbenz. It is also unfair to blame Arbenz for cracking down on civil liberties for the sake of safety. The United States has backed countless strongmen and dictators throughout the region. One of the United States’ closest allies was the President of Nicaragua Anastasio Somoza. Somoza was later assassinated by his own people, in response to his years of tyrannical rule. The United States should have provided Arbenz more leeway. A full Arbenz presidency would have led to the continued democratization of Guatemala. Guatemala was transferring from a improverished nation to an increasing industrialized one under Arbenz’s presidency. More people, particularly the indigenous Guatemalans, would have appeared from the edges of society and would have gained more from Arbenz that from Castillo Armas’ watered down social and economic reforms. 63 The United States supported the Castillo Armas regime, as a means to get back at the Arbenz government for the expropriation of United Fruit Company land. The coup d'état was based on American economic self-interest. A bastardized version of capitalism led the United States and its allies to oppose Arbenz and support Armas. The United States did not act on some idealist principles. In the case of Lazaro Cardenas in Mexico, the United States welcomed the exchange of money for land. The United States did not welcome such an exchange in Guateamala, because they felt as though they were being undercompensated. The United States played public and international fears about communism, in order to drum up domestic and international support for the overthrow of the Jacobo Arbenz government. If the Arbenz government were to have offered more in exchange for land, Castillo Armas could have been a simple footnote in Guatemalan history. Piero Gleijeses, “The Death of Francisco Arana: A Turning Point in the Guatemalan Revolution,” Journal of Latin American Studies 22, no. 3 (Oct., 1990): 527 accessed May 13, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/157468. 63 Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower, 224. 62 15 Bibliography Primary Bouscaren, Anthony Trawick. “Guatemala in Transition.” World Affairs 120, no. 4 (Winter 1957): 108-110. Accessed April 4, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20669444. Bracker, Milton. "The Lessons of the Guatemalan Struggle." New York Times (1923-Current File), Jul 11, 1954. http://search.proquest.com/docview/112872620?accountid=14068. Bracker, Milton. "U. S. Likely to Get the Blame however Latin Revolt Ends." New York Times (1923-Current File), Jun 21, 1954. http://search.proquest.com/docview/112876188?accountid=14068. Brewer, Sam Pope. "Unity Plea Opens Caracas Meeting." New York Times (1923-Current File), Mar 02, 1954. http://search.proquest.com/docview/113153589?accountid=14068. 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